


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CHARLES HODGE, D.D.

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THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.
JANUARY, 1864.

No. I.

ART. I.—*The Union of Church and State in the Nicene Age, and its Effects upon Public Morals and Religion. An Historical Essay.*

THE name of Constantine the Great marks an important epoch in the history of Christianity. With him the church ceased to be a persecuted sect, and became the established religion of the Roman Empire. Since that time the church and the state, though frequently jarring, have remained united in Europe, either on the hierarchical basis, with the temporal power under the tutelage of the spiritual, or on the cæsaro-papal, with the spiritual power merged in the temporal; while in the United States of America, since the end of the eighteenth century, the two powers have stood peacefully but independently side by side. The church could now act upon the state, but so could the state act upon the church; and this mutual influence became a source of both profit and loss, blessing and curse, on either side.

The martyrs and confessors of the first three centuries, in their expectation of the impending end of the world, and their desire for the speedy return of the Lord, had never once thought of such a thing as the great and sudden change, which meets us at the beginning of this period, in the relation of the Roman state to the Christian church. Tertullian had even held the Christian profession to be irreconcilable with the office of a

Roman emperor.* Nevertheless the clergy and people very soon and very easily accommodated themselves to the new order of things, and recognised in it a reproduction of the theocratic constitution of the people of God under the ancient covenant. Save that the dissenting sects, who derived no benefit from this union, but were rather subject to persecution from the state and from the established catholicism, the Donatists for an especial instance, protested against the intermeddling of the temporal power with religious concerns.† The heathen, who now came over in a mass, had all along been accustomed to a union of politics with religion, of the imperial with the sacerdotal dignity. They could not imagine a state without some cultus, whatever might be its name. And as heathenism had outlived itself in the empire, and Judaism, by its national exclusiveness and its stationary character, was totally disqualified, Christianity must take the throne.

The change was as natural and inevitable as it was great. When Constantine planted the standard of the cross upon the forsaken temples of the gods, he but followed the irresistible current of history itself. Christianity had already, without a stroke of sword or of intrigue, achieved over the false religion the internal victory of spirit over matter, of truth over falsehood, of faith over superstition, of the worship of God over idolatry, of morality over corruption. Under a three hundred years' oppression it had preserved its irrepressible moral vigour, and abundantly earned its new social position. It could not possibly continue a despised sect, a homeless child of the wilderness, but, like its divine founder on the third day after his crucifixion, it must rise again; take the reins of the world into its hands, and, as an all-transforming principle, take state, science, and art to itself, to breathe into them a higher life, and consecrate them to the service of God. The church, of course,

* Apologeticus, c. 21: "Sed et Cæsares credidissent, si aut Cæsares non essent sæculo necessarii, aut si et Christiani potuissent esse Cæsares."

† Thus the bishop Donatus, of Carthage, in 347, rejected the imperial commissioners, Paulus and Macarius, with the exclamation: "Quid est imperatori cum ecclesia?" See Optatus Milev.: De schismate Donat. l. iii. c. 3. The Donatists, however, were the first to provoke the imperial intervention in their controversies, and would doubtless have spoken very differently had the decision turned in their favour.

continues to the end a servant, as Christ himself came not to be ministered unto, but to minister; and she must at all times suffer persecution, outwardly or inwardly, from the ungodly world. Yet is she also the bride of the Son of God, therefore of royal blood; and she is to make her purifying and sanctifying influence felt upon all orders of natural life, and all forms of human society. And from this influence the state of course is not excepted. Union with the state is no more necessarily a profanation of holy things, than union with science and art, which in fact themselves proceed from God and must subserve his glory.

On the other hand, the state, as a necessary and divine institution, for the protection of person and property, for the administration of law and justice, and for the promotion of earthly weal, could not possibly persist for ever in her hostility to Christianity, but must at least allow it a legal existence, and free play; and if she would attain a higher development, and better answer her moral ends than she could in union with idolatry, she must surrender herself to its influence. The kingdom of the Father, to which the state belongs, is not essentially incompatible with the church, the kingdom of the Son; rather does "the Father draw to the Son," and the Son leads back to the Father, till God become "all in all." Henceforth should kings again be nursing fathers and queens nursing mothers to the church,* and the prophecy begin to be fulfilled: "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever." †

The American separation of church and state, even if regarded as the best settlement of the true relation of the two, is not in the least inconsistent with this view. It is not a return to the pre-Constantinian basis, with its spirit of persecution, but rests upon the mutual reverential recognition and support of the two powers, and must be regarded as the continued result of that mighty revolution of the fourth century.

But the elevation of Christianity, as the religion of the state, presents also an opposite aspect to our contemplation. It

* Isa. xlix. 23.

† Rev. xi. 15.

involves great risk of degeneracy to the church. The Roman state, with its laws, institutions, and usages, was still deeply rooted in heathenism, and could not be transformed by a magical stroke. The christianizing of the state amounted, therefore, in great measure, to a paganizing and secularizing of the church. The world overcame the church as much as the church overcame the world, and the temporal gain of Christianity was in many respects cancelled by spiritual loss. The mass of the Roman Empire was baptized only with water, not with the Spirit and fire of the gospel, and it smuggled heathen manners and practices into the sanctuary under a new name. The very combination of the cross with the military ensign, by Constantine, was a most doubtful omen, portending an unhappy mixture of the temporal and the spiritual powers; the kingdom, which is of the earth, and that which is from heaven. The settlement of the boundary between the two powers, which, with all their unity, remain as essentially distinct as body and soul, law and gospel, was itself a prolific source of errors and vehement strifes about jurisdiction, which stretch through all the middle ages, and still repeat themselves in these latest times, save where the amicable American separation has thus far forestalled collision.

Amidst all the bad consequences of the union of church and state, however, we must not forget, that the deeper spirit of the gospel has ever reacted against the evils and abuses of it, whether under an imperial pope or a papal emperor, and has preserved its divine power for the salvation of men under every form of constitution. Though standing and working in the world, and in many ways linked with it, yet is Christianity not of the world, but stands above it.

Nor must we think the degeneracy of the church began with her union with the state.* Corruption and apostacy cannot

* This view is now very prevalent in America. It was not formerly so. Jonathan Edwards, in his "History of Redemption," a practical and edifying survey of church history, as an unfolding of the plan of redemption, even saw in the accession of Constantine, a type of the future appearing of Christ in the clouds for the redemption of his people, and attributed to it the most beneficial results; to wit: (1.) "The Christian church was thereby wholly delivered from persecution. . . (2.) God now appeared to execute terrible judgments on their enemies. . . (3.) Heathenism now was in a great measure abo-

attach to any one fact or personage, be he Constantine, or Gregory I., or Gregory VII. They are rooted in the natural heart of man. They revealed themselves, at least in the germ, even in the apostolic age, and are by no means avoided, as the condition of America proves, by the separation of the two powers. We have among ourselves almost all the errors and abuses of the old world, not collected indeed in any one communion, but distributed among our various denominations and sects. The history of the church presents, from the beginning, a twofold development of good and of evil; an incessant antagonism of light and darkness, truth and falsehood, the mystery of godliness and the mystery of iniquity, Christianity and Anti-christ. According to the Lord's parables of the net, and of the tares among the wheat, we cannot expect a complete separation before the final judgment, though in a relative sense the history of the church is a progressive judgment of the church, as the history of the world is a judgment of the world.

I. RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE CHURCH RESULTING FROM THIS ALLIANCE.

The conversion of Constantine, and the gradual establishment of Christianity as the religion of the state, had, first of all, the important effect of giving the church not only the usual rights of a legal corporation, which she possesses also in America, and

lished throughout the Roman Empire. . . . (4.) The Christian church was brought into a state of great peace and prosperity. . . . This revolution," he further says, p. 312, "was the greatest that had occurred since the flood. Satan, the prince of darkness, that king and god of the heathen world, was cast out. The roaring lion was conquered by the Lamb of God in the strongest dominion he ever had. This was a remarkable accomplishment of Jer. x. 11: 'The gods that have not made the heaven and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth and from under the heavens.'" This work, still much read in America and England, was written, to be sure, long before the separation of church and state in New England, viz., in 1739; (first printed in Edinburgh in 1774, twenty-six years after the author's death.) But the great difference of the judgment of this renowned Puritan divine from the prevailing American opinion of the present day, is an interesting proof that our view of history is very much determined by the ecclesiastical circumstances in which we live, and at the same time that the whole question of church and state is not at all essential in Christian theology and ethics. In America, all confessions, even the Roman Catholics, are satisfied with the separation, while in Europe it is the reverse.

here without distinction of confessions, but at the same time the peculiar privileges, which the heathen worship and priesthood had heretofore enjoyed. These rights and privileges she gradually secured, either by tacit concession or through special laws of the Christian emperors, as laid down in the collections of the Theodosian and Justinian codes. These were limited, however, as we must here at the outset observe, exclusively to the catholic or orthodox church.* The heretical and schismatic sects, without distinction, excepting the Arians, during their brief ascendancy under Arian emperors, were now worse off than they had been before, and were forbidden the free exercise of their worship, even under Constantine, upon pain of fines and confiscation, and from the time of Theodosius and Justinian, upon pain of death. Equal patronage of all Christian parties was totally foreign to the despotic uniformity system of the Byzantine emperors, and the ecclesiastical exclusiveness and absolutism of the popes. Nor can it be at all consistently carried out upon the state-church basis, for every concession to dissenters loosens the bond between the church and the state.

The immunities and privileges which were conferred upon the Catholic church in the Roman empire, from the time of Constantine, by imperial legislation, may be specified as follows:

1. *The exemption of the clergy from most public burdens.*

Among these were obligatory public services,† such as military duty, low manual labour, the bearing of costly honours, and, in a measure, taxes for the real estate of the church. This exemption,‡ which had been enjoyed, indeed, not by the

* So early as 326, Constantine promulgated the law, (Cod. Theodos. lib. xvi. lit. 5, l. 1:) "Privilegia, quae contemplatione religionis indulta sunt, catholicae tantum legis observatoribus prodesse opportet. Haereticos autem atque schismaticos non tantum ab his privilegiis alienos esse volumus, sed etiam diversis muneribus constringi et subjici." Yet he was lenient towards the Novatians, adding in the same year respecting them, (C. Theodos. xvi. 5, 2:) "Novatianos non adeo comperimus praedammatos, ut iis quae petiverunt, crederemus minime largienda. Itaque ecclesiae suae domos, et loca sepulcris, apta sine inquietudine eos firmiter possidere praecipimus." Comp. the eighth canon of the Council of Nice, which likewise deals with them indulgently.

† The munera publica, or *λατυνγίαι*, attaching in part to the person as a subject of the empire, in part to the possession of property, (munera patrimoniorum.)

‡ Immunitas, *διατυπεγμοία*.

heathen priests alone, but at least partially by physicians also and rhetoricians, and the Jewish rulers of synagogues, was first granted by Constantine in the year 313 to the catholic clergy in Africa, and afterwards, in 319, extended throughout the empire. But this led many to press into the clerical office without inward call, to the prejudice of the state; and in 320 the emperor made a law prohibiting the wealthy * from entering the ministry, and limiting the increase of the clergy, on the singular ground, that “the rich should bear the burdens of the world, the poor be supported by the property of the church.” Valentinian I. issued a similar law in 364. Under Valentinian II. and Theodosius I. the rich were admitted to the spiritual office on condition of assigning their property to others, who should fulfil the demands of the state in their stead. But these arbitrary laws were certainly not strictly observed.

Constantine also exempted the church from the land tax, but afterwards revoked this immunity; and his successors likewise were not uniform in this matter. Ambrose, though one of the strongest advocates of the rights of the church, accedes to the fact and the justice of the assessment of church lands;† but the hierarchy afterwards claimed for the church a divine right of exemption from all taxation.

2. *The enrichment and endowment of the church.*

Here again Constantine led the way. He not only restored (in 313) the buildings and estates which had been confiscated in the Diocletian persecution, but granted the church also the right to receive legacies, (321,) and himself made liberal contributions in money and grain to the support of the clergy, and the building of churches in Africa,‡ in the Holy Land, in Nico-

* The decuriones and curiales.

† “Si tributum petit Imperator,”—says he in the *Orat. de basilicis non tradendis haereticis*—“non negamus; agri ecclesiae solvunt tributum; solvimus quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, et quae sunt Dei Deo; tributum Caesaris est; non negatur.” Baronius, (ad ann. 387,) endeavours to prove that this tribute was meant by Ambrose merely as an act of love, not of duty!

‡ So early as 314 he caused to be paid to the bishop Caecilian of Carthage 3000 *folles* ($\tauροχιλίους φύλακες$ = £1800) from the public treasury of the province, for the catholic churches in Africa, Numidia, and Mauritania, promising further gifts for similar purposes. Euseb. H. E. X. 6, and Vit. Const. iv. 28.

media, Antioch, and Constantinople. Though this, be it remembered, can be no great merit in an absolute monarch, who is lord of the public treasury as he is of his private purse, and can afford to be generous at the expense of his subjects. He and his successors likewise gave to the church the heathen temples and their estates, and the public property of heretics; but these more frequently were confiscated to the civil treasury, or squandered on favourites. Wealthy subjects, some from pure piety, others from motives of interest, conveyed their property to the church, often to the prejudice of the just claims of their kindred. Bishops and monks not rarely used unworthy influences with widows and dying persons; though Augustine positively rejected every legacy which deprived a son of his rights. Valentinian I. found it necessary to oppose the legacy-hunting of the clergy, particularly in Rome, with a law of the year 370,* and Jerome acknowledges there was good reason for it.† The wealth of the church was converted mostly into real estate, or at least secured by it. And the church soon came to own the tenth part of all the landed property. This land, to be sure, had long been worthless or neglected, but under favourable conditions rose in value with uncommon rapidity. At the time of Chrysostom, towards the close of the fourth century, the church of Antioch was strong enough to maintain entirely, or in part, three thousand widows and consecrated virgins, besides many poor, sick, and strangers.‡ The metropolitan churches of Rome and Alexandria were the most wealthy. The various churches of Rome in the sixth century, besides enormous treasures in money, and gold and silver vases, owned many houses and lands not only in Italy and Sicily, but even in Syria, Asia Minor, and Egypt.§ And when John, who bears the honourable distinction of the Alms-giver, for his unlimited liberality to the poor, became patriarch of Alexandria, (606,)

* In an edict to Damasus, bishop of Rome. Cod. Theod. xvi. 2, 20:—“Ecclesiastici . . . yiduarum ac pupillarum domos non adeant,” etc.

† Epist. 34, (al. 2,) ad Nepotianum, where he says of this law: “Nec de lege conqueror, sed doleo, cur meruerimus hanc legem;” and of the clergy of his time: “Ignominia omnium sacerdotum est, propriis studere divitiis,” etc.

‡ Chrys. Hom. 66 in Matt. (vii., p. 658.)

§ Comp. the Epistles of Gregory the Great.

he found in the church treasury eight thousand pounds of gold, and himself received ten thousand, though he retained hardly an ordinary blanket for himself, and is said, on one occasion, to have fed seven thousand five hundred poor at once.*

The control of the ecclesiastical revenues vested in the bishops. The bishops distributed the funds according to the prevailing custom, into three or four parts: for themselves, for their clergy, for the current expenses of worship, and for the poor. They frequently exposed themselves to the suspicion of avarice and nepotism. The best of them, like Chrysostom and Augustine, were averse to this concernment with earthly property, since it often conflicted with their higher duties; and they preferred the poverty of earlier times, because the present abundant revenues diminished private beneficence.

And most certainly this opulence had two sides. It was a source both of profit and of loss to the church. According to the spirit of its proprietors and its controllers, it might be used for the furtherance of the kingdom of God, the building of churches, the support of the needy, and the founding of charitable institutions for the poor, the sick, for widows and orphans, for destitute strangers and aged persons,† or perverted to the fostering of indolence and luxury, and thus promote moral corruption and decay. This was felt by serious minds even in the palmy days of the external power of the hierarchy. Dante, believing Constantine to be the author of the pope's temporal sovereignty, on the ground of the fictitious donation to Sylvester, bitterly exclaimed:

"Your gods ye make of silver and of gold;
And wherein differ from idolaters,
Save that their god is one—your's hundred-fold?
Ah, Constantine! what evils caused to flow,
Not thy conversion, but that plenteous dower,
Thou on the first rich Father didst bestow!"‡

* See the *Vita S. Joannis Eleemosynarii* (the next to the last catholic patriarch of Alexandria) in the *Acta Sanct. Bolland.* ad 23 Jan.

† The πτωχοτροφεῖα, νοσοκομεῖα, ὄφαντροφεῖα, γηραικομεῖα, and ξενῶνες; or ξενοδοχεῖα, as they were called; which all sprang from the church.

‡ Inferno, canto xix. v. 112—118, as translated by Wright, (with two slight alterations.) Milton, in his prose works, has translated this passage, as well

3. *The better support of the clergy*, was another advantage connected with the new position of Christianity in the Empire.

Hitherto the clergy had been entirely dependent on the voluntary contributions of the Christians, and the Christians were for the most part poor. Now they received a fixed income from the church funds, and from the imperial and municipal treasuries. To this was added the contribution of first-fruits and tithes, which, though not as yet legally enforced, arose as a voluntary custom at a very early period, and probably in churches of Jewish origin existed from the first, after the example of the Jewish law.* Where these means of support were not sufficient, the clergy turned to agriculture or some other occupation; and so late as the fifth century many synods recommended this means of subsistence, although the Apostolical Canons prohibited the engagement of the clergy in secular callings, under penalty of deposition.†

This improvement, also, in the external condition of the clergy, was attended with a proportional degeneracy in their moral character. It raised them above oppressive and distracting cares for livelihood; made them independent, and permitted them to devote their whole strength to the duties of their office; but it also favoured ease and luxury; allured a host of unworthy persons into the service of the church, and checked the exercise of free giving among the people. The better bishops, like Athanasius, the two Gregories, Basil, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Ambrose, Augustine, lived in ascetic simplicity, and used their revenues for the public good; while others indulged their vanity, their love of magnificence, and their voluptuousness.

as that of Ariosto, where he humourously places the donation of Constantine in the moon, among the things lost or abused on earth.

“Ah, Constantine! of how much ill was cause,
Not thy conversion, but those rich domains
That the first wealthy pope received of thee.”

Especially favoured was the *Basilius*, for sick and strangers in Caesarea, named after its founder, the bishop Basil the Great. Basil. Ep. 94., Gregor. Naz. Orat. 27 and 30.

* Lev. xxvii. 30—33; Num. xviii. 20—24; Deut. xiv. 22 sqq.; 2 Chron. xxxi. 4 sqq.

† Constit. Apost. lib. viii. cap. 47, can. 6, (p. 239, ed Ueltzen:) Ἐπίσκοπος ἡ διάνοια παρατίθεται μη αυτοματεύεται εἰ δὲ μή, καθαρισθεῖται.

The heathen historian Ammianus gives the country clergy in general the credit of simplicity, temperance, and virtue, while he represents the Roman hierarchy, greatly enriched by the gifts of matrons, as extreme in the luxury of their dress and their more than royal banquets;* and St. Jerome agrees with him.† The distinguished heathen prefect, Praetextatus, said to Pope Damasus, that for the price of the bishopric of Rome he himself might become a Christian at once. The bishops of Constantinople, according to the account of Gregory Nazianzen,‡ who himself held that see for a short time, were not behind their Roman colleagues in this extravagance, and vied with the most honourable functionaries of the state in pomp and sumptuous diet. The cathedrals of Constantinople and Carthage had hundreds of priests, deacons, deaconesses, subdeacons, prelectors, singers, and janitors.§

It is worthy of notice, that, as we have already intimated, the two greatest church fathers gave the preference in principle to the voluntary system in the support of the church and the ministry, which prevailed before the Nicene era, and which has been restored in modern times in the United States of America, and among the dissenters in England and the free churches of Scotland. Chrysostom no doubt perceived, that under existing circumstances the wants of the churches could not well be otherwise supplied, but he was decidedly averse to the accumulation of treasure by the church, and said to his hearers in Antioch: "The treasure of the church should be with you all, and it is only your hardness of heart that requires her to hold earthly property, and to deal in houses and lands. Ye are unfruitful in good works, and so the ministers of God must meddle in a thousand matters foreign to their office. In the days of the apostles people might likewise have given them houses and lands; why did they prefer to sell the houses and lands and give the proceeds? Because this was without doubt the better way. Your fathers would have preferred that you

* Lib. xxvii. c. 3. † Hieron. Ep. 34, (al. 2,) et passim. ‡ Orat. 32.

§ The cathedral of Constantinople fell under censure for the excessive number of its clergy and subordinate officers, so that Justinian reduced it to five hundred and twenty-five, of which probably more than half were useless. Comp. Inst. Novell. iii. c. 1—3.

should give alms of your incomes, but they feared that your avarice might leave the poor to hunger; hence the present order of things."* Augustine desired that his people in Hippo should take back the church property, and support the clergy and the poor by free gifts.†

4. We proceed to the legal validity of the episcopal jurisdiction, which likewise dates from the time of Constantine.

After the manner of the Jewish synagogues, and according to the exhortation of the apostle,‡ the Christians were accustomed from the beginning to settle their controversies before the church, rather than carry them before heathen tribunals; but down to the time of Constantine, the validity of the bishop's decision depended on the voluntary submission of both parties. Now this decision was invested with the force of law, and in spiritual matters no appeal could be taken from it to the civil court. Constantine himself, so early as 314, rejected such an appeal in the Donatist controversy, with the significant declaration: "The judgment of the priests must be regarded as the judgment of Christ himself."|| Even a sentence of excommunication was final; and Justinian allowed appeal only to the metropolitan, not to the civil tribunal. Several councils, that of Chalcedon, for example, in 451, went so far as to threaten clergy, who should avoid the episcopal tribunal, or appeal from it to the civil, with deposition. Sometimes the bishops called in the help of the state, where the offender contemned the censure of the church. Justinian I. extended the episcopal jurisdiction also to the monasteries. Heraclius subsequently (628) referred even criminal causes among the clergy to the bishops, thus dismissing the clergy thenceforth entirely from the secular courts; though, of course, holding them liable

* Homil. 85 in Matt. (vii. 808 sq.) Hom. 21 in 1 Cor. vii. (x. 190.) Comp. also De sacerdot. I. iii. c. 16.

† Possidius, in Vita Aug. c. 23: "Alloquebatur plebem Dei, malle se ex collationibus plebis Dei vivere quam illarum possessionum curam vel gubernationem pati, et paratum se esse illis cedere, ut eo modo omnes Dei servi et ministri viverent."

‡ 1 Cor. vi. 1—6.

|| "Sacerdotum judicium ita debet haberi, ut si ipse Dominus residens judicet." Optatus Milev.: De schism. Donat. f. 184.

for the physical penalty, when convicted of capital crime,* as the ecclesiastical jurisdiction ended with deposition and excommunication. Another privilege granted by Theodosius to the clergy, was, that they should not be compelled by torture to bear testimony before the civil tribunal.

This elevation of the power and influence of the bishops was a salutary check upon the jurisdiction of the state, and on the whole conduced to the interests of justice and humanity, though it also nourished hierarchical arrogance and entangled the bishops, to the prejudice of their higher functions, in all manner of secular suits in which they were frequently called into consultation. Chrysostom complains that “the arbitrator undergoes incalculable vexations, much labour, and more difficulties than the public judge. It is hard to discover the right, but harder not to violate it when discovered. Not labour and difficulty alone are connected with the office, but also no little danger.”† Augustine, too, who could make better use of his time, felt this part of his official duty a burden, which nevertheless he bore for love to the church.‡ Others handed over these matters to a subordinate ecclesiastic, or even, like Silvanus, bishop of Troas, to a layman.||

5. Another advantage resulting from the alliance of the church with the empire, was *the episcopal right of intercession*.

The privilege of interceding with the secular power for criminals, prisoners, and unfortunates of every kind, had belonged to the heathen priests, and especially to the vestals, and now passed to the Christian ministry, above all to the bishops, and thenceforth became an essential function of their office. A church in Gaul, about the year 460, opposed the ordination

* Even Constantine, however, before the Council of Nice, had declared, that should he himself detect a bishop in the act of adultery, he would rather throw over him his imperial mantle, than bring scandal on the church by punishing a clergyman.

† *De sacerd.* l. iii. c. 18, at the beginning.

‡ In Psalm xxv. (vol. iv. 115,) and Epist. 213, where he complains, that before and after noon he was beset and distracted by the members of his church with temporal concerns, though they had promised to leave him undisturbed five days in the week, to finish some theological labours. Comp. Neander, iii. 291 sq. (ed. Torrey, ii. 189 sq.)

|| *Socrat.* I. vii. c. 37.

of a monk to the bishopric, because, being unaccustomed to intercourse with secular magistrates, though he might intercede with the heavenly Judge for their souls, he could not with the earthly for their bodies. The bishops were regarded particularly as the guardians of widows and orphans, and the control of their property was entrusted to them. Justinian, in 529, assigned to them also a supervision of the prisons, which they were to visit on Wednesdays and Fridays, the days of Christ's passion.

The exercise of this right of intercession, one may well suppose, often obstructed the course of justice; but it also, in innumerable cases, especially in times of cruel, arbitrary despotism, protected the interests of innocence, humanity, and mercy. Sometimes by the powerful pleadings of bishops with governors and emperors whose provinces were rescued from oppressive taxation, and from the revenge of conquerors. Thus Flavian of Antioch, in 387, averted the wrath of Theodosius on occasion of a rebellion, journeying under the double burden of age and sickness even to Constantinople, to the emperor himself, and, with complete success, as an ambassador of their common Lord, reminding him of the words, "If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you."*

6. With the right of intercession was closely connected *the right of asylum in churches.*

In former times many of the heathen temples and altars, with some exceptions, were held inviolable as places of refuge; and the Christian churches now inherited also this prerogative. The usage, with some precautions against abuse, was made law by Theodosius II., in 431, and the ill-treatment of an unarmed fugitive in any part of the church edifice, or even upon the consecrated ground, was threatened with the penalty of death.*

Thus slaves found sure refuge from the rage of their masters, debtors from the persecution of inexorable creditors, women and virgins from the approaches of profligates, the conquered from the sword of their enemies in the holy places, until the bishop by his powerful mediation could procure justice or

* Matt. vi. 14. † Cod. Theodos. ix. 43, 1—4. Comp. Socrat. vii. 33.

mercy. The beneficence of this law, which had its root not in superstition alone, but in the nobler sympathies of the people, comes most impressively to view amidst the ragings of the great migration and of the frequent intestine wars.*

7. The *legal sanction of the observance of Sunday*, and other festivals of the church, or the origin of the Christian *civil Sabbath*, as distinct from the Christian *religious Sabbath*, which was observed from the resurrection of Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.

The state, indeed, should not and cannot enforce the positive observance, but may undoubtedly, and should, prohibit the public disturbance and profanation of the Christian Sabbath, and protect the Christians in their right and duty of its proper observance. Constantine in 321 forbade the sitting of courts and all secular labour in towns, on "the venerable day of the sun," as he expresses himself, perhaps with reference at once to the sun-god Apollo, and to Christ, the true Sun of Righteousness; to his pagan and his Christian subjects. But he distinctly permitted the culture of farms and vineyards in the country, because frequently this could be attended to on no other day so well;† though one would suppose, that the hard-working peasantry were the very ones who most needed the day of rest. Soon afterwards, in June 321, he allowed the manumission of slaves on Sunday;‡ as this, being an act of benevolence, was different from ordinary business, and might be altogether appropriate to the day of resurrection and redemption. According to Eusebius, Constantine also prohibited

* "The rash violence of despotism," says even Gibbon, "was suspended by the mild interposition of the church; and the lives or fortunes of the most eminent subjects might be protected by the mediation of the bishop."

† This exception is entirely unnoticed by many church histories, but stands in the same law of 321 in the Cod. Justin. lib. iii. tit. 12; de feris, l. 3: "Omnes judicēs, urbanaeque plebes, et cunctarum artium officia venerabili die Solis quiescant. Ruri tamen positi agrorum culturae libere licentesque inseruant: quoniam frequenter evenit, ut non aptius alio die frumenta sulcis, aut vineae scrobibus mandentur, ne occasione momenti pereat commoditas cœlesti provisione concessa." Such work was formerly permitted, too, on the pagan feast days; comp. Virgil. Georg. i. v. 268 sqq. Cato, De re rust. c. 2.

‡ Cod. Theodos. lib. ii. tit. 8. l. 1: "Emancipandi et manumittendi die festo cuncti licentiam habeant, et super his rebus actus non prohibeantur."

all military exercises on Sunday, and at the same time enjoined the observance of Friday, in memory of the death of Christ.*

Nay, he went so far, in well-meaning but mistaken zeal, as to require of his soldiers, even the pagan ones, the positive observance of Sunday, pronouncing at a given signal the following prayer, which they mechanically learned: "Thee alone we acknowledge as God; thee we confess as king; to thee we call as our helper; from thee we have received victories; through thee we have conquered enemies. Thee we thank for good received; from thee we hope for good to come. Thee we all most humbly beseech to keep our Constantine and his God-fearing sons through long life healthy and victorious."† Though this formula was held in a deistical generalness, yet the legal injunction of it lay clearly beyond the province of the civil power, trespassed on the rights of conscience, and unavoidably encouraged hypocrisy and empty formalism.

Later emperors declared the profanation of Sunday to be sacrilege, and prohibited also the collecting of taxes and private debts, (368 and 386) and even theatrical and circus performances on Sunday and the high festivals, (386 and 425.)‡ But this interdiction of public amusements, on which a council of Carthage (399 or 401) with reason insisted, was probably never rigidly enforced, and was repeatedly supplanted by the opposite practice.||

* Eus. Vit. Const. iv. 18—20. Comp. Sozom. i. 8. In our times, military parades and theatrical exhibitions in Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and other European cities are so frequent on no other day as on the Lord's day! In France political elections are usually held on the Sabbath!

† Eus. Vit. Const. l. iv. c. 20. The formulary was prescribed in the Latin language, as Eusebius says in c. 19. He is speaking of the whole army, (comp. c. 18,) and it may be presumed that many of the soldiers were heathen.

‡ The second law against opening theatres on Sundays and festivals (A. D. 425) in the Cod. Theodos. l. xv. tit. 7, l. 5, says expressly: "Omni theatrorum atque circensium voluntate per universas urbes . . . denegata, totae Christianorum ac fidelium mentes Dei cultibus occupentur."

|| As Chrysostom, at the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, often complains that the theatre is better attended than the church; so, down to this day, the same is true in almost all the large cities on the continent of Europe. Only in England and the United States, under the influence of Calvinism and Puritanism, are the theatres closed on Sunday.

II. INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY ON CIVIL LEGISLATION AND THE REFORM OF SOCIAL EVILS.

While in this way the state secured to the church the well-deserved rights of a legal corporation, the church exerted in turn a most beneficent influence on the state, liberating it by degrees from the power of heathen laws and customs, from the spirit of egotism, revenge, and retaliation, and extending its care beyond mere material prosperity to the higher moral interests of society. In the previous period we observed the contrast between Christian morality and heathen corruption in the Roman empire. We are now to see how the Christian morality gained public recognition, and began at least in some degree to rule the civil and political life.

As early as the second century, under the better heathen emperors, and evidently under the indirect, struggling, yet irresistible influence of the Christian spirit, legislation took a reformatory, humane turn, which was carried by the Christian emperors as far as it could be carried on the basis of the ancient Graeco-Roman civilization. Now, above all, the principle of *justice* and *equity*, *humanity* and *love*, began to assert itself in the life of the state. For Christianity, with its doctrines of man's likeness to God, of the infinite value of personality, of the original unity of the human race, and of the common redemption through Christ, first brought the universal rights of man to bear* in opposition to the exclusive national spirit, the heartless selfishness, and the political absolutism of the old world, which harshly separated nations and classes, and respected man only as a citizen, while, at the same time, it denied the right of citizenship to the great mass of slaves, foreigners, and barbarians.

Christ himself began his reformation with the lowest orders of the people, with fishermen and tax-gatherers, with the poor, the lame, the blind, with demoniacs and sufferers of every kind, and raised them first to the sense of their dignity and their high destiny. So now the church wrought in the state, and through the state, for the elevation of the oppressed and the

* Comp. Lactantius: *Inst. divin.* l. v. c. 15.

needy, and of those classes which, under the reign of heathenism, were not reckoned at all in the body politic, but were heartlessly trodden under foot. The reformatory motion was thwarted, it is true, to a considerable extent, by popular custom, which is stronger than law, and by the structure of society in the Roman empire, which was still essentially heathen and doomed to dissolution. But reform was at least set in motion, and could not be turned back even by the overthrow of the empire; it propagated itself among the German tribes. And although even in Christian states the old social maladies are ever breaking forth from corrupt human nature, sometimes with the violence of revolution, Christianity is ever coming in to restrain, to purify, to heal, and to console, curbing the wild passions of tyrants and of populace, vindicating the persecuted, mitigating the horrors of war, and repressing incalculable vice in public and in private life among Christian people. The most cursory comparison of Christendom with the most civilized heathen and Mohammedan countries affords ample testimony of this.

Here again the reign of Constantine is a turning-point. Though an oriental despot, and but imperfectly possessed with the earnestness of Christian morality, he nevertheless enacted many laws, which distinctly breathe the spirit of Christian justice and humanity, as the abolition of the punishment of crucifixion, the prohibition of gladiatorial games and cruel rites, the discouragement of infanticide, and the encouragement of the emancipation of slaves. Eusebius says, he improved most of the old laws, or replaced them by new ones.* Henceforward we feel, beneath the toga of the Roman lawgiver, the warmth of a Christian heart. We perceive the influence of the evangelical preaching and exhortations of the father of monasticism out of the Egyptian desert to the rulers of the world, Constantine and his sons; that they should show justice and mercy to the poor, and remember the judgment to come.

* Vit. Const. l. iv. c. 26, where the most important laws of Constantine are recapitulated. Even the heathen Libanius (Basil. ii. p. 146,) concedes, that under Constantine and his sons legislation was much more favourable to the lower classes; though he accounts for this only by the personal clemency of the emperors.

Even Julian, with all his hatred of the Christians, could not entirely renounce the influence of his education, and of the reigning spirit of the age, but had to borrow from the church many of his measures for the reformation of heathenism. He recognised especially the duty of benevolence towards all men, charity to the poor, and clemency to prisoners; though this was contrary to the general sentiment, and though he proved himself anything but benevolent towards the Christians. But then the total failure of his philanthropic plans and measures shows, that the true love for man can thrive only in Christian soil. And it is remarkable that, with all this involuntary concession to Christianity, Julian himself passed not a single law "in line with the progress of natural rights and equity."*

His successors trod in the footsteps of Constantine, and to the end of the West Roman empire kept the civil legislation under the influence of the Christian spirit, though thus often occasioning conflicts with the still lingering heathen element, and sometimes temporary apostacy and reäction. We observe, also, in remarkable contradiction, that while the laws were milder in some respects, they were in others even more severe and bloody than ever before; a paradox to be explained, no doubt, in part by the despotic character of the Byzantine government, and in part by the disorders of the time.†

It now became necessary to collect the imperial ordinances‡ in a *codex* or *corpus juris*. Of the first two attempts of this kind, made in the middle of the fourth century, only some fragments remain.§ But we have the Codex Theodosianus,

* Troplong; *De l'influence du Christianisme sur le droit civil des Romains*, p. 127. Paris, 1843.

† Comp. de Rhoer, *Dissertationes de effectu relig. Christianae in jurisprudentiam Romanam*, p. 59 sqq. Groning. 1776. The origin of this increased severity of penal laws is, at all events, not to be sought in the church; for in the fourth and fifth centuries she was still rather averse to the death penalty. Comp. Ambros. Ep. 25 and 26 (al. 51 and 52), and Augustine, Ep. 153 ad Macedonium.

‡ Constitutiones or Leges. If answers to questions, they were called *Rescripta*; if spontaneous decrees, *Edicta*.

§ The *Codex Gregorianus* and *Codex Hermogenianus*; so called from the compilers, two private lawyers. They contained the rescripts and edicts of the heathen emperors from Hadrian to Constantine, and would facilitate a comparison of the heathen legislation with the Christian.

which Theodosius II. caused to be made by several jurists between the years 429 and 438. It contains the laws of the Christian emperors from Constantine down, adulterated with many heathen elements; and it was sanctioned by Valentinian III. for the western empire. A hundred years later, in the flourishing period of the Byzantine state-church despotism, Justinian I., who, by the way, cannot be acquitted of the reproach of capricious and fickle law-making, committed to a number of lawyers, under the direction of the renowned Tribonianus,* the great task of making a complete revised and digested collection of the Roman law from the time of Hadrian to his own reign; and thus arose, in the short period of seven years, (527—534,) through the combination of the best talent and the best facilities, the celebrated *CODEX JUSTINIANUS*, which thenceforth became the universal law of the Roman empire, the sole text-book in the academies at Rome, Constantinople, and Berytus, and the basis of nearly all the legal relations of Christian Europe to this day.†

* Tribonianus, a native of Side in Paphlagonia, died 546, was an advocate and a poet, and rose, by his talents and the favor of Justinian, to be Quaestor, Consul, and at last Magister officiorum. Gibbon compares him, both for his comprehensive learning and administrative ability, and for his enormous avarice and venality, with Lord Bacon. But in one point these statesmen were very different: while Bacon was a decided Christian in his convictions, Tribonianus was accused of pagan proclivities and of atheism. In a popular tumult in Constantinople, the emperor was obliged to dismiss him, but found him indispensable, and soon restored him.

† The complete *Codex Justinianus*, which has long outlasted the conquests of that Emperor, (as Napoleon's Code has outlasted his,) comprises properly three separate works: (1.) The *Institutiones*, an elementary text-book of jurisprudence, of the year 533. (2.) The *Digesta* or *Pandectae* (*πανδέκται*, complete repository,) an abstract of the spirit of the whole Roman jurisprudence, according to the decisions of the most distinguished jurists of the earlier times, composed in 530—533. (3.) The *Codex* proper, first prepared in 528 and 529, but in 534 reconstructed, enlarged, and improved, and hence called *Codex repetitae praelectionis*; containing four thousand six hundred and forty-eight imperial ordinances, in seven hundred and sixty-five titles, in chronological order. To these is added, (4.) A later Appendix: *Novellae constitutiones* (*νοβελαι δικαιολόγια*), or simply *Novellae* (a barbarism); that is, the New Code, or one hundred and sixty-eight decrees of Justinian subsequently collected, from the 1st of January 535, to his death in 565, mostly in Greek, or in both Greek and Latin. Excepting some of the novels of Justinian, the codex was composed in the Latin language, which Justinian and Trebonianus understood;

This body of Roman law* is an important source of our knowledge of the Christian life in its relations to the state, and its influence upon it. It is, to be sure, in great part, the legacy of pagan Rome, which was constitutionally endowed with legislative and administrative genius, and thereby, as it were, pre-destined to universal empire. But it received essential modification through the orientalizing change in the character of the empire, from the time of Constantine, through the infusion of various Germanic elements, through the influence of the law of Moses, and, in its best points, through the spirit of Christianity. The church it fully recognises as a legitimate institution, and of divine authority, and several of its laws were enacted at the direct instance of bishops. So the "Common Law," the unwritten traditional law of England and America, though descending from the Anglo-Saxon times, therefore, from heathen Germandom, has ripened under the influence of Christianity and the church, and betrays this influence even far more plainly than the Roman code.

The benign effect of Christianity on legislation in the Græco-Roman empire is especially noticeable in the following points:

1. In the treatment and elevation of *woman*. From the beginning Christianity laboured, primarily in the silent way of fact, for the elevation of the female sex from the degraded, slavish position, which it occupied in the heathen world;† and even in this period it produced such illustrious models of female virtue as Nonna, Anthusa, and Monica, who commanded the

but afterwards, as this tongue died out in the East, it was translated into Greek, and sanctioned in this form by the Emperor Phocas in 600. The emperor Basil, the Macedonian, in 876 caused a Greek abstract (*τρόχησιν τῶν νόμων*) to be prepared, which, under the name of the *Basiliceae*, gradually supplanted the book of Justinian in the Byzantine empire. The Pandects have narrowly escaped destruction. Most of the editions and manuscripts of the west, (not all, as Gibbon says,) are taken from the Codex Florentinus, which was transcribed in the beginning of the seventh century, at Constantinople, and afterwards carried by the vicissitudes of war and trade to Amalfi, to Pisa, and in 1411 to Florence.

* Called *Corpus juris Romani* or *Corpus juris civilis*, in distinction from *Corpus juris canonici*, the Roman Catholic Church law, which is based chiefly on the canons of the ancient councils, as the civil law is upon the rescripts and edicts of the emperors.

† See Schaff's History of the Christian Church, during the first three centuries, § 91.

highest respect of the heathens themselves. The Christian emperors pursued this work, though the Roman legislation stops considerably short of the later Germanic in regard to the rights of woman. Constantine, in 321, granted to women the same right as men to control their property, except in the sale of their landed estates. At the same time, from regard to their modesty, he prohibited the summoning them in person before the public tribunal. Theodosius I., in 390, was the first to allow the mother a certain right of guardianship, which had formerly been entrusted exclusively to men. Theodosius II., in 439, interdicted, but unfortunately with little success, the scandalous trade of the *lenones*, who lived by the prostitution of women, and paid a considerable license tax to the state.* Woman received protection in various ways against the beastly passion of man. The rape of consecrated virgins and widows was made punishable, from the time of Constantine, with death.†

2. In the matrimonial legislation Constantine gave marriage its due freedom by abolishing the old Roman penalties against celibacy and childlessness.‡ On the other hand, marriage now came to be restricted under heavy penalties, by the introduction of the Old Testament prohibitions of marriage within certain degrees of consanguinity, which subsequently were arbitrarily extended even to the relation of cousin down to the third remove.§ Justinian forbade also the marriage between a god-parent and god-child, on the ground of spiritual kinship. And better than all, the dignity and sanctity of marriage were now protected by restrictions upon the boundless liberty of divorce, which had obtained from the time of Augustus, and had vastly hastened the decay of public morals. Still, the strict view of the fathers, who, following the word of Christ, recognised adultery alone as a sufficient ground of divorce, could not be carried out in the state.|| The legislation of the

* Cod. Theod. lib. xv. tit. 8; de lenonibus.

† C. Theod. ix. 24; de raptu virginum et viduarum (probably nuns and deaconesses.)

‡ C. Theod. viii. 16, 1. Comp. Euseb. Vit. Const. iv. 26.

§ C. Theod. iii. 12; de incestis nuptiis.

|| C. Theod. iii. 16; de repudiis. Hence Jerome, says in view of this, Ep.

emperors in this matter wavered between the licentiousness of Rome and the doctrine of the church. So late as the fifth century we hear a Christian author complain that men exchange wives as they would garments, and that the bridal chamber is exposed to sale like a shoe on the market. Justinian attempted to bring the public laws up to the wish of the church, but found himself compelled to relax them; and his successor allowed divorce even on the ground of mutual consent.*

Concubinage was forbidden from the time of Constantine, and adultery punished as one of the grossest crimes.† Yet here, also, pagan habit ever and anon reacted in practice, and even the law seems to have long tolerated the wild marriage, which rested only on mutual agreement, and was entered into without covenant, dowry, or ecclesiastical sanction.‡ Solemn-

30 (al. 84) ad Oceanum: "Aliae sunt leges Caesarum, aliae Christi; aliud Papinianus [the most celebrated Roman jurist, died A. D. 212,] aliud Paulus noster præcipit."

* Gibbon: "The dignity of marriage was restored by the Christians. . . . The Christian princes were the first who specified the just causes of a private divorce; their institutions, from Constantine to Justinian, appear to fluctuate between the custom of the empire and the wishes of the church, and the author of the Novels too frequently reforms the jurisprudence of the Code and the Pandects. . . . The successor of Justinian yielded to the prayers of his unhappy subjects, and restored the liberty of divorce by mutual consent."

† In a law of 326, it is called, "facinus atrocissimum, scelus immane." Cod. Theod. l. ix. tit. 7, l. 1 sq. And the definition of adultery, too, was now made broader. According to the old Roman law, the idea of adultery on the part of the man was limited properly to illicit intercourse with the *married* lady of a *free citizen*, and was thought punishable, not so much for its own sake, as for its encroachment on the rights of another husband. Hence Jerome says, l. c., of the heathen: "Apud illos viris impudicitiae frena laxantur, et solo stupro et adulterio condemnato passim per lupanaria et ancillulas libido permittitur; quasi culpam dignitas faciat, non voluntas. Apud nos quod non licet feminis, aequo non licet viris, et eadem servitus pari conditione censetur." Yet the law, even under the Christian emperors, still excepted carnal intercourse with a female slave from adultery. Thus the state here also stopped short of the church, and does to this day in countries where the institution of slavery exists.

‡ Even a council at Toledo, in 398, conceded so far on this point, as to decree, can. 17: "Si quis habens uxorem fidelis concubinam habeat, non communicet. Ceterum is, qui non habet uxorem et pro uxore concubinam habeat, a communione non repellatur, tantum ut unius mulieris aut uxoris aut concubinae, ut ei placuerit, sit conjugatione contentus. Alias vero vivens abjiciatur donec desinat et per poenitentiam revertatur."

ization by the church was not required by the state as the condition of a legitimate marriage till the eighth century. Second marriage, also, and mixed marriages with heretics and heathens, continued to be allowed, notwithstanding the disapproval of the stricter church teachers; only marriage with Jews was prohibited, on account of their fanatical hatred of the Christians.*

3. *The power of fathers over their children*, which according to the old Roman law extended even to their freedom and life, had been restricted by Alexander Severus, under the influence of the monarchical spirit, which is unfavourable to private jurisdiction, and was still further limited under Constantine. This emperor declared the killing of a child by its father, which the Pompeian law left unpunished, to be one of the greatest crimes.† But the cruel and unnatural practice of exposing children and selling them into slavery continued for a long time, especially among the labouring and agricultural classes. Even the indirect measures of Valentinian and Theodosius I. could not eradicate the evil. Theodosius, in 391, commanded that children, which had been sold as slaves by their father from poverty, should be free, and that without indemnity to the purchasers; and Justinian, in 529, gave all exposed children, without exception, their freedom.‡

4. *The Institution of Slavery.*

The institution of slavery remained throughout the empire, and is recognised in the laws of Justinian as altogether legitimate.|| The purchase and sale of slaves for from ten to seventy pieces of gold, according to their age, strength, and

* Cod. Theod. iii. 7, 2; C. Justin. i. 9, 6. A proposal of marriage to a nun was even punished with death, (ix. 25, 2.)

† A. D. 318; Valentinian did the same in 374. Cod. Theod ix. tit. 14 and 15. Comp. the Pandects, lib. xlvi. tit. 8, l. ix.

‡ Cod. Theod. iii. 8, 1. Cod. Just. iv. 48, 1; viii. 52, 3. Gibbon says: "The Roman empire was stained with the blood of infants, till such murders were included, by Valentinian and his colleagues, in the letter and spirit of the Cornelian law. The lessons of jurisprudence and Christianity had been inefficient to eradicate this inhuman practice, till their gentle influence was fortified by the terrors of capital punishment."

|| Instit. lib. i. tit. 5—8. Digest. l. i. tit. 5 and 6.

training, was a daily occurrence.* The number was not limited; many a master owning even two or three thousand slaves. The legal wall of partition, which separated them from free citizens and excluded them from the universal rights of man, was by no means broken down, and even the church taught only the moral and religious equality. Constantine issued rigid laws against intermarriage with slaves, all the offspring of which must be slaves; and against fugitive slaves, (A. D. 319 and 326,) who at that time in great multitudes plundered deserted provinces, or joined with hostile barbarians against the empire. But, on the other hand, he facilitated manumission, permitted it even on Sunday, and gave the clergy the right to emancipate their slaves simply by their own word, without the witnesses and ceremonies required in other cases.† By Theodosius and Justinian the liberation of slaves was still further encouraged. The latter emperor abolished the penalty of condemnation to servitude, and by giving to freed persons the rank and rights of citizens, he removed the stain which had formerly attached to that class.‡ The spirit of his laws favoured the gradual abolition of domestic slavery. In the Byzantine empire in general, the differences of rank in society were more equalized, though not so much on Christian principle as in the interest of despotic monarchy. Despotism and extreme democracy meet in predilection for universal equality and uniformity. Neither can suffer any overshadowing greatness, save the majesty of the prince or the will of the people. The one system knows none but slaves; the other, none but masters.

Nor was an entire abolition of slavery at that time at all demanded or desired even by the church. As in the previous

* The legal price, which, however, was generally under the market price, was thus established under Justinian, (Cod. l. vi. tit. xlvi. l. 3): "Ten pieces of gold for an ordinary male or female slave under ten years; twenty, for slaves over ten; thirty, for such as understood a trade; fifty, for notaries and scribes; sixty, for physicians and midwives. Eunuchs ranged to seventy pieces.

† In two laws of 316 and 321. Corp. Jur. l. i. tit. 18, l. 1 and 2.

‡ Cod. Just. vii. 5, 6. Nov. 22, c. 8, (A. D. 536,) and Nov. 78 praef. 1, 2, (A. D. 539.)

period, she still thought it sufficient to insist on the kind Christian treatment of slaves, enjoining upon them obedience for the sake of the Lord, comforting them in their low condition with the thought of their higher moral freedom and equality, and by the religious education of the slaves making an inward preparation for the abolition of the institution. All hasty and violent measures met with decided disapproval. The council of Gangra threatens with the ban every one who, under pretext of religion, seduces slaves into contempt of their masters; and the council of Chalcedon, in its fourth canon, on pain of excommunication, forbids monasteries to harbour slaves without permission of the masters, lest Christianity be guilty of encouraging insubordination. The church fathers, so far as they enter this subject at all, seem to look upon slavery as at once a necessary evil and a divine instrument of discipline; tracing it to the curse on Ham and Canaan.* It is true, they favour emancipation in individual cases, as an act of Christian love on the part of the master, but not as a right on the part of the slave; and the well-known passage: "If thou mayest be made free, use it rather," they understand not as a challenge to slaves to take the first opportunity to gain their freedom, but on the contrary as a challenge to remain in their servitude, since they are at all events inwardly free in Christ, and their outward condition is of no account.†

Even St. Chrysostom, though of all the church fathers the nearest to the emancipation theory, and the most attentive to the question of slavery in general, does not rise materially above this view.‡ According to him mankind were originally created perfectly free and equal, without

* Gen. ix. 25: "Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren."

† 1 Cor. vii. 21. The fathers supply, with μᾶλλον χρῆσαι, the word δουλεία (Chrysostom: μᾶλλον δουλεύει); whereas nearly all modern interpreters (except De Wette and Meyer) follow Calvin and Grotius in supplying ἐλευθερία. Chrysostom, however, mentions this construction, and in another place (Serm. iv. in Genes., tom. v., p. 666) seems himself to favour it.

‡ The views of Chrysostom on slavery are presented in his Homilies on Genesis and on the Epistles of Paul, and are collected by Möhler in his beautiful article on the Abolition of Slavery (*Vermischte Schriften*, ii., p. 89 sqq.) Möhler says, that since the times of the apostle Paul no one has done a more valuable service to slaves, than St. Chrysostom. But he overrates his merit.

the addition of a slave. But by the fall man lost the power of self-government, and fell into a threefold bondage: the bondage of woman under man, of slave under master, of subject under ruler. These three relations he considers divine punishments and divine means of discipline. Thus slavery, as a divine arrangement occasioned by the fall, is at once relatively justified and in principle condemned. Now, since Christ has delivered us from evil and its consequences, slavery, according to Chrysostom, is in principle abolished in the church; yet only in the sense in which sin and death are abolished. Regenerate Christians are not slaves, but perfectly free men in Christ and brethren among themselves. The exclusive authority of the one and subjection of the other give place to mutual service in love. Consistently carried out, this view leads of course to emancipation. Chrysostom, it is true, does not carry it to that point, but he decidedly condemns all luxurious slaveholding, and thinks one or two servants enough for necessary help, while many patricians had hundreds and thousands. He advises the liberation of superfluous slaves, and the education of all, that in case they should be liberated, they may know how to take care of themselves. He is of opinion, that the first Christian community at Jerusalem, in connection with community of goods, emancipated all their slaves;* and thus he gives his hearers a hint to follow that example. But of an appeal to slaves to break their bonds, this father shows of course no trace; he rather, after apostolic precedent, exhorts them to conscientious and cheerful obedience for Christ's sake, as earnestly as he inculcates upon masters humanity and love. The same is true of Ambrose, Augustine, and Peter Chrysologus of Ravenna (458).

St. Augustine, the noblest representative of the Latin church, in his profound work on the "City of God," excludes slavery from the original idea of man and the final condition of society, and views it as an evil consequent upon sin, yet under divine

* Homil. xi. in Acta Apost. (tom. ix., p. 93;) οὐδέ γάρ τότε ποῦτο ἢν ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρους ἴσως ἐπέρπει γίνεσθαι. The monk Nilus, a pupil of Chrysostom, went so far as to declare slaveholding inconsistent with true love to Christ, Ep. lib. i. ep. 142 (quoted by Neander in his chapter on Monasticism:) Οὐ γάρ δημιούργος οἰκέτην ἔχει τὸν φιλικόντον, εἰδότα τὴν χάριν τὴν πάντας ἐλευθερωσασαν.

direction and control. For God, he says, created man reasonable, and lord only over the unreasonable, not over man. The burden of servitude was justly laid upon the sinner. Therefore the term servant is not found in the Scriptures till Noah used it as a curse upon his offending son. Thus it was guilt, and not nature, that deserved that name. The Latin word *servus* is supposed to be derived from *servare* [*servire* rather], or the preservation of the prisoners of war from death, which itself implies the desert of sin. For even in a just war there is sin on one side, and every victory humbles the conquered by divine judgment, either reforming their sins or punishing them. Daniel saw in the sins of the people the real cause of their captivity. Sin, therefore, is the mother of servitude, and first cause of man's subjection to man; yet this does not come to pass except by the judgment of God, with whom there is no injustice, and who knows how to adjust the various punishments to the merits of the offenders. . . . The apostle exhorts the servants to obey their masters and to serve them *ex animo*, with good will; to the end that, if they cannot be made free from their masters, they may make their servitude a freedom to themselves, by serving them not in deceitful fear, but in faithful love, until iniquity be overpassed, and all man's principality and power be annulled, and God be all in all.*

As might be expected, after the conversion of the emperors, and of the rich and noble families who owned most slaves, cases of emancipation became more frequent.† The biographer of St. Samson Xenodochus, a contemporary of Justinian, says of him: "His troop of slaves he would not keep, still less exercise over his fellow-servants a lordly authority; he preferred magnanimously to let them go free, and gave them enough for the necessities of life."‡ Salvianus, a Gallic presbyter of the fifth century, says, that slaves were emancipated daily.§ On

* *De Civit. Dei*, lib. xix. c. 15.

† For earlier cases, at the close of the previous period, see Schaff's *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vol. i. § 89, at the end.

‡ *Acta Sanct. Boll. Jun. tom. v.*, p. 267.—According to Palladius, *Hist. c. 119*, St. Melania had in concert with her husband Pinius manumitted as many as eight thousand slaves. Yet it is only the ancient Latin translation that has this almost incredible number.

§ *Ad eccles. cath. l. iii. § 7* (Galland. *tom. x. p. 71*): In usu quidem quo-

the other hand very much was done by the church to prevent the increase of slavery; especially in the way of redeeming prisoners, to which sometimes the gold and silver vessels of churches were applied. But we have no reliable statistics for comparing, even approximately, the proportion of the slaves to the free population at the close of the sixth century with the proportion in the former period.

We conclude then that the ancient catholic church of the Graeco-Roman empire, although naturally conservative, and decidedly opposed to all radical revolution and violent measures, nevertheless, in its inmost instincts and ultimate tendencies favoured universal freedom, and by raising the slave to a spiritual equality with the master and treating him uniformly as an immortal being, capable of the same virtues, blessings, and rewards, it placed the hateful institution of human bondage, then universally prevalent, in the way of gradual mitigation and ultimate extinction.

5. *The poor and unfortunate in general*, above all the *widows* and *orphans*, *prisoners* and *sick*, who were so terribly neglected in heathen times, now drew the attention of the imperial legislators. Constantine in 315 prohibited the branding of criminals on the forehead, that the "human countenance," as he said, "formed after the image of heavenly beauty, should not be defaced."* He provided against the inhuman maltreatment of prisoners before their trial.†

To deprive poor parents of all pretext for selling or exposing their children, he had them furnished with food and clothing, partly at his own expense and partly at that of the state.‡ He

tidiano est, ut servi, etsi non optimae, certe non infimae servitudinis, Romesia a dominis libertate donentur, in qua scilicet et proprietatem peculii capiunt et jus testamentarium consequuntur; ita ut et viventes, cui volunt, res suas tradant, et morientes donatione transcribant. Nec solum hoc, sed et illa, quae in servitute positi conquisierant, ex dominorum domo tollere non vetantur. From this passage it appears that many masters, with a view to set their slaves free, allowed them to earn something; which was not allowed by the Roman law.

* Cod. Theod. ix., 40, 1 and 2.

† Cod. Theod. ix., tit. 3, de custodia reorum. Comp. later similar laws of the year 409 in l. 7, and of 529 in the Cod. Justin. i. 4, 22.

‡ Comp. the two laws De alimentis quae inopes parentes, de publico petere debent, in the Cod. Theod. xi. 27, 1 and 2.

likewise endeavoured, particularly by a law of the year 331, to protect the poor against the venality and extortion of judges, advocates, and tax collectors, who drained the people by their exactions.* In the year 334 he ordered, that widows, orphans, the sick, and the poor, should not be compelled to appear before a tribunal outside their own province. Valentinian, in 365, exempted widows and orphans from the ignoble poll-tax.† In 364 he entrusted the bishops with the supervision of the poor. Honorius did the same in 409. Justinian, in 529, as we have before remarked, gave the bishops the oversight of the state prisons, which they were to visit on Wednesdays and Fridays, to bring home to the unfortunates the earnestness and comfort of religion. The same emperor issued laws against usury and inhuman severity in creditors, and secured benevolent and religious foundations, by strict laws, against alienation of their revenues from the original design of the founders. Several emperors and empresses took the church institutions for the poor and sick, for strangers, widows, and orphans, under their special patronage, exempted them from the usual taxes, and enriched or enlarged them from their private funds.‡ Yet in those days, as still in ours, the private beneficence of Christian love took the lead, and the state followed at a distance, rather with ratification and patronage, than with independent and original activity.§

6. And finally, one of the greatest and most beautiful victories of Christian humanity over heathen barbarism and cruelty, was the abolition of the *gladiatorial contests*, against which even

* Ib. tit. 7, l. 1: Cessent jam nunc rapaces officialium manus, cessent inquam ! nam si moniti non cessaverint, gladiis praecedentur.

† The capitatio plebeia. Cod. Theod. xiii. 10, 1 and 4. Other laws in behalf of Widows, Cod. Just. iii. 14, ix. 24.

‡ Cod. Theod. xi. 16, xiii. 1. Cod. Just. i. 8, Nov. 131. Comp. here in general Chastel: The charity of the Primitive Churches, (transl. by Matile,) p. 281—293.

§ Comp. Chastel, l. c. p. 293: "It appears, then, as to charitable institutions, the part of the Christian emperors was much less to found themselves, than to recognise, to regulate, to guarantee, sometimes also to enrich with their private gifts, that which the church had founded. Everywhere the initiative had been taken by religious charity. Public charity only followed in the distance, and when it attempted to go ahead originally and alone, it soon found that it had strayed aside, and was constrained to withdraw."

the apologists in the second century had already raised the most earnest protest.*

These bloody shows, in which human beings, mostly criminals, prisoners of war, and barbarians, by hundreds and thousands killed one another, or were killed in fight with wild beasts, for the amusement of the spectators, were still in full favour at the beginning of the period before us. The pagan civilization here proves itself impotent. In its eyes the life of a barbarian is of no other use than to serve the cruel amusement of the Roman people, who wish quietly to behold with their own eyes, and enjoy at home the martial blood-shedding of their frontiers. Even the humane Symmachus gave an exhibition of this kind during his consulate (391), and was enraged that twenty-nine Saxon prisoners of war escaped this public shame by suicide.† While the Vestal virgins existed, it was their special prerogative to cheer on the combatants in the amphitheatre to the bloody work, and to give the signal for the deadly stroke.‡

The contagion of the thirst for blood, which these spectacles generated, is presented to us in a striking example by Augustine in his *Confessions*.§ His friend Alypius, afterwards bishop of Tragaste, was induced by some friends in 385, to visit the amphitheatre at Rome, and went, resolved to lock himself up against all impressions. "When they reached the spot," says Augustine, "and took their places on the hired seats, every thing already foamed with blood-thirsty delight. But Alypius, with closed eyes, forbade his soul to yield to this sin. O had he but stopped also his ears! For when, on the fall of a gladiator in the contest, the wild shout of the whole multitude fell upon him, overcome by curiosity, he opened his

* Comp. Schaff's *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vol. i. § 88.

† Symm. l. ii. Ep. 46, Comp. vii. 4.

‡ Prudentius *Adv. Symmach.* ii. 1095:

Virgo—consurgit ad ictus,
Et quotiens victor ferrum jugulo inserit, illa
Delicias ait esse suas, pectusque jacentis
Virgo modesta jubet, converso pollice, rumpi;
Ni lateat pars ulla animæ vitalibus imis,
Altius impresso dum palpitat ense secutor.

§ Lib. vi. c. 8.

eyes, though prepared to despise and resist the sight. But he was smitten with a more grievous wound in the soul, than the combatant in the body, and fell more lamentably. For when he saw the blood, he imbibed at once the love of it, turned not away, fastened his eyes upon it, caught the spirit of rage and vengeance before he knew it, and, fascinated with the murderous game, became drunk with blood-thirsty joy. . . . He looked, shouted applause, burned, and carried with him thence the frenzy, by which he was drawn to go back, not only with those who had taken him there, but before them, and taking others with him."

Christianity finally succeeded in closing the amphitheatre. Constantine, who in his earlier reign himself did homage to the popular custom in this matter, and exposed a great multitude of conquered barbarians to death in the amphitheatre at Trier, for which he was highly commended by a heathen orator,* issued, in 325, the year of the great council of the church at Nice, the first prohibition of the bloody spectacles, "because they cannot be pleasing in a time of public peace."† But this edict, which is directed to the prefects of Phœnicia, had no permanent effect even in the East, except at Constantinople, which was never stained with the blood of gladiators. In Syria, and especially in the West, above all in Rome, the deeply rooted institution continued into the fifth century. Honorius (395—423), who at first considered it indestructible, abolished the gladiatorial shows about 404, and did so at the instance of the heroic self-denial of an eastern monk by the name of Telemachus, who journeyed to Rome expressly to protest against this inhuman barbarity, threw himself into the arena, separated the combatants, and then was torn to pieces by the populace, a martyr to humanity.‡ Yet this put a stop only to the bloody combats of men. Unbloody spectacles of every kind, even on the high festivals of the church, and amidst the invasions of

* Eumenii Panegyr. c. 12.

† Cod. Theod. xv., tit. 12, l. 1, de gladiatoriibus: *Cruenta spectacula in otio civili et domestica quiete non placent; qua propter omnino gladiatores esse prohibemus.* Comp. Euseb. v. Const. iv. 25.

‡ So relates Theodoret: Hist. eccl. l. v., c. 26. For there is no law of Honorius extant on the subject. Yet after this time there is no mention of a gladiatorial contest between man and man.

the barbarians, as we see by the grievous complaints of a Chrysostom, an Augustine, and a Salvian, were as largely and as passionately attended as ever; and even fights with wild animals, in which human life was generally more or less sacrificed, continued,* and, to the scandal of the Christian name, are tolerated in Spain and South America to this day.

III. EVILS OF THE UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

We turn now to the dark side of the union of the church with the state; to the consideration of the disadvantages which grew out of their altered relation after the time of Constantine, and which continue to show themselves in the condition of the church in Europe to our own time.

These evil results may be summed up under the general designation of the *secularization of the church*. By taking in the whole population of the Roman empire, the church became, indeed, a church of the masses, a church of the people, but at the same time more or less a church of the world. Christianity became a matter of fashion. The number of hypocrites and formal professors rapidly increased;† strict discipline, zeal, self-sacrifice, and brotherly love proportionally ebbed away; and many heathen customs and usages, under altered names, crept into the worship of God and the life of the Christian people. The Roman state had grown up under the influence of idolatry, and was not to be magically transformed at a stroke. With the secularizing process, therefore, a paganizing tendency went hand in hand.

* In a law of Leo, of the year 469, (in the Cod. Justin. iii., tit. 12, l. 11), besides the *scena theatralis* and the *circense theatrum*, also *ferarum lacrymosa spectacula* are mentioned as existing. Salvian likewise, in the fifth century, (De gubern. Dei, l. vi., p. 51,) censures the delight of his contemporaries in such bloody combats of men with wild beasts. So late as the end of the seventh century, a prohibition from the Tullan council was called for in the East. In the West, Theodorick appears to have exchanged the beast-fights for military displays, whence proceeded the later tournaments. Yet these shows have never become entirely extinct, but remain in the bull-fights of southern Europe, especially in Spain.

† Thus Augustine, for example, Tract. in Joann. xxv., c. 10, laments that the church filled itself daily with those, who sought Jesus not for Jesus, but for earthly profit. Comp. the similar complaint of Eusebius, Vit. Const. l. iv. c. 54.

Yet the pure spirit of Christianity could by no means be polluted by this. On the contrary, it retained, even in the darkest days, its faithful and steadfast confessors, conquered new provinces from time to time, constantly reacted, both within the established church and outside of it, in the form of monasticism, against the secular and the pagan influences, and, in its very struggle with the prevailing corruption, produced such church fathers as Athanasius, Chrysostom, and Augustine, such exemplary Christian mothers as Nonna, Anthusa, and Monica, and such extraordinary saints of the desert as Anthony, Pachomius, and Benedict. New enemies and dangers called forth new duties and virtues, which could now unfold themselves on a larger stage, and therefore also on a grander scale. Besides, it must not be forgotten, that the tendency to secularization is by no means to be ascribed only to Constantine and the influence of the state, but to the deeper source of the corrupt heart of man, and did reveal itself, in fact, though within a much narrower compass, long before, under the heathen emperors, especially in the intervals of repose, when the earnestness and zeal of Christian life slumbered and gave scope to a worldly spirit.

The difference between the age after Constantine and the age before, consists, therefore, not at all in the cessation of true Christianity and the entrance of false, but in the preponderance of the one over the other. The field of the church was now much larger, but with much good soil, it included far more that was stony, barren, and overgrown with weeds. The line between church and world, between regenerate and unregenerate, between those who were Christians in name and those who were Christians in heart, was more or less obliterated, and in place of the former hostility between the two parties there came a fusion of them in the same outward communion of baptism and confession. This brought the conflict between light and darkness, truth and falsehood, Christ and antichrist, into the bosom of christendom itself.

1. The secularization of the church appeared most strikingly in the prevalence of *mammon-worship* and *luxury*, compared with the poverty and simplicity of the primitive Christians. The aristocracy of the later empire had a downright passion

for outward display and the sensual enjoyments of wealth, without the taste, the politeness, or the culture of true civilization. The gentlemen measured their fortune by the number of their marble palaces, baths, slaves, and gilded carriages; the ladies indulged in raiments of silk and gold, ornamented with secular or religious figures, and in heavy golden necklaces, bracelets and rings, and went to church in the same flaunting dress as to the theatre.* Chrysostom addresses a patrician of Antioch: "You count so and so many acres of land, ten or twenty palaces, as many baths, a thousand or two thousand slaves, carriages plated with silver and gold."† Gregory of Nazianzen, who presided for a time in the second oecumenical council of Constantinople in 381, gives us the following picture, evidently rhetorically coloured, yet drawn from life, of the luxury of the degenerate civilization of that period: "We repose in splendour on high and sumptuous cushions, upon the most exquisite covers, which one is almost afraid to touch, and are vexed if we but hear the voice of a moaning pauper; our chamber must breathe the odour of flowers, even rare flowers; our table must flow with the most fragrant and costly ointment, so that we become perfectly effeminate. Slaves must stand ready, richly adorned and in order, with waving, maiden-like hair, and faces shorn perfectly smooth, more adorned throughout than is good for lascivious eyes; some, to hold cups both delicately and firmly with the tips of their fingers, others, to fan fresh air upon the head. Our table must bend under the load of dishes, while all the kingdoms of nature, air, water, and earth, furnish copious contributions, and there must be almost no room for the artificial products of cook and baker. . . . The poor man is content with water; but we fill our goblets with wine to drunkenness, nay, immeasurably beyond it. We refuse one wine, another we pronounce excellent when well-flavoured, over a third we

* Ammianus Marcellinus gives the most graphic account of the extravagant and tasteless luxury of the Roman aristocracy in the fourth century, which Gibbon has admirably translated and explained in his 81st chapter.

† Homil. in Matt. 63, § 4, (tom. vii., p. 533,) comp. Hom. in 1 Cor. 21, § 6, and many other places in his sermons. Comp. Neander's *Chrysostomus I.*, p. 10 sqq.

institute philosophical discussions; nay, we count it a pity if he does not, as a king, add to the domestic wine a foreign also.”* Still more unfavourable are the pictures, which, a half-century later, the Gallic presbyter, Salvianus, draws of the general moral condition of the Christians in the Roman empire.†

It is true, these earnest protests against degeneracy themselves, as well the honour in which monasticism and ascetic contempt of the world were universally held, attest the existence of a better spirit. But the uncontrollable progress of avarice, prodigality, voluptuousness, theatre-going, intemperance, lewdness, in short, of all the heathen vices, which Christianity had come to eradicate, still carried the Roman empire and people with rapid strides towards dissolution, and gave it at last into the hands of the rude, but simple and morally nervous barbarians. When the Christians were awakened by the crashings of the falling empire, and anxiously asked why God permitted it, Salvian, the Jeremiah of his time, answered: “Think of your vileness and your crimes, and see whether you are worthy of the divine protection.”‡ Nothing but the divine judgment of destruction upon this nominally Christian, but essentially heathen world, could open the way for the moral regeneration of society. There must be new, fresh nations, if the Christian civilization prepared in the old Roman empire was to take firm root and bear ripe fruit.

2. The unnatural confusion of Christianity with the world culminated in the *imperial court of Constantinople*, which, it is true, never violated moral decency so grossly as the court of a Nero or a Domitian, but in vain pomp and prodigality far out-did the courts of the better heathen emperors, and degenerated into complete oriental despotism. The household of Constantius, the son and successor of Constantine the Great, according to the description of Libanius,§ embraced no less than a thousand barbers, a thousand cup-bearers, a thousand cooks, and so many eunuchs, that they could be compared only to the insects

* Orat. xiv. Comp. Ullmann’s monograph on Gregory, p. 6.

† Adv. avarit. and De gubern. Dei, passim. Comp. § 139, at the close.

‡ De gubern. Dei, l. iv. c. 12, p. 82.

§ Lib., Epitaph. Julian.

of a summer day. This boundless luxury was for a time suppressed by the pagan Julian, who delighted in stoical and cynical severity, and was fond of displaying it; but under his Christian successors the same prodigality returned; especially under Theodosius and his sons. These emperors, who prohibited idolatry upon pain of death, called their laws, edicts, and palaces "divine," bore themselves as gods upon earth, and, on the rare occasions when they showed themselves to the people, unfurled an incredible magnificence and empty splendour.

"When Arcadius"—to borrow a graphic description from a modern historian—"descended to reveal to the public the majesty of the sovereign, he was preceded by a vast multitude of attendants, dukes, tribunes, civil and military officers, their horses glittering with golden ornaments, with shields of gold set with precious stones, and golden lances. They proclaimed the coming of the emperor, and commanded the ignoble crowd to clear the streets before him. The emperor stood or reclined on a gorgeous chariot, surrounded by his immediate attendants, distinguished by shields with golden bosses set round with golden eyes, and drawn by white mules with gilded trappings; the chariot was set with precious stones, and golden fans vibrated with the movement, and cooled the air. The multitude contemplated at a distance the snow-white cushions, the silken carpets, with dragons inwoven upon them in rich colours. Those who were fortunate enough to catch a glimpse of the emperor, beheld his ears loaded with golden rings, his arms with golden chains, his diadem set with gems of all hues, his purple robes, which, with the diadem, were reserved for the emperor, in all their sutures embroidered with precious stones. The wondering people, on their return to their homes, could talk of nothing but the splendour of the spectacle: the robes, the mules, the carpets, the size and splendour of the jewels. On his return to the palace, the emperor walked on gold; ships were employed with the express purpose of bringing gold dust from remote provinces, which was strewn by the officious care of a host of attendants, so that the emperor rarely set his foot on the bare pavement."*

* Milman: Hist. of Christianity, p. 440, (Amer. ed.) Comp. the sketch of

The Christianity of the Byzantine court lived in the atmosphere of intrigue, dissimulation, and flattery. Even the court divines and bishops could hardly escape the contamination, though their high office, with its sacred functions, was certainly a protecting wall around them. One of these bishops congratulated Constantine, at the celebration of the third decennium of his reign (the tricennalia), that he had been appointed by God ruler over all in this world, and would reign with the Son of God in the other! This blasphemous flattery was too much even for the vain emperor, and he exhorted the bishop rather to pray God, he might be worthy to be one of his servants in this world and the next.* Even the church historian and bishop Eusebius, who elsewhere knew well enough how to value the higher blessings, and lamented the indescribable hypocrisy of the sham Christianity around the emperor,† suffered himself to be so far blinded by the splendour of the imperial favour, as to see in a banquet, which Constantine gave in his palace to the bishops at the close of the council of Nice, in honour of his twenty years' reign (the vicennalia), an emblem of the glorious reign of Christ upon the earth!‡

And these were bishops, of whom many still bore in their body the marks of the Diocletian persecution! So rapidly had changed the spirit of the age. While, on the other hand, the well-known firmness of Ambrose with Theodosius, and the life of Chrysostom, afford delightful proof that there were not wanting, even in this age, bishops of Christian earnestness and courage to rebuke the sins of crowned heads.

3. Intrusion of Politics into Religion.

With the union of the church and the state begins the long and tedious history of their collisions and their mutual struggles for

the court of Arcadius, which Montfaucon, in a treatise in the last volume of his *Opera Chrys.*, and Müller: *De genio, moribus, et luxu ævi Theodosiani*, Copenh. 1798, have drawn, chiefly from the works of Chrysostom.

* Euseb. Vit. Const. iv. 48.

† V. Const. iv. 54.

‡ V. Const. iii. 15, where Eusebius, at the close of this imperio-episcopal banquet, "which transcended all description," says: Χριστοῦ βασιλεῖας ἴδετε ἀ τις φαντασίοις εἰκὼν, ὅταν τὸ εἶναι ἄλλον οὐχ ἵππος τὸ γνόμενον.

the mastery: the state seeking to subject the church to the empire, the church to subject the state to the hierarchy, and both full often transgressing the limits prescribed to their power in that word of the Lord, “Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.” From the time of Constantine, therefore, the history of the church and that of the world in Europe are so closely interwoven, that neither can be understood without the other. On the one hand the political rulers, as the highest members and the patrons of the church, claimed a right to a share in her government, and interfered in various ways in her external and internal affairs either to her profit or to her prejudice. On the other hand, the bishops and patriarchs, as the highest dignitaries and officers of the state religion, became involved in all sorts of secular matters, and in the intrigues of the Byzantine court. This mutual intermixture, on the whole, was of more injury than benefit to the church and to religion, and fettered her free and natural development.

Of a separation of religion and politics, of the spiritual power from the temporal, heathen antiquity knew nothing, because it regarded religion itself only from a natural point of view, and subjected it to the purposes of the all-ruling state, the highest known form of human society. The Egyptian kings, as Plutarch tells us, were at the same time priests, or were received into the priesthood at their election. In Greece the civil magistrate had supervision of the priests and sanctuaries.* In Rome, after the time of Numa, this supervision was intrusted to a senator, and afterwards united with the imperial office. All the emperors, from Augustus,† to Julian the Apostate, were

* This overseer was called *βασιλεὺς* of the *ἱρῶν* and *ἱράς*.

† Augustus took the dignity of Pontifex Maximus after the death of Lepidus, A. u. 742, and thenceforth that office remained inherent in the imperial, though it was usually conferred by a decree of the senate. Formerly the pontifex maximus was elected by the people for life, could take no civil office, must never leave Italy, touch a corpse, or contract a second marriage; and he dwelt in the old king’s house, the Regia. Augustus himself exercised the office despotically enough, though with great prudence. He nominated and increased at pleasure the members of the sacerdotal college, chose the vestal virgins, determined the authority of the vaticinia, purged the Sibylline books of apocryphal interpolations, continued the reform of the calendar begun by Cæsar, and changed the month Sextilis into Augustus, in his own honour, as Quintilis,

at the same time supreme pontiffs, (Pontifices Maximi,) the heads of the state religion, emperor-popes. As such they could not only perform all priestly functions, even to offering sacrifices, when superstition or policy prompted them to do so, but they also stood at the head of the highest sacerdotal college, (of fifteen or more Pontifices,) which in turn regulated and superintended the three lower classes of priests, (the Epulones, Quindecimviri, and Augures,) the temples and altars, the sacrifices, divinations, feasts, and ceremonies, the exposition of the Sybilline books, the calendar, in short, all public worship, and in part, even the affairs of marriage and inheritance.

Now it may easily be supposed, that the Christian emperors, who, down to Gratian, (about 380,) even retained the name and the insignia of the Pontifex Maximus, should claim the same oversight of the Christian religion established in the empire, which their predecessors had had of the heathen; only with this material difference, that they found here a stricter separation between the religious element and the political, the ecclesiastical, and the secular, and were obliged to bind themselves to the already existing doctrines, usages, and traditions of the church.

4. The Emperor-Papacy and the Hierarchy.

And this, in point of fact, took place first under Constantine, and developed under his successors, particularly under Justinian, into the system of the Byzantine imperial papacy,* or of the supremacy of the state over the church.

Constantine once said to the bishops at a banquet, that he also, as a Christian emperor, was a divinely appointed bishop,

the birth-month of Julius Cæsar, had before been re-baptized Julius. Comp. Charles Merivale: *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. iii. p. 478 sqq. (Lond. 1851.)

* In England and Scotland the term *Erastianism* is used for this; but is less general, and not properly applicable at all to the Greek church. For the man who furnished the word, Thomas Erastus, a learned and able physician and professor of medicine in Heidelberg, (died at Basle, in Switzerland, 1583,) was an opponent not only of the independence of the church towards the state, but also of the church ban and of the presbyterian constitution and discipline, as advocated by Frederick III. of the Palatinate, and the authors of the Heidelberg Catechism, especially Olevianus, a pupil of Calvin. He was at last excommunicated for his views by the church council in Heidelberg.

a bishop over the external affairs of the church, while the internal affairs belonged to the bishops proper.* In this pregnant word he expressed the new posture of the civil sovereign towards the church in a characteristic though indefinite and equivocal way. He made there a distinction between two divinely authorized episcopates; one secular or imperial, corresponding with the old office of Pontifex Maximus, and extending over the whole Roman empire, therefore oecumenical or universal; the other spiritual or sacerdotal, divided among the different diocesan bishops, and appearing properly in its unity and totality only in a general council.

Accordingly, though not yet even baptized, he acted as the patron and universal temporal bishop of the church;† summoned the first oecumenical council for the settlement of the

* His words, which are to be taken neither in jest and pun, (as Neander supposes,) nor as mere compliment to the bishops, but in earnest, run thus, in Eusebius; Vita Const. l. iv. c. 24: 'Υμῖς (the *ἐπίσκοποι* {addressed}) μὲν τὸν εἰοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης, ἵνα δὲ τὸν εἰτὸς ὑπὸ θεοῦ καθεσταμένος ἐπίσκοπος ἀνήν. All depends here on the interpretation of the antithesis *τὸν εἰοῦ* and *τὸν εἰτὸς τῆς οἰκουμένης*. (a) The explanation of Stroth and others takes the genitive as masculine, *οἱ εἰοῦ* denoting Christians, and *οἱ εἰτὸς* heathens; so that Constantine ascribed to himself only a sort of episcopate *in partibus infidelium*. But this contradicts the connection; for Eusebius says immediately after, that he took a certain religious oversight over *all* his subjects, (*τοὺς ἀρχούμενους ἀναγνώστες*, etc.,) and calls him also elsewhere a "universal bishop," (i. 44.) (b) Gieseler's interpretation is not much better, (§ 92, not. 20. Engl. ed. vol. i. p. 423): that *οἱ εἰτὸς* denotes all his subjects, Christian as well as non-Christian, but only in their civil relations, so far as they are outside the church. This entirely blunts the antithesis with *οἱ εἰοῦ*, and puts into the emperor's mouth a mere common-place instead of a new idea; for no one doubted his *political* sovereignty. (c) The genitive is rather to be taken as neuter in both cases, and *περιγγυάτων* to be supplied. This agrees with usage, (we find it in Polybius,) and gives a sense, which agrees with the view of Eusebius and with the whole practice of Constantine. There is, however, of course, another question: What is the proper distinction between *τὰ εἰοῦ* and *τὰ εἰτὸς*, the *interna* and *externa* of the church, or, what is much the same, between the sacerdotal *jus in sacra* and the imperial *jus circa sacra*. This Constantine and his age certainly could not themselves exactly define, since the whole relation was at that time as yet new and undeveloped.

† Eusebius in fact calls him, a divinely appointed universal bishop, *οἴα τῆς οὐρανὸς ἐπίσκοπος ἐν θεῷ καθεσταμένος, συνίδεος τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ λειτουργῶν συνεκρότευτος.* Vit. Const. i. 44. His son Constantius was fond of being called "bishop of bishops."

controversy respecting the divinity of Christ; instituted and deposed bishops; and occasionally even delivered sermons to the people; but on the other hand, with genuine tact, (though this was in his earlier period, A. D. 314,) kept aloof from the Donatist controversy, and referred to the episcopal tribunal as the highest and last resort in purely spiritual matters. In the exercise of his imperial right of supervision, he did not follow any clear insight and definite theory, so much as an instinctive impulse of control, a sense of politico-religious duty, and the requirements of the time. His word only raised, did not solve the question of the relation between the imperial and the sacerdotal episcopacy, and the extent of their respective jurisdictions in a Christian state.

This question became thenceforth the problem and the strife of history, both sacred and secular, ran through the whole mediaeval conflict between emperor and pope, between imperial and hierarchical episcopacy, and recurs in modified form in every Protestant established church.

In general, from this time forth, the prevailing view was, that God has divided all power between the priesthood and the kingdom (*sacerdotium et imperium*), giving internal or spiritual affairs, especially doctrine and worship, to the former, and external or temporal affairs, such as government and discipline, to the latter.* But internal and external here vitally inter-

* Justinian states the Byzantine theory thus, in the preface to the 6th Novel: *Maxima quidem in hominibus sunt dona Dei a superna collata clementia Sacerdotium et Imperium, et illud quidem divinis ministrans, hoc autem humanis praesidens ac diligentiam exhibens, ex uno eodemque principio utraque procedentia humanam exornant vitam.* But he then ascribes to the Imperium the supervision of the Sacerdotium, and maximam sollicitudinem circa vera Dei dogmata et circa Sacerdotum honestatem. Later Greek emperors, on the ground of their anointing, even claim a priestly character. Leo the Isaurian, for example, wrote to pope Gregory II. in 730: *Βασιλεὺς καὶ ιερέψ εἰμι* (Mansi xii. 976). This, however, was contested even in the East, and the monk Maximus in 655 answered negatively the question put to him: *Ergo non est omnis Christianus imperator etiam sacerdos?* At first the emperor's throne stood side by side with the bishop's in the choir; but Ambrose gave the emperor a seat next to the choir. Yet, after the ancient custom, which the Concilium Quinisext, A. D. 692, in its 69th canon, expressly confirmed, the emperors might enter the choir of the church, and lay their oblations in person upon the altar;—a privilege, which was denied to all the laity, and which implied at least a half-priestly character in the emperor. Gibbon's statement needs correction accordingly,

penetrate and depend on each other, as soul and body, and frequent reciprocal encroachments and collisions are inevitable upon state-church ground. This becomes manifest in the period before us in many ways, especially in the East, where the Byzantine despotism had freer play than in the distant West.

The emperors after Constantine (as the popes after them) summoned the general councils, bore the necessary expenses, presided in the councils through commissions, gave to the decisions in doctrine and discipline the force of law for the whole Roman empire, and maintained them by their authority. The emperors nominated or confirmed the most influential metropolitans and patriarchs. They took part in all theological disputes, and thereby inflamed the passion of parties. They protected orthodoxy and punished heresy with the arm of power. Often, however, they took the heretical side, and banished orthodox bishops from their sees. Thus Arianism, Nestorianism, Eutychianism, and Monophysitism successively found favour and protection at court. Even empresses meddled in the internal and external concerns of the church. Justina endeavoured with all her might to introduce Arianism in Milan, but met a successful opponent in bishop Ambrose. Eudoxia procured the deposition and banishment of the noble Chrysostom. Theodora, raised from the stage to the throne, ruled the emperor Justinian, and sought by every kind of intrigue to promote the victory of the Monophysite heresy. It is true, the doctrinal decisions proceeded properly from the councils, and could not have maintained themselves long without such sanction. But Basiliscus, Zeno, Justinian I., Heraclius, Constans II., and other emperors issued many purely ecclesiastical edicts and rescripts, without consulting the councils, or through the councils by their own influence upon them. Justinian opens his celebrated codex with the imperial creed on the trinity, and the imperial anathema against Nestorius, Eutyches, Apollinaris, on the basis certainly of the apostolic church and of the four oecumenical councils, but in the consciousness of absolute legislative

(ch. xx.): "The monarch, whose spiritual rank is less honourable than that of the meanest deacon, was seated below the rails of the sanctuary, and confounded with the rest of the faithful multitude."

and executive authority even over the faith and conscience of all his subjects.

The voice of the catholic church in this period conceded to the Christian emperors in general, with the duty of protecting and supporting the church, the right of supervision over its external affairs, but claimed for the clergy, particularly for the bishops, the right to govern her within, to fix her doctrine, to direct her worship. The new state of things was regarded as a restoration of the Mosaic and Davidic theocracy on Christian soil, and judged accordingly. But in respect to the extent and application of the emperor's power in the church, opinion was generally determined, consciously or unconsciously, by some special religious interest. Hence we find, that catholics and heretics, Athanasians and Arians, justified or condemned the interference of the emperor in the development of doctrine, the appointment and deposition of bishops, and the patronage and persecution of parties, according as they themselves were affected by them. The same Donatists, who first appealed to ~~the imperial protection~~, when the decision went against them, denounced all intermeddling ~~of~~ the state with the church. There were bishops who justified even the most arbitrary excesses of the Byzantine despotism, in religion, by reference to Melchizedek and the pious kings of Israel, and yielded themselves willing tools of the court. But there were never wanting also fearless defenders of the rights of the church against the civil power. Maximus the confessor declared before his judges in Constantinople, that Melchizedek was a type of Christ alone, not of the emperor.

In general the hierarchy formed a powerful and whole ^{some} check on the imperial papacy, and preserved the freedom and independence of the church towards the temporal power. That age had only the alternative of imperial or episcopal despotism; and of these the latter was the less hurtful and the more profitable, because it represented the higher intellectual and moral interests. Without the hierarchy, the church in the Roman empire and among the barbarians had been the football of civil and military despots. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance, that the church, at the time of her marriage with the state, had already grown so large and strong as to withstand

all material alteration by imperial caprice, and all effort to degrade her into a tool. The Apostolic Constitutions place the bishops even above all kings and magistrates.* Chrysostom says, that the first ministers of the state enjoyed no such honour as the ministers of the church. And in general the ministers of the church deserved their honour. Though there were prelates enough who abused their power to sordid ends, still there were men, like Athanasius, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Leo, the purest and most venerable characters, which meet us in the fourth and fifth centuries, far surpassing the contemporary emperors. It was the universal opinion, that the doctrines and institutions of the church, resting on divine revelation, are above all human power and will. The people looked, in blind faith and superstition, to the clergy as their guides in all matters of conscience, and even the emperors had to pay the bishops, as the fathers of the church, the greatest reverence; kiss their hands, beg their blessing, and submit to their admonition and discipline. In most cases the emperors were mere tools of parties in the church. Arbitrary laws, which were imposed upon the church from without, rarely survived their makers, and were condemned by history. For there is a divine authority above all thrones and kings and bishops, and a power of truth above all the machinations of falsehood and intrigue.

The western church, as a whole, preserved her independence far more than the eastern, partly through the great firmness of the Roman character, partly through the favour of political circumstances, and of remoteness from the influence and the intrigues of the Byzantine court. Here the hierarchical principle developed itself, from the time of Leo the Great even to the absolute papacy, which, however, after it fulfilled its mission for the world among the barbarian nations of the middle age, degenerated into an insufferable tyranny over conscience, and thus exposed itself to destruction. In the catholic system, the freedom and independence of the church involve the supremacy of an exclusive priesthood and papacy;

* Lib. ii., c. 11, where the bishop is reminded of his exalted position, *λεῖτον τύπον ἔχειν εἰς ἀνθρώπους τὰ πάντας δέχειν ἀνθρώπων, ιερέων, βασιλίων, αρχόντων, etc.*
Comp. c. 33 and 34.

in the Protestant, they can be realized only on the broader basis of the universal priesthood, in the self-government of the Christian people; though this is, as yet, in all Protestant established churches, more or less restricted by the power of the state.

5. Restriction of Religious Freedom, and beginnings of Persecution of Heretics.

An inevitable consequence of the union of church and state was restriction of religious freedom in faith and worship, and the civil punishment of departure from the doctrine and discipline of the established church.

The church, dominant and recognised by the state, gained, indeed, external freedom and authority, but in a measure at the expense of inward liberty and self-control. She came, as we have seen in the previous section, under the patronage and supervision of the head of the Christian state, especially in the Byzantine empire. In the first three centuries, the church, with all her external lowliness and oppression, enjoyed the greater liberty within, in the development of her doctrines and institutions, by reason of her entire separation from the state.

But the freedom of error and division was now still more restricted. In the ante-Nicene age heresy and schism were as much hated and abhorred, indeed, as afterwards, yet were met only in a moral way, by word and writing, and were punished with excommunication from the rights of the church. Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and even Lactantius were the first advocates of the principle of freedom of conscience, and maintained, against the heathen, that religion was essentially a matter of free will, and could be promoted only by instruction and persuasion, not by outward force.* All they say against the persecution of Christians by the heathen, applies in full to the persecution of heretics by the church. After the Nicene age all departures from the reigning state-church faith were not only abhorred and excommunicated as religious errors, but were treated also as crimes against the Christian state, and hence were punished with civil penalties; at first with deposi-

* Just. Mart. Apol. i., 2, 4, 12. Tertull. Apolog. 24, 28. Ad. Scapul. c. 2. Lactant. Instit. v., 19, 20. Epist. c. 54.

tion, banishment, confiscation, and after Theodosius, even with death.

This persecution of heretics was a natural consequence of the union of religious and civil duties and rights, the confusion of the civil and the ecclesiastical, the juridical and the moral, which came to pass in Constantine. It proceeded from the state and from the emperors, who in this respect showed themselves the successors of the Pontifices Maximi, with their relation to the church reversed. The church, indeed, steadfastly adhered to the principle, that, as such, she should employ only spiritual penalties, excommunication in extreme cases; as in fact Christ and the apostles expressly spurned and prohibited all carnal weapons, and would rather suffer and die than use violence. But, involved in the idea of Jewish theocracy and of a state church, she practically confounded in various ways the position of the law and that of the gospel, and in theory approved the application of forcible measures to heretics, and not rarely encouraged and urged the state to it; thus making herself at least indirectly responsible for the persecution. This is especially true of the Roman church in the times of her greatest power, in the middle age and down to the end of the sixteenth century; and by this course that church has made herself almost more offensive in the eyes of the world and of modern civilization, than by her peculiar doctrines and usages. The Protestant reformation dispelled the dream that Christianity was identical with a fixed organization, with the papacy, and gave a mighty shock thereby to the principle of ecclesiastical exclusiveness. Yet, properly speaking, it was not till the eighteenth century that a radical revolution of views was accomplished in regard to religious toleration; and the progress of toleration and free worship has gone hand in hand with the gradual loosening of the state-church basis, and with the clearer separation of civil and religious rights and of the temporal and spiritual power.

In the beginning of his reign Constantine proclaimed full freedom of religion (312), and in the main continued tolerably true to it; at all events he used no violent measures, as his successors did. This toleration, however, was not a matter of fixed principle with him, but merely of temporary policy;

a necessary consequence of the incipient separation of the Roman throne from idolatry, and the natural transition from the sole supremacy of the heathen religion to the same supremacy of the Christian. Intolerance directed itself first against heathenism; but as the false religion gradually died out of itself, and at any rate had no moral energy for martyrdom, there resulted no such bloody persecutions of idolatry under the Christian emperors, as there had been of Christianity under their heathen predecessors. Instead of Christianity, the intolerance of the civil power now took up Christian heretics, whom it recognised as such. Constantine, even in his day, limited the freedom and the privileges which he conferred to the catholic, that is, the prevailing orthodox episcopal church, and soon after the Council of Nice, by an edict of the year 326, expressly excluded heretics and schismatics from these privileges.* Accordingly he banished the leaders of Arianism, and ordered their writings to be burned; but afterwards, wavering in his views of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and persuaded over by some bishops and his sister, he recalled Arius and banished Athanasius. He himself was baptized shortly before his death by an Arian bishop. His son Constantius was a fanatical persecutor of idolatry and the Nicene orthodoxy, and endeavoured with all his might to establish Arianism alone in the empire. Hence the earnest protest of the orthodox bishops, Hosius, Athanasius, and Hilary, against this despotism and in favour of toleration;† which came, however, we have to remember, from parties who were themselves the sufferers under intolerance, and who did not regard the banishment of the Arians as unjust.

Under Julian the Apostate religious liberty was again proclaimed, but only as the beginning of return to the exclusive establishment of heathenism; the counterpart, therefore, of Constantine's toleration. After his early death, Arianism

* Cod. Theod. xvi. 5, 1: *Privilegia, quae contemplatione religionis indulta sunt, catholicae tantum legis observatoribus prodesse opportet. Haereticos autem atque schismaticos non tantum ab his privilegiis alienos esse volumus, sed etiam diversis muneribus constringi et subjici.*

† Comp. § 3, above.

again prevailed, at least in the East, and showed itself more intolerant and violent than the catholic orthodoxy.

At last Theodosius the Great, the first emperor who was baptized in the Nicene faith, put an end to the Arian interregnum, proclaimed the exclusive authority of the Nicene creed, and at the same time enacted the first rigid penalties not only against the pagan idolatry, the practice of which was thenceforth a capital crime in the empire, but also against all Christian heresies and sects. The ruling principle of his public life was the unity of the empire and of the orthodox church. Soon after his baptism, in 380, he issued, in connection with his weak co-emperors, Gratian and Valentinian II., to the inhabitants of Constantinople, then the chief seat of Arianism, the following edict: "We, the three emperors, will, that all our subjects steadfastly adhere to the religion which was taught by St. Peter to the Romans, which has been faithfully preserved by tradition, and which is now professed by the pontiff Damasus of Rome, and Peter, bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic holiness. According to the institution of the apostles and the doctrine of the gospel, let us believe in the one Godhead of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, of equal majesty in the holy Trinity. We order, that the adherents of this faith be called *catholic Christians*; we brand all the senseless followers of other religions with the infamous name of *heretics*, and forbid their conventicles assuming the name of churches. Besides the condemnation of divine justice, they must expect the heavy penalties, which our authority, guided by heavenly wisdom, shall think proper to inflict."* In the course of fifteen years this emperor issued at least fifteen penal laws against heretics,† by which he gradually deprived them of all right to the exercise of their religion, excluded them from all civil offices, and threatened them with fines, confiscation, banishment, and in some cases, as the Manichæans, the Audians, and even the Quartodecimanians, with death.

* Cod. Theod. xvi. 1, 2: Baronius and even Godefroy call this edict, which in this case, to be sure, favored the true doctrine, but involves the absolute despotism of the emperor over faith, an "edictum aureum, pium et salutare."

† Comp. Cod. Theod. xvi., tit. v., leg. 6—33, and Godefroy's Commentary.

From Theodosius therefore, dates the state-church theory of persecution of heretics, and the embodiment of it in legislation. His primary design, it is true, was rather to terrify and convert, than to punish, the refractory subjects.*

From the theory, however, to the practice was a single step; and this step his rival and colleague, Maximus, took, when, at the instigation of the unworthy bishop Ithacius, he caused the Spanish bishop Priscillian, with six respectable adherents of his Manichæan-like sect (two presbyters, two deacons, the poet Latronian, and Euchrocia, a noble matron of Bordeaux,) to be tortured and beheaded with the sword at Trier in 385. This was the first shedding of the blood of heretics by a Christian prince for religious opinions. The bishops assembled at Trier (Treves), with the exception of Theognistus, approved this act.

But the better feeling of the Christian church shrunk from it with horror. The bishops Ambrose of Milan† and Martin of Tours‡ raised a memorable protest against it, and broke off all communion with Ithacius and the other bishops, who had approved the execution. Yet it should not be forgotten, that these bishops, at least Ambrose, were committed against the death penalty in general, and in other respects had no indulgence for heathens and heretics.§ The whole thing, too, was

* So Sozomen asserts, l. vii., c. 12.

† Epist. xxiv. ad Valentin. (tom. ii. p. 891.) He would have nothing to do with bishops, "qui aliquos, devios licet a fide, ad necem petebant."

‡ In Sulpic. Sever., Hist. Sacra, ii. 50: "Namque tum Martinus apud Treveros constitutus, non desinebat increpare Ithacium, ut ab accusatione desisteret, Maximum orare, ut sanguine infelicum abstineret: satis superque sufficere, ut episcopali sententia haereticici judicati ecclesiis pellerentur: novum esse et inauditum nefas, ut causam ecclesiae judex saeculi judicaret." Comp. Sulp. Sev. Dial. iii. c. 11—18, and his Vit. Mart. c. 20.

§ Hence Gibbon, ch. xxvii., charges them, not quite groundlessly, with inconsistency: "It is with pleasure that we can observe the humane inconsistency of the most illustrious saints and bishops, Ambrose of Milan, and Martin of Tours, who, on this occasion, asserted the cause of toleration. They pitied the unhappy men, who had been executed at Treves; they refused to hold communion with their episcopal murderers; and if Martin deviated from that generous resolution, his motives were laudable, and his repentance was exemplary. The bishops of Tour and Milan pronounced, without hesitation, the eternal damnation of heretics; but they were surprised and shocked by the bloody image of their temporal death, and the honest feelings of nature resisted the artificial prejudices of theology."

irregularly done; on the one hand the bishops appeared as accusers in a criminal cause, and on the other a temporal judge admitted an appeal from the episcopal jurisdiction, and pronounced an opinion in a matter of faith. Subsequently the functions of the temporal and spiritual courts in the trial of heretics were more accurately distinguished.

The execution of the Priscillianists is the only instance of the *bloody* punishment of heretics in our period, as it is the first in the history of Christianity. But the propriety of violent measures against heresy was thenceforth vindicated even by the best fathers of the church. Chrysostom recommends, indeed, Christian love towards heretics and heathens, and declares against their execution, but approves the prohibition of their assemblies and the confiscation of their churches; and he acted accordingly against the Novatians and the Quartodecimanians, so that many considered his own subsequent misfortunes as condign punishment.* Jerome, appealing to Deut. xiii. 6—10, seems to justify even the penalty of death against religious errorists.† Augustine, who himself belonged for nine years to the Manichæan sect, and was wonderfully converted by the grace of God to the catholic church without the slightest pressure from without, held at first the truly evangelical view, that heretics and schismatics should not be violently dealt with, but won by instruction and conviction; but after the year 400 he turned and retracted this view, in consequence of his experience with the Donatists, whom he endeavoured in vain to convert by disputation and writing, while many submitted to violent punishment.‡ Henceforth he was led to advocate the persecution of heretics, partly by his doctrine of the Christian state, partly

* Hom. xxix. and xlvi. in Matt. Comp. Socrat. H. E. vi. 19. Elsewhere his principle was (in Phocam mart. et c. haer. tom. ii. p. 705): Ἐμοὶ θόρι δίκαιος οὐκ μὴ δίκαιος; that is, he himself would rather suffer injury than inflict injury.

† Epist. xxxvii. (al. liii.) ad Riparium adv. Vigilantium.

‡ Epist. 93 ad Vincent., § 17: Mea primitus sententia non erat, nisi neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogendum, verbo esse agendum, disputatione pugnandum, ratione vincendem, ne fictos catholicos haberemus, quos apertos haereticos neveramus. Sed—he continues—haec opinio mea non contradicentium verbis, sed demonstrantium superabatur exemplis. Then he adduces his experience with the Donatists. Comp. Retract. ii. 5.

by the seditious excesses of the fanatical Circumcelliones, partly by the evident wholesome effect of temporal punishments, and partly by a false interpretation of the *cogite intrare*, in the parable of the great supper, Luke xiv. 23.* “It is, indeed, better,” says he, “that men should be brought to serve God by instruction than by fear of punishment or by pain. But because the former means are better, the latter must not therefore be neglected. . . . Many must often be brought back to their Lord, like wicked servants, by the rod of temporal suffering, before they attain the highest grade of religious development. . . . The Lord himself orders, that the guests be first invited, then compelled, to his great supper.”† This father thinks that if the state be denied the right to punish religious error, neither should she punish any other crime, like murder or adultery, since Paul, in Gal. v. 19, attributes divisions and sects to the same source in the flesh.‡ He charges his Donatist opponents with inconsistency in seeming to approve the emperors’ prohibitions of idolatry, but condemning their persecution of Christian heretics. It is to the honour of Augustine’s heart, indeed, that in actual cases he earnestly urged upon the magistrates clemency and humanity, and thus in practice remained true to his noble maxim: “Nothing conquers but truth; the victory of truth is love.”§ But his theory, as Neander justly observes, “contains the germ of the whole system of spiritual despotism, intolerance, and persecution, even to the court of the Inquisition.”|| The great authority of his name was often afterwards made to justify cruelties, from which he himself would have shrunk with horror. Soon after him, Leo the Great, the first representative of consistent, exclusive, universal papacy, advocated even the penalty of death for heresy.¶

* The direction: “*Compel them to come in*,” which has often since been abused in defence of coercive measures against heretics, must, of course, be interpreted in harmony with the whole spirit of the gospel, and is only a strong descriptive term in the parable to signify the fervent zeal in the conversion of the heathen, such as St. Paul manifested without ever resorting to physical coercion.

† Epist. 185 ad Bonifacium, § 21, § 24.

‡ C. Gaudent. Donat. i., § 20. C. epist. Parmen. i., § 16.

§ “Non vincit nisi veritas, victoria veritatis est caritas.”

|| Kirchengesch. iii., p. 427.—Torry’s ed. ii., p. 217.

¶ Epist. xv. ad Turribium, where Leo mentions the execution of the Priscil-

Henceforth none but the persecuted parties from time to time protested against religious persecution; being made, by their sufferings, if not from principle, at least from policy and self-interest, the advocates of toleration. Thus the Donatist bishop, Petilian, in Africa, against whom Augustine wrote, rebukes his catholic opponents, (as formerly his countryman, Tertullian, had condemned the heathen persecutors of the Christians,) for using outward force in matters of conscience; appealing to Christ and the apostles, who never persecuted, but rather suffered and died. "Think you," says he, "to serve God by killing us with your own hand? Ye err, ye err, if ye, poor mortals, think this; God has not hangmen for priests. Christ teaches us to bear wrong, not to revenge it." The Donatist bishop, Gaudentius, says, "God appointed prophets and fishermen, not princes and soldiers, to spread the faith." Still we cannot forget, that Donatists were the first who appealed to the imperial tribunal in an ecclesiastical matter, and did not, till after that tribunal had decided against them, turn against the state-church system.

ART. II.—*An Introduction to the Old Testament, critical, historical, and theological*, containing a discussion of the most important questions belonging to the several books. By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D. D., LL.D. 3 vols. 8vo., pp. 536, 492, and 492. 1862—3.

UPON the appearance of the tenth edition of Horne's Introduction, six years ago, we felt called upon to notice particularly the volume relating to the Old Testament, which was prepared by Dr. Davidson. At the conclusion of that notice we remarked: "The principles avowed or covertly insinuated in this volume will legitimately lead much further than the extent

lianists with evident approbation: "Etiam mundi principes ita hanc sacrilegam amentiam detestati sunt, ut auctorem ejus cum plerisque discipulis legum pullicarum ense prosternerent."

to which they are actually pursued. There is no logical consistency in going so far as Dr. Davidson does, and stopping there." The volumes before us amply justify this language. Almost every page might be cited in evidence that the author has found his old position of compromise between orthodoxy and unbelief to be untenable, and has exchanged it for another more consistent with his radical principles.

It is not so much our present purpose to subject the merits or demerits of this treatise to examination, as to deduce from it a few illustrations of the processes and results of the "higher criticism," as practised by our author and the school to which he has addicted himself. In order to accomplish this in the most coherent and intelligible manner, we shall restrict ourselves to his discussion of a single book of Scripture. And with this view we have selected the prophecy of Isaiah, both from its intrinsic interest and from its affording a fair specimen of the whole.

In 1856 we were told that the entire book which bears the name of Isaiah was the genuine production of the prophet, not excepting the four historical chapters, xxxvi—xxxix., which, though not incorporated with his prophecies by himself, were extracted from another work written by him. Now we are informed, that out of the sixty-six chapters but twenty-three, together with a few scattered verses, have proceeded from Isaiah. At the former date, Dr. Davidson tells us in his preface, "he had not reached his present maturer views. He did what he could under the circumstances and with the knowledge he had at the time." "The circumstances in which he was placed," *i. e.*, as Professor of Biblical Literature in an Independent College, "were averse to the free expression of thought. A man under the trammels of a sect, in which religious liberty is but a name, is not favourably situated for the task of thoroughly investigating critical or theological subjects." "Harsh-minded theologians," he adds, "who have inherited a little system of infallible divinity out of which they may excommunicate their neighbours, will not understand such development." We are glad to be thus expressly excluded at the outset from a class, which our author so violently and repeatedly reprobates, for we fancy that we do understand his develop-

ment exactly, and, assuming his point of departure, we think it the most natural thing in the world.

We lay no stress upon his having previously attributed the first chapter "to the reign of Hezekiah," whereas he is now "inclined to refer it to the reign of Ahaz." And it is of slight consequence that adopting, as before, the hypothesis that the passage common to Isaiah, (ii. 2—4,) and to Micah (iv. 1—3,) was borrowed by both from an older prophet, he now retracts his former confident assertion, "that older prophet was not Joel," and thinks it a "probable" "conjecture that he was Joel." His change of mind in regard to the sixth chapter is more deserving of note, on account of the reason upon which it is professedly based, and which reveals the secret of more considerable and serious alterations yet to come. He had formerly said, "The sixth chapter is ascribed in the first verse to the year of Uzziah's death, and there is no reason with various critics for supposing it to have been written later. The most natural interpretation is that which refers it to the very commencement of the prophet's entrance upon office, as describing his original inauguration." Now he says, "It refers to the inauguration of the prophet, but was not composed at the time; for he could not then know that his addresses would only tend to aggravate the guilt of the people, because they would be treated with neglect. The experience of the prophet in his intercourse with his fellow-countrymen had made him acquainted with their stubborn unbelief; and the reflection of such experience appears in the composition. Hence we must assume an interval of time between his induction into office and the writing of the prophecy."

There is more involved in this language than might at first sight appear. It is not purely a question whether a given chapter was committed to writing a few years earlier or later; it concerns the integrity of the prophet and the possibility of prophetic prediction. If the reason given is valid against the writing of the vision in the year that king Uzziah died, it is equally so against its being received at that time. Isaiah's word is discredited, he is charged with declaring that a vision was granted him upon his inauguration to the prophetic office, which he could not possibly have had; and this when his origi-

nal auditors were still able to testify whether or no they had heard it from his lips at that early period. And the decisive argument is, "he could not then know" what had not yet taken place.

We do not here care to argue with the Doctor that even upon his own principles the honesty of the prophet might have been spared. Thus he admits, ii., p. 464, that "certain events in the immediate future are sometimes foretold with great confidence, so that the prophets must have been sure they would take place without doubt, in precise harmony with the announcement. Authentic oracles of this nature, though rare, (?) are an evidence that an influence superior to human sagacity pervaded the spirits of the prophets." Again we read, iii., p. 69: "The Old Testament seer never projected his vision into the far distant future, so as to be able to predict events there, or describe persons beforehand with infallible certainty. . . . The near, not the remote, was the limit of prophetic foretelling. This is now acknowledged by all who understand the genius of prophecy." The reception of the prophet's message by his countrymen, certainly belongs to the near and not to the remote future; and if he allows, as he says that he does, the possibility of a revelation which may disclose the former before it becomes apparent to the unaided human understanding, why may not this have been included within "the limit of prophetic foretelling?" Whence then his certainty that this could not have been known in advance of experience?

In fact even upon a lower theory of prophecy than this, the correctness of his conclusion might be disputed. Even if the prophets' "allusions to the future were the product of human wisdom," and their "experience" "enabled them to glance correctly into the future, because they drew from the past and present the proper materials for their survey," a view which he pronounces "untenable" and "defective in leaving out the divine element," ii., p. 464, why might not the past and present obduracy of the people have been such, that the prophet could confidently anticipate its continuance in the future?

Waiving all discussion of the point at issue, however, we simply wish two things to be distinctly observed as exhibited in the case before us, as well as in all that are to follow. First,

it is upon his own avowal fundamental to the higher criticism, as Dr. Davidson understands and practises it, that no prophecy can have been uttered prior, or none at least long prior to the event to which it relates. The dogma of the impossibility of prediction, in its strict and proper sense, is decisive of the date of every alleged prophecy, irrespective of all other considerations. Secondly, his confident and often-repeated assertions that there are in fact no real prophecies in the Old Testament, are wholly based upon a logical circle. Thus ii., p. 460: "Wherever definite predictions having special details occur, particularly in relation to times, it can be shown that they are supposititious, or that the whole prophecy is spurious." And p. 462: "In no place or prophecy can it be shown that the literal predicting of distant historical events is contained." Fix the date of each prophecy in detail, on the assumption that prediction is impossible, and the general conclusion will inevitably follow. He might in the same way have demonstrated any other principle, that he set out to prove, no matter what it was.

The next six chapters also exhibit traces of "development," which are here referred to, not so much from their inherent consequence, as from their betraying a general tendency. Chap. vii. retains the date formerly assigned to it in the invasion of Judah, during the reign of Ahaz, by the confederate kings of Ephraim and Syria. "The date of the piece is about 742, hardly later." Chaps. viii.—xii., from being "only about three-quarters of a year later," "though committed to writing some time after they were spoken, *when the prophetic announcements began to be confirmed*," have come to be distributed along from B. C. 741 to 722.

We have now seen how those prophecies are managed, whose accomplishment took place during the prophet's life. The critical dictum to which our author bows, is satisfied by shifting them to such times in his ministry that they shall appear to have been spoken, or at least recorded, after or near the events predicted. But when Isaiah utters predictions, the fulfilment of which was reserved to a future age, this method will no longer answer. Where it fails, however, two artifices yet remain: one in the domain of criticism, and the other in that

of interpretation. The former requires the summary and violent process of denying Isaiah's authorship either of the entire prophecy, or at least of its obnoxious portions. What unvarying tradition has ascribed to him, and what is rightfully his by all external evidence, as well as by the strongest internal considerations, is unhesitatingly pronounced spurious, and attributed to some nameless writer of such date as will satisfy the critical dictum. Where this is impossible, or only partially successful, the remaining resort is to empty the prophecy of its meaning, either distorting it by a forced exegesis, or in some way obscuring its correspondence with the event, and thus converting it into a vague expression of patriotic hopes, or of devout anticipations, which were never actually realized. False theories of inspiration cannot maintain themselves beside the facts which lie upon the very face of the Scriptures. The denial of prophetic foresight has as its inevitable concomitant a destructive criticism and an unfair interpretation.

Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. It is the word of Him who knows the end from the beginning; and instead of being limited in its disclosures, as Dr. Davidson would have us believe, to "the immediate future," the most distant events may be revealed as readily and distinctly as those nearer at hand. They are alike known to God, and he can make them known to his servants to whatever extent he sees fit.

His revelations of the future are not, however, made indiscriminately nor at random. Just that is disclosed which is needed at the time for the instruction, warning, or guidance of the people of God. The purpose of God respecting Judah embraced especially two particulars lying beyond the lifetime of Isaiah, at different degrees of remoteness, with which it was important that the people should then be made acquainted. One belonged to his work of judgment, the other to his plan of grace. The first was the Babylonish captivity, involving calamities so unprecedented and distressing to the hearts of the pious, that they needed to be schooled in reference to it, and taught its meaning and issue. The second was the person and work of Messiah, with the blessed results which should

thence follow to them and to the world. Intervening or extraneous events were comparatively of small consequence to Isaiah's contemporaries. And, in fact, these still continued to be the great themes of prophecy until this heavy judgment had burst over Jerusalem. The burden of Jeremiah's instructions were the approaching exile and the coming Saviour. No foresight of the long succession of events which lay between was granted to him. It was not until the exile had actually begun, that a new vista was opened to Daniel, the interval to Messiah's advent measured, and the succession of worldly empires as well as the varying fortunes of the kingdom of God foreseen.

The judgment to be wrought by Babylon and upon it, accordingly occupies a prominent place among the predictions of Isaiah. Every thing relating to this subject, Dr. Davidson's critical dictum declares to be spurious; for how could this prophet know what would take place one or two centuries after his death? On the other hand, every thing Messianic is either converted into an indefinite rhapsody, or declared to have no reference to Christ at all.

Those who have never concerned themselves about critical questions, will accordingly have little difficulty in determining in advance what Dr. Davidson admits to be genuine, and what he rejects, by the simple criterion just afforded. If they ever mistake, it will be from a difference of judgment between him and them as to the question whether a knowledge of the Babylonish oppression is presupposed in a particular chapter or paragraph. That this is not only a sure test of the suspected chapters, but that it furnishes the real cause of their being suspected, will appear from an examination of them individually.

The burden of Babylon (ch. xiii. xiv.) belongs as a matter of course to the spurious chapters. "It did not proceed from Isaiah, but from a prophet living near the end of the Babylonian exile." In order to establish this conclusion, he tells us "Isaiah lived during the supremacy of the Assyrian, not the Chaldean empire. He could therefore refer to the future Chaldean one merely in its commencement. His historical standpoint could not be in it: nor, according to the analogy of prophecy, could he transfer his position at once into the distant

future, disregarding the political horizon of his own day. In making this statement, neither prophetic foresight nor inspiration is denied. The prophets did occasionally predict future events. They did not, however, cease to make their own time their starting point, out of which they surveyed the approaching future. Thus the charge made by Alexander and others against those who take our view of the nature of prophecy, resolves itself not into a denial of the possibility of prophetic inspiration, but a denial of their opinion respecting such inspiration. We do not reject the thing, but only their hypothesis, which is an arbitrary and an erroneous one."

No other reply to this seems to be necessary than that furnished by himself in 1856: "It has been assumed by many critics that xiii. 1, xiv. 23, proceeded from a much later writer than Isaiah, one living towards the termination of the Babylonian captivity. Their arguments, *if such they can be called*, in favour of this hypothesis, have been well refuted by Hävernick and Alexander. The chief cause which has led so many astray here is *the erroneous view of prophecy* they take. As long as prophetic foresight is limited to the gropings of human sagacity, without any supernatural element, such prophecies as the present will be totally misunderstood."

His other arguments, "if such they can be called," against the genuineness of these chapters, are in like manner proved futile out of his own mouth. Thus the allegation that "the tone and spirit of the prophecy are unlike Isaiah's," is met by the counter declaration, "When it is said that the spirit and views are foreign to Isaiah, the assertion is radically incorrect." "The style and diction are unlike those of Isaiah," is controverted by the express statement, "the style and diction are by no means dissimilar." He also formerly asserted, what he now denies, that "the ideas, images, and expressions in these chapters" are such as are found elsewhere in Isaiah, and are characteristic of him. His assertion, that "the unknown author has made use of several prophets later than Isaiah," is reversed by his previous assertion, based on the very same data, that the "using" was all the other way: "Later prophets have imitated and used the chapters under consideration." The only thing in his argument which is not anticipated by himself and contra-

dicted in express terms, is a list of words which he alleges to be of later origin than the time of Isaiah, but which is as unfortunate a selection as he could well have made. His first example, פְצַח רָבָה xiv. 7, is peculiar to Isaiah, occurring four times besides in his writings, and nowhere else. His second example, נִזְבֵּן xiv. 8, occurs five times in the ancient book of Job, while its verbal root occurs not only in other parts of Isaiah, which Dr. Davidson himself admits to be genuine, but even in the book of Genesis. נִזְבֵּשׁ xiv. 16 is found only in Ps. xxxiii. 14, and in the Song of Solomon, both written long before the time of Isaiah. נִזְבֵּשׁ xiii. 16 appears in Deut. xxviii. 30. חַתֵּחַ occurs in the same sense, Gen. xxiv. 32, as in Isa. xiv. 17. רַעֲשָׂה has the same meaning in Lev. xvii. 7, as in Isa. xiii. 21.

He even yet admits that "the authenticity of xiv. 24—27 is unquestionable;" this being so, the genuineness of the entire prophecy is established upon his own showing. For he tells us in his former work, "to separate the verses in question from the preceding prophecy," the very thing which he now does, "is quite arbitrary."

The next prophecy of Babylon's overthrow is contained in ch. xxi. 1—10: this, of course, shares the fate of its predecessor, and is declared not to belong to Isaiah himself, but to "an unknown author living towards the close of the Babylonian exile." Respecting this view he held the following language in 1856: "The considerations advanced respecting both pieces are the same, and proceed on the same false view of the nature of biblical prophecy. Their authenticity, however, is amply attested by the inscriptions which cannot be arbitrarily rejected; by the fact that several succeeding prophets, who appeared before the exile, present reminiscences and imitations of them; by genuine Isaiah-ideas and linguistic peculiarities." He here again reverses his own words almost sentence by sentence, and yet is so outraged by Dr. Alexander's ascribing the suspicion of spuriousness to the very source to which he had formerly traced it himself, "the fundamental principle of unbelief," that he hurls upon him the charge of "dogmatism, ignorance, and uncharitableness," "compensating for the absence of argument by railing." We can hardly refrain from saying

that Dr. Davidson affords the best possible illustration of his own words.

Chapter xxii., relating to Jerusalem, is admitted to be a genuine production of Isaiah, but then "the prophecy was not fulfilled." "The prophet merely uttered what he expected to happen." "Alexander has recourse to his not unusual hypothesis of a generic prediction, a picture of the conduct of the Jews in a certain conjuncture of affairs which happened more than once. This is a convenient subterfuge under the pressure of difficulties like the present." And yet in his previous work he not only admits the substantial fulfilment of the prediction, but in relation to the very next chapter affirms that view of prophecy which he here scouts as a "convenient subterfuge." He there says: "Hence there is reason for the view of Alexander, who regards the prophecy as generic, not specific, a panoramic picture of the downfall of Tyre from the beginning to the end of the destroying process, with particular allusion to the siege by Nebuchadnezzar."

Chap. xxiii. passes under the ban, because the Chaldeans are spoken of, ver. 13: "We dare not alter *Chaldeans*; else the difficulty could be obviated." He formerly said: "None of the arguments advanced against the Isaiah-authorship are sufficient to overthrow it."

Of ch. xxiv.—xxvii. he says: "The prophecy was not written by Isaiah, because the historical standpoint is in the Babylonian captivity." Yet every objection which he now adduces was formerly answered by himself in detail, and the prophecy declared to be "an authentic production of Isaiah."

The same thing is repeated in ch. xxxiv. xxxv.: though here, not satisfied with contradicting, sentence by sentence, what he had formerly written, he comes into collision with his existing theory. The writer of these chapters lived, as he has ascertained, "during the Babylonish captivity, probably about the middle of it." "We date the oracle about B. C. 555." He adds further, "It is not improbable that he was acquainted with ch. xl.—lxvi., though a different person from the author of those chapters." "The mind of the prophet before us was full of the ideas, and sometimes the diction of Isa. xl.—lxvi." This is said on p. 29. On turning to p. 45, we are informed

that ch. xl.—lxvi. were written from “B. C. 542 and onward till the eve of Babylon’s conquest.” Thus we have the ideas and diction of one composition reproduced in another several years before the first was written! Again, on p. 26, we are told that “the spirit of bitter hatred against the Edomites,” and against “the heathen generally, argues a later period” than that of Isaiah. Whereas, on p. 39, one of the proofs that ch. xl.—lxvi. were written long subsequent to the time of this prophet is, that “the tone is tenderer, and more uniformly evangelical than that of Isaiah,” and “the destruction of the Gentile nations is not dwelt upon with fierce rejoicings over it.”

Chapters xl.—lxvi. are also pronounced spurious with as much confidence as a few years ago he declared them to be genuine. He adduces nothing on this subject, in the volumes before us, which he did not present in his former publication. But here again we meet with the singular phenomenon, that not only is his general conclusion respecting the genuineness of these chapters the opposite of what it was before, but he has changed sides in regard to the validity of each individual argument. Every thing is stringent now which was worthless then, and *vice versa*. Nothing can be plainer than that it is not the array of arguments from style and diction, etc., etc., which determine his mind. His conclusion is reached quite irrespective of any such considerations. As long as he admitted the possibility of the foresight of the distant future, the book of Isaiah was genuine. Now he holds that the prophet can see nothing beyond his own political horizon; and there is much in Isaiah which cannot be squared with this theory, unless the dissecting knife of criticism is applied.

That the whole strain of argumentation by which the endeavour has been made to set aside the genuineness of parts of this book, rests on the dogmatic basis of unbelief, no one saw more clearly, or stated mere strongly than Dr. Davidson himself. Thus, he says (Horne’s Introd. II., p. 853): “Incorrect views of the nature of biblical prophecy lie at the basis of much that is here set forth. . . . The prophets were not confined to their own times. Their vision stretched beyond contemporary events and influences *into remote periods.*” And yet when Dr. Alexander says, in his commentary on Isaiah,

what is not only true by Dr. Davidson's former confession, but is demonstrably true, as we have shown, in his own case: "The fundamental principle of the higher critics is the impossibility of inspiration or prophetic foresight," he vents his spleen by denouncing this as an exhibition of *odium theologicum*.

After mangling the book in this manner, and converting it into "a collection of oracles belonging to different times, and proceeding from different prophets," it is not surprising that he complains of the absence of any principle of arrangement. Upon his theory it is indeed a singular jumble, and presents a phenomenon to which it might not be easy to find a parallel in literary history. We have here a book which was regarded as a standard authority from its first appearance, and was guarded with the most jealous care by a people who counted the very letters of their scriptures, in their anxiety to preserve them from error, and which yet has been interpolated and enlarged by spurious additions, without the slightest suspicion of the fact ever having been awakened. These spurious passages, moreover, compose the largest, most striking, and most important portion of the whole. And yet their several authors, though confessed to be prophets of rare genius and influence, and living by the hypothesis almost at the end of the exile, very near the time, therefore, when the canon was gathered and reduced to its permanent and final form, were wholly unknown to the collectors of the canon and to their contemporaries. And this, though there is not another instance of an anonymous prophecy in the Old Testament. The brief books of the minor prophets, such even as Obadiah and Nahum, though belonging to a former age, are preserved distinct, and referred each to its proper author. Yet not only were the names of these supposed writers lost, but their very existence was unknown to their own contemporaries; and their writings, in spite of their recent origin, were attributed to another, who lived two centuries before, and whose prophecies had been familiar from the time when they were first uttered. And these fresh additions to the volume of Isaiah's writings were not simply appended at the end, but inserted here and there at intervals, and so intermingled with the genuine portions that

nothing but the elaborate criticism of modern times could ever have separated them.

And what is yet more strange, there is nothing in the circumstances of the case to account for this remarkable literary error. There is no inherent similarity between these later passages and the writings of the prophet, with which they have been thus unaccountably confused, such as might have led to the mistake of attributing them to the same author. On the contrary, there is such a wide and palpable difference in subject, ideas, style, language, and general character, that modern critics distinguish them without difficulty, in the absence of all external evidence, and even in the face of it. Though, strangely enough, while the critics are unanimous in deciding that these passages are so unlike the genuine Isaiah that they cannot possibly be his, they cannot come to an agreement upon the question whether they agree with or differ from each other, and what number of distinct writers must therefore be assumed.

But what is perhaps most extraordinary of all, this odd jumble of the genuine and the spurious, this confused mixture of prophecies from various authors, belonging to different ages, forms a symmetrical whole. This heterogeneous mass of unconnected and discordant materials, thrown together without any system, presents nevertheless a most orderly arrangement. It is only to the merciless critic that there is any appearance of disorder. His violent sundering of what belongs together, obscures to him that consistent plan and method which pervades it. Admit this book to be what it claims, the record of one continuous prophetic ministry, and it unfolds regularly from first to last, and bears the stamp of consistent unity, completeness, and appositeness to the time and circumstances.

The prophets of the Old Testament whose writings are preserved to us, are grouped about the Assyrio-Babylonish judgment; the meaning of which it was their province as authentic interpreters of the will of God to explain, and the providential or gracious ends of which it was their mission to labour to secure. The several ministries of the different prophets derive their shape and character from the particular stage of this great disciplinary process at which they were raised up, and the par-

ticular aspect or portion of the divine plan which they were severally directed and enabled to present.

Isaiah witnessed the first flood of invasion by the Assyrians under Sennacherib, and his miraculous overthrow; this was an important crisis in his prophetic ministry. Another stroke of judgment preliminary to this, and standing in an intimate relation to it, was the invasion of Judah in the reign of Ahaz, by the combined forces of Syria and Ephraim; this formed another crisis in Isaiah's ministry, as it did likewise in the history of Judah. These two events, which mark the principal epochs in the prophet's life, and which are turning-points in the divine dealings with Judah, divide his ministry into three portions, and suggest a corresponding distribution of the book in which his ministry is recorded.

1. Chapters i.—vi., before the invasion by Syria and Ephraim.
2. Chapters vii.—xxxvii., between this and the Assyrian invasion.
3. Chapters xxxviii.—lxvi., after the Assyrian invasion.

Whether the chronological arrangement is strictly maintained throughout the book, as Hengstenberg has shown to be probable, or whether this is for special reasons departed from in some minor details, is a matter of small moment. The great periods of the prophet's ministry are undoubtedly preserved distinct, and succeed each other in their proper order. Each of these has a character of its own, determined by the particular exigencies of the time, and the spiritual necessities of the people. Each differs from the others in its general tone, in the scope of its revelations, and in its disclosures respecting the Messiah.

The first period belongs to the reigns of the pious Uzziah and Jotham. The prophet was called to confront a corrupt and wicked people, "drawing iniquity with cords of vanity, and sin as it were with a cart-rope," v. 18; but yet who were outwardly prosperous; "their land is full of silver and gold, neither is there any end of their treasures; their land is also full of horses, neither is there any end of their chariots," ii. 7. And, as a consequence, they were carnally secure, and incredulous of the divine judgments. They said, v. 19, "Let him make speed and hasten his work, that we may see it; and let the counsel of

the Holy One of Israel draw nigh and come, that we may know it." This obduracy, which only grew more obdurate under the prophet's warning voice, it was the purpose of God to break by a succession of heavy judgments, vi. 9—13. Accordingly the prophet's ministry during this first period is one of denunciation and woe. He is perpetually pointing forward to the coming judgment, and exhibiting its necessity and certainty. The four prophecies of this period, chap. i.,* chap. ii.—iv., chap. v., and chap. vi., are so many arguments of the approaching doom, plied with growing distinctness and severity, until in the last the climax is reached in that sublime vision, in which the Lord of Hosts appears in awful majesty, to pronounce sentence in person, from his lofty throne in the temple, upon the transgressing people.

The prophecies of Isaiah in this period offer little that is cheering. He has no promises whatever for the proximate future, either of a positive or of a negative kind. He neither holds out the prospect of benefits to be directly communicated to Judah, nor gives them any assurance of the overthrow of their enemies, present or prospective, by whom they were then threatened, or from whom they were afterwards to suffer. The only blessings of which he speaks belong to the distant Messianic future. And these, so far from detracting from the severity of the threatened evils, tend rather to aggravate it; for it is only through the purgation of terrible judgments, which shall remove the dross of the people, and wash away their filth, that this blessed period can be reached.

Moreover these promises are not only limited to a far distant period, serving by contrast rather to enhance the intervening gloom, but the space devoted to them is comparatively brief. They occupy but a few verses, while there are whole chapters of denunciation. It is likewise to be observed that the Messi-

* The general plan of the book is unaffected by the question whether chap. i. is the earliest of Isaiah's prophecies, and appears in its proper chronological place, or whether it belongs to a later period, and is prefixed as a suitable introduction to the whole. It is therefore needless to enter upon this discussion here, which, so far as it is capable of being decided, depends upon the view to be taken of verses 5—9. Upon the former hypothesis they are predictive, upon the latter they are descriptive.

anic future is here merely spoken of in general terms. No mention is made of the person of the Messiah, except in an enigmatical phrase, descriptive of his divine and human nature: "the Branch of the Lord and the Fruit of the earth," iv. 2. And the blessings of this glorious period are presented, not so much in the way of a positive development of their proper character and fulness, as negatively by way of contrast with the existing character and condition of the people. Their present guilt and unfaithfulness should then be exchanged for a purity befitting the people of God, and corresponding with their true ideal; and the evils from which they suffered, or were shortly to suffer, should be removed or reversed. Jerusalem shall then be purged from her crimes, and be made holy, i. 25, etc., iv. 3, 4. The nations shall flow to her, not for hostility, but for instruction; they shall not give law to her, but she to them, ii. 2, 3. Wars, of which she and the world at large have had and shall still have such terrible experience, shall cease, ii. 4. Her degradation and losses shall be made up by the sublimity and beauty of "the Branch of the Lord and the Fruit of the earth," iv. 2. And God, who now resolved upon her humiliation, abandons her to her foes, or brings her foes upon her, shall then afford invincible protection and glory, iv. 5, 6.

The second portion of Isaiah's ministry extends from the invasion by Syria and Ephraim in the reign of Ahaz to the invasion by Assyria in the fourteenth year of Hezekiah. The vision of chap. vi. was seen "in the year that king Uzziah died." Whether this be understood to mean before or after Uzziah's death, it must be reckoned to the reign of Jotham, who administered the kingdom during the leprosy of his father, 2 Chron. xxvi. 21. Chap. vii. transports us at once to "the days of Ahaz, the son of Jotham, the son of Uzziah." Whether Isaiah received no divine communications during the remainder of the reign of Jotham, being like Ezekiel xxiv. 27, xxxiii. 22, dumb for a season as to the exercise of his office, or whether his prophecies, being substantially repetitions of those already uttered, presented nothing to be recorded for the permanent use of the church, we have no means of ascertaining. We only know of his ministry, as it is here reproduced. The King, the Lord of Hosts has himself pronounced sentence on

the people. God has spoken, and the prophet's voice is hushed. He adds nothing to this sublimely awful utterance, until the Lord himself breaks the impressive silence, speaking not by words but by deeds. The decree of desolation to be effected by successive strokes of judgment enters upon the first stage of its providential accomplishment, and the prophet is then directed to enter upon his work afresh.

One heavy woe has come; another and heavier was not far distant. The ministry of Isaiah now alternates between judgment and mercy. The themes upon which he dwells are speedy deliverance from the present distress, the necessity and certainty of yet severer suffering to subdue their unhumbled hearts, the miraculous overthrow of the future great oppressor, the fall of minor foes, and the blessed results to the covenant people and the world when the judgment shall have done its work. The person of the Messiah is now repeatedly brought to view in his kingly office as the secure pledge of his people's preservation and their deliverer from every oppressor and from every form of evil.

This section of the book, like the preceding, consists of four parts, *viz.*

1. Chapters vii.—xii., a prophecy or prophecies occasioned by the first act in the predicted drama of judgment, the invasion by Syria and Ephraim. Deliverance is promised from this, but a sorcer calamity is threatened in the future.

2. Chapters xiii.—xxvii, the prophet's vision takes a wider scope, unfolding the purpose of God in these coming events with reference to the world at large. The same storm which impended over the covenant people in the invasion of the great Asiatic empire had a commission to perform in respect to heathen nations, and would burst over them likewise. The nations should be trodden down, the oppressor should be broken, but this temporary humiliation should prepare the way for an ultimate experience of the blessings of salvation.

3. Chapters xxviii.—xxxv, prophecies called forth by the near approach of the second act of judgment, the Assyrian invasion, whose miraculous defeat is promised.

4. Chapters xxxvi., xxxvii. record the invasion itself, the min-

istry of the prophet in that critical juncture, and the catastrophe which followed and by which this period was closed.

The first of these divisions contains a closely connected prophecy, or series of prophecies, which may be again divided into five parts, viz.

1. Chapter vii. details the circumstances of, and promises deliverance from, the existing invasion, but upon the presumptuous incredulity of the king threatens a severer one by Assyria.

2. Chapters viii. 1—ix. 7, both from this present and that future distress Immanuel is a pledge of protection to them who truly fear God.

3. Chapters ix. 8—x. 4, Ephraim, the foe of the present, shall perish.

4. Chapter x. 5—34, Assyria, the foe of the future, shall likewise perish.

5. Chapters xi., xii., the blessings of Immanuel's reign.

The three Messianic passages, which occur in the course of this prophecy and at its close, form a climax both in length and fulness. In the first, Immanuel, the virgin's child,* is a pledge of the deliverance from Syria and Ephraim. In the second, the child born, who is nevertheless the mighty God, the everlasting Father, and the Prince of peace, honours afflicted Galilee by his presence, gives joy to his suffering people, multiplies their diminished numbers, breaks the rod not only of Assyria but of every oppressor, and puts an end to war itself. In the third, he fills the world with the knowledge of the Lord, and restores the harmlessness of paradise; the Gentiles shall flock to the standard of the son of Jesse, and the dispersed outcasts of Israel be regathered from the four corners of the earth. In the present peril from Syria and Ephraim, and in the future and still greater one from Assyria, and after that peril and all others are surmounted, Immanuel is the star of hope, the sign

* Dr. Davidson admits, what it is impossible to deny, that the evangelist Matthew applies this prophecy to Christ. "But," he adds, "Matthew is not an infallible expounder of the prophecy, especially since he represents Jesus Christ to have been born of a virgin, and all the circumstances of his birth to have taken place in order that this very prediction might be fulfilled." "It is possible also that the first two chapters of Matthew may be unhistorical. Rothe believes so." So true is it that he who barters away his faith in the Old Testament must give up the New Testament likewise.

and pledge of safety. Ahaz need not fear the threatened overthrow of his royal house, though the foes leagued against him have already named his successor, (vii. 6,) for the virgin's son is yet to be born, and till then Judah and the house of David must be preserved. Assyria may fill the land of Immanuel with his armies, and flood it till the swelling waters reach the neck, viii. 8; and other enemies may combine against him only to be themselves broken in pieces, verse 9. Whatever miseries may be in store for the covenant people, and especially for the unfaithful portion of them, however many "may stumble and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken," the Wonderful, the Counsellor, shall yet sit upon the throne of David, of the increase of whose government and peace there shall be no end. The mighty Assyrian forest shall be hewn down, (x. 33, 34,) and the branch out of the roots of Jesse shall spring up. Every opposing power shall be removed out of the way, and the peaceful reign of the Son of David shall be universally established.

One function of the Assyrio-Babylonish empire has now been explained. It is to be a scourge divinely sent upon Judah. Is this the whole of its mission? Or is there any other work to be performed by it or upon it in the grand scheme of providence? The answer to this question is afforded by the next division of this section, (chapters xiii.—xxvii.) which sets the events already considered in their true relation to God's universal plan. This consists of a series of ten burdens or denunciatory prophecies, culminating in a judgment upon the whole world, and followed by the triumph of the Lord's people, whose foes have all been destroyed.

1. Chapters xiii. 1—xiv. 27, the burden of Babylon.
2. Chapter xiv. 28—32, the burden of Palestina, (Philistia.)
3. Chapters xv., xvi., the burden of Moab.
4. Chapters xvii., xviii., the burden of Damascus.
5. Chapters xix., xx., the burden of Egypt.
6. Chapter xxi. 1—10, the burden of the desert of the sea, (Babylon.)
7. Chapter xxi. 11, 12, the burden of Dumah, (Edom, Idumea.)
8. Chapter xxi. 13—17, the burden upon Arabia.

9. Chapter xxii, the burden of the valley of vision, (Jerusalem.)

10. Chapter xxiii., the burden of Tyre.

Chapter xxiv., the visitation upon the whole world.

Chapters xxv.—xxvii., the triumph of God's people.

Dr. Davidson argues from these prophecies against foreign nations, that the title (i. 1) which ascribes the entire book to Isaiah could only have been intended to embrace the antecedent chapters, which accordingly must have been published by themselves in the first instance, and which constitute the only part free from spurious additions. "The inscription does not suit the whole book, because it is said, 'which he saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem,' words inapplicable to chapters xiii.—xxiii. Hence it refers to an original collection of Isaiah's prophecies, to chapters i.—xii., and may have proceeded from the prophet himself." But why does he not on the same ground exclude the denunciations of Ephraim and of Assyria in chapters ix. and x. from the "original collection"? If the title is applicable to those chapters it is equally applicable to these burdens.

The predictions relating to foreign nations concerned Judah and Jerusalem as well. They were not intended for the benefit of the nations immediately affected. They were not even as a general rule made known to them. They were designed for the instruction, warning, or comfort of the chosen people. And that this is particularly the case here, appears from the intimate relation of these prophecies to the foregoing, as this has been already exhibited, seeing that they disclose the bearings which events of such special interest to Judah had upon the wider circle of the nations around, and upon the whole world. But further, the nations here named had been guilty of offences against the theocracy, and Judah was specially interested in knowing that these could not be perpetrated with impunity. That Arabia and Tyre form no exceptions to this statement, appears from 2 Chron. xxi. 16; Joel iii. 4; Amos i. 9. In six of the burdens, whence the inference may be extended to the remainder, the motive of the punishment is drawn from the attitude in which they stood to the chosen people. The humiliation of Egypt was in order to remove an object of idolatrous

trust, xx. 6. Babylon, xiv. 1, 2, 25; xxi. 10; Philistia, xiv. 32; Moab, xvi. 1—6, and Damascus, xvii. 14, are sentenced for the avenging of the cause of God's people, and their deliverance from oppression or vexatious treatment. It was surely a vision concerning Judah, when the prophet foresaw that Babylon would be laid low, that the captive people might be set free.

The structure of these burdens is remarkably symmetrical. If they be divided into two series of five each, the first series will exhibit a striking correspondence with the second in several particulars. The first burden of each series is directed against Babylon, which, although at that time but a dependent province, was destined to become the seat of empire. Isaiah had predicted, chapters i.—vi., the total desolation and exile of Judah, and had described the instruments of the judgment, v. 26—29, in general terms, indicative of their remoteness and the rapidity of their conquests, but had mentioned no name. This had in all probability not yet been revealed to him or to any contemporaneous prophet. In chapters vii.—xii. he showed that this would be effected neither by Syria nor by Assyria. It is here for the first time declared, xiv. 1, 2, as Micah iv. 10 also hints, that Babylon should be the real agent of Judah's downfall. Hence the prominence accorded to it, not only of being named first among these hostile nations, but of being the subject of two distinct burdens, the first in each series. The rest of the burdens are directed against nations subjugated by Assyria or Babylon, and found in that subjugation their partial or complete accomplishment. For these were in reality not so much two distinct empires, as one continuous empire with a simple change of the seat of authority, and they are here viewed together as fulfilling one common function, and experiencing a like overthrow. The aggregation of nations under a common head was substantially identical, only the dominant people was in the one case the Assyrians, in the other the Chaldeans. This ideal combination is further shown by the fact that the fall of Assyria is included in the burden of Babylon, xiv. 24, 25.

The second and third burdens of both series have relation to minor powers in the vicinity of Judah, the third in each case concluding with a declaration of the time when the fulfilment should take place, measured by "the years of an hireling," *i. e.*,

years accurately reckoned; an expression peculiar to these two passages. The fourth members of the two series have as their subjects the two branches of the covenant people; for though the first of these names Damascus in its title, it passes almost immediately, xvii. 3, to a denunciation of Ephraim or the ten tribes, who had allied themselves with Syria in the attack upon Judah. The fifth and last members of each series are directed against the two most prominent nations of that time, who were not under the domination of Assyria, viz., Egypt and Tyre. Here again dates are given; there is this difference, however, in the two cases, that the number of years designated in the first series, xx. 3, points to the entrance of the judgment, that in the second, xxiii. 15, 17, to its duration and the period of its removal. Possibly these numbers, found in burdens on either side of those directed to the two branches of the covenant people, may have been intended for them as well as for the particular nations to which they nominally belong. And if so, it is doubtless significant, that while the period of the coming of the judgment is fixed for Ephraim, but no prospect is held out of its removal, it is intimated that the duration of Jerusalem's judgment shall be but seventy years, xxiii. 15. At any rate, there would seem to be some relation between this seventy years of Tyre's humiliation by Babylon, and the same term of Jerusalem's humiliation by the same power, subsequently predicted in express terms by Jeremiah, xxv. 11, 12; xxix. 10.

A more remarkable correspondence in the burdens, with which each series closes, may be found, however, in the promises which they contain. The merchandise of Tyre shall be "holiness to the Lord," the very inscription worn by the high priest himself. Exod. xxviii. 38. And Egypt should be all that Israel had ever been, standing in the same relation to God, alike rendering him worship and service, and equally the recipient of his glorious salvation. Moreover the blessings here recited are not to be restricted exclusively to these individual nations, as though they were to be solitary instances of the Divine favour to the heathen, but they are rather to be regarded as examples and representatives of the whole, so that what is expressly granted to them belongs in like manner to all. This appears not only from their position at the end of each of the

two series, implying a relation to all of the foregoing, but also from the explicit though incidental mention of Assyria, xix. 23—25, and Ethiopia, xviii. 1, 7, as included within the circle of the divine mercy, which Jeremiah extends with equal explicitness to Moab, xlvi. 47, but especially from xxiv. 13—16, where it is predicted that God's praise shall ascend from the remotest parts of the earth, as a consequence of his universal judgments, the terms being strikingly conformed to the language used respecting Israel himself, xvii. 6.

The inflictions upon these several nations are also set forth, not as isolated facts, but as component parts of God's universal work of judgment, comprehending all the displays of his punitive justice, both in the course of the world's history, and in the catastrophe which is to mark its close. That this is the import of the burdens is suggested by their number ten, the symbol of completeness, which can no more be fortuitous than the seven denunciations with which the book of Amos opens. It is more explicitly shown by intimations both at the beginning and end of the series. The convulsions of nature which are to occur in the final judgment are in ch. xiii. 6—13, connected with the overthrow of Babylon as parts of a common subject, just as they are for the same reason linked with the destruction of Jerusalem in our Lord's discourse, Matt. xxiv. And the universal purport of these judgments is declared in express terms, ch. xiv. 26: "This is the purpose that is purposed upon the whole earth; and this is the hand that is stretched out upon all the nations." The burdens are also at their close expanded into a judgment upon the world at large, ch. xxiv., the terms of which are universal in their character, and should be interpreted with the utmost latitude both of time and place.

Then follows chs. xxv.—xxvii., the triumph of Judah redeemed from every foe, which both in length and fulness of meaning is an advance upon that which concludes the preceding division, and which celebrated the overthrow of Assyria.

This brief exhibition of the plan of this division, and the mutual correspondences of the several burdens, supplies us with a fresh test of Dr. Davidson's higher criticism. In spite of these clear evidences of a carefully considered structure, or

rather not seeming to suspect their existence, he deals with the burdens as though they were a congeries of disconnected and unrelated fragments, disposed without any principle of order, instead of a symmetrical series, no member of which can be sundered from the rest without a mutilation. He would have us believe that some of them were written by Isaiah, and the others, without any reference to the preceding, by a prophet or prophets a century and a half later, and that these were by some accident huddled together. Though here again he cannot escape his inveterate vice of self-contradiction. After carefully pruning from these prophecies every thing relating to Babylon, and pronouncing such passages manifestly spurious, he makes an admission on p. 47, which completely undoes his own work. He is endeavouring to discredit the genuineness of chs. xl.—lxvi., and in the course of his argument he says, "Former prophecies of Isaiah had come to pass; therefore those now uttered should be likewise verified. The older prophecies referred simply to the punishment of Babylon by a hero raised up and divinely commissioned, the new ones to its complete overthrow." Where are these former prophecies of Isaiah referring to the punishment of Babylon, unless in these very burdens, whose genuineness he impugns?

The lessons of this period have now been fully exhibited. But as the time for the Assyrian invasion approached, it was necessary to reiterate these words of warning and of consolation, that presumptuous sinners might be shaken out of their carnal security, and the pious comforted in the trial which was coming upon them. This is accordingly the aim of the next division, chs. xxviii.—xxxv. The denunciatory address, "Wo!" is characteristic of these chapters, as the denunciatory title "burden," of the preceding. After being five times directed against the covenant people, chs. xxviii. 1, xxix. 1, 15, xxx. 1, xxxi. 1, it is at length, ch. xxxiii. 1, turned against their foes. The prophet begins by predicting the overthrow of the kingdom of the ten tribes by the Assyrians, and the protection which would be vouchsafed to Judah. He then reproaches Judah for his sins, which would bring this same scourge upon himself, his breaches of God's law, the hypocrisy of his external services, his disregard of admonitions, his presumptuous contempt of

threatened judgments. These rebukes are blended together and repeated in various forms. And they are again and again interrupted by interjected promises of the sudden and complete overthrow which awaited the Assyrians, and the deliverance to be wrought for Judah, these promises expanding constantly in length and fulness until at length they are poured forth in an almost unbroken stream of mercy to Judah and judgment on his foes. Christ's coming and kingdom are from time to time wrought into this picture of the future good; and the full glories of that kingdom form, as in previous divisions of this section, the fitting termination of the whole. The hope of the Messiah is the brilliant background in every prophetic representation of the future. Inferior good things are set forth as types and earnts of the greater. And these are so intermingled, the one shading off gradually into the other, and the expressions used being often aptly descriptive of both, that it is frequently impossible to separate them.

This entire section of the book and of the prophet's ministry is wound up by that providential event to which much that preceded had reference. Chapters xxxvi., xxxvii. record the actual invasion by the Assyrians, the prophecy uttered by Isaiah at the time, and the signal miraculous deliverance granted in fulfilment of this and previous predictions. These, and the two historical chapters which follow, the Doctor tells us, p. 32, "were not composed as they are by Isaiah himself." The decisive reason is given as follows: "Some mythic and marvellous things would not have been written by Isaiah; but the plain facts as they occurred. Thus it is related in xxxvii. 36, that the angel of the Lord went forth and smote in the camp of the Assyrians one hundred and eighty-five thousand, which were all found dead corpses early in the morning. Here the influence of tradition is visible in giving a particular form to natural events. Such definite prediction of future events as we find in xxxvii. 7, . . . xxxviii. 5, . . . are contrary to the nature of prophetic foresight. They are too exact and precise to be predicted; and must therefore have been written after the things mentioned were known and past." This is another instance of the author's "development." When he wrote the second volume of Horne's *Introduction* he was of

the opinion that the narrative given almost in identical language in the second book of Kings was characterized by "historical fidelity and accuracy," p. 848.

The Doctor gives us a specimen of his characteristic looseness in argument in relation to these same chapters, on p. 61. He assumes that these chapters of Isaiah, and those corresponding to them in Kings, were both extracted, with certain verbal and other changes, from a genuine work of Isaiah, now lost, in which the acts of Uzziah and of Hezekiah were recorded. 2 Chron. xxvi. 22; xxxii. 32. Then arguing from this assumption, as if it were an ascertained fact, he thus triumphantly disposes of Isaiah's authorship of the book which now bears his name: "Is it likely that the prophet would revise his own composition in chapters xxxvi.—xxxix.? Will the believers in an infallible inspiration maintain this? Infallibility revising itself! The idea is absurd, for infallibility does not admit of degrees." But if infallibility does not, nonsense does, as the foregoing clearly evidences. There is nothing in the strictest view of inspiration to require that Isaiah, in repeating in a new connection and for a new purpose, what he had previously written with a different design, should adhere scrupulously to every word and letter which he had used before. The same inspiration which preserved him from error in the original draught, was competent to guide him in the copy, however freely it might be modified, whether in unimportant verbal changes, or in more serious alterations of form and character, to adapt it more precisely to its new position. No one surely need tremble either for the prophet's truthfulness or his authority, when he learns the real character and extent of the variations which occur in the two passages. They are such as "strange waters," 2 Kings xix. 24, for "water," Isaiah xxxvii. 25; "hearkened," 2 Kings xx. 13, "was glad," Isaiah xxxix. 2; "is it not if," 2 Kings xx. 19, "for," Isaiah xxxix. 18; also the omission in Isaiah of Hezekiah's message of submission to the king of Assyria, 2 Kings xviii. 14, and the insertion, Isaiah xxxviii. 9, etc., of Hezekiah's psalm of praise, which the account in Kings omits.

Two woes are now past; but a third is yet to come. The direful vision of chapter vi. demands a future accomplishment.

The obduracy there foreshown is not at an end, and its predicted train of consequences must follow. A desolation still more complete awaits the land; and the surviving remnant of the people must undergo another diminution. A better prince than Ahaz now sat upon the throne; and to the public deliverance just experienced was added the individual mercy of a restoration from mortal sickness. And yet when the people were once again tried in their monarch, Hezekiah showed that he had not escaped the taint of the prevailing corruption. His vainglorious exhibition of his treasures to the messengers of the king of Babylon led to the crushing announcement by the prophet, "Behold the days come that all that is in thine house, and that which thy fathers have laid up in store until this day, shall be carried to Babylon; nothing shall be left, saith the Lord."

This fearful prospect gives shape and character to what yet remains of the prophet's ministry. He no longer deals in words of terror, but in words of consolation. This section of the book is devoted to the work of comfort, which is no longer administered in limited passages or in solitary chapters joined with gloomy denunciations, but forms the great staple of all that follows. It was so terrible and unprecedented a disaster that the theocracy should be broken up, the atoning sacrifice abolished, the mediating priesthood deprived of its functions, God's dwelling-place reduced to ruins and his people carried away from the land which he had given them, to the heart of a powerful heathen empire, that the righteous were in danger of falling into utter despair and imagining that God had abandoned so unfaithful a people for ever. And this is doubtless one of the reasons why the comfort designed for those times is furnished not only by contemporary prophets, but by one belonging to a former age, just as subsequently Daniel was sent with consolations for the times of Antiochus Epiphanes. Judah needed to be thus prepared for it, and schooled with reference to it in advance. And it was important that when it actually came, they should recognise in it the hand of God, and look upon it not as an unforeseen and unexpected thing, but what had been revealed and provided for long beforehand. The prophet accordingly assures the people, that although this calamity

must come, it shall have an end. The oppressor shall be overthrown, the instrument for this purpose shall most certainly be raised up, as a pledge of which he is already designated and named, and Israel shall be restored, be blessed, and be a blessing.

In conformity with this prospective design of these closing chapters, they are not broken up into distinct discourses like the previous sections, but form one continuous and connected composition. They were not prepared to suit the varying circumstances of the present, and with reference to public delivery on separate occasions, but were adapted to a great necessity of the future, which naturally impressed upon them more uniformity of character. This, too, accounts largely for those differences of style, so far as they really exist, between this and preceding portions of the book, which the higher criticism has made the pretext of its unwarrantable conclusions. The uninterrupted treatment of a theme so animating and absorbing, lent its influence in producing those flowing sentences and fervid periods, by which this section of Isaiah is so eminently characterized.

This period of the prophet's ministry, like each of those which preceded it, has its own peculiar Messianic revelations. He does not now look forward merely to the period of the Messiah in general, as in chs. i.—vi., nor does he contemplate Messiah as a king, as in chs. vii.—xxxvii., but under an aspect more appropriate to his present theme, as a prophet and a sufferer, the antitype and head of his people. He is united with Israel in the commission to enlighten the world, and he will secure the accomplishment of it. And in the execution of this commission he is joined with them in a suffering which shall avail for the good of others, and shall issue in a glory which all that is glowing in human speech is summoned to describe.

The comfort, which the prophet is instructed to address to Judah in the prospect of these overwhelming calamities, is mainly drawn from the mission and destiny of the chosen people. This may accordingly be stated to be the general theme of these chapters. God had made choice of Israel that all families of mankind might be blessed in him. It was his mis-

sion to spread the true religion over the earth and to save the nations. This commission had never been and never would be revoked. The purpose of God made it infallibly certain that Israel would effect all that he had been raised up to do. No adverse circumstances must be suffered to cause discouragement or despondency. His own unfaithfulness should not baffle or frustrate God's designs. And the sufferings, which were to befall him on account of it, would further the accomplishment of his task instead of obstructing it, while they would be succeeded by the richest blessings for him and for the world.

The exhibition of the mission of the covenant people would be very incomplete, if it did not include the work of the Messiah, who was to be of them according to the flesh, and in whom all God's purposes of mercy were to meet their fulfilment. Israel was nothing without the Messiah. It was with reference to him that Israel was made the Lord's people; their whole history was a preparation for his coming; every thing about them pointed forward to him. He was the goal of their hopes; all their expectations centred in him. They waited anxiously for his appearing, and looked forward to it as the bright and blissful era in which every thing should reach its true ideal. From every present sorrow they were taught to turn for comfort to the happy future which he would inaugurate. The oppression of the heathen made them sigh for him who would break every yoke. He was to redeem Israel out of all his troubles, achieve his unperformed task, and fulfil his unaccomplished destiny. Zion should one day give law to the world; all men should worship the God of Israel; universal peace should be established, sin and woe be banished, and death itself destroyed; but it was in Messiah's days, and by him, that these results were to be effected. The Messiah was thus linked with every devout aspiration of those who were waiting for the consolation of Israel, and for the coming of the kingdom of God. And he was either explicitly or implicitly the centre or the background of every prophetic picture.

And yet notwithstanding all this, Dr. Davidson can say, on p. 35, that Isaiah could not "predict a far distant personal Messiah, consistently with the analogy of prophecy. Such leaps

into the future are unknown." And on page 69, "That the Messiah cannot be intended by the prophet, we argue, first, because it would be contrary to the nature of prophecy. The Old Testament seer never projected his vision into the far distant future so as to be able to predict events there, or describe persons beforehand with infallible certainty."

We had supposed it to be universally confessed, that if there was anything that the prophets did predict, it was the Messiah; and if there was anything consonant to the analogy of prophecy, it was such predictions. "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy" from first to last and at all times. If the Doctor had claimed that such predictions were fanatical, or that they were not really fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth, his position, however untenable, would at least have been intelligible. But to say that such predictions were not made, and that it is inconsistent with the analogy of prophecy to predict a far distant personal Messiah, evidences an ignorance or an assurance utterly unfathomable. And yet upon occasion he admits the existence of such prophecies, as on p. 81, where he allows that ix. 6, 7, is correctly referred to Messiah. But if Messiah is described in these last chapters of Isaiah, there is such a minuteness and exactness in the description as might overturn the Doctor's favourite view of the impossibility of predicting what lies remotely in the future. He is described "with infallible certainty," and hence a reference to him must be denied at all hazards and at every cost.

For the reasons already stated, the prophet in unfolding the mission of Israel includes under it all that was to be wrought by Israel's great descendant. This latter is in fact the ruling idea; the work of Messiah is really the main thing, and overshadows every thing else that Israel was to do for the glory of God and the salvation of man. This union between the church and her great Head is laid by the prophet at the basis of the comfort appropriate to the coming trial. It results from her connection with him, it is part of her likeness to him, that she is called to perform her work in the midst of shame and suffering, and to win her way through it to glory and honour. Messiah is identified with Israel in his work, his humiliation, and his glory. It is in view of this identification that the pro-

phet includes them both under one common name, “the servant of the **LORD**.” This expression strictly denotes one whom the Lord employs to execute his will. It is accordingly applicable to any person whom God raises up to perform some important work, as Moses, Deut. xxxiv. 5; David, 1 Kings xi. 13; Nebuchadnezzar, Jer. xxv. 9. But in this connected prophecy it is appropriated to Israel as a people divinely chosen to accomplish the salvation of the world—to Israel, that is, not exclusive of the Messiah, but including him, inasmuch as he was to spring from this people, and was really and in the highest sense to accomplish the work, with the performance of which Israel was charged. The servant of the **LORD**, of whom Isaiah speaks, is, therefore, a complex person, embracing Christ the head, as well as his church, the body.

This explanation of the term, first propounded by Dr. Alexander, is not only recommended by its simplicity and naturalness, and by its ready applicability to all the passages in which it occurs, but by a number of scriptural analogies both in the Old and in the New Testament. Thus, “the seed of the woman,” Gen. iii. 15, “the seed of Abraham,” Gen. xxii. 18, “the son of David,” 2 Sam. vii. 12—16, “the prophet,” Deut. xviii. 18, ideal “man,” Ps. viii., and the “righteous sufferer,” in the typical Psalms, have both a collective and an individual sense. These several terms embrace the entire body of those whom they properly describe, including Christ, and indeed with predominant reference to him as the most important and prominent of all. So Israel embraces Christ by the law of natural descent, and Christ is linked with Israel by the eternal covenant of union, and by the vital power of his indwelling spirit.

The intimacy of the union subsisting between Christ and his people is abundantly set forth in the New Testament, both by literal statement and under the most expressive emblems. In fact, the name “Christ” is in one passage of the New Testament used with such latitude as to include the church of Christ along with Christ himself. 1 Cor. xii. 12, “For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body; *so also is Christ.*” The inspired authority of the New Testament may also be claimed

in favour of this interpretation, not only from its direct application of passages in Isaiah, which speak of “the servant of the *Lord*,” both to Christ, in repeated instances, and to members of his church in at least two passages, Acts xiii. 47, comp. Isa. xl ix. 6, and 2 Cor. vi. 2, comp. Isa. xl ix. 8; but also by its use of the term παῖς, which is evidently the יְהוָה בֶּן־יִשְׂרָאֵל of Isaiah, to denote both Israel, Luke i. 54, and Christ, Matt. xii. 18, Acts iii. 13. Jeremiah too, xi. 19, applies language to himself which Isaiah liii. 7, uses of “the servant of the Lord,” showing that the people of God, as well as the Messiah, are to be included under that term.

Of this view of Dr. Alexander’s, so strongly recommended by its appropriateness and the weighty considerations which may be urged in its favour, Dr. Davidson sneeringly says, p. 73, “The hypothesis is plausible. It is very convenient, too, because of its flexibility; for wherever the head does not suit, it is supposed to recede into the background, and the body to become prominent. Thus in xl ix. 5, the idea of the head predominates over that of the body; whereas the reverse is the fact in xl ii. 20, 21. Even so, however, the hypothesis cannot be carried out in practice, for the complexity of the person has occasionally to be laid aside, and either the head or body exclusively assumed. . . . In the fifty-third chapter, the body is entirely excluded. . . . The absurdity to which this interpretation leads, appears from the fact, that though the servant is a complex person, including Messiah and his church, things are predicated of Israel, or the body, totally adverse to the Head. They are even inconsistent with it. Thus we read in xl ii. 19, 20, ‘Who is blind, but my servant? or deaf, as my messenger that I sent? Who is blind as he that is perfect, and blind as the Lord’s servant? Seeing many things, but thou observest not; opening the ears, but he heareth not.’”

This flippant and contemptuous rejection of the interpretation, which we have been considering, will by analogy prepare the reader for the statement that it was once accepted and defended by Dr. Davidson himself. Thus in his former treatise he says, p. 865, “Since the appellation before us is used in two ways, both in reference to one person, who is none other than Christ, and collectively of Israel; neither the one nor the

other can be adopted exclusively. Indeed the one does not necessarily exclude the other. The Messianic interpretation is consistent with the collective use of ‘servant of Jehovah,’ because the latter denotes Christ and his church, the head and the members of his spiritual body. . . . This interpretation, as Alexander justly remarks, ‘agrees exactly with the mission both of the Redeemer and his people, as described in Scripture, and accounts for all the variations which embarrass the interpretation of the passages in question upon any more exclusive exegetical hypothesis.’”

The “absurdity,” which Dr. Davidson now attempts to fasten upon this interpretation, will not be apt to impair its credit, so long as the usages of ordinary speech continue what they are. Precisely the same variety of application, which he ridicules, attaches to all general terms. They are constantly employed, not only where respect is had to every particular that they properly include, but also where the mass is regarded, and some individuals are left out of sight, or even where the mass is lost sight of, and one or more prominent particulars are alone regarded. And every intelligent reader or hearer instinctively makes the restriction, which the circumstances of the case demand. Thus, if we speak of the apostles as chosen by Christ, all are intended; if we speak of them as holy men, we predicate something of the body of the apostles, which is “totally adverse” to Judas, and “even inconsistent” with his character; if we speak of their writings, those who are included among the sacred penmen “become prominent,” and the rest “recede into the background.” So when we say that man is the creature of God, we refer to him as a complex being made up of soul and body; when we say that he is mortal or that he is immortal “the complexity” is laid aside,” and either the soul or body exclusively referred to; when we speak of his appetites, both parts of his nature are affected, but the idea of the body predominates over that of the soul. We may properly speak of our being indebted to the Greeks for the Iliad and the Parthenon, though Homer wrote the one, and Callimachus built the other.

The third section of the book of Isaiah, chapters xxxviii.—lxvi., is like each of those which precede it, divisible into four

parts. The first, chapters xxxviii., xxxix., is introductory. It explains the occasion of the succeeding prophecy by detailing the circumstances that led to the prediction of the Babylonish captivity, which forms the starting point of all that follows. At the same time it links, as Isaiah is careful to do from first to last, the judgment with that blindness and obduracy, which in the gradually unfolding vision of chapter vi. was its predicted cause. Upon the entrance of the first in the train of woes the prophet was sent to Ahaz with a promise of speedy deliverance. The infatuated king, in this reflecting only too faithfully the heart of the people, preferred to rely upon Assyria for aid rather than upon God, and in so doing chose the Assyrian invasion, which was plainly set before him as the consequence of this fatal course. And it is not without a purpose, that the seemingly trivial, though not altogether casual circumstance is recorded, that the Assyrian general Rabshakeh, sent by Sennacherib against Jerusalem, stood and delivered his insolent speech, xxxvi. 2, "by the conduit of the upper pool in the highway of the fuller's field;" this is the very place, vii. 3, where Ahaz was met by the prophet, and where he exhibited his guilty unbelief. And then relief is scarcely experienced from this second disaster, before Hezekiah's vain display of his treasures takes the initiative in bringing on the third and worst calamity of all. The whole is thus concatenated together; and it is shown how each descending step to Judah's ruin is self-induced, flowing directly from his own acts of folly and of sin.

The prophet observes no strict method in the treatment of his theme in the last twenty-seven chapters, and no logical division is therefore possible. But a formal division is suggested by the recurrence of the same verse at the close of chapter xlviij. and chapter lvii.: "There is no peace, saith the Lord, to the wicked." This may be regarded as an emphatic termination of distinct paragraphs or sections, declaring that the wicked should be excluded from participation in the blessings therein announced. And the book ends, lxvi. 24, with the yet more awful declaration, that besides this negative exclusion, the wicked are reserved for the worm that dies not and the fire that is not quenched. Three portions are thus indicated of

nine chapters each, chapters xl.—xlviii., chapters xlix.—lvii., chapters lviii.—lxvi. These groups may be distinguished by the prominence given in each to a particular event of the future, without, however, their being in any case exclusively occupied with it. In the first, the leading theme is deliverance from the Babylonish exile; chapter xlv. may be regarded as the characteristic chapter of this division. Babylon and Cyrus, who are here so conspicuous, are nowhere named after these first nine chapters; the captivity and restoration from it being only the starting-point of this great prophecy, from which it rises to the contemplation of the entire future in reserve for the people of God. In the second division, the vicarious sufferings and consequent exaltation of the Messiah are introduced, chapter liii. being the characteristic chapter. In the third division, the future glory of the people of God is dwelt upon, the characteristic chapter being chapter ix.

Perhaps the suggestion of Hahn is not altogether fanciful, that this triple division is already shadowed forth in the triple comfort with which the prophecy begins. The prophet is instructed, xl. 2, to cry unto Jerusalem that her warfare, her definite period of toilsome service, is accomplished; that her iniquity is pardoned; that (not *for*, as in the common version) she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins; not double punishment, as if she had suffered twice as much as her sins deserved, or twice as much as the Lord had intended to inflict, but double blessings, notwithstanding all her sins, or even for all her sins; divine grace abounding even beyond her multiplied transgressions, and repaying her offences with mercies twice as great. In unfolding this triple comfort, the prophet may then be supposed to dwell successively upon those conjectures in the future which would afford the most striking exemplifications of its several phases. The promise of an end to Zion's warfare is illustrated by pointing to the certain termination of the sore evil then impending, the Babylonish exile. The second comforting assurance of the pardon of their sins, finds its basis and pledge in the vicarious sufferings of the Redeemer. And the third word of comfort, the double blessings from the hand of the Lord, shall find its fulfilment in the triumph and glory which await the church.

The first impression which the book of Isaiah makes upon the ordinary reader, probably is, that the prophecies uttered by him are here put together without any special regard to their order or arrangement. The rapid and inadequate survey which we have now taken of it, will be sufficient, we trust, to show that this is a very superficial view. Underneath all this appearance of isolated and detached predictions there is a regular plan constantly pursued from first to last, and all the more striking, when discovered, from its not having been immediately obvious. This methodical arrangement, this careful selection of appropriate materials, and judicious distribution of them, is of itself an effectual bar to all those critical theories, which assume a jumble of unrelated prophecies, and account for it by the accidental confusion of the independent productions of various authors belonging to different ages. With Dr. Davidson's oft-paraded preference for German ideas and German modes of thought, it may be a fact of consequence in his esteem, that there are instances of German critics of no mean standing among their learned countrymen, who have professed themselves convinced of the integrity and genuineness of the whole book of Isaiah, by the single consideration of its structure and methodical arrangement.

We are willing at least here to rest the question, whether the Doctor was not nearer the truth when he said, "Isaiah greatly excels in all the graces of method, order, connection, and arrangement," (Horne's Int. ii., p. 868,) than he is now in saying, p. 61, "the present book of Isaiah is an aggregate of authentic and unauthentic pieces, accumulating by degrees to its present extent and disposition," and p. 4, "no definite, well-ordered plan can possibly be discovered."

ART. III.—*Memorial Sermon of the late Rev. James Hoge, D.D.*

Preached October 4, 1863, by the REV. WM. C. ROBERTS.
Columbus, Ohio, 1863.

TRUE religion is a matter of personal experience. The pious know by actual trial what it is to walk with God. They have felt in their hearts the power of religious emotion. If there are on earth any competent and credible witnesses respecting godliness, they are the real servants of Christ. Nor have they been backward to declare their estimate of God's service.

One says, "Thy loving-kindness is better than life." Another says, "A day in thy courts is better than a thousand. I had rather be a door-keeper in the house of my God than to dwell in the tents of wickedness." Another, "Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee."

Paul said, "I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord, for whom I have suffered the loss of all things." Polycarp said to the pro-consul, "Eighty and six years have I served Christ, and he hath never wronged me, and how can I blaspheme my King who hath saved me?"

Melanchthon's testimony was this: "I have often said, and I must take all occasions to repeat it, that a holy, heavenly life, spent in the service of God and in communion with him, is, without doubt, the most pleasant, comfortable life that any one can live in this world."

Similar to the above was the last testimony of Dr. Hoge. Not long before his death he said: "I am not alarmed at the prospect." "Oh, that blessed hope of which I spoke!" "I am still of the same mind, by the grace that is in Jesus Christ."

Like testimonies might be almost indefinitely cited. Some things respecting them may be noticed.

One is, that they are in substance the same in all ages, and under all circumstances. David and Asaph, under the old dispensation, speak just like Paul or Hoge under the new.

Another fact worthy of notice is, that they are all in one

direction. God's people are firmly and unanimously agreed in their estimate of the excellence of divine things.

So remarkably clear is the evidence in favour of the value of religion, especially in times of trial, that from the days of Balaam to this hour, many carnal men have said, "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." The wicked themselves, in their honest hours, are persuaded that the righteous have a secret unknown to carnal men.

If these things are so, the righteous have chosen a good part. They are in fact the only wise men on earth. They are wise unto salvation. Rutherford well exclaims: "What is so needful as salvation? Fie upon this condemned and foolish world, that would give so little for salvation. Oh, if there were a free market of salvation on that day when the trumpet shall sound, how many buyers would be there! What are all the sinners in the world to that day when heaven and earth shall go up in a flame of fire, but a number of beguiled dreamers? Every one shall say of his hunting, and of his conquest, 'Behold, it was a dream.'"

We have been led to make these remarks here, because we have long noticed that old friends very often turn to the closing scenes of life, described in biography, before reading the earlier portions of the work. When we know how a man has lived, we naturally wish to know how he died. Besides, in ordinary cases, death is comparatively an honest hour. But if men even succeed in holding fast their delusions in that awful moment, the future world will take away all disguise, and truth and honour and the love of God will be found to be enduring, while every form of falsehood and deception will vanish for ever.

And if so great a difference between the saint and the sinner commonly appears on earth, how vast must be the difference in eternity! In this world we have hints of things, rather than full declarations. If these things be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry? "If thou hast run with the footmen, and they have wearied thee, then how canst thou contend with horses? and if in the land of peace, wherein thou trustedst, they wearied thee, then how wilt thou do in the swelling of Jordan?" Jer. xii. 5.

It is therefore a reasonable thing to believe the Bible.

Were it but probably God's word, a wise man would act upon it. If it is merely probable that one's house is on fire, he will rise and search his whole premises. If it is probable the thief will come on a given night, the good man of the house will watch. In the absence of certainty, wise men will be governed by probability. And when the evidence is so strong as it is in favour of the Christian religion, it is mere obstinacy to persevere in rejecting the Lord Jesus Christ. The Saviour himself teaches that the evidence is so strong in favour of his religion, that infidels in gospel lands shall in the last day receive a sentence in accordance with his written word: "He that rejecteth me and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him at the last day." John xii. 48. This judgment is just. This sentence is righteous. All men will one day confess as much.

Ever since it was announced that Dr. Hoge had departed this life on the 22d day of September, 1863, in the 80th year of his age, we have felt a desire to see some extended notice of his life and labours. Dr. Hoge was a historic person. The sermon noticed at the head of this article is very creditable to its author. It gives much pleasing information. The family of Dr. Hoge have also consented that a gentleman long intimate with him shall use some materials in his possession, for the purpose of bringing before the public some of the facts in his remarkable history. In this way we hope to preserve from oblivion some things that would otherwise be lost.

Dr. Hoge was one of the descendants of a man who lived and died in Scotland during the latter part of the reign of the Stuarts. His three sons emigrated to America, during the latter half of the 17th century. The names of these men were Peter, Solomon, and William. Their names and the names of their descendants are spelled variously—Hoge, Hogue, Hoag, and Hogg. Peter settled in the neighbourhood of New York, and left a considerable family. His descendants are widely scattered. Solomon first resided in Pennsylvania, but afterwards removed to Loudon county, Virginia, married a member of the Society of Friends, and perhaps became a Friend himself. He was the progenitor of those numerous and respectable

people in the State of Ohio and elsewhere, who still bear his surname, and are Friends.

William Hoge, the great-grandfather of the Rev. Dr. James Hoge, settled in Pennsylvania, between Harrisburg and Carlisle. Here he resided until he was an old man. He then removed to the neighbourhood of Winchester, Virginia, where he died and was buried in the graveyard of either the Ope-quon or of the Cedar Creek church. William Hoge married Barbara Hume, a lady who, with her father's family, came over in the same ship with him. Although these Humes were of the same family with the historian of the same name, yet they were far removed from his wicked infidelity. They were zealous, and therefore persecuted, Covenanters. One of William Hoge's sons was named James. Early in life he settled at Cedar Creek, fourteen miles south-west of Winchester, Virginia. Here he lived to old age. Here he died and was buried. He was twice married; first to Martha Vance. By her he had several children. One of these, John, left home at the age of seventeen years, and was one of Washington's men at Braddock's defeat. He was taken prisoner; remained in Canada until the Revolutionary War broke out; then came to Massachusetts; entered the army, and continued in it till he was honourably discharged after peace. He lived in the South, and to a great age. James Hoge, an uncle of the subject of this notice, and a son of James, settled in Montgomery county, Virginia, in the part of it now forming Pulaski county. He lived to be considerably over eighty years of age, and left a large family—some sons and more daughters—one of whom was married to a Mr. Evans, and another to a Mr. Wilson; both men of note and worth.

The grandfather of Dr. James Hoge was married a second time, to Agnes Blackburn. She lived to be near eighty years old, and then died from an injury received in leaping from a horse after having ridden more than thirty miles that day. Her husband also died in consequence of a fall, when he was between eighty and ninety years old. Some account of this venerable man may be seen in Dr. Foote's Historical Sketches of Virginia, and in the Life of Dr. Archibald Alexander. By his second marriage he had three sons. The eldest was Edward, who lived and died on the same farm with his father,

leaving five children. The youngest was Solomon, who lived on the same farm for many years after his brother's death; but when about sixty years old he removed to Maury county, Tennessee. He lived in Tennessee upwards of fifteen years and then died, leaving two sons and two daughters.

The second son of James Hoge and Agnes Blackburn was Moses. Very early in life he was made a subject of renewing grace. At the age of nineteen years he began his studies for the ministry of the gospel. His first teacher was a Scotchman. He afterwards entered Liberty Hall, now Washington College, Va. Here he enjoyed rare advantages. Some of his schoolmates proved to be the brightest men of that day. But he enjoyed the teachings of that great master, the Rev. William Graham, of blessed memory. Here Moses Hoge also studied theology. He was licensed to preach the gospel, when he was about twenty-nine years old. About the year 1783, the Rev. Moses Hoge settled in Hardy county, Va., as pastor of a church near Moorfield. He was, about the same time, married to Elizabeth Poage, near Staunton, Va. Three or four years later, he removed to Shepherdstown, Berkely county, Va. Here he laboured with great diligence and faith, until 1806, when he was appointed President of Hampden Sydney College, in Prince Edward county, Va. Here he continued teaching and preaching until his death. In May, 1821, he was sent to Philadelphia as a member of the General Assembly, became ill, was most tenderly cared for both by physicians and the Christian family of the late Samuel Smith, Esq., whose hospitality he enjoyed, lingered till near the first of July, and then expired. He was buried in the graveyard of the Third Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia. A brief notice of him will not be unwelcome to our readers.

A memoir of him was partly prepared by one of his sons, but after passing through various hands it seems to have been lost; at least it has never been published. Not long after his death a volume of his sermons was printed, but they were not much circulated. The edition, owing to some cause, did not sell well. John Randolph pronounced him the most eloquent man he had ever heard. It is true that he and Randolph agreed in politics. It is also true that Randolph was under

very deep religious impressions during most of the time that he heard Dr. Hoge. Yet Dr. Hoge had some great disadvantages. His voice had considerable unpleasantness, arising from a nasal twang. So that it must be regarded as certain that he was a very remarkable man, to have won such commendation from his gifted countryman. Public sentiment everywhere gave Dr. Hoge a very high position.

Dr. Hoge often said that he could not remember the time when he did not love the Lord Jesus Christ. He was doubtless converted very early in life. This gave to his whole character a great charm. It was free from many of those faults and defects which arise from spending childhood and youth in vanity. Oh that early piety was the rule and not the exception.

There was a delightful tenderness in the character of Dr. Hoge's piety. It is said, and we believe correctly, that he seldom, if ever, slept at all on the night previous to the administration of the Lord's Supper, if he was expected to take part in the solemnities of that ordinance as preacher. He did not think it wrong to sleep, but he became so absorbed in meditating on the love and sufferings of the Saviour, that sleep departed from him.

We have seen an eminent Christian lady, who told us that some years before his death she heard him say that for twenty years he had not seriously doubted his interest in Christ. His assurance was strong.

Yet he was profoundly humble. On one occasion a high-tempered but good man disliked some views expressed by Dr. Hoge on the politics of those times. He lost his temper and said pettishly, "Dr. Hoge, you are nothing but a man after all, sir." Hoge wholly disarmed him by saying with unaffected modesty and sincerity, "Yes, sir, and a very erring and sinful man at best." One of his dying sayings was—"With the old English bishop I must say, 'Lord, forgive my sins of omission.'"

His income was often small, and his hospitality and kindness were unstinted. He took many poor young men into his family, and aided them in their whole course of preparation for the sacred office. In this way he did much good. One of these men was afterwards famous as a great preacher. We refer to James Robinson, who was a giant in strength, a great

sinner saved by grace, with an iron constitution, a very tender heart, and a voice of unusual sweetness and power. He traversed large regions of country, preaching with great zeal and success. We never saw him, but we knew his widow, and a very lovely son of his, who died soon after he began to preach, and who had been a communicant in the church from his childhood. Dr. Hoge's liberality and hospitality were not uncalled-for, and yet he was often in straits. But his confidence in God never failed, neither did his supplies. Many well-authenticated scraps of history concerning him in these matters have been given us by good people, and in particular by his late excellent widow. We will mention one. It was a cold Saturday morning, when Mrs. Hoge discovered that there was not wood enough to keep up the fires till Monday. She found she had no money, and went to her husband. He had no money. What was to be done? The wife wished to borrow, or use some extraordinary efforts. The Dr. said, "Our Heavenly Father knoweth that we have need of fire in such weather, and he will send us some. Let us trust in him." Not long after mid-day, a man was seen unloading wood, and presently he drove away, without saying anything to the family. This looked strange. The teamster was not a member of the church, nor even a stated hearer of Dr. Hoge's. Upon inquiry, it was found that the owner of the wagon had come to Shepherdstown with a load of wood, for which no one would offer him as much as he thought it worth, and he said, "None of you shall have it. I will give it to the minister up here."

Dr. Hoge left four sons, of whom three were preachers—James, John Blair, and Samuel Davies. The other became a physician, and still survives. Dr. Moses Hoge has three grandsons in the ministry. His son, John Blair Hoge was a man of great eloquence. He was settled in Richmond, Virginia, where a sweet fragrance is still connected with his memory. Samuel Davies Hoge died at Athens, Ohio, as Professor in the State university there. He seldom preached without having his face suffused with tears. His heart was very tender.

But few living men remember Dr. Moses Hoge. He was a fine scholar, a faithful man, a refined gentleman, a remarkable

Christian, an eloquent preacher, and an admirable teacher of theology.

The chief fields of labour of this eminent servant of Christ, were Hardy, Jefferson, and Berkeley counties, in Virginia, in early life, afterwards Hampden Sidney College, Virginia, and the churches in the counties of Charlotte, Prince Edward, and Cumberland. In all these he has left a name that is like precious ointment.

His first wife died while he was settled at Shepherdstown. His second marriage was to Mrs. Susan Hunt, whose maiden name was Watkins, of Charlotte county, Virginia.

One can hardly speak of this worthy man without being reminded of another, whose heart was knit to him in the tenderest love, who was associated with him in the government of the college, and who was allied to him by the intermarriage of their children. We refer to the Rev. Drury Lacy.

During the Revolutionary War a company of men were drilling and firing guns. One man loaded his musket very heavily, and, when they were about to fire, he asked the young lad Lacy to take his place, and fire his piece. They fired, and the gun burst, shivering Lacy's left hand. This act of cruelty gave a turn to his future life. His parents consented to his "going to learning," as it was then expressed. He learned well, was very ardent in his desire to be useful, and was always a favourite with his acquaintances. When he grew up, he had a silver hand put on his left arm. In riding, he attached the bridle reins to that as the bridle hand. He could easily remove this artificial hand, and put a fork in its place. In Virginia, clergymen were expected to carve the turkey on wedding occasions. Mr. Lacy performed that part of his duty with great skill. He had a very fine voice, so that he has, with ease, preached to thousands in the open air; he was sometimes spoken of as "the preacher with the silver fist and the silver voice."

Mr. Lacy, after he became a preacher, often had a private grammar-school on his own premises, and was, for a time, an officer of Hampden Sidney College. He was very useful as a letter writer. He wrote a beautiful hand, and there was a sweet savour of piety and of friendliness in all his private correspond-

ence. But, as a popular preacher, he excelled. His noble figure, his excellent voice, his good sense, his godly sincerity, and his melting tenderness, made him a great favourite with the masses of the people. Some of the old people still speak with enthusiasm of a sermon delivered in the open air to thousands on the words: "Where is the Lord God of Elijah?"

In 1809 he was Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church.

Two of his sons and four or five of his grandsons became ministers of the gospel, and are, we believe, still proclaiming the salvation their ancestor so delighted in preaching.

Like Dr. Hoge, Mr. Lacy died in Philadelphia. He came to that city for the purpose of having a surgical operation performed. He was taken into the family of that great and good man and merchant prince, the late Robert Ralston. He was most tenderly cared for. The operation was skilfully performed, and, for a time, it was confidently hoped he would soon be well. But God had determined otherwise. He began to sink, and in a few days closed his eyes on earth. About the same time his excellent wife died at the old homestead in Virginia. Neither of them knew that the other had left the world till they met around the throne of God in heaven.

We have in our possession a letter of Mr. Lacy written in 1802, which, if ever published, must surely be quite out of print now. It gives a pleasing account of the state of religion at that time in several places of the Old Dominion. We insert a part of it, in the hope that it will please our readers, and awaken in some of them a spirit of prayer for the return of such blessed scenes as are here described. He says: "You have already been informed of a meeting which took place last Christmas at Bedford Court House. Since that time greater harmony and brotherly love have been apparent among the different denominations. They frequently preach together, and seem much stirred up to promote the common cause of religion and the interest of the Redeemer's kingdom. But, as the proposed plan of union has not yet been discussed by the respective church judicatories, to which it was referred, it is impossible to say what will be the final result of that business. However, whether that be adopted or rejected, I am happy to

inform you that the attention to religion, which was excited at that meeting has continued to increase. It has spread upwards of twenty miles, and there have been pleasing prospects in more distant places, whenever the ministers have found an opportunity to preach from home. The Presbytery of Hanover, of which I am a member, met in that neighbourhood about the middle of April. Great numbers of people, considering the busy season of the year with planters and farmers, attended public worship four days successively. The congregation appeared very solemn and attentive, and the word preached was accompanied with considerable power. Numbers of the audience, during public worship, were frequently in tears, and sometimes the impression seemed almost general. It was delightful to observe with what spirit the people joined in singing the praises of God. This heavenly exercise they usually begin as soon as they meet. It continues sometimes an hour before public worship commences. They have committed a great number of suitable hymns and spiritual songs to memory, which they sing with so much solemnity and animation that it is peculiarly affecting. I was particular in inquiring what number had professed religion since the revival began, and, as nearly as I could learn, between eighty and a hundred had been brought to submit to the terms of the gospel and rejoice in Christ as the portion of their souls. I conversed with several who had been the subjects of the work, and their exercises appeared to me to have been entirely rational and consistent with the gospel plan. The views they had of the corruption of their hearts, as being opposed to God and holiness; their deep sense of being in a condemned state, and of their absolute need of Christ; also, the manner in which they were brought to submit to the sovereignty of God and to accept of salvation, through a crucified Redeemer, appeared clear and rational, and convinced me that it was the work of the Spirit of God on the soul. There have been a few instances of persons whose bodily powers have been overcome, but without being accompanied by any noise or confusion.

"A revival has also taken place in Albemarle county, eighty miles distant from Bedford, about the beginning of the present year. Mr. Robinson (the same mentioned above), who has

charge of two congregations in that county, was present at the meeting in Bedford, and had his affections greatly inflamed and his soul much comforted. On his return he felt much engaged, and had greater enlargements, both in praying and preaching, than usual. But God began the work before he had an opportunity to preach. A young man, about nineteen or twenty years of age, had accompanied Mr. Robinson to Bedford. This youth is the eldest son of a family of ten children, whose father is dead. His mother and three of his sisters were professors of religion, and esteemed pious; but, from the diffidence of females, the worship of God was not kept up in the family. It pleased God, while this young man was in Bedford, to strike him with very powerful convictions. On his way home, he formed the happy resolution of setting up the worship of God in his mother's house. He returned late in the evening, and, after giving the family a short account of the meeting, told them of the resolution he had formed, and called for the books in order to read and sing before prayer. The whole family burst into tears. His mother was almost overcome with excess of joy, and one of his sisters, in a transport, exclaimed: 'Glory to God; this is what I have been some years praying for.' Conviction seized the younger members of the family, and they now seem to be all engaged in walking together in the fear of the Lord and in obedience to his commands. The next Sabbath Mr. Robinson gave an account of what he had seen abroad, which greatly comforted the pious in his congregations, and encouraged them to be more importunate in prayer; and it pleased the God of grace and mercy, in a few weeks, to give them an evidence that he hears and answers prayer. A considerable number became deeply convinced of their sin and danger, and were brought to inquire what they should do to be saved. Since that time the work has been progressing, and religion appears in a very lively state. I was with Mr. Robinson in the beginning of April, and assisted him at a sacrament. I have hardly, in my life, been a witness of more solemn appearances. Numbers of the people were deeply affected, and wept abundantly during worship."

Oh that God's saving power might be again displayed in all the land in a like precious outpouring of his Spirit!

James Hoge, the son of Rev. Moses Hoge, D. D., was born at Moorfield, Virginia, in 1784. He was chiefly educated under his father's roof, though he was one year at an academy at Charlestown, Jefferson county, Virginia, and one year at Jefferson College, at Canonsburgh, Pennsylvania. He then taught for three or four years, part of the time as assistant, in an academy in Baltimore, Maryland, under the charge of Dr. James Priestley, afterwards President of Cumberland College, at Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Hoge was licensed to preach the gospel by the Presbytery of Lexington, in Virginia, April 17th, 1805, at the age of about twenty-one. He was ordained to the full work of the gospel ministry by the Presbytery of Washington (now Chillicothe), June 11th, 1808, at the town of Franklinton, Ohio. On the 18th of December, 1810, he was married to the amiable and excellent Miss Jane Woods, of Wheeling, Virginia. She was seven years his junior, but she had character enough even at the age of seventeen or eighteen to preside with dignity and wisdom in his family. By her he had eleven children, six of whom, four daughters and two sons, survive. His youngest son is now pastor of the Westminster Presbyterian Church, in Cleveland, Ohio. One of his daughters is married to the Rev. Dr. Nall of Alabama. Another (now dead) was married to the Rev. Mr. Hackett. Mrs. Hoge's death preceded that of her husband by a year or two.

But we shall let Mr. Roberts speak:

"Without being personally handsome, Dr. Hoge possessed a noble appearance and native majesty that impressed every one that saw him. He was tall and perfectly erect until the day of his death."

There was a reason, not generally known, for Dr. Hoge's continuing to be so erect. The spinal column, for a considerable distance from the shoulders down, seemed to have become solid. More than a year ago we asked him if this was so. He said it was, and that he could not curve his spine if he would, except at one point. But we will hear Mr. Roberts again.

"There was something peculiar in his looks that attracted every one's attention, and when once observed, it was never forgotten. His great dignity forbade all levity and undue familiarity. This was mistaken by the young for that sternness of

character which tends to repel, but there was nothing more erroneous ever entertained concerning him. He was a man of strong affections and keen sensibilities. His countenance, in the company of his friends and relatives, always beamed with the warmth and kindness of his heart. He so unbent himself, at times, as to amuse his guests with his ready wit and playful repartee.

"No one could be freer than Dr. Hoge from that mean spirit of envy and jealousy which is the bane of so many of our public men. He never felt that a brother's elevation reduced him in the least, and hence never sought to bring him down that he might exalt himself. His ever-abiding principle was that God had a special place for every man, and endowed him with gifts to perform the duties of that place, and in that way, excluded all rational grounds for strife or unhallowed emulation. He was never heard to speak slightly of any worthy brother, or known to indulge in invidious insinuations about him for the sake of lessening his influence. But he laboured peaceably with brethren of different denominations, and wished them all God-speed in building up the Redeemer's kingdom.

"He was not only free from the spirit of envy and jealousy, but possessed of a *most equable temper*. No one ever saw him angry or perturbed in the least degree. He was always the same in sunshine and in storms, in safety and in danger. He remarked once to a friend, that he never experienced the sense of fear. This was partly owing to physical peculiarities, and partly to that perfect love which casteth out fear. He was always firm and decided, but neither rash nor reckless. This made him just the kind of man that was needed to labour on our frontiers, where the white population was weekly threatened with Indian massacres. When it became known once, that the red man was contemplating the speedy and utter destruction of Franklinton, a meeting of the citizens was called together to adopt some means of fortifying the place, and saving their lives. Dr. Hoge, then a young man, was made chairman of that meeting. 'The danger was imminent enough,' said Mr. Gardiner in a speech afterwards at a political meeting, 'to make the pale face of the young parson turn red;' but, instead of that, he calmly remarked that God was a shield and a buckler against

the arrows of the Indians, and the dagger of the assassin. These words were like oil poured upon the troubled waters: they calmed the frantic women, and inspired the weak-hearted men with courage.

"Such a spirit in many a man would have led him to all kinds of excesses, but it did not produce that effect upon Dr. Hoge. He was one of the most *prudent* men of his day. This was owing to his excellent judgment and profound sense. These, we are told, never failed him; but served as regulators to all his actions, and a balance-wheel to all his movements. He was never known to do an unwise thing. When looking back over a life of four-score years, he was able to say, that he could scarcely think of any thing that he ever did, that he would like to have undone. He gave the benefit of his good judgment to many others, who frequently resorted to him for counsel. It is no exaggeration to say, as you all know, that he was consulted on almost every thing from a common agricultural implement to the highest laws that regulate the State. On many matters, his word '*was the end of all strife.*'

"With all this, he was *extremely modest and unassuming*. He made no display of his power, or parade about his learning; but, on the other hand, abominated all pomp and outward show. He would scarcely ever refer to himself, or mention any of his actions. He kept self always in abeyance, that the grace of God might be magnified, his favourite motto being, '*By the grace of God, I am what I am.*' He was a living rebuke to the conceited and would-be great men that came in contact with him; and yet he never was obtrusive, in volunteering his criticisms, or urging upon any one his opinions.

"He was also an exceedingly frank or candid man in all his dealings. He never waited to be urged to do any thing, but consented, when asked, with unaffected simplicity, rarely found in any public man, or refused with great promptness, if he was unable to comply with the request. He never had a policy in any thing he ever did, but a great end to accomplish, for he always acted from Christian principles, and not from mere feelings or personal motives.

"These noble traits of character, as found in Dr. Hoge, were not due entirely to constitutional peculiarities, or early advan-

tages, but to the grace of God, and his close adherence to the revealed principles of the divine law. He was, by nature, ‘of like passions with ourselves,’ and the reason why he became so much more eminent as a man than many around him, is to be found ‘in his diligence in business, fervency in spirit, serving the Lord.’ This leads us to remark, that Dr. Hoge was an eminent Christian man. His piety was not of the negative kind, like that of so many in our day, but a life in the soul, a principle that regulated all his actions. His life was an embodiment of all the truths he so ably preached from year to year, and the result of hard labour and many struggles. No aspirant in the school of painting lived more constantly under the shades of Raphael or of Rubens, than he did under the mysterious shadow of the ‘Holy, Harmless, Undefiled, and Separate from sinners.’ No candidate for military glory ever drank deeper into the enthusiasm of a Cæsar or a Napoleon, than he did into the spirit of ‘the great Captain of our salvation.’ He strove hard to imitate him in all his imitable perfections.

“He did this, not simply by a careful and exegetic study of the Scriptures ‘that testify of Him,’ but by spending hours daily in reading them prayerfully and meditatively, so as to catch their hidden meaning and divine beauty. Thus he lived literally on the marrow and fatness of the gospel. Such a nourishment would naturally manifest itself in the growth of the inward man, and in the increasing strength of his religious principles. So plain and prominent were these, that the worldly and the fashionable, the careless and profane, would say sometimes, to make their assertions emphatic, that they were as true and correct as Dr. Hoge. Christians were often heard exclaiming, ‘Let our death be the death of that venerable saint, and our latter end be like his.’ One of the most eminent scientific men in our land said once, ‘I am compelled to believe that there is truth and power in the Christian religion whenever I think of Dr. Hoge. Why, if all were like him, we would be in need of no civil laws, judges, policemen, jails, or penitentiaries.’ I know that I am expressing your sentiments, my hearers, when I say, that the life of Dr. Hoge, more than that of any other man perhaps, was a living sermon to

you on your own duty; an incessant reproof to you of your negligence of it; and a perpetual monitor to you of your obligations to that God whom he so dearly loved and faithfully served. You could not look at him, in his old age and feeble health, wending his way to the house of prayer on dark and stormy nights, without feeling rebuked—nay, condemned.

“He was not only an exemplary Christian, but a loving husband and kind father. Four of his children were taken away in infancy to chasten his feelings, teach him submission to the Divine will, and qualify him to sympathize with the afflicted in his congregation. This accounts, in a great degree, I have no doubt, for that tender pathos which is said to have marked his words and prayers in the house of mourning. He was peculiarly tender on such occasions, and able to say to the bereaved, ‘I am a man that has seen affliction.’ But he was remarkably happy in his own family. I feel that I am now treading on the verge of sacred, if not forbidden ground. The presence of so many members of that favoured circle, remind me of my duty to be careful in speaking of family affairs. But as he was the same consistent Christian at home that he was abroad, I am relieved of much embarrassment, and encouraged to say, in general terms, that but few parents ever gained the respect and profound veneration of their children in the same degree that Dr. Hoge did. He was their friend, counsellor, and, I may add, their oracle. His will was the law of the family, his wishes the principles by which it was regulated, and his presence its light and joy. In his conduct towards his children, he combined, in the happiest manner, dignity of bearing, to command respect; decision of character, to secure obedience; justness of requisition, to insure confidence; and mildness of temper, to elicit the purest love. As few parents only have such traits of character, few only enjoy, in the same degree, the respect, the obedience, the confidence, and love of their children.

“Our late venerable father was a Christian scholar. . . . He went through his studies under the vigilant and jealous eye of his distinguished father, who drilled him in them as no disinterested professor ever would. Thus, he learned well how to study to advantage, and how absolutely necessary it was to

carry on painful investigations afterwards, in order to enjoy any degree of success in his profession. Having come out to the wilderness as a missionary, he did not, like many others, give up all his studies, except those that were indispensable to his comfort in his field of labour. But he carried on his investigations just as carefully and extensively as if he had the most learned audience in the land. He had the name of 'devouring' every book of importance that came to the neighbourhood.

"He studied every subject thoroughly and profoundly; in other words, he completely mastered it. Only six weeks before he died, he gave me, without hesitation or mistake, a complete analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, stating what he regarded as its grand theme, and then dividing and subdividing it, giving the chapter and verse under each head. He went through the book of Acts in the same manner, pointing out at every step what he deemed erroneous in the leading commentaries on it. He was equally versed in the other books of the Bible. And he was not only versed in their analysis and exegesis, but in the antiquities of the Jews, and the oriental customs alluded to in so many passages. He was an excellent ecclesiastical historian; in fact, he taught that branch of study in the Theological Seminary which he was the means of starting at Cincinnati.

"He did not confine his studies to the sacred Scriptures, but familiarized himself with all the discoveries of science, and was particularly well read in astronomy, natural philosophy, and anatomy, as well as in the profounder researches of metaphysicians. He had acquired such an extensive knowledge of law and diplomacy, that he became a book of reference to many of the State legislators on all that pertained to the Constitution, respective relations and laws of the provinces before the Federal Union was formed. He seemed to have the history of that chaotic period perfectly clear in his mind, as well as the transaction of every convention that contemplated the independence of the provinces. He could explain the compromises, concessions, and adjustments made by the different States that originally formed our mighty Republic, with greater accuracy and facility than many of our gifted statesmen that made it a professional study. Indeed, one of the most eminent jurists in the

State said, in my hearing, that he believed him to be the best statesman in our commonwealth. As a token of their high appreciation of these rare attainments, the trustees of Miami University conferred their first title of Doctor of Divinity upon him in the year 1827.

"Soon after being licensed, he applied to the General Assembly for a commission to go out to Ohio as a missionary, which was granted him in the following terms: 'Resolved, that Mr. James Hoge be appointed missionary to the State of Ohio, and the parts adjacent thereto.' Thus he not only gave himself up to the self-denying work of the ministry, but applied for the most laborious and trying part of that work, even that which falls to the lot of a missionary. Being a son of one of the most distinguished scholars of the day, descending from an influential family, and possessing himself rare qualities of mind and heart, he might have easily found an inviting field of labour in one of the seaboard towns or cities. But he did not turn his attention in that direction. His soul yearned for the destitute and neglected on our frontiers; and accordingly he directed his steps towards the West. He arrived at Franklinton on the 19th of November, 1805, and held religious services the next day in the room occupied by the Supreme Court. He found the prospect of doing much good for the Master there rather gloomy, but he was not to be deterred. He laboured with great zeal for months, and as a result of this labour, a church was organized of thirteen members, on the 18th of February, 1806, Robert Culbertson and William Read being elected as its ruling elders; and Joseph Dixon, John Dill, Daniel Nelson, William Domigan, Joseph Hunter, and Lucas Sullivant, as its trustees. Thus commenced the new enterprise under the pastoral care of young Hoge, but alas! his health became so impaired that he was compelled to return to his native State early in the fall. Many would have made that a sufficient ground for abandoning the whole undertaking as being too full of danger and discouragements for him, but Mr. Hoge's conscience was not so easily set at rest. He determined to return, as soon as God, in his providence, saw fit to restore his health, and on the 25th of September, 1807, the church at Franklinton made out a call for three-fourths of his

time, and forwarded it to him. He soon returned to signify his acceptance of the same, and commence his labours.

"Not long after this, the settlement of Columbus commenced, and Mr. Hoge was solicited to preach occasionally this side of the river. He consented, and the First Presbyterian church was in time removed thither to a log cabin, rudely constructed, near the corner of Spring and Third streets. In a few years, it was removed to a house that was familiarly called by the Methodists of that day, the 'Old Trinity in Unity,' situated near the south-west corner of Town and Front streets. On the first Sunday in December of 1830, the first services were held in the basement of this building which we now occupy. He continued to minister here in holy things until the 28th of February, 1858, when a congregational meeting was called to accept the resignation of their venerable pastor. After making a few touching remarks, Dr. Hoge stated that his age and feeble health induced him to ask them to accept his resignation. They acceded to his request, but expressed, at the same time, their unfeigned regret at the circumstances that led to the necessity of severing the ties that had bound them so long together as pastor and people. Thus, you observe, he continued as pastor of the same people for over fifty years. The growth of the church, in the meanwhile, must have been rapid, from the fact that so many other churches went out of it. The nuclei that formed the Methodist Episcopal, the Protestant Episcopal, the Second Presbyterian, the Westminster, and partly the Congregational, and other churches, went out of it at different times, and yet left the old mother church, in many respects, the strongest of them all.

"All this is to be attributed to three causes, viz., the grace of God, the growth of population, and the abilities of the pastor. It is impossible to tell how abundantly God poured of his Spirit upon the people, during a pastorate of fifty years, and I have no data within reach to give you the rate of the increase of population, but I shall endeavour to give you some of the impressions I have received of Dr. Hoge as a preacher. He was very unlike his father and two brothers in this respect. His father was exceedingly eloquent, drawing crowds to hear him whenever he preached. His brother Samuel was blessed

with a rich imagination, and John Blair is said to have been like a meteor, bright, brilliant, and attractive. He consumed his vital energies, by excess of light and heat, long before he reached his prime. James never attracted the crowd, but gathered around him the learned and the elite, not by the brilliancy of his imagination, the charm of his eloquence, or beauty of his style, but by the profundity of his thoughts, soundness of his views, and strength of his logic. The Supreme Court that was in session at Franklinton adjourned, on one occasion, for the express purpose of going to hear young Hoge preach. After his removal to Columbus, the great majority of the church-going members of the State Legislature attended his preaching, it being very attractive to that class of men. His sermons were always rich in biblical and historical lore; they were logically arranged and well expressed. The range of his subjects, perhaps, was not quite as wide as that of many others less gifted than he, for he confined himself very closely to the great doctrines of grace, or the fundamental principles of the Christian religion. ‘He determined to know nothing among his people, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.’ He never became so animated in his preaching as when he was explaining the great plan of salvation through a Redeemer, or describing the glory of the Divine attributes; setting forth the doctrine of vicarious atonement, justification by faith, repentance and eternal life. These were evidently his favourite themes, though he did not neglect those that pertain more directly to morals and casuistry.

“Owing to the closeness of his reasoning and profundity of his thoughts, the careless hearer felt often that he was uninteresting. The different parts of his discourses were so connected with each other, that the full knowledge of the one was necessary to the due appreciation of the other. In addition to that, his sentences were considered by some too lengthy, and at times somewhat involved. This was not owing to a desire to appear profound, for he always aimed at the greatest simplicity of arrangement and expression, adopting usually the textual mode of dividing his subjects, and sometimes even the expository. Whatever might have been the method used, he was eminently scriptural. He never attempted to embellish his sermons by

any flowers of rhetoric, for the simple reason that he felt that he could not make them so effective, his aim being to reach the heart and conscience. His darts were never coloured with rainbow tints, but sharpened on the tables of the law, and dipped in the blood of the atonement, before they were hurled at the torpid conscience.

"I have been told, that Dr. Hoge was a revival preacher in his early days. By this you are not to understand that he indulged in horrid descriptions, or in vapid declamations, but that he was greatly blessed on such occasions. He was frequently called upon, many years ago, to take part in the exercises, during seasons of special awakening. His preaching at such times was exceedingly simple, but pointed and powerful. He seized the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, and applied it most effectually 'to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, joints and marrow.' He hurled at his hearers the old barbed arrows, that proved so effectual on the day of Pentecost in the hands of Peter, and in those of Paul at Macedonia, Corinth, and Greece.

"But he was never so happy, perhaps, in any of his pulpit efforts as on special occasions. This can be easily accounted for. Being naturally cool, and free from ambitious motives, he needed some extraneous force to call out all his powers. Those of you who heard his Thanksgiving sermons, his lectures on the Apocalypse, during the winters of 1835—36, or his discourses before the Synod and General Assembly, can readily indorse these sentiments. It is said that the sermon he preached from Eph. v. 25, 27, at the opening of the General Assembly at Philadelphia in 1833, was a masterly production; and yet the report is, that he had to call up the line of argument and every train of thought on his way thither, for he had inadvertently left his manuscript at home. The excitement connected with the occasion made him equal to the task. No less remarkable, in many respects, perhaps, was the hastily gotten up funeral discourse he delivered in the Ohio Senate Chamber over the mortal remains of the lamented Dr. Kane, on the 8th of March, 1857; and that on the signs of the times, when Europe was trembling beneath the tramp of war, will be long remembered.

"The vast and varied powers of Dr. Hoge were not confined to the individual church of which he was pastor, but were largely enjoyed by the whole denomination to which he belonged. He may be justly called the father of the Presbytery of Columbus, and even of the Synod of Ohio. He never appeared to better advantage than in our church courts: there he was a giant among his brethren. His personal influence, his practical wisdom, his extensive historical knowledge, his clear mind and logical powers told effectually whenever they were brought to bear on any subject. He did not say much, as a general thing, on any question, but when he rose it was usually done just before taking the vote to state some important fact, or mention some overlooked principle, that decided the case. He never argued for the sake of carrying his point, or showing his power, but because he conscientiously believed it to be his duty to do so. So great was his influence over the Synod, that a large number of its members, on an important occasion, tried to have the roll so called that Dr. Hoge's vote might be cast last, lest it should influence all that followed him; for they felt that it was impossible for many men to see differently from him on any subject.

"His power was felt also in the General Assembly. For many years, he was one of the most prominent men that attended its sessions, having acted as its Moderator in the year 1832, and served always on some of its important committees. A single incident will show you how faithfully he attended to such duties. When nominated, by a meeting held in his own church, as a member of some important committee, he declined the nomination for the want of time to attend to the business. Some one rose, and expressed his hope that Dr. Hoge would allow his name to remain, even if he could not be present at its meetings. He promptly replied, 'No, Sir; I have made it a principle never to be an irresponsible member of a responsible committee.' His faithful adherence to this principle made him a most valuable director or trustee of any institution. Dr. Spencer, of Brooklyn, himself one of the most useful and practical men in our church, said to a distinguished judge in our city, a little before he died, that Dr. Hoge was one of the most useful men that attended the meetings of the General

Assembly; and added, that he had more business tact and practical wisdom than almost any man he ever knew. During the stormy times and heated discussions that led to the great rupture of 1838, he was a peacemaker; but when the question of deciding between the two sides came, he cast his lot most decidedly with the Old-School side, and continued with it until the end of his days.

"It is proper to add, in this connection, that the efforts of Dr. Hoge were not bound by any ecclesiastical ties, but he was ever ready to lend a helping hand to every good cause, or united effort for the well-being of man. - Unlike many of the fathers of his day, he was not so shackled by notions and prejudices that he could see nothing good in new and reformatory measures. His eye was so keen that he could see, at a glance, whether a cause had any merits in it or not; it never failed to discriminate between the vapid dreams of enthusiasts, and the wise measures of reformers. He taught the first Sabbath-school in this section of country. When he began, people thought that he was doing wrong, but he was satisfied that the Sabbath-school was not only a sinless institution, but the hope of our rapidly-growing country. He first gathered the little lambs of his flock into his own parlour, on the Lord's day, in order to instruct them in the great truths of the gospel, and soon succeeded in securing the aid of a good Methodist brother to carry on the work more profitably and extensively. Thus commenced that school into which you now send your children.

"Some years after this, he acted as the pioneer of the great temperance reform in our State. Seeing the heart-rending desolation and misery produced by the use of intoxicating liquors, he felt that it was his duty to see if no means, civil or ecclesiastical, could be adopted to stay them. He consulted the late venerable Governor Trimble, who was, at that time, a member of the State legislature, and a frequent guest at his own house, and found him ready to coöperate in any movement for that purpose. They, accordingly, drew up a series of resolutions on the subject, and obtained seventeen names of the most respectable citizens in the place, to their own. This was the first movement, as far as we know, towards a temperance reform in the State of Ohio.

"He acted, for many years, as a trustee in the two State Universities of Ohio, and cast his influence in favour of the present common-school system, which was first introduced in 1825.

"He was one of the warmest advocates of the Bible Society in the West, ever holding that it was the most honoured of all human institutions for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom. He proved the sincerity of these views by giving for its use his time, his influence, and his means.

"In addition to all this, Dr. Hoge was a *thorough patriot*. He was not one of those who are clamorous for their country's well-being as long as it is to their pecuniary advantage to be so; nor one of those who are extremely loyal whilst their own views and peculiar notions are being carried out; but a true lover of his country in spirit and in truth, pouring out his prayers most fervently for its safety and integrity.

"Dr. Hoge was a philanthropist. . . . He found two or three classes of men at home that claimed his attention and enlisted his warmest sympathies. These were the deaf, the dumb, and the blind. He learned, in some way, that these unfortunate creatures could be taught to read the word of God, and master the arts and sciences. Feeling very anxious that it should be tried in the State of Ohio, he applied to the most prominent members of the legislature for their influence to bring it about, but they could not be convinced that such a thing was within the bounds of possibility, and yet so great was their confidence in Dr. Hoge's judgment that they passed a bill authorizing him to try an experiment of that kind. He undertook the work; and, with his characteristic discrimination, selected a most excellent instructor. The thing proved an entire success, and the first report was made to the legislature of the State on the 8th of December, 1827. Hundreds, since that day, have had good reasons to thank God for such a boon.

"On the 11th day of March, 1836, the legislature of Ohio appointed Dr. Hoge, Judge Swayne, and Dr. Awl, as a committee to prepare a report respecting the possibility of ameliorating the condition of the blind. They investigated the matter with great diligence and care, prepared a report at Dr.

Hoge's house, and handed it in, in the month of December of the same year. It was accepted and adopted, and I am told that it forms the basis of every institution for the blind in our Western States.

"He was an efficient aid, as well as constant counsellor to the first projector of the Lunatic Asylum, watching daily the progress of the enterprise with the intensest interest. We might safely add, in this connection, that he manifested a special interest in all the charitable institutions of the State. In fact, it is not too much to say that the great majority of them have felt, in some form, the plastic power of his hand, or the moulding influence of his intellect."

"Our vast country, in all its varied interests, did not wholly absorb the mind and heart of Dr. Hoge. When that loud and doleful wail of the famishing in Ireland wafted across the broad Atlantic, some years since, its first notes reached his ears. They moved his heart to pity, and consequently to take an active part in a movement set on foot to send them immediate relief."

About a year ago, an article appeared in one of our weekly papers, headed "A Western Preacher." In it things were said, which unmistakably pointed to Dr. Hoge. In that piece the writer said,

"As early as 1814, this venerable man suggested to Dr. Speece, of Virginia, the plan of colonizing with their own consent the free people of colour in our land on the coast of Africa. Speece urged him to present his thoughts to the public, yet he declined. But his friend Speece, 'the man of giant body and giant mind,' did that year write and publish on the subject. This was two years before Dr. Finley and his coadjutors had their meeting in Washington to form the American Colonization Society."

When Dr. Hoge could not but see that he was pointed out in the article, he surmised the author, and wrote him a friendly letter, a copy of which is now before us. In that letter he makes this statement:

"In the month of February, 1814, I was on my journey from my father's residence in Virginia to my home in the West. On the way I called on the Rev. Conrad Speec^h, then

pastor of the Augusta church, near Staunton. We had much conversation, and among other things, on my having fixed my residence in a free State. I gave as one reason, my opposition to slavery. This produced some discussion of that institution, and, as usual in that day, Dr. Speece proposed the question, What should be done with the slaves if they were emancipated? I answered, Send them back to Africa, if they cannot be retained among us as free labourers. The proposal took hold on his mind, and he urged me to write and publish on the subject. This I declined, and requested him to examine the plan, and if he approved it, to write and have *his* views communicated to the public through some suitable medium. I was afterwards informed that Dr. Speece did write, and that his articles were published in a weekly paper printed in Richmond, Virginia, called, if I remember correctly, 'The Family Visitor.' I have not claimed the Plan of Colonization as my own, for I had previously read what was published by Dr. S. Hopkins, of Newport, Rhode Island, suggesting something of the same kind. This conversation with Dr. Speece occurred two years before I knew any thing of Dr. Robert Finley's agency in the matter."

As the article just referred to is not long, we insert most of the remaining paragraphs. Speaking of Dr. Hoge the writer says:

"Though aged, his heart is young. He loves children. He loves horses, and always keeps a good one. He thinks children ought always to have a dog to play with, not only because it furnishes them harmless amusement, but because they thus learn to observe the instincts of animals. It is said that as his own children were growing up, he had a little dog, that *would* go to church on the Lord's day. Although to some it seemed strange that a minister should oppose *any* one going to church, yet 'Fip' was often ordered to be tied or shut up on Sabbath morning. At length he grew so cunning, that when he heard the bells ring early in the morning, long before time for church, he would go out in the street, where they could not catch him, and after service had commenced 'Fip' would come in, ascend the pulpit steps and stand looking intently at his master, until at the end of a paragraph he would turn his head and look over

the congregation, as if to say, ‘How do you like that? I think it is first-rate.’

“This venerable man has always been a great reader of newspapers and of penny papers, sometimes in small print. He often sat up late at night to read them by a single lamp.

“He has also through life done much of his studying at night, often sitting up for hours after others had retired to rest. This habit seems never to have injured either his sight or his health. Until of late, no amount of preaching seemed to produce even weariness. Through life, he has often preached three times on the Lord’s day, yet was as fresh on Monday as on Saturday.”

“Though naturally inclined to taciturnity, yet when he has had a good listener he has often sat up to a late hour, and poured forth a fund of rich thoughts. He has a great dislike to speaking of himself. He has no talent for uttering what Miss Edgeworth calls ‘agreeable nonsense.’ He is habitually exceedingly grave in his manners and appearance, yet he evidently loves to see others laugh at the right time, and has himself a keen perception of the ludicrous.

“In person, this venerable man is tall, without any tendency to obesity. He is as slender as when young. His complexion is swarthy. His attitude, both when sitting and standing, is very erect. His countenance is somewhat stern. His carriage is very dignified. No man could see him without perceiving at once that he was no changeling, but possessed great decision of character. His whole mien would repel undue familiarity. For most of his long life, his hair has been of a glossy jet black, but of late, time has been frosting it over.

“In preaching, this father is plain, simple, logical, scriptural and practical. He is brisk and lively, but seldom impassioned. He has been eminently useful.

“In deliberative bodies his power is great, because his wisdom is unusual. Public men often consult him. I have seen a venerable deliberative body impatient to come to a vote, when he would rise, shrug his shoulders, and begin to say some kind, weighty thing, until the house gave earnest heed for thirty or forty minutes, when he would sit down as unexpectedly as he rose. He never wearied a body with words after his ideas had been presented.

"I have heard from him wise and powerful addresses and sermons in our largest eastern cities; but he is as earnest and as eloquent in addressing twenty people in a little schoolhouse in the country as in addressing a thousand people in a populous city."

Dr. Hoge's life was not marked by very great variety. The history of one year was substantially the history of another. We will state an exception. In August 1845, he set out on a journey to his native State. The companion of his journey was a beloved child. He went as far as Lewisburg, Va., in his own vehicle. His object, probably, was again to see the country over which he had travelled forty years before. On the way, he pointed out old landmarks, which he recognised. His topical memory was good. He showed peculiar pleasure at discovering the identical bridle-path by which, near the beginning of this century, he had crossed one of the noble mountains—a path forsaken by the public, though still used by some of the mountaineers. In the valley of the great Kanawha, he met, at a late hour of the night, four eminent officers of the court on their way to Charleston. They were all his seniors, but had all been his pupils. The meeting was unexpected, and in the extreme joyous. Every day's journey produced increased exhilaration. How could it be otherwise? The scenery was magnificent. The climate was delightful. Everybody was kind. The whole appearance of the agricultural districts was vastly improved. Every day reminded him of Jacob's return after his long absence in Padan-aram. Near Lewisburg, he came to a spring, where he was once near dying. On his first return from the West, he was at that very spot seized with violent hemorrhage of the lungs; not knowing what to do, and being greatly exhausted, he drank of the water of the spring till he could drink no more. He was soon after discovered by a woman living in a cabin near the spring. She took him to her house, procured medical advice, and nursed him tenderly. It was thought by his physician that the copious draughts of water, probably, saved his life. In 1845, the cabin was still standing, though nearly in ruins. Its kind occupant was gone to eternity. But the memory of Dr. Hoge brought vividly back the whole scene. What recollections! what emotions! what gratitude!

what vows of entire consecration to Him, who had made that life his care. The day will declare all this.

In eastern Virginia, Dr. Hoge found his brother Thomas Hoge, M. D. He was living in Halifax county, on his plantation. As the carriage entered the spacious grounds, a gentleman was seen coming out of the doctor's office and walking across the lawn. It was twenty-seven years since the brothers had met. The carriage was stopped. Dr. James Hoge alighted. The brothers approached each other in silence. Not a word was spoken. They embraced each other for at least five minutes, each with his head on the other's shoulder. The scene reminds us of that scene in Genesis: "And Joseph fell upon his brother Benjamin's neck, and wept; and Benjamin wept upon his neck."

On this visit great numbers flocked to hear Dr. Hoge preach. Churches would not contain the people. The multitudes filled some of the noble groves. There the man of God pleaded with God for the lives of men's souls; and there he pleaded with men to be reconciled to God. His health was excellent. His preaching was powerful. God owned his labours. Among other good done, he had the pleasure of leading his only surviving brother to the cross of Christ. This was reward a thousand times over for all the fatigues of his long journey. When before he left the county he received his brother to the communion of the church, the scene was melting beyond description.

On the same visit he spent a few days with the widow of his father, a lady of much worth and dignity, who greatly enjoyed his society. On his way home he met the Synod of Virginia at Charlottesville, and was most cordially received. On Sabbath morning he preached with great power on the words, "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures."

In estimating the character and services of Dr. Hoge, we wish to be regarded as endorsing in the main the remarks of Mr. Roberts. Some things, indeed, we would have uttered with more strength of expression. We add some thoughts of our own, illustrated by some facts within our knowledge.

If asked how we account for his great usefulness, we of course ascribe it all to the distinguishing grace of God. No

man was more ready than Dr. Hoge to say, "What I am, I am by the grace of God." Yes, it was all rich, free, unmerited grace. But this grace, in making him a chosen vessel, was manifested in the ways and methods likely to produce such a character as his.

Thus his whole early history of hardship and exertion taught him self-reliance. He did not depend on others for what he ought to do for himself. He early saw that the world was busy about its own affairs, cold and selfish; and that even if disposed to help him, it was better to rely on his own exertions.

He was also a child of the covenant. We have spoken of the piety of his paternal ancestry. On his mother's side he had the same blessing. The connection between the prayers of God's people and the conversion and usefulness of their posterity is often hid from us; but in the next world we may see it in a manner that will surprise us. How many able ministers there are now on earth, who have been raised to their present position in answer to the prayers of ancestors who never saw them, no man can tell. We doubt not there are many.

Moreover, Dr. Hoge had a rich and increasing experience during the whole of his life. His early conflicts were followed by a wretched state of health, which made him look solemnly at eternal things. Then the death of four beloved children greatly softened his heart. These were followed by yet other trials and disappointments. John Owen says:

"Ordinarily, it is so in the holy, wise providence of God, that afflictions and troubles increase with age. It is so in an especial manner with ministers of the gospel; they have, many of them, a share in the lot of Peter, which our Lord Jesus Christ declared unto him, John xxi. 18. Besides those natural distempers and infirmities which accompany the decays of life, troubles of life, and in their affairs, do usually grow upon them when they look for nothing less, but were ready to say with Job, 'We shall die in our nest.' Job xix. 18. So was it with Jacob, after all his hard labour and travail to provide for his family, such things fell out in it in his old age as had almost broken his heart; and oft times both persecutions and public dangers do befall them at the same season. While the outward man is thus perishing, we need great supportment, that

we faint not. And this is only to be had in an experience of daily spiritual renovations in the inner man."

Dr. Hoge was no exception to this remark.

Dr. Hoge had a deep and abiding sense of his own utter want of sufficiency to do anything effectually for building up the church, except by the saving energies of the Holy Spirit. He held with another, who said :

" Could preachers declaim the rocks into wax, or hold the attention of the hills by their oratory; could their rhetoric shake the mountains into molehills, or rive the earth to its centre, the hardened heart of man would remain proof against the expostulation, unless he, whose prerogative it is to turn streams into blood, cut seas in sunder, shake the mountains, turn the flint to floods, drop the stars from their spheres and stop the sun in his course, put forth his omnipotent arm, and bow their perverse wills. Such is the desperate condition into which men have fallen by sin, that God must bleed to purchase life for them—the Holy One imputatively become a sinner to make them righteous; and, yet, they will be miserable for ever, unless the same Almighty hand make particular personal application of this infinite expense to their souls by immediate power."

Another secret of Dr. Hoge's success was his untiring industry. "If he was not making a draught of fishes, he was mending his nets." Who ever saw him sit down quietly to do nothing? He was, if not otherwise properly engaged, continually *reading*. He read constantly, not only theology, but history, philosophy and polite literature, etc. This habit was unbroken till he had gone far into his last sickness. Of course, his information was varied and extensive.

Dr. Hoge greatly extended his usefulness by his enlarged Christian hospitality. His house was open to all ministers of the gospel, and, indeed, it was for many years the resort of many of all classes. Of course, he was sometimes imposed on; but he bore this patiently. Nor did he lose his reward. Many pleasant scenes were witnessed by his family. Intelligent Christian gentlemen's visits refine, enliven, and bring down many blessings on a well-ordered household.

Another element of Dr. Hoge's power was his sincerity and

heartiness. Perhaps no man ever heard him accused of want of candor, or of earnestness in any profession of regard. He was not very demonstrative, and yet, he had an affectionate nature.

Dr. Hoge also abounded in secret prayer. Many a time have his children suddenly entered his study and found him on his knees; until at last it came to be their custom to knock or give some notice of their coming in. Even then very often it was evident he had just risen from his knees.

Dr. Hoge also well understood the meaning of the apostle when he said, "No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life; that he may please him who hath chosen him to be a soldier." Upon reflection and deliberation he renounced wealth and its temptations. He had ample opportunities of accumulating a vast property. Indeed, he had in actual possession such an amount, that if he had husbanded it, as did many of his neighbours, he would have possessed a very large fortune. But he saw the danger, and made his escape. At one time he was offered on terms quite accordant with his means *thirty thousand* acres of fine land in Madison county; but he saw the effect it was likely to have on his ministerial character and usefulness, and declined the offer. He had some experience of the increasing cares attending a growing fortune, and although the scantiness of his salary, during a considerable part of his life, would have furnished a very plausible pretext to many to embark in secular pursuits, he determined to mind his calling, which was serving Christ in the gospel. His decision was wise. He did never regret it. Even here, he has left his children a better heritage than boundless wealth. "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches." Yet Dr. Hoge was independent in his old age. "He lacked no good comfort."

Dr. Hoge loved to preach. When some one was asked, What is Dr. Hoge doing these days? the answer was, "He is preaching away." He held with the apostles, that the two greatest things done on earth are preaching and praying. Acts vi. 4. If one did not wish Dr. Hoge to preach for him, it was safest not to ask him; for he seldom declined an invitation. Whitefield, who began to preach at twenty-four years of age

and died at fifty-six, had preached *eighteen thousand* times. We have no means of knowing how many times Dr. Hoge preached; but we do know, that for fifty-nine years he was abundant in labours. "There will be time enough to rest in the grave," said a laborious servant of Christ. Men can keep silence without licensure or ordination. Let those who hold a commission proclaim the glad tidings. Some have asked, Was Dr. Hoge eloquent? The answer to this question will depend on the definition we give of eloquence. One writer says, "Eloquence is animated simplicity of speech." In this sense Dr. Hoge was truly eloquent. Another says, "Eloquence is the art of persuasion." In this sense also he was eloquent. He often, even in his latter years, very powerfully moved large audiences. Or, if eloquence consists in a happy use of appropriate language, then Dr. Hoge was eloquent. For who ever wished to "lend him a word?" On communion occasions, Dr. Hoge, like his venerated father before him, was peculiarly tender and solemn. Yet never did he seek meretricious ornament; never was he highly imaginative; seldom did he thrill a whole audience by rare words uttered in clarion tones; perhaps at no time did men say, What an orator!

Dr. Hoge's reverence for sacred things was marked and life-long. He never "wooed a smile, when he should win a soul." He was always fluent, never flippant.

And he made men feel "how awful goodness is." His presence hushed indecent levity. Yea more, it commanded profound respect. On one occasion he was called into court as a witness. The clerk was about to administer the usual oath. The counsel of the party who had not summoned him, said, "Mr. Clerk, you need not swear that witness." Without the oath the court permitted him to give his testimony, and it was decisive of the case.

Dr. Hoge was also a man of peace, and well did he know how to keep the unity of the Spirit. We have heard very harsh and ungracious things said to him, but we never knew him to give the bitter retort. When the great rupture in the Presbyterian church took place about twenty-five years ago, some of his church desired an organization in connection with our New-school brethren. These discontented persons, of

course, would talk, and some agitation was felt. Dr. Hoge knew what was going on. He called his session together. They sent for the persons who were causing dissension. They insisted on remaining in the church. He and his session insisted that they should bind themselves to live quietly, or at once take regular dismissions. The pastor and session prevailed. All were dismissed, and there was no further disturbance.

Hardly anything has struck us as more remarkable than the uniform agreement of men in estimating Dr. Hoge's character. Just as we were closing this article our eye lighted on an estimate of him in the *Cleveland Herald*. The editor says:

"Dr. Hoge was one of the remarkable men of the age. He was not only an Old-school Presbyterian, but an Old-school Christian gentleman. Tall, erect, active, and inured to the privations and hardships of pioneer life, he bore the weight of accumulating years with unusual vigour and strength, and did not shrink from the great work of his youth and manhood in old age. Modest, affable, benevolent, talented, and full of good sense, Dr Hoge held the even tenor of his way among the same people for nearly three-score years, baptizing their children, marrying the young, consoling the dying, burying their dead, each year binding closer the bonds of union."

ERRATUM—On page 100, for Hackett read Sackett.

ART. IV.—*Can God be known?*

THIS is a question which lies at the foundation of all religion. If God be to us an unknown God; if we know simply that he is, but not what he is, he cannot be to us the object of love or the ground of confidence. We cannot worship him or call upon him for help. Our Lord tells us that the knowledge of God is eternal life. How is it then that there are some among us, who say that God cannot be known?

There are, however, three answers given to the question which we purpose now to consider. The one is a distinct affirmative answer; another as distinctly negative; and the third

is a qualified affirmative. Among the ancient philosophers there were some who asserted that the nature of God could be as distinctly and as fully determined as any other object of knowledge. This opinion, however, was confined to a small class, until the rise of the modern speculative school of philosophers and philosophical theologians. With the disciples of this school, it is a primary principle, that what cannot be known cannot exist. And consequently that God is, only so far as he is known. To say, therefore, that God cannot be known, is to deny God, or, as Hegel says, it is the sin against the Holy Ghost., *Werke* xiv. p. 219. *Mansel*, p. 301.

How God is thus known in his own nature, these philosophers differ among themselves. Schelling says, it is by direct intuition of the higher reason. He assumes that there is in man a power which transcends the limits of ordinary consciousness, and by which the mind takes immediate cognizance of God.

Hegel and his followers say, it is by a process of thought; our thought of God is God. Our knowledge of God is God's knowing himself. We know of God all that God knows of himself. This knowledge is God's self-consciousness. *Werke* xii. p. 400. *Mansel*, p. 245. Hamilton's *Discuss.* p. 10. Cousin finds this knowledge in the common consciousness of men. That consciousness includes the knowledge of the finite and infinite. We know the one as we know the other, and cannot know one without knowing both. "God in fact exists to us only so far as he is known." These philosophers all admit that the infinite can only be comprehended by the infinite, and, therefore, man to known God must be himself God. Reason in man, according to Cousin, does not belong to his individuality. It is impersonal, infinite, divine. What is personal to us is our free and voluntary activity; what is not free and voluntary does not constitute an integrant part of our individuality. See Hamilton's *Discuss.* p. 15. *Princeton Review* on Cousin's Philosophy, 1856.

This theory starts, as we have seen, with the idea of the absolute, which is defined to be that which exists in and of itself, and is independent of any necessary relation. From the absolute, which is the object of immediate knowledge, in one of the methods above mentioned, are determined the nature

of God. 2. His relation to the world; and, 3. What the world is. As to the nature of God, it follows from the nature of the absolute, that he is all things. "What kind of absolute Being is that," asks Hegel, "which does not contain all that is actual, even evil included." *Werke* xv. p. 275. *Mansel*, p. 77. It also follows from this idea that neither intelligence, will, or consciousness can be predicated of the absolute being as such. For all these imply limitation and relation. He is indifferent substance, which manifests itself, and comes into existence in the world. This determines his relation to the world. It is that of identity, so far as the world is the existence of God. It is coeternal with him. Creation is necessary as the self-evolution of God. And the world itself is merely phenomenal. It is the ever-changing mode of the divine existence. It has in itself no reality, except as the actual of the divine being is the real. Man has no individual subsistence, no personal immortality, no liberty, no accountability. Such is the doctrine of those who pretend to a knowledge of the infinite. In opposition to this doctrine, so monstrous and destructive, others have gone to the opposite extreme, and maintained that God is not knowable. We know that he is, but not what he is. This proposition has been understood in very different senses by those who use it. Plato has said, the search after God was difficult, and when found, his nature could not be declared. And Philo still more definitely asserts that the divine essence is without qualities and attributes; and as we can know nothing of any essence but by its distinguishing qualities, God in his own nature must be to us altogether unknowable.* So the devout Pascal, (*Pensées*, partie ii., art. iii. 5.), says, "We know there is an infinite, and we are ignorant of its nature—we may well know that there is a God without knowing what he is." This is repeated continually by the Greek and Latin fathers, many of whom intended nothing more than that the infinite God is incomprehensible by his creatures. Others again in this declaration of the incapacity of man to know God, refer to the spiritual blindness occasioned by sin. And, therefore, while they deny that God can be known by the unregenerated, affirm that he is

* Strauss's *Dogm.* i. p. 527.

known by those to whom the Son has revealed him. The sense in which so many Christian fathers, philosophers, and theologians have pronounced that God cannot be known, is very different from the sense in which that proposition is asserted by Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Mansel, and others of the same school. These distinguished writers had for their object the refutation of the monstrous system of modern pantheism which is founded in what is called a philosophy of the absolute, or, in the language of Hamilton, of the unconditioned. In opposition to the doctrine that we can know only the properties and phenomena of the world within and around us, and must from the limitation of our faculties be ignorant of the real essence which underlies these phenomena, the pantheistic or transcendental school of philosophy, assert that experience is unworthy the name of science, and that there can be no philosophy unless we can know things as they are, or can directly cognise the absolute (or unconditional), "As philosophy is the science of the unconditioned (*i. e.* the absolute and infinite), the unconditioned must be within the compass of science." Sir William Hamilton, p. 30. This assumption the philosophers just referred to have effectually proved to be unfounded. 1. By showing that the immediate knowledge of God, *i. e.*, of an absolute and infinite, is impossible. They have demonstrated that the immediate intuition of Schelling, which Hegel ridiculed, is a chimera; and that the dialectics of Hegel, which Schelling denounced, was a mere play of words, (see p. 31); and that Cousin's impersonal reason which enters into our consciousness, but not into our personality, is a gratuitous assumption. If these pretended methods of attaining an immediate knowledge of the infinite are unavailing, the knowledge itself must be unattainable. Existence is revealed to us only under specific modifications, and these are known only under the conditions of our faculties of knowledge. Things in themselves, matter, mind, God, all in short that is not finite, relative, phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the verge of our knowledge." Hamilton's *Discuss.* p. 23. 2. In the second place, this claim to the immediate cognition of the infinite is proved to be false, by the admission that none but the infinite can know the infinite. The assumption that man is infinite,

which this philosophy involves, shocks the reason and common consciousness of man, as well as outrages his religious and moral convictions. 3. In the third place, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel have abundantly shown that assuming the definitions of the absolute and infinite given by the transcendentalists, the most contradictory conclusions may be logically deduced from them. "There are three terms," says, Mr. Mansel, "familiar as household words; in the vocabulary of philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of metaphysical theology. To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By *First Cause*, is meant that which produces all things, and of itself is produced by none. By the *Absolute*, is meant that which exists by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the *Infinite*, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, consequently, can receive no additional attributes or mode of existence, which it had not from eternity." Accepting these definitions in the sense in which they are intended to be understood, it follows, first, that the absolute and infinite must amount to the sum of all reality. This, says Mr. Mansel, although rejected with indignation, as referring all evil to God, or making God to include all evil that is either real or possible, must be admitted as a necessary inference. "For that which is conceived as absolute and infinite, must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation." P. 76. Secondly, if the absolute and infinite be as above defined, it necessarily follows that they cannot be the object of knowledge—for to know is to limit; it is to define; it is to distinguish the object of knowledge from other objects. We cannot, for example, says Hamilton, conceive of an absolute whole, that is of a whole so great that we cannot conceive it as a part of a greater whole. Nor can we conceive of an infinite line, nor infinite space, nor infinite duration. We may as well think without thought, as to assign any limit beyond which there can

be no extension, no space, no duration. "Goad the imagination to the utmost, it still sinks paralyzed within the bounds of the finite." Hamilton, *Discuss.* 35. It follows, therefore, from the very nature of knowledge, that the absolute and infinite cannot be known. Thirdly, another no less necessary inference is, that as the infinite cannot be known, neither can it know. All knowledge or thought, say these philosophers, is limitation and difference. There is a difference between subject and object, between what knows and what is known. But in the absolute and infinite there can be no such difference, and therefore there can be no knowledge. Intelligence, therefore, whose essence is plurality, (*i. e.*, includes subject and object,) cannot be absolute, p. 39; nor the absolute intelligent. Fourth, it follows also from the nature of the absolute and infinite that it cannot be conscious; for consciousness involves a distinction between the self and not self. It is the knowledge of ourselves as different from what is not ourselves. "There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious." Even if only conscious of itself, there is the same distinction between subject and object; the self as subject, and a mode of the self as the object of consciousness. *Mansel*, p. 78, sec. 79. "The unanimous voice of philosophy," says *Mansel*, "in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter," p. 79. "Consciousness is the only form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation and change—the perception of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object with others," p. 95. The conception of an absolute and infinite consciousness, contradicts itself, p. 79. Fifth, it is no less clear that the absolute and infinite cannot be cause. Causation implies relation, the relation of efficiency to the effect. It implies also change, a change from inactivity to activity. It implies also succession, and succession implies existence in time, which cannot be predicated of the infinite and absolute. "A thing existing absolutely, (*i. e.*, not under relation,) and a thing existing absolutely as a cause," says Hamilton, *Discuss.* p. 40, "are contradictory." He quotes Schelling as saying, that he would deviate wide as the poles from the idea of the absolute, who would think of defining its nature as *activity*. "But he who

would define the absolute by the notion of cause," adds Hamilton, "would deviate still more widely from its nature; inasmuch as the notion of a cause involves not only a determination to activity, but a determination to a particular kind of activity," p. 40. "The three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not," asks Mr. Mansel, "imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction as attributes of one and the same being? A cause cannot as such be absolute; the absolute cannot, as such, be cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the cause is the cause of the effect, and the effect is the effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation." Sixth, according to the laws of our reason and consciousness there can be no duration without succession, but succession as implying change cannot be predicated of the absolute and infinite, and yet without succession there can be no thought or consciousness, and, therefore, to say that God is eternal, is to deny that he has either thought or consciousness. Seventh, "Benevolence, holiness, justice, wisdom," says Mansel, "can be conceived of us only as existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not identical with any of his attributes, but the common subject of them all in one person. But personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and relation. To speak of an absolute and infinite person is simply to use language to which, however it may be true in a superhuman sense, no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself." P. 103.

What then is the result of the whole matter? It is that reason and the laws and necessities of human thought, lead us into a labyrinth of contradictions. If there be an absolute and infinite Being, he must be the sum of all existence, evil as well as good, possible as well as actual; if admitted to exist, such a being cannot be an object of knowledge, for we know and can know only the finite; and as the infinite cannot be known, neither can it know. It can neither be self-conscious, nor a cause, nor a person, nor the subject of any moral attributes. What is the inference from all this? The first inference drawn by Sir William Hamilton from these premises, is that a

philosophy of the Absolute is a sheer impossibility. It cannot be known "any more than a greyhound can outstrip his shadow, or the eagle soar higher than the atmosphere." The human mind can think only under the limitations which confine its knowledge to the phenomenal and finite. Consequently, the whole modern transcendental philosophy is a baseless fabric. In this conclusion we may well acquiesce, and feel deep gratitude to the man whose unequalled learning and matchless power have been employed in unmasking the pretensions of this stupendous system of pantheistic atheism, whose highest results are the deification of man and the deification of evil.

But unfortunately Hamilton does not stop here. He infers that all that is said of the Absolute by the transcendentalists is true of God. That is, that so far as human faculties are concerned he is not an object of knowledge; that if we conceive of him as absolute and infinite, we cannot conceive of him as cause, as intelligent, as conscious, as a person, or possessed of any attributes. He is pure nothing—the simple negation of all thought. "A God understood," he says, "would be no God at all. To think that God is as we can think him to be, is blasphemy. The last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar—*Ἄγνωστῳ Θεῷ*—To the known and unknowable God."

Discuss. p. 22. Nevertheless he admits, and Mr. Mansel admits, that we are forced to think of God as absolute and infinite, to believe that he is such, and also that he is a person, self-conscious, the first cause of all things, benevolent, wise, holy and just. They admit that he is declared to be all this in the Scriptures, to the authority of which they bow. How are these things to be reconciled? How can our reason lead us inevitably to the conclusion that the absolute is unconscious, without intelligence, will, activity, or moral perfections, when the constitution of our nature, and the word of God, declare the very reverse? To meet this difficulty, they have recourse to two principles. First, that this contradiction is merely in our own minds, or arises from the limitations of human thought. It determines nothing as to what the absolute, or God, is in himself. And, second, that the Bible is not intended to teach us what God really is, but what he chooses that we should think

him to be. As to the former of these principles, Mr. Mansel says, "It is our duty to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God. . . . It proves that there are limits to man's power of thought; and it proves nothing more." P. 106. On the second principle, that our knowledge of God is mere *regulative*, he says, we must be "content with those regulative ideas of the Deity, which are sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect—which tell, not what God is in himself, but how he wills that we should think of him." P. 132. "Though this kind of knowledge is," says Hampden, (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 54, quoted by Mr. Mansel, p. 303,) "abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel and how to act towards God—for it is the language we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice—it is altogether inadequate in point of science." Regulative knowledge, therefore, is that which is designed to regulate or determine our character and practice. It need not be true, much less adequate or complete. All that is necessary is, that it should be trustworthy, *i. e.*, such as we can safely act upon. As our senses, it is said, give us only relative, and not absolute knowledge, telling us what things appear to us to be, not what they really are, so the revelation which God has made of himself in our moral nature and in his word, reveals him as he appears to be, as he wills that we should regard him, but not at all as he really is. But as we can safely trust to our senses, and act as though the knowledge which they give us is real and not merely regulative; so we can safely act on the assumption that God is what he declares himself to be, whether he really is in his own nature what we think he is or not. All that the Bible and our own nature reveals of God we are to believe—that is, regard as trustworthy—although we must remain in profound and absolute ignorance whether

these revelations are true, that is, answer to objective reality or not.

This whole theory which teaches that God cannot be known, appears to us self-contradictory and destructive.

1. In the first place, it cannot even be stated, without involving a denial of doctrine in the very terms in which it is presented. For example, Mr. Mansel says, after Sir William Hamilton, that we cannot know whether God is a person or not. We must think of him as a person, and feel toward him as such, but this is only a *regulative* revelation, designed to control our thoughts, feelings, and conduct. But what is regulative truth, but truth designed to accomplish a given end? And what is design, but the intelligent adaptation of means to an end? And what is intelligent adaptation of means but a personal act? Unless, therefore, God be in reality a person, there can be no regulative truth. Mr. Mansel says, we do not know what God is in himself, "but how he wills that we should think of him." Here will is attributed to God, and the personal pronouns, He and Him, are used, and must be used, in the very statement of the doctrine. That is, it must be assumed and asserted that He is a person in the very assertion of the principle that our knowledge is regulative and not real.

2. This theory contradicts itself, in that it both affirms and denies the veracity of consciousness, and the authority of our intuitive convictions. Thus it admits that our consciousness teaches absolute truth when it declares the real existence of the objects of sense. We know they are; but we do not know that they are what we take them to be. Consciousness, however, teaches the one as well and as clearly as the other. If Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel are right in repudiating the authority of consciousness when it teaches us that things are what they appear to be, why may not Spinoza repudiate its authority when it teaches that the external is real? Again, Mr. Mansel says, consciousness teaches us not only that we are, but what we are, and its testimony as to both parts must be received with implicit confidence as the foundation of all science, religion, and morals. "I think, therefore, I am," or rather, as M. Bartholemé, *Histoire des doctrines religieuses*, i. p. 23, (quoted by Mansel, p. 288), renders the *ergo, c'est à dire*, "that is to say, I who see, and hear, and think, and feel, am

the one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation to personality, all that we know of that which seems to exist." P. 105. Consciousness gives us the knowledge of *substance*. We are a substantive existence, p. 288. "Kant," he says, "unquestionably went too far in asserting that things in themselves *are not* as they appear to our faculties; the utmost that his premises could warrant him in asserting is, that we cannot tell whether they are so or not. And even this degree of scepticism, though tenable as far as external objects are concerned, cannot legitimately be extended to the personal self. I exist, as I am conscious of existing; and conscious self is the *Ding an sich*, the standard by which all representations of personality must be judged, and from which our notion of reality, as distinguished from appearance, is originally derived." P. 291. That is to say, when we see a tree, we are authorized to conclude there is something seen—but not what that something is—that is, a real subsistence in a given form, with given properties and attributes. All we know is, there is something, but whether a substance, a force, an idea in our own mind, or a mode of God's existence, we cannot tell. But when we are conscious not of a sense-perception—but of our own thoughts and feelings, then it is not merely an unknown something of which thought and feeling are phenomena, which is assumed, but really a substance, the existing self. This seems to us a contradiction, as it affirms in one sentence what is denied in the next. Consciousness no more directly apprehends the substance self, than it does the substance tree. And if in the perception of a tree, we cannot infer (or rather assume as given in) the phenomena what the something is that we perceive; neither are we authorized to infer, or to assume, the substance self, to account for the phenomena of thought and feeling. As many men deny the one as deny the other. The application of this principle to the case of our knowledge of God is obvious. As we know, says Mansel, that sensible objects are, but not what they are, so we know God is, but not what he is. But as we do know that a tree is not merely an unknown something, but a tree; as we know that we are an intelligent feeling acting substance—and not merely that the

phenomena of thought and feeling exist, so we know not only that God is, but what he is. We know from our consciousness what a spirit is, as Mr. Mansel admits. And therefore, when it is revealed in consciousness, as he also admits, that we stand in relation to God as to another spirit, on whom we are dependent and to whom we are accountable, it is thereby revealed in consciousness or in the laws of our nature, not only that God is, but that he is a spirit. And this obscure revelation given within, which so many men in their blindness misread or neglect, is authenticated by the express declaration of Him who is truth itself. God is a spirit. It is not true, therefore, that God is unknown and unknowable, and the theory which leads to that conclusion is not only false, but, as we have endeavoured to show, self-contradictory.

3. This is not the worst. This theory involves not only at one time the admission, and at another the denial, of the veracity of consciousness; it causes scepticism beyond the limits assigned to it in other departments of knowledge. Mr. Mansel says that Kant is wrong in asserting that the objects of sense *are not* what they appear to our faculties; we simply do not know what they are. They may be what we take them to be, or they may not. But Sir William Hamilton says it is blasphemy to think that God is as we can think him to be. He and Mr. Mansel both say the absolute cannot be a cause, the infinite cannot be a person. "A thing—an object—an attribute—a person—or any other term to signify one of many possible objects of consciousness, is by that very relation necessarily declared to be finite." P. 107. That is, if we think of God as a person distinct from other persons, ourselves for example, it is impossible to think of him as infinite. He is thereby necessarily declared to be finite. This theory, therefore, does not merely teach that we do not know what God is, but that we do know that he is what we think him to be; he is not cause, intelligent, conscious, or person. If he is absolute and infinite, it is said, he cannot be any of these.

4. But these distinguished writers are devout Theists. They believe in an absolute, infinite, personal God. They say the existence of such a being is a matter of faith. We may believe what we cannot know, and, it seems, what we know is self-

contradictory. On this doctrine, that we may and must believe what the reason pronounces to be impossible, we would remark, in the first place, that it supposes a conflict between the constitutional elements of our being inconsistent with rationality. The reason of a man is the man himself; so is his conscience; and so are his other faculties. It is the one substantive self that thinks, feels, and wills. To assume, therefore, that by necessity we should think one way and feel another; that the laws of our reason should declare that to be true which our conscience or senses declare to be false, is to destroy our rationality. In the second place, it destroys the foundation of all knowledge. The ultimate ground of knowledge is confidence in the veracity of God. How do we know that consciousness is not a delusion or a lie? How do we know that the laws of belief impressed upon our nature, and which we are forced to obey, are not all false? If laws of our reason necessitate the belief of what is not true, or necessarily lead to false conclusions, why may not the senses, and conscience, and consciousness itself, be equally fallacious? We do not see what Hamilton or Mr. Mansel can have to say to the Pantheist who pronounces the finite to be a show and delusion. All foundation of confidence is gone, if we once admit that God has so constituted our nature that it cannot be trusted; that reason, conscience, or the senses, acting according to the laws he has given them, lead us into contradictions and absurdities. It does not avail to say that this evil arises from men attempting to transcend the limits which God has assigned to the human mind. It is conceded that there are such limits, and that they are very narrow, and that all beyond them is for us darkness and chaos. But it is not a question about what is beyond these limits, but as to what are the legitimate results of human thinking. These philosophers say that the right use of reason leads inevitably and of necessity to the conclusion that the absolute and infinite is not a cause, intelligent, or a person. But this conclusion is admitted to be false, and it therefore follows that God has made it necessary for us to believe what is not true. To say that the difficulty arises from the fact that the absolute is not an object of knowledge, and hence it is that we of necessity err when we attempt to reason about it, is

equivalent to saying that because sound is not an object of vision, the right use of our eyes necessarily leads to a false theory of acoustics. If a man assumes that the incomprehensible can be comprehended, his reasoning will no doubt be vicious and his conclusions false. But this is only saying that false premises and false reasoning lead to false conclusions. But according to Hamilton and Mansel, right premises and correct reasoning lead to false conclusions; which is a very different thing, and a direct impeachment of the Author of our rational nature, and destructive of the foundation of all knowledge. In the third place, the principle that reason may legitimately pronounce absurd that which nevertheless we are bound to believe, renders faith itself impossible. If our reason, acting according to the laws which God hath given us, teaches that the infinite cannot be a person, then it is impossible that we should believe in his personality. It is important, however, that we should distinguish between the incomprehensible and the impossible. We may not be able to understand how the infinite can be a person; but this is very different from seeing that the two ideas are incompatible, so that an infinite person is an impossibility. We may be utterly unable to understand the law of gravitation, or how matter can attract matter in proportion to its quantity and the square of the distance between one portion and another, but this is very different from seeing that such attraction is impossible. As faith is the inward affirmation of the mind that a thing is true, and impossibility or contradiction is an affirmation or perception that it is not and cannot be true, it is evident that faith cannot coexist in the mind with the conviction that its object is an impossibility. If, therefore, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are right in saying that the absolute and infinite cannot be cause, intelligent, conscious, or a person; if reason, as they say, pronounces these ideas contradictory, then faith in them becomes an impossibility, or, if possible, it would be irrational and irreligious. Just as all Protestants pronounce the faith of the Catholic, that the consecrated wine is blood, both irrational and irreligious. It supposes God to require us to believe what the constitution of the nature which he has given us declares to be false. The theory under consideration reduces, therefore,

Theism to a level with transubstantiation; a doctrine which cannot be believed without renouncing our rationality and our allegiance to God. It concedes every thing to the transcendentalists. For while it demonstrates that their conclusions are false, it admits the validity of their premises; and from these premises, either their conclusions or absolute scepticism must follow. This objection that Hamilton's doctrine renders faith-impossible is not met by the remark of Mansel, that the contradictions referred to are only in our own minds. So is faith in our own minds. We cannot believe what is contradictory to us. Other and higher intelligences, to whom these things are not contradictions, may believe them. But no rational being can believe what to him is a contradiction.

5. Sir William Hamilton's doctrine that God is unknown and unknowable, not only as we have endeavoured to show, involves self-contradictions, or is inconsistent with itself; it not only denies the veracity of consciousness, and leads to absolute scepticism by destroying the foundation of both knowledge and faith; but, as a farther objection, it is, as it seems to us, illogical. It is a specimen of false reasoning. He starts with a certain definition of the absolute and infinite; from that definition he deduces by a strict process of reasoning, a mass of contradictions. The legitimate conclusion from this fact is, that the premises are wrong; that he has assumed something as belonging to the absolute which does not really belong to it. But instead of admitting any error in his definition, he asserts that the absolute is entirely unknowable. This is certainly a *non-sequitur*. If a man chooses to define the human soul as an idea, or as a mode of God's existence, instead of an individual self-conscious substance, and from that definition draws any number of contradictory conclusions, that does not prove that the soul is absolutely unknowable. It only proves that the definition is wrong. So when Hamilton and Mansel draw from the definition of the absolute and infinite as given by the transcendentalists, what the former calls a whole fasciculus of contradictions, the conclusion is decisive as against the transcendentalists and their definitions, but altogether illegitimate as against those who repudiate the premises as well as the conclusions. Hamilton and Mansel, however, admit the premises,

and therefore are reduced to the alternative of absolute scepticism, or a blind, irrational and impossible faith. What right have these philosophers to define the absolute as that which existing by and in itself, and without necessary relation to any other being, in such a sense as to deny any possible relation whatever. If the idea of the absolute exclude the idea of relation—then the absolute must be absolutely all that is, whether potential or actual, whether good or evil. Then, also, it cannot sustain the relation of cause to effect, or of subject to object. Then, as these philosophers teach, it cannot be intelligent, conscious, or a person. But suppose we define the absolute to be the self-existent, having no necessary relation to any thing out of itself, then none of these conclusions follow. If the self-existing being is a spirit, then it has and must have power, intelligence, and will; the distinctions and relations involved in activity and intelligence are not inconsistent with its nature. What right again have they to define the infinite so as necessarily to exclude the finite. If, say they, the infinite does not include the finite, then it can be greater than it is, and therefore not infinite. But, if the infinite implies the negative of only such limitations as is inconsistent with perfection, then these absurdities do not follow. If, as Hamilton and Mansel, after the transcendentalists, say, that all thought is limitation, then such limitation is an excellence. An infinite that is intelligent is surely higher than an infinite that is unintelligent. There is nothing, therefore, in the idea of the absolute or the infinite, legitimately understood, which is inconsistent with the absolute and infinite God, that is, God considered as self-existing and of infinite perfection, being the cause of all things out of himself; a self-conscious, intelligent person, holy, just, and good. The contradictions said to be involved in this idea, all flow from arbitrary definitions, the incorrectness of which is demonstrated by the absurdities to which they lead.

6. Another fallacy in the argument of Hamilton and Mansel, to prove that God cannot be known, is found in their use of the word *to know*. If all knowledge be limitation, not only in the subject but in the object, if we must limit God's power in order to know it; if we limit omniscience in order to

have any knowledge of it; then, of course, the infinite cannot be known. And this is the sense in which Hamilton uses the word. He often, indeed almost habitually, interchanges the words to conceive and to know, the conceivable and the knowable. What, therefore, we cannot conceive of, we cannot know. But in the ordinary sense of the word, and in that sense in which Hamilton and Mansel, at least, often use it, *to conceive* is to form an image of. "All conception," says Mr. Mansel, (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 24,) "implies imagination. To have a conception of a horse," he adds, "we must be able to combine the attributes constituting the definition of the animal *into a representative image.*" "Conception," is also defined by Taylor in his *Elements of Thought*, as "the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will." In this sense of the word all must admit that the infinite is not an object of knowledge. We cannot form an image of infinite space, or of infinite duration, or of an infinite whole, or of an infinite part, or of an infinite God. And it is well we cannot, for that would be mental idolatry. No wonder that Hamilton says it is blasphemy to think God is what we can think him to be, if by thinking or knowing him, we must of necessity limit or make a mental image of him. A second sense in which these writers use the word *to know*, is that of comprehending, understanding. To know the absolute, in this sense of the word, is to have such a comprehension of its nature, as to be able, *a priori*, to determine all about it; to decide what is and what is not consistent with the idea. It is so to understand what it is, as to make it the foundation of all science. The incomprehensible, the inconceivable, and unknowable, are in the philosophy of Hamilton, and in the reasoning of Mr. Mansel, convertible terms. They are, however, all clearly and easily distinguishable. The incomprehensible may be knowable, but it cannot be conceived of, or reduced to a mental image. It is, therefore, far from following that because God is incomprehensible and inconceivable he cannot be known.

"Knowledge," says Archbishop Whately, (*Logic*, book iv. chap. ii., and *e note*), implies three things: "1st, firm belief; 2d, of what is true; 3d, and on sufficient grounds." This

may not be an accurate statement, as it does not sufficiently discriminate between knowledge and faith. The difference lies in the ground of the firm persuasion which is common to both. The ground of knowledge, is sense, consciousness or deduction. In faith it is adequate testimony, or authority. But this does not concern the present subject. If knowledge be the firm belief of what is true, on sufficient and appropriate grounds, then all the arguments of Hamilton and Mansel to prove that God cannot be known fall to the ground.

7. If our knowledge of God be merely regulative; if God be not in reality what the Scriptures declare him to be; if the design of the revelation he has made of himself in the constitution of our nature, in the external world, in his word, and in Christ, is not to teach us what God is, but simply to regulate our feelings and conduct, then it is deceptive and powerless. This theory not only assumes that God may be altogether different from what we think him to be, but it is certain that he is not what we think, or can think him to be. We think he is a person, that he thinks, and feels, and acts. Although we are bound to believe this, it is nevertheless a delusion. It not only may be a mistake, but it certainly is a mere form of subjective knowledge, to which the reality does not correspond. Mr. Mansel indeed says, that the objects of our sense-perception may be what they appear to us to be, and so God may be what we think he is. But then, he also teaches that this assumption induces endless contradictions and absurdities. If that is so, it cannot be true and cannot be believed. And Sir William Hamilton says, that it is blasphemy to assert that he is what we can think him to be. He is unknown and unknowable. And Mr. Mansel says, "the infinite cannot be an object of thought at all," p. 194. Then, of course, to us he does not exist. What is not and cannot be thought has no reality for us. What is said about the infinite, that is about God, cannot be any thing more for us than imagination, delusions, and fanciful representations. We can imagine the whole universe to be peopled with intelligent agents, fairies, or gods and goddesses, and this imagination may have a regulative power, as it doubtless had over those who adopt these fancies. But it is all a delusion. In like manner, we may have the notion of an absolute

and infinite being who is the first cause of all things, a person who thinks, feels, and acts, who takes cognizance of human conduct, and judges men according to their works. And this notion or imagination may have great power over those who believe it. But according to this philosophy it is not true. It is only the form under which an unknown truth is presented to our minds. All we certainly know is, that our thoughts do not represent the reality. God treats men as some parents educate their children, by fictions and fairy tales. It should be remembered, however, that the power of regulative truth depends on the belief that it is true. If a mother tells her child that there is no Christkind or Santa Claus, the giver of Christmas presents—that she is the real giver, of course, the power of the delusion of a supernatural giver is gone. Or, to take a more elevated illustration, if a philosopher had convinced the Greeks that there was no Neptune, or death-dealing Apollo, to be propitiated, the regulative power of the belief in those deities would be lost. In like manner, if Sir William and Mr. Mansel can convince the world that God is not what we think him to be, the power of the thought—that is, the power of the doctrine of theism—will be gone. What we call God may be a mere unconscious force, or a moral order of the universe, or an idea with no objective reality at all. The principle which these philosophers apply to the doctrine of God must, if sound, be applicable to all the doctrines of religion, natural and revealed. If what is taught concerning God is merely regulative, then what is taught of sin and atonement, and Christ, and heaven and hell, must be merely regulative. Then, the whole system of truth, the external universe, the world of mind and thought, is one vast illusion, a phantasmagoria, having semblance but not reality. We do not forget that Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are devout men, that they write not against the truth, but in its defence. They believe in God, and in the doctrines of his word. It is not against them or their beliefs that these remarks are directed, but against their philosophy. The conclusions to which their principles, as it seems to us, inevitably lead to the overthrow not only of theism, but of all rational faith in the doctrines of religion.

We have endeavoured to show, 1. That the principles of this

philosophy are self-contradictory. 2. That they involve at once the assertion and denial of the veracity of consciousness. 3. That they destroy the foundation of all knowledge, which is confidence in God that he has not so constituted our nature as to force us to believe what is not true. 4. That they destroy the possibility of faith, as they require us to believe what our reason declares to be impossible. 5. That the system is illogical, as it adopts principles which necessarily lead to false conclusions; and instead of renouncing the premises, it falsely concludes that God, or the Infinite, cannot be known; whereas the only thing the argument proves is that the *a priori* ideas of the Absolute and Infinite on which the system is founded are incorrect. 6. That the whole doctrine of regulative truth, adopted to save us from absolute scepticism, is itself delusive and destructive. And 7. That the system itself is founded on an arbitrary and false notion of the nature of knowledge.

We come now to state in what sense, according to the Scriptures and the common faith of the church, God can and may be known. 1. It is admitted that God is inconceivable in the same sense that infinite space, infinite duration, or any form of infinitude is inconceivable. That is, it is conceded, that we cannot form a conception or representative image of an absolute and infinite being. The same, however, is true of many other objects of knowledge. We know that substance is, but we can form no conception of what it is. Neither can we form any representative image of the soul, or of any thing that is not at once finite and material.

2. It is admitted that God is incomprehensible. To comprehend is to know fully. It is to know all that is to be known of its object by any intelligence, even by the highest. Such knowledge is impossible in a creature, either of itself or any thing out of itself. It includes, *a.* The knowledge of the essence as well as the attributes of its objects. *b.* A knowledge not of some, but of all its properties. *c.* Of the relation in which these attributes stand to each other and to the substance to which they belong. *d.* Of the relation in which the object of knowledge stands to all other things. Such knowledge of God can belong to no one but to God himself. We do not know his essence, we do not know all his attributes. He

may have, and doubtless has, many perfections of which we have no idea. Neither can we comprehend his relation to things out of himself. That is, of the infinite to the finite. But the same may be said of every thing else, even of our own souls. We do not know its essence; we do not know all its capacities. We have only an imperfect knowledge of those powers which are called into exercise in the present life. The soul doubtless has faculties of which we at present have no knowledge whatever, but which will be developed in a future state of existence. These, and other limitations of our knowledge of ourselves, however, are not incompatible with definite and certain knowledge of our nature and capacities to a certain extent. And as this knowledge is real, and not merely regulative, as we are sure that we really are what we are conscious of being, so, in like manner, our knowledge of God is real, and not merely regulative. He really is what we take him to be, so far as our views are determined by the revelation which he has made of himself.

3. It is also conceded that our knowledge of God is not only imperfect in the sense that there is much that is true concerning him which we do not know at all; but also that our knowledge of what is revealed concerning him is merely partial and inadequate. We know that God knows; but there is much relating to his mode of knowing, as well as to the extent of his knowledge and of its relation to its objects, of which we are ignorant. We know that he acts, but we do not know how he acts, or the relation which his activity bears to time, or to the things out of himself. We know that he feels, that he loves, pities, is merciful and gracious, that he hates sin. We know that these representations convey real truth, *i. e.*, they answer to what is objectively true in God, and are not merely modes in which we express our subjective convictions. The emotional element of the divine nature is covered with an obscurity as great, but no greater, than that which rests over his knowledge, thoughts, and purposes. Here again our ignorance, or rather the limitations of our knowledge, in relation to God, finds a parallel in our ignorance of ourselves. We know that we perceive, think, feel, reason, and act, but how, we do not know. It is perfectly inscrutable to us how the mind, which is

immaterial, takes cognizance of what is material; or how matter can act on spirit; or how the mind can act on the body. These are facts of consciousness which are as incomprehensible to us as the modes in which God acts on his creatures. But as partial knowledge of the facts of consciousness is not inconsistent with the reality and correctness of that knowledge as far as it goes, so our partial knowledge of God is not incompatible with the reality or correctness of our knowledge of him. Mr. Mansel's argument against the claim of partial knowledge of God, is a remarkable specimen of that play on words with which the most distinguished men often delude themselves and confound their readers. "To have a partial knowledge of an object," he says, "is to know a part of it, but not the whole. But the part of the infinite which is supposed to be known must be itself either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, it presents the same difficulties as before, (*i. e.*, it cannot be known.) If it is finite, the point in question is conceded, and our consciousness is allowed to be limited to finite objects." *Limit.* p. 98. It might as well be said that we can have no partial and yet definite knowledge of duration, unless we can comprehend eternity, nor of space, unless we can comprehend infinite space, or of knowledge, unless we understand omniscience, or of power, unless we are conscious of omnipotence. There is such a thing as partial knowledge, even of the infinite, as our knowledge of the finite is in all directions partial. "We know in part," says the apostle, a much higher authority than any philosopher.

The limitations, therefore, which belong to our nature as finite beings, do not impose on us any such ignorance of God as that which belongs to irrational creatures or to idiots, to whom the name and attributes of God have no meaning; nor yet the ignorance under which the blind labour with regard to colour. The blind have nothing in their experience or consciousness which answers to that word, and they can attach to it no definite idea. They know there is something which other men call colour, but what it is they cannot tell. This is a form of ignorance which the theory under consideration would ascribe to men in reference to God, but which the human consciousness instinctively rejects. Nor again are we ignorant of

God in any such sense as we are, or should be, if a geometrical figure were proposed to us in its elements, which we could demonstrate was a square, and with equal certainty prove it to be a circle. This again is a form of ignorance which this theory attributes to man in relation to God. By one process we can prove he is a person, and by another that he cannot be a personal being; that he is a cause, and that he cannot be a cause; that he is intelligent, and that he cannot be intelligent; that he is holy, just, and good, and that he cannot possess moral attributes.

In opposition to all this, the Scriptures declare and the whole church believes, that God is a proper object of knowledge; that while we cannot conceive of him in infinitude, nor comprehend his nature, his perfections, nor his relation to his creatures, yet our partial knowledge is correct knowledge; that he really is what he declares himself to be—a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent, infinite, eternal and immutable in his being and attributes. By knowledge is meant, not full comprehension of its object, but a firm belief of what is true on appropriate grounds addressed to our reason. That such belief is of the nature of knowledge, Sir William Hamilton himself admits. The primary truths revealed in the constitution of our nature, and vouched for by the common consciousness of men, he calls primary cognitions or beliefs. We know that we ourselves are, and that we are intelligent, personal subsistences; we know that the external world exists, and that the primary qualities of matter really belong to it. These things are matters of knowledge. We are commonly and correctly said to know whatever is given in consciousness, or that can be fairly deduced from these primary truths or intuitions. It is in this sense we know God. We know that he is, and that he is what we know him to be. We have in the constitution of our nature the knowledge of what a spirit is, and, therefore, we know what God is, when our Lord declares he is a spirit. We know what knowledge, power, will, and moral excellence are, and therefore we know what is meant when these attributes and perfections are ascribed to God. As he is infinite in being and perfection, we necessarily remove all imperfection or limitation from these attributes, as they belong to God. But this does not destroy their nature. Knowledge does not cease to be knowledge,

because it is omniscience; nor does power cease to be power, because it is omnipotence. If men frame to themselves such a notion of the infinite that an infinite being must include all other beings; or such a notion of knowledge that an infinite mind cannot know; or such an idea of the absolute, that an absolute being cannot act, this only proves that their notions of the infinite and absolute are wrong, and not that the infinite being cannot be known. We form our notion, or idea, of God, therefore, by attributing to him the perfections of our own nature without limitation, and in an infinite degree. And in so doing we attain a definite and correct knowledge of what God is; while we admit there is in him infinitely more than we know anything about; and while we are duly sensible that our ideas or apprehensions of what we do know are partial and inadequate, we are, nevertheless, assured that our knowledge within its limits is true knowledge; it answers to what God really is.

The ground, or reason, why we are authorized to ascribe to God the perfections of our own nature, is that we are his children. He is the Father of spirits; we are of the same generic nature with him; we were created in his image; we are, therefore, like him, and he is like us. This is the fundamental principle of all religion. This is the principle urged by the Apostle in his address to the Athenians. Inasmuch as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the godhead is like to gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art, or man's device. On the same ground we ought not to think of him as the unconscious ground of being, or as a mere abstraction, or a name for the order of the universe, nor as the unknown and unknowable, but as a Father—whose image we bear, and of whose nature we partake. This, in the proper sense of the term, is anthropomorphism, a word much abused, and sometimes employed in a bad sense, to express the doctrine that God is altogether such an one as ourselves, a being of like limitations and passions. But in the sense above explained, it expresses the doctrine of the church in all ages, and of the great mass of mankind. Jacobi (*von den göttlichen Dingen, Werke* iii. p. 418, 422,) well says, "We confess accordingly, to an anthropomorphism inseparable from the conviction that man bears the image of God; and maintain that besides this anthro-

pomorphism, which has always been called Theism, is nothing but atheism or fetichism."

To this it was of old objected, as it has been by sceptics of every class in modern times, that other creatures, as for example, the beaver or reindeer, if possessed of religious feelings, would also conceive of the Deity with the limitations of its own personality. This is only saying that if irrational creatures were rational, they too would bear the image of God, and, of necessity, conceive of him as rational. That this method of framing our ideas of God is trustworthy, or that God really is what we are led to think him to be, is proved: 1. Because it is the law of our nature. That all men do thus think of God is admitted. Even in the lowest form of fetichism, the life of the worshipper is assumed to belong to the object of worship. The power dreaded is reverenced, and is assumed to be possessed of a life like our own. So under all the forms of polytheism which have prevailed in the world, the gods of the people have been intelligent, personal agents. It is only in the schools of philosophy that we find a different mode of conceiving of the godhead. They have substituted the abstract for the concrete— $\tauὸ δὐ$ for $ὁ ἄντεν$, $\tauὸ θεῖον$ for $ὁ Θεός$, $\tauὸ ἀγαθόν$ for $ὁ ἀγαθός$. It is here as with regard to the knowledge of the external world. The mass of mankind believe that they have immediate knowledge of the objects of perception, that they see and feel the things themselves. It is the philosophers who contradict this universal and necessary belief, and say that it is not the things themselves that we perceive, but certain ideas, species, or images of the things. Now as the philosophers are wrong here, and the people right, so in the mode of conceiving of God, the people are right and the philosophers wrong. In other words, the conviction that God is what he has revealed himself to be, rests on the same foundation as our conviction that the external world is what we take it to be. The ground of assurance in both cases is the veracity of consciousness, or the trustworthiness of the laws of belief impressed upon the constitution of our nature. "Invincibility of belief," according to Sir William Hamilton himself, "is convertible with truth of belief." *Wight.* edit. p. 233. "That which is by nature necessarily BELIEVED to be, truly IS." P. 226. This

principle he makes the foundation of all philosophy and of all knowledge. No man has more nobly or more ably vindicated this great truth. "Consciousness," he says, "once convicted of falsehood, an unconditional scepticism, in regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melancholy, but only rational result. Any conclusion may now with impunity be drawn against the hopes and dignity of human nature. Our personality, our immateriality, our moral liberty, have no longer an argument for their defence. Man is the dream of a shadow; God is the dream of that dream. The only question, therefore, is, Are we invincibly led to think of God as possessing the attributes of our rational nature—as an intelligent personal being, infinite in being and perfection? This is not denied. "Fools," exclaimed Mansel, against the transcendentalists, "to dream that man can escape from himself, that human reason can draw aught but a human portrait of God." P. 57. True, he denies the correctness of that portrait, or at least asserts that we cannot tell whether it is correct or not. But that is not now the question. He admits that we are forced by the constitution of our nature thus to conceive of God; and by the fundamental principles of his own and of Hamilton's philosophy, what we are forced to believe is true. It is true, therefore, that God is what we thus think him to be.

2. In the second place, all men are conscious of accountability to a being superior to themselves, who knows what they are, and what they do, and who has the will and purpose to reward or punish men according to their works. The God, therefore, who is revealed to us in our moral nature, is one who knows, and wills, and acts: who approves and disapproves; that is, he is revealed as a person, an intelligent, voluntary agent, possessing moral attributes. Now, this revelation of God must be assumed to be conformed to the truth. God must be what he thus declares himself to be, or our whole nature is a lie. All this Mr. Mansel admits. He admits that a sense of dependence on a superior power is a "fact of the inner consciousness;" that this superior power is "not an inexorable fate or immutable law, but a being having, at least so far, the attributes of personality, that he can show favour or severity to

those dependent on him, and be regarded by them with the feeling of hope, and fear, and reverence, and gratitude." P. 120. No man, however, is, or can be, grateful to the sun, or to the atmosphere, or to force, or law. Gratitude is the tribute of acknowledgment of a person to a person. Again, the same author admits that "The moral reason, or will, or conscience of man, call it by what name we please, can have no authority, save as implanted in him by some higher spiritual being, as a law emanating from a lawgiver." P. 121. "We are thus compelled," he adds, "by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral (and of course of a personal) Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity." P. 122. Both in a sense of dependence and consciousness of moral obligation, he says, "We are compelled to regard ourselves as persons related to a person." P. 130. Our argument from these facts is, that if our moral nature compels us to believe that God is a person, then he is a person; and therefore, we arrive at a true knowledge of God by ascribing to him the perfections of our own nature.

3. The argument from our religious, as distinguished from our moral, consciousness, is essentially the same. Morality is not all of religion. Men must worship as well as obey. The one is as much a law and necessity of their nature as the other. To worship (in the religious sense of the word,) is to adore. It is to ascribe infinite perfection to its object; it is to address to that object acknowledgments for the blessings we enjoy; it is to seek their continuance or increase; it is to confess, and praise, and pray. Can we worship the law of gravity, or unconscious power, or mere order of the universe? Our whole religious nature, which demands an object of supreme reverence, love, and confidence, demands a personal God—a God clothed with the attributes of a nature like our own, who can hear our confessions, praises and prayers, and who can supply all our wants, and fill all our capacities for good. Thus again, it appears that unless our whole nature is a contradiction and a falsehood, we arrive at true knowledge of God, when we attribute to him the perfections of our own nature. Mr. Mansel admits that our nature does demand a personal and moral

Deity; but he says, "The only human conception of personality is that of limitation. The very conception of a moral nature is itself the conception of a limit; for morality is the compliance with law; and a law, whether imposed from within or from without, can only be conceived to operate by limiting the range of possible actions." P. 127. Therefore, God is not a person after all, neither can he have a moral nature. We must, he tells us, (in a passage already quoted,) "renounce all knowledge of the absolute, and be content with those *regulative* ideas of the Deity, which are sufficient to guide our practice, but do not satisfy our intellect; which tell us not what God is in himself, but what he wills that we should think of him." That is, we must not rely on our instinctive beliefs; we must not regard as true what God has rendered it necessary for us to believe. This is the subversion of all philosophy as well as of all religion. And why? Why is this contradiction between reason and conscience, between our rational and our religious nature, assumed to exist? Simply, because these philosophers choose to define personality and morality in a way which forbids them being predicated of an infinite being. Both, they say, imply limitation, and therefore the infinite cannot be either personal or moral. But we deny that either imply any limitation inconsistent with absolute perfection, or which is not necessary to it. We do not limit God when we say he cannot be irrational as well as rational, unconscious as well as conscious, the finite as well as the infinite, evil as well as good. The only limitation admitted is the negation of imperfection. Sense is not limited, when we say it is not also nonsense, or spirit when we say it is not also matter; or light when we say it is not also darkness, nor space when we say it is not also time. We do not, therefore, limit the Infinite when we exalt him in our conceptions from the unconscious to the conscious, from the unintelligent to the intelligent, from an impersonal something, to the infinitely perfect, personal Jehovah.

4. If we are not justified in referring to God the attributes of our own rational and moral nature, then we have no God. The only alternative is between anthropomorphism, in this sense of the term, and atheism. For an unknown God; a God of whose nature and of whose relation to us we know nothing, to

us is nothing. And, as an historical fact, those who reject this method of forming an idea of God, who deny that we are to refer to him the perfections of our own nature, have become atheists. They take spirit, and strip from it consciousness, intelligence, will, and moral attributes; and the residue, which is blank nothing, they call God. Hamilton and Mansel take refuge from this dreadful conclusion in faith. They admit that reason leads to the denial of all these attributes to the Infinite and Absolute, but they say that faith protests against this conclusion. But this protest of faith is unavailing, unless it can be shown that it is well founded; that the conclusions against which she protests are fallacious. When Kant proved that there is no rational evidence of the existence of God, and fell back from the speculative to the practical reason, (*i. e.*, from reason to blind faith,) his successors universally gave up faith in a personal God entirely. It is admitted that we can form no idea of God unless we think of him as possessing the attributes of our own nature, and therefore, if this procedure lead us to false apprehensions, and be repudiated as invalid, we are left in total darkness, without God and without hope. Mr. Mansel acknowledges that "anthropomorphism is the indispensable condition of all human theology." P. 241. He quotes Kant, (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, p. 282,) as saying, "We may confidently challenge all natural theology to name a single distinctive attribute of the Deity, whether denoting intelligence or will, which, apart from anthropomorphism, is anything more than a mere word, to which the slightest notion can be attached, which serves to extend our theoretical knowledge." Unfortunately, however, these writers, while they admit that this is the only possible method in which we can know God, deny that we thereby attain any true knowledge. It does not teach us what he is, but simply what we are forced (against reason) to think He is.

5. A fifth argument on this subject is, that the works of God manifest the attributes of a nature like our own. It is a legitimate principle that we must refer to the cause whatever attributes are required to account for the effects which that cause produces. If the effects manifest intelligence, wisdom, power, and moral excellence, these qualities or properties

must belong to the cause. As, therefore, the works of God are a revelation of all these attributes on the most stupendous scale, we are under a rational necessity to ascribe them to the cause of the Universe. This is only saying that the revelation made of the nature of God in the external world, authenticates the revelation of himself which he has made in the constitution of our own being. In other words, it proves that the image of himself, which he has enstamped on our nature, is a true likeness.

6. The Scriptures declare God to be just what we are led to believe he is, when we refer to him in an infinite degree, the perfections of our own nature. We are self-conscious; so is God. We are spirit; so is God. We are voluntary agents; so is God. We have a moral nature, miserably defaced indeed; God has moral excellence in absolute perfection. We are persons; so is God. All this the Scriptures declare to be true. The great primal revelation of God is as the "I Am," the personal God. All the names and titles given to God in the Scriptures, all the attributes ascribed to him, and all the works attributed to him, are revelations of his nature. He is the Elohim; the Mighty One; the Holy One; the Omnipresent Spirit. He knows all things. He is the Maker; the Preserver; the Governor of all things. He is our Father; the Hearer of Prayer; the Giver of all good. He feeds the young ravens; He clothes the flowers of the field; He is love. He so loved the world that he spared not his own Son, but freely gave him for us all. He is merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth. He is a help in every time of need; a refuge; a high tower; and an exceeding great reward. The relations in which we are represented as standing to him are such as we can sustain only to a person. We are bound to fear, worship, love, trust, and obey him. He is our Ruler, our Father, with whom we can have communion. His favour is our life; his loving-kindness is better than life. This sublime exhibition of God in his own nature and in his relation to us, is not a delusion. It is not mere regulative truth, or it would be a mockery. It makes God known to us as he really is. We know God, although no creature can understand the Almighty unto perfection.

7. Finally, God has revealed himself to us in the person of his Son. No man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him. Jesus Christ is the true God. The revelation which he made of himself while on earth, was the manifestation of God in the flesh. He and the Father are one. The words of Christ were the words of God. The works of Christ were the works of God. The love, mercy, tenderness, and forgiving grace, as well as the holiness, severity, and power manifested by Christ, were manifestations of the nature of God. We see, therefore, as with our eyes what God is. We know that, although infinite and absolute, he can think, act, and will; that He can love and hate; that He can hear prayer and forgive sin; that we can have fellowship with him as one person can commune with another. Philosophy must vail her face and seal her lips in the presence of God thus manifest in the flesh, and not pretend to declare that he is not, or is not known to be, what he has just revealed himself as being. As this doctrine concerning the nature of God, as the object of certain and true knowledge, lies at the foundation of all religion, it was necessary to devote the more time to its explanation and vindication.

ART. V.—*A History of Christian Doctrine.* By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

THE title of this work, coupled with the author's reputation, will awaken large expectations in all who take an interest in the scientific unfolding of Christian doctrine. These expectations will not be disappointed, in the case of those who love the distinctive truths of Christianity, and who study these volumes sufficiently to understand their significance and power. In our judgment, no production of greater moment has been given to the public for a long time. It will, beyond doubt, attract great attention, and exercise a commanding and permanent influence in shaping opinion, in regard to those highest Christian doc-

trines which have ever staggered the reason, humbled the pride, and rebuked the corruption of fallen man—which constitute the offence of the cross, and leave not the flesh whereof to glory. And we are happy to say that, in support of nearly all those high Christian doctrines which have suffered most violent and persistent assaults from heretics, latitudinarians, rationalists, infidels, heathens, and atheists, but which still keep their grasp on the faith of the church, these volumes render efficient and signal service. We say this with none the less emphasis and cordiality, although we shall be constrained to differ with the accomplished and respected author, on an occasional point.

There is a great advantage in the study of doctrines and creeds by the light of history. The maxim of Bolingbroke, now become proverbial, that “history is philosophy teaching by example,” has a pregnant import in regard to church history. For not only can the doctrines of Christianity be illustrated and interpreted by Christian history, but, so far as the scientific statement and exposition of them is concerned, they are evolved by history. That is, while, for substance and implicitly, they were held by the church from the first; yet it was only as they came in conflict with heretical and rationalistic opposers, that they were developed into those exact and self-consistent forms of statement, which parry the ingenious assaults of adversaries. The great Christian doctrines, and more especially the symbols which articulate them, will be best understood in the light of the heretical assaults by which they were impugned, and to guard against which, they were expressly shaped and phrased. It is notorious that the creed-formulas in which the mind of the church finally settled, were reached in successive eras—in regard to different doctrines, as they were successively impugned, and by such antagonism developed into greater clearness and fulness. Says Dr. Shedd, “The endeavour to defend Christianity very often elicits a more profoundly philosophic statement of it. The defence of the doctrine of the Trinity against Sabellian and Arian objections, resulted in a deeper view of the subject than had heretofore prevailed. The subtle objections, and dangerous half-truths of the Tridentine divines, were the occasion of a more accurate statement of the doctrine

of justification by faith without works, than is to be found in the ancient church. Indeed, a clear, coherent, and fundamental presentation is one of the strongest arguments. Power of statement is power of argument. It precludes misrepresentations. It corrects misstatements. Hence, we find that the Defences of Christianity embody a great amount of philosophical expansion of Scripture doctrine; so that the history of Apologies is oftentimes, to a great extent, the history of the influence of philosophy upon Christianity." Vol. i. p. 31.

The author gives a fine illustration of what we have been saying, while he sets forth his own method, which is mainly that of "Special Dogmatic History," or the history of individual doctrines. We should be glad to quote, but have room only to refer the reader to pages 33, 34, of vol. i.

In these volumes the author precedes his history of individual Christian doctrines, by the history of Apologetics, and of philosophy in its relation to and influence upon Christian doctrines. He follows it with a history of Symbols, which concludes his work; the body of which is occupied with the analysis of the historical development of particular doctrines.

As the several formulas of doctrine are best understood in the light of their historical genesis in guarding the truth against opposing errors, so that historian is best qualified to understand and explain this historical evolution, who, *ceteris paribus*, has had most personal experience of the antagonistic relations between these truths and their correspondent errors. He will best appreciate the doctrine of atonement and justification as exhibited in the Symbols of the Reformation, who has lived amidst and been called to combat the contrary errors; and all the more so, if in his own personal experience and thinking, he has been led to work his way out of such errors into the clear light of the glorious gospel of the blessed God. Dr. Shedd, with eminent scholarship, with the studies demanded in the chair of ecclesiastical history, which he filled many years with such honour to himself and advantage to the church, with a mind apt by nature and early training for metaphysical and dogmatic insight and discrimination, with a keen relish for doctrinal discussion, and the most solemn earnestness in his convictions of the importance of doctrinal truth—with these

and other qualifications for his task—combines that to which we have just referred. He has lived in a region which boasts of great improvements in the church theology he vindicates and loves. We find no trace of the so-called New England Theology in his book; and so far as this theology boasts peculiarities, the counter-points of catholic doctrine are boldly and sharply set forth by him. We know little of the relation of these matters to his personal experience, beyond what may be indicated by the foregoing facts, and by his intense earnestness.

The superiority of the author's method of historico-doctrinal analysis to the methods which have generally been in vogue, is evident. Most historians of doctrine have also mingled with it all other matters pertaining to the progress, organization, and vicissitudes of the church. They have followed the order of time in their treatment of the whole. They have treated continuously of doctrine only so far as it characterized the period under review, and then have left it to record all else belonging to the history of the church during that period. Of course, this gives only a fragmentary and confused view of the unfolding of any particular doctrine. Others, who are historians of doctrine only, conduct the thread of their narrative according to centuries or periods, rather than by the course of particular doctrines as they are severally evolved into creed-formulas in successive ages. They treat of *all* the doctrines as they are connected with each period, before they pass on to the next period. This method is measurably exposed to the same objections as the last-mentioned. The treatment of each doctrine is necessarily a series of fragments, separated from each other by the accompanying matter interposed in regard to other doctrines. No clear and complete view is presented of the progress and vicissitudes of any one doctrine, until it reached a form of statement with which the mind of the church, as a whole, has been permanently satisfied. By far the most thorough and satisfactory method is that adopted by the author, of treating each doctrine by itself, tracing its development through successive controversies with antagonistic heresies, until it reached its fixed form, which parried the thrusts of adversaries, and satisfied the theological mind, as being an adequate summation of scriptural doctrine.

We have spoken of the "development" of Christian doctrine. Development is a favourite idea of our author. It is in this light that he contemplates all history, especially church history, and the history of Christian doctrine. He is, however, careful to repudiate the modern German pantheistic doctrine of development, in all its forms. Development has no relation to the Infinite and Absolute, who is evermore perfect, and is, therefore, *ex vi termini*, incapable of development. He is not, like the Absolute of the pantheists, a mere "potentiaality," to be developed in man and nature. Development, according to Dr. Shedd, pertains only to created things, which are capable of imperfection and immaturity. Creation mostly produces germs which are ceaselessly evolving into actuality what is potentially enfolded in them. But inasmuch as God is good, and creates only that which is good, how are sin and evil evolved from what he creates? The answer is, that sin is not the creation of God, but of the free will of man. Thus was interpolated an alien and abnormal germ into humanity, which is in constant development, and bringing forth fruit unto death. To counterpoise and neutralize this pernicious development of sin, God has introduced a supernatural force among men, which is continually working itself out in the redemption and salvation of men from sin and the curse. These germinant forces, however, do not, as we understand our author, evolve themselves in any such changeless or fatalistic uniformity as to preclude God's providential government of the world, or his sovereignty in the administration of grace.

So far as doctrinal development is concerned, Dr. Shedd carefully guards against the idea of adding to the teachings of Scripture. The sum and substance of all Christian doctrine is to be found in the sacred volume. But to gather up its manifold representations into one whole, which shall set forth all, and contradict nothing, that is essential in these representations, is often the work of ages, consummated only after long and dire conflicts with opposing heresies. This is the only doctrinal development for which our author contends.

Dr. Shedd begins by tracing the mutual relations of philosophy and Christianity. He shows that it is vain to ignore this relation; that men will philosophize and inquire what truths

are witnessed by the light of nature, by consciousness, sense, and reason; and that this philosophy must ever tend to an accordance with their religious convictions, since truth cannot contradict truth, and the human mind cannot be brought to accept contradictions. Hence philosophy will either control or be controlled by men's acceptance and interpretations of Scripture. The course of Christian doctrine will depend largely upon the type of philosophy dominant for the time being, and the degree and manner in which they interpenetrate each other.

The author assigns to the systems of Plato and Aristotle a paramount influence and ascendancy in the apostolic and all subsequent periods marked by decided doctrinal development. And they have been antiquated only by systems that have sprung from them by lineal derivation, so far as the latter have exerted any formative influence on the modes of stating, defending, and explaining catholic doctrine. Of course, Dr. Shedd does not allow to philosophy any authority in matters of Christian doctrine that is original, paramount, decisive, or coordinate with revelation. When Scripture and philosophy conflict, of course the latter is convicted of error by infallible authority, and must yield. But as Scripture must be interpreted in accordance with known and indisputable truth—as a true philosophy supports, and a false philosophy antagonizes with all other truth, natural and revealed—it follows logically, as it has been found historically, that a certain class of philosophical principles have generally prevailed in connection with a sound theology. We do not go quite the length of our author in regarding Platonism as forming the base of this Christian, or as Turretin calls it, "regenerate philosophy." Its supersensual and spiritual element gives it a more friendly relation to Christianity than Epicureanism, while, nevertheless, this element is overstrained so as to make body intrinsically evil, and the great source of evil. Probably Plato's realism is the important matter with Dr. Shedd, as furnishing that philosophic solution of the race sinning in Adam's sin, which he evidently has fixed upon as the church view, and true view, of that subject. There is no doubt that something like this was at times apparently advanced by Augustin, and entered con-

siderably into orthodox anthropology, until the advance of the Protestant reformation, which had for its special doctrinal mission, to unfold and formulate the doctrines of sin and grace, particularly as regards their origin, and their responsible, legal, and judicial relations.

We think the author rather fully estimates the influence of Locke over English and American theology, until a recent period. That influence was undeniably felt, not for good, but for evil. But we quite disagree with him in regarding the Scotch school as in any sense retaining the system of Locke, and counteracting its virus by a loose interpretation. On the contrary, as represented by Reid, its founder, this school is in direct and avowed opposition to Locke's sensuous system.

We are glad to observe the just and discriminating view which the author gives of Mysticism, in both its potencies, as related to extreme speculative subtlety, to orthodoxy, and to practical piety, especially on pages 79, 80.

Dr. Shedd, of course, attributes to Aristotle the predominant influence during the mediæval scholastic period, in which dialectic subtleties so largely anatamatized the great living ideas and truths of morals and religion till they perished, and gave place to the legion of cadaverous entities and quiddities brought forth in their place. During this period, according to Dr. Shedd, the prevailing philosophy had Aristotelianism for its base, with some infusion of Platonism, and was Aristotelo-Platonism. During the healthier periods which preceded and followed the scholastic era, it was Platonism with a tincture from Aristotle, Platonico-Aristotelianism—idealism systematized and regulated by logical order and precision, and dialectic forms filled with the content of Platonic ideas. This is Dr. Shedd's ideal, if we may not say of Christian philosophy, at least, of a philosophy favourable to Christianity. And undoubtedly it is more so than the exclusive and overbearing predominance of either of these systems. The virtue of metaphysical and ethical distinctions in shaping the construction of formulas, so as to express the various elements of Christian doctrine, clear of contradictions, and invulnerable to the shafts of adversaries, is happily illustrated by our author, in the instance of the *Symbolum cuicumque*, ascribed, and probably with justice, to

Athanasius. We barely refer the reader to volume i. pp. 72, 73.

The author's estimate of German philosophy, theology, and especially of Schleiermacher, have importance and interest for various reasons. After saying that pantheism destroys the foundations, not merely of revealed religion, but of all religion, by affirming that God is the only substance, and the only Being, and that all that has been, is, and ever shall be, is his self-evolution and manifestation, he proceeds thus:

"On looking at the scientific theology of Germany, during the present century, we find it modified by both of these two great philosophical tendencies. The two systems of theism and pantheism have been conflicting in this highly speculative country, with an energy and intensity unequalled in the history of philosophy; so that the theological mind of Germany exhibits a remarkable diversity of opinions and tendencies. Even in the anti-rationalistic or spiritual school, this same opposition between the historical Theism and Spinozism is to be seen. The theology of Schleiermacher, which has exerted a great influence upon classes that disagree with it—upon the Rationalist on the one hand, and the Supernaturalist on the other, and upon all the intermediates between these—is characterized by a singular heterogeneity of elements. Its founder was a diligent student of Plato, and an equally diligent student of Spinoza. Hence, while we find in this system, a glowing and devout temper that is favourable to a living theism, and a vital Christianity, we also find *principles* that are subversive not merely of revealed but of natural religion. In fact, this system presents, in one respect, the most remarkable phenomenon in the whole history of theology and philosophy—the phenomenon of a system mainly pantheistic, instrumental at a particular crisis in the history of a national mind, in turning its attention to the more distinctively spiritual and evangelical doctrines of Christianity. Having served this purpose, however, its work is done, and it cannot, as the course of thinking now going on in Germany itself plainly indicates, continue to satisfy the wants of the theological mind, but must either be adopted in all its logical consequences, and thereby become the destruction of evangelical religion, or else be rejected and left behind, in that further

progress towards, and arrival at New-Testament Christianity, which it was instrumental, by a logical inconsistency however, in initiating.

"The final judgment, consequently, in respect to the real worth and influence of the philosophic movement of the German mind, must be held in reserve, until the final issue appears. The estimate which the future historian will form of it, will be determined according as the German Church of the future shall draw nearer to the symbols of the Reformation, or shall recede further from them." Vol. i. pp. 98—100.

Passing on to theology proper, we can barely refer to the author's ingenious defence of Anselm's ontological argument for the being of a God. We cannot see our way clear from the mere idea of a perfect and necessary being to his actual existence. We require other evidence, which is so abundant and overpowering both within and without us, that only the "fool hath said in his heart, there is no God."

With regard to the attributes of God, we find that our author is profound and discriminating. He justly observes, what we think must soon attract increasing attention, as undeniably and deplorably true in the first eight centuries: "Phraseology was, however, sometimes employed by orthodox teachers themselves, that would be pantheistic if employed by an acknowledged pantheist." P. 225. We will add that such phraseology did not cease with the expiration of that period. It abounds in later writers, such as Aquinas and the scholastic theologians. Not being among the disputed points of the Reformation, some of it was taken up inconsiderately by many reformed divines, and was not entirely eliminated from the lucid, precise, and profound works of Turretin. In the lights and shades thrown upon this subject from revelation and the dark background of modern pantheism, we are satisfied that some phrases which have passed current with many standard theologians, will require to be revised, and either amended or expurgated. Dr. Shedd well observes:

"As theological science advanced, however, it was perceived that the essence of the Deity cannot safely be contemplated apart from his attributes. The essence is *in* the attributes, and the attributes *in* the essence, and consequently Christian

science must seize both ideas at once, and hold them both together. This led to the examination and exhibition of the Divine attributes, as *real* and *eternal* characteristics of the Deity.

"We cannot follow out the development of thought upon the Divine attributes; for this would require their being taken up one by one, and their history exhibited through the various periods. A single remark, only, can be made at this point. In proportion as the attributes have been discussed in connection with the essence of the Deity, has the doctrine of God been kept clear from pantheistic conceptions. In proportion, on the contrary, as speculation has been engaged with the essence of the Godhead, to the neglect or non-recognition of the attributes in which this essence manifests itself, has it become pantheistic. It is impossible for the human mind to know the Deity abstractly from his attributes. It may posit, i. e., set down on paper, an unknown ground of being, like the unknown x in algebra, of which nothing can be predicated, and may suppose that this is knowing the absolute Deity. But there is no such dark predicateless ground; there is no such Gnostic abyss. The Divine nature is in and with the attributes, and hence the attributes are as deep and absolute as the nature." Vol. i. pp. 240—1.

On the subject of the Trinity, the author finds no trace of the Christian doctrine in pagan writers, and utterly repudiates the Socinian pretence of its being borrowed from Plato. He also maintains the doctrine of the Nicene creed, in all its fulness, including the eternal generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit, and shows, beyond a péradventure, that it has been so uniformly the doctrine of the post-Nicene church, that the exceptions, outside of Unitarians and within the pale of the church, are too slight to deserve serious notice. For proof of this we deem it unnecessary to do more than to refer the reader to his very extended and thorough historical review of this subject. In regard to the opposition which the doctrine of eternal generation has encountered in New England, he barely remarks, in a foot-note, which we give below.*

* This foot-note is as follows, on p. 383. "The Nicene trinitarianism came with the English and Continental colonists into the American churches. The

While Dr. Shedd ably vindicates the thorough church doctrine of the Trinity without qualification, there are one or two solutions or explications, which he either propounds or appears to approve, that call for a word of criticism. We think the following has some look of explaining the oneness of substance in the three persons of the Godhead by the realistic theory, and shows that the want of precision in the use of certain terms, so common even in standard writers on this subject, has not been wholly avoided by the rigidly logical and metaphysical mind of Dr. Shedd.

"The Father and Son are of one and the same uncreated and infinite essence, even as the human father and son are of one and the same created and finite essence. The participation in the same identical nature or essence, or, in the Nicene phrase, the consubstantiality (*ὁμοούσιον*), places the first and second persons in the Godhead in the same class or grade of being. Both are equally divine, because they share equally in the *substance* of deity; as, in the sphere of the finite, both father and son are equally human, because participating equally in the *substance* of humanity. The category of substance determines the grade of being. That which is of a divine substance is divine; and that which is of a human substance is human. And the mere relationship in each case—the mere being a father, and the mere being a son—

Episcopalian church adopts it, in adopting the Thirty-nine Articles. The Presbyterian church receives it in the Westminster Confession; as did also the early Congregational churches. The churches of New England, represented in the Synod at Boston in 1680, made their statement in the following phraseology: 'In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and Son.' (Boston Confession, chap. ii.) An earnest defender of the Nicene doctrine of 'eternal generation,' is Samuel Hopkins, (Works, i. 293 sq.,) the leader of one of the later New England schools. The elder Edwards is also supposed to have left in manuscript reflections upon the doctrine of the trinity, in the line of the Nicene trinitarianism. During the present century, some opposition to the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship has shown itself in a few New England writers. The opposition, however, is founded upon an inadequate dogmatico-historical knowledge—the Origenistic theory of eternal generation, as revived in England in the last century by Samuel Clarke, being mistaken for the historical doctrine of Athanasius, and the Nicene theologians."

does not in the least affect the grade or *species* of being to which each belongs. The human son is as truly a *man* as is the human father; and the Divine Son is as truly God as is the Divine Father. "We men," says Athanasius, "consisting of a body and a soul, are all *μίας φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, of one nature or essence; but we are many persons." Again, when his Anomoean opponent compares the Father, Son, and Spirit, to a bishop, presbyter, and deacon, Athanasius directs his attention to the fact that these latter have all the same nature, being each of them man.* Vol. i. pp. 342-3.

There are two or three terms that play an important part in this controversy, and in that respecting realism, whose ambiguity causes great confusion, unless understood and guarded against. The first of these is the word "same," which strictly denotes numerical identity or oneness, but is often used in the sense of similar. Thus we say, one man is of the same nature or substance with another, meaning that he is of similar nature, &c. Two houses are built of the same *i. e.* similar materials. This ambiguity sometimes extends to the word "identical," which is of stricter import than "same." This equivocal import of these terms would enable them to take in not only the *όμοούσιον* of the Athanasian creed, but the *όμοούσιον* which it rejected, because the latter would let in Arianism, and not only that, but Tritheism. Then again, "essence" has its original metaphysical sense of substance or being, and its logical meaning of the essential marks (genus and specific difference) of a species. In the former sense, unity of essence means unity of substance. In the latter, it means those similar marks in a plurality of substances, which make them of one species or kind; as animality and rationality are the essence of manhood, or of the species man; four sides with the opposites parallel the essence of a parallelogram. Now, it is only in the second meaning of the word essence that "the

*Our Author says in a foot-note: "It should be added to this illustration of Athanasius, that the *whole* Nature or Essence is in the divine Person; but the human person is only a *part* of the common human nature. Generation in the Godhead admits no abscission or division of substance; but generation in the instance of the creature implies separation or division of essence. A human person is an individualized *portion* of humanity."

human father and son are of one and the same created and finite essence," *i. e.* they have similar marks which constitute the logical essence of humanity, but are different beings. But it is very clear that this is no proper or safe illustration of "consubstantiality" in the persons of the godhead; for thus they would become not only three persons, but three beings. And when he illustrates this consubstantiality by the statement that "both father and son are equally human, because participating equally in the *substance* of humanity;" this can be true only in a loose and unusual sense of the word *substance*, as equivalent to logical essence as above defined, in which case it would be obnoxious to the criticisms already made. Or, if substance be used in its strict and proper meaning, then it can be true only on the supposition that manhood is one numerical substance, by participation in which individuals become men. This is realism. If true, undoubtedly it would solve all difficulties in regard to the oneness of substance in the three persons of the godhead. If all human persons are one substance, much more are the Divine hypostases. But it is to be considered first, whether the realistic theory does not involve more difficulties than it removes—a question on which we may yet have somewhat to offer—and next, whether, if the consubstantiality of the divine persons be only such as subsists between men, the Trinity be not cleared of all that mystery which, from the first, friends and foes have agreed in attributing to it, and does not amount to tritheism.

We do not forget that our author, in the foot-note we have quoted, attempts the distinction between the unity of substance in the divine and human persons, that the former partake of the whole, the latter of a part of it. But if realism be true, every man is permeated by the one substance of humanity, which being one, can suffer no "abscission." If it be false, there is no one numerical substance common to all men, either partially or wholly.

We do not place strong reliance on the author's evolution of a Trinity, through the self-consciousness of the Deity, as giving us three eternal personal distinctions, or *supposita* in a subject-*ego*, an object-*ego*—and the union of the two—although he is far from being novel or singular in this view.

While we have noted these slight questionable points, they are as nothing compared with the great service which Dr. Shedd renders to the trinitarian cause, by his masterly analysis of the history of the doctrine, and the ability with which, on the whole, he maintains the church doctrine.

In his Christology, Dr. Shedd states clearly, and defends ably, the scriptural doctrine which the history of the church has only served to develope and confirm. He introduces his chapter on this subject with the following passage, which fully defines the true doctrine and its antagonistic heresies, while he goes on to show how, as the latter successively infested the church, they were exorcised, until the scriptural view of the Incarnation became the permanent catholic doctrine.

"Four factors are necessary in order to the complete conception of Christ's Person: 1. True and proper deity; 2. True and proper humanity; 3. The union of deity and humanity in one Person; 4. The distinction of deity from humanity, in the one Person, so that there be no mixture of natures. If either of these is wanting, the dogmatic statement is an erroneous one. The heresies which originated in the Ancient Church took their rise, in the failure to combine all these elements in the doctrinal statement. Some one or more of these integral parts of the subject were adopted, while the others were rejected. The classification of the ancient errors in Christology will, therefore, very naturally follow the above enumeration."

Vol. i. 392.

Although the author treats Anthropology next in order, and not without support of logic as well as usage, still Christology naturally links itself to Soteriology. And it will best suit our convenience, to say what little we have to offer upon his treatment of Soteriology first. There is little need of comment here, as his views on this whole subject are, with hardly a qualification, those of the Reformed symbols. If he varies anywhere, it is in not assigning the obedience, as distinguished from the sufferings of Christ, its due prominence in our justification.

The following in regard to the nature of the atonement, and the tardy evolution of the explicit definition of it in creed-formulas, is highly satisfactory, and all the more so from one

whose theological life and training have been in New England. The italics are the author's.

“Taking the term atonement in its technical signification, to denote the *satisfaction of Divine justice for the sin of man, by the substituted penal sufferings of the Son of God*, we shall find a slower scientific unfolding of this great cardinal doctrine than of any other of the principal truths of Christianity. Our investigations in this branch of inquiry will disclose the fact, that while the doctrines of Theology and Anthropology received a considerably full development during the Patristic and Scholastic periods, it was reserved for the Protestant church, and the Modern theological mind, to bring the doctrines of Soteriology to a correspondent degree of expansion.” Vol. ii. p. 205.

The Arminian, which is also the modern New England and New-school theory, and resolves the divine justice into benevolence, so making the atonement really a mere satisfaction of benevolence, is disposed of as follows.

“According to these positions, the sufferings of Christ were not a substituted penalty; but a substitute *for* a penalty. A substituted penalty is a strict equivalent, but a substitute *for* a penalty, may be of inferior worth, as when a partial satisfaction is accepted for a plenary one, by the method of acceptilation; or, as if the finite sacrifice of the lamb and the goat should be constituted by the will of God an offset for human transgression. And the term ‘satisfaction,’ also, is wrested from its proper signification, in that the sufferings of Christ are asserted to be a satisfaction of *benevolence*. ‘Our Lord satisfied . . . not the rigour and exactitude of divine justice, but the just and *compassionate* will of God,’—a use of language as solecistical as that which should speak of smelling a sound.” Vol. ii. pp. 373—4.

Two more extracts from our author's exceedingly valuable historical survey of this doctrine, one on justification, and another on the extent of the atonement, must suffice.

“The ‘*justification of the ungodly*,’ of which St. Paul speaks—*i. e.*, the judicial acquittal from condemnation of a soul that is still polluted with indwelling sin, and will be more or less until it leaves the body—cannot of course be founded upon

any degree of holiness that has been wrought within it by the Holy Spirit. It must rest altogether upon an outward and finished work, namely, the atoning suffering of the Son of God. This *declarative* act of God, whereby, on the ground of the objective satisfaction made to law by the Redeemer, he forgives the past, must be carefully distinguished from the subjective transforming work of God in the soul, whereby he secures its holiness in the future." Vol. ii. pp. 256, 257.

The remaining extract occurs in his analysis of the controversy between the Arminians and the Synod of Dort, relative to the extent of the atonement. The author does not expressly declare which view he adopts. But the manner in which he puts the arguments of the respective parties shows unmistakably the drift of his own convictions.

"The Arminians held that the atonement of Christ is intended for all men alike, and indiscriminately. As matter of fact, however, it saves only a part of mankind. The reason why the atonement does not save all men alike and indiscriminately, lies in the fact that the will of the finally lost sinner defeats the divine intention. There is no such degree of grace as is irresistible to the sinful will. The effectual application of the atonement, therefore, depends ultimately upon the decision of the sinner's will, and this decision in the case of the lost defeats the divine purpose. In opposition to this view, the Dort Synod held that the atonement, though sufficient in value for the salvation of all men, was intended only for those to whom it is effectually applied, viz., the elect. The Holy Spirit possesses a power that is irresistible, in the sense that it can subdue the obstinacy of any human will, however opposed to God. Hence, the application of the atonement depends ultimately, not upon the sinner's decision, but the divine determination to exert special grace. There is, therefore, no defeat of the divine intention, and the atonement saves all for whom it was intended." Vol. ii. 496, 497.

Dr. Shedd treats of regeneration under the head of Anthropology.

In regard to regeneration, our author thoroughly repudiates all theories which militate against its being exclusively the work of the Holy Ghost. Contrary choice, synergism, all

grades of ability in man for self-regeneration, or any part thereof, find no favour with him. And he writes with an earnestness and clearness which betray an experimental, not less than a speculative ground. We will not detain the reader with further remark on this subject, but refer him to the work itself. We shall confine ourselves in the residue of this article to the author's speculative and historical analysis of the doctrine of Original Sin.

On the subject of original sin, native corruption, and inability, as on other subjects, Dr. Shedd's opinions appear more in the manner in which he portrays historical controversies than in his own express avowals. It is inevitable that a writer should be able and willing to put doctrines which he believes, and the arguments for them in a stronger light than the contrary. He believes, and therefore he speaks. He is likely to apprehend his own doctrine and the reasons of it more fully than its rejecters, and the opposite side more imperfectly than those who embrace it. In this way, the reader feels no doubt with which set of opinions Dr. Shedd is in sympathy, or to which of them he would be glad to win assent. According to this criterion, Dr. Shedd takes the highest ground with regard to the native inherent corruption, and spiritual impotency of man. He also maintains that the race fell in the first sin of the first man; that this sin sustains a real causative relation to the corruption of the race, because it was the sin of the race, in such a sense that the race is justly condemned, and abandoned to the bondage of a sinful nature, as a natural and penal consequence. All this abundantly appears not only in these volumes, but in other publications of the author. It is further to be said, that he holds the inherent native sinfulness and impotency of man, not only on speculative grounds, but in the interest of a deeper religious experience than consists with Pelagian and Arminian theories. Moreover, all his theories in regard to the manner of the fall of our race in Adam, by virtue of that kind of race-unity which he maintains, and we are about to discuss, are held in the hope of conciliating with philosophy the testimonies of Scripture and religious experience in regard to the depth, sinfulness, and obduracy of our inherent native dispositions.

The chief question of moment between him and us relates to the kind of union, in virtue of which Adam's sin was accounted and treated as the sin of the race. We hold that we sinned in Adam, as he was our federal head and representative, and acted in our "room and stead;" that his act was therefore ours representatively; that thus it was imputed to us, and is the ground of our original guilt, and condemnation, and abandonment by God to that loss of communion with him, whence came the loss of original righteousness, and the corruption of our whole nature, whereby "we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good," and whence "do proceed all actual transgressions." The theory of "race-unity" by which the author explains our participation in Adam's sin, is the realistic, or that the manhood common to Adam and his descendants is one substance, so that when he sinned the race sinned. At least, this is exhibited as the theory of those defenders of original sin who are signalized and made prominent, and which is itself presented in its utmost strength, in this work. The other system, which is not only ours, but that of the leading Reformed, Puritan, and Calvinistic divines and creeds, since the theological mind of the Reformation fully developed the judicial relations of sin and redemption, is scarcely exhibited; indeed, we should judge, very imperfectly apprehended by the author. The theory presented in the strongest and most favourable light in this work, will be seen in the extracts we shall make from his sketches of the anthropology of Augustin and Anselm, which, in view of the following at the conclusion of his sketch of the latter, may not unjustly be taken as a fair exponent of the author's theories on the subject.

"The harmony of Anselm's doctrine of original sin with that of Augustin is apparent. Had the anthropology of the mediaeval church been shaped by the profound contemplations of Anselm, instead of the superficial speculations of Lombard—had the archbishop of the then unknown and insignificant see of Canterbury been accepted by the Latin church as its leader and thinker, instead of the Master of Sentences—the history of the Western church would have been that of a gradual purification and progress, instead of a gradual corruption and decline." Vol. ii. pp. 138, 139.

Augustin's theory is thus stated, vol. ii. pp. 77 et seq.

"These passages, which might be multiplied indefinitely, are sufficient to indicate Augustin's theory of generic existence, generic transgression, and generic condemnation. The substance of this theory was afterwards expressed in the scholastic dictum, '*natura corruptit personam*',—human *nature* apostatizes, and the consequences appear in the human *individual*. In the order of nature, mankind exists before the generations of mankind; the *nature* is prior to the individuals produced out of it. But this human *nature*, it must be carefully noticed, possesses all the attributes of the human individual; for the individual is only a portion and specimen of the *nature*. Considered as an essence, human *nature* is an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the corresponding qualities. Hence, according to Augustine, generic or original sin is truly and properly sin, because it is moral agency.

"The Manichaean theory that sin is a substance created, and infused into man by creative power, Augustin refuted and combatted with all the more energy, because he had at one time been entangled in it. Hence, he was careful to teach that original sin itself, as well as the actual transgressions that proceed from it, is moral agency. But in order to agency there must be an agent; and since original sin is not the product of the individual agent, because it appears at birth, it must be referred to the generic agent—*i. e.*, to the human *nature* in distinction from the human *person*, or individual. Hence the stress which he laid upon the act of transgression in Adam. At this point in the history of man, he could find a common agent, and a common agency; and only at this point. Ever after, there are only portions or individualizations of the *nature*, in the series of generations. This one common agent yields him the one common agency which he is seeking. In this manner, original sin is voluntary agency, as really as actual sin is—the difference between the two being only formal. Both are equally the product of human will; but original sin is the product of human will as yet uninindividualized in Adam, while actual sin is the product of human will as individualized in his posterity."

Anselm's Realism is thus described by Dr. Shedd: "In

Anselm's theory, the species is an entity as truly as the individual. For him, the universal has *objective* existence, and is not a mere name for the collective aggregate of particulars. The human 'nature' is prior to the individuals that are produced from it, and is as substantially existent as they are. For the individuals are only the nature *distributed*; they are the 'species' metamorphosed into persons. The 'nature,' therefore, is not the collective aggregation of individuals; for in this case the nature is not an entity,—it is only the name given to the aggregation of particular individuals, and the only entity is the individual. On the contrary (according to the theory of Realism), the nature is a primary entity, having real existence, which is metamorphosed by distribution into a multitude of individual persons." P. 117.

The quotation which follows, with much more equally pronounced, shows the application of this realistic doctrine by Anselm to the explication of original sin.

"That only is imputed to all men which *all* men have committed; and the only sin which *all* men have committed is that one sin which they committed when they were all '*ille unus homo*,' one human nature, in the first human pair.

"Thus, in Anselm's anthropology, as in Augustin's, everything starts from the *original unity of the human race*. If this idea is not conceded, the whole doctrine of original and transmitted sin, as Anselm constructs it, falls to the ground. Original sin is original agency; but original agency supposes an original agent; and this original agent is the whole human nature undistributed and unindividualized, in distinction from this or that individualized part of it. Original sin, coming into existence by the single primitive act of apostasy, is then transmitted along with the nature, from generation to generation—the generation being so many individualizations of the common humanity. The first pair of individuals are created, and contain the substance of the entire race, both upon the spiritual and the physical side. All the posterity, as individualizations, are propagated, not created. Herein consists the possibility of a transmission of sin from the first human pair, to the whole posterity, and also of a transmission of holiness." P. 120.

The theory thus clearly and undeniably found in Anselm, (but not without question as to interpretation, to be acknowledged as the mature and steadfast doctrine of Augustin,) Dr. Shedd considers to be characteristic of the Protestant anthropology. He says,

"The Reformers constructed their doctrines of sin and regeneration after the same general manner with Augustin and Anselm; so that the somewhat minute account which we have given of the Augustinian and Anselmic anthropologies renders a detailed representation of the Protestant anthropology unnecessary." P. 152.

On this we think proper to say just here; 1. Although Augustin firmly maintained such a union of Adam and his posterity in reference to the first sin, that they so sinned in him as justly to suffer the punishment of his sin, yet he was far from having developed into clearness, consistency, and stability his view of the nature of this union, whether it were federal and representative, or a realistic and numerical oneness. Thus Turretin at once interprets Augustin, and gives his own view as to the natural oneness of our race, and whether it is such that realism or federal representation explains the manner of our sinning in Adam. "Ut Adamus esset persona publica et repræsentativa, non necesse fuit, ut munus illud a nobis ipsi demandaretur, ut tam nostro quam suo nomine ageret; sufficit intercessisse justissimam Dei ordinationem secundum quam voluit Adamum esse stirpem et Caput totius Generis humani, qui ideo non sibi tantum, sed et suis bona acciperet, vel amitteret; unde omnes dicuntur fuisse unus homo. 'Quicunque,' inquit August. ep. 106, 'ex illo uno multi in seipsis futuri erunt, in illo uno, unus homo erant,' unitate *non specifica*, *vel numerica*, sed partim *unitate originis*, quia omnes ex uno sunt sanguine, partim *unitate repræsentationis*, quia unus omnium personam repræsentabat, ex ordine Dei." *Loc. ix. Quæst. 9.*

2. It follows that nothing can be inferred from the frequent reference in the Reformation theologians and symbols to Adam's being the root and natural head of his posterity, or to their being seminally in his loins, and other like phraseology, against their holding to representation and denying realism in the premises. We see that this is done by Turretin, in the

same paragraph in which he expressly denies the numerical or realistic, and asserts the representative oneness of Adam and his descendants. And this often occurs in other writers and creeds that avow precisely the same principles. This remark applies especially to the *Formula Consensus Helvetici*, composed by Turrettin, Heidegger, and others, in opposition to Joshua Placæus's theory of mediate imputation, and quoted by Dr. Shedd on pages 158, 159, which we will soon notice more particularly. 3. It is proper to add, that like Augustin, some of the Reformation divines, especially before the Protestant theological mind had worked out their theology to its full development, have a wavering, indeterminate style of expression, which simply shows that they had not very fully examined and settled the kind of oneness with Adam which was the ground of the imputation of his sin; and that nothing conclusive on this point can be inferred from their statements. Conspicuous among these was Calvin.

We are bound to add, that Dr. Shedd evinces a less satisfactory acquaintance with the Reformed doctrine of representation in Adam, and consequent imputation of his sin, and the terms related thereto, than is usual with him on historico-theological points. Thus he translates *culpa* and *reatus* in the *Formula Concordiae*, the first "guilt," and the second "crime." We will now look at his analysis of the *Formula Consensus Helvetici*, which he justly says, in regard to sin and grace, contains "statements that are more exhaustive and scientific than that of any of the other creeds drawn up by the Reformed or Calvinistic theologians," as well as the "most clear and specific;" also at his analysis of the system of Placæus, which this Formula was framed especially to repel.

Dr. Shedd says, "the imputation of the effects of Adam's apostacy, Placæus denominated 'mediate;' while the imputation of the apostatizing act itself, or of the cause of these effects, he called 'immediate.'" P. 159. As we understand it, it is agreed on all hands that the imputation of the effects of Adam's sin, *i. e.*, of inherent and actual sin in his descendants to the subjects of it, is immediate. How can it be otherwise? The question, as stated by Placæus himself in the passage quoted from him by Dr. Shedd immediately below the fore-

going is, whether the imputation of Adam's sin is immediate, or mediate; *i. e.*, antecedently and without regard to personal hereditary sin; or "mediately, *i. e.*, through the medium of hereditary inward corruption;" in other words, whether, in consequence of such corruption, we are regarded as either virtually sanctioning, or being equally criminal as if we had personally committed, Adam's sin; and so, on this ground, or through this medium, it is meditately imputed to us. Immediate imputation Placæus rejects; mediate, he maintains.

"In opposition to this theory of 'mediate' imputation," says Dr. Shedd, "the Formula Consensus makes the following statements," a part of which only we have room to quote:

"As God entered into a covenant of works with Adam, not only for himself, but also with the whole human race in him as its head and root, so that the posterity who were to be born of him would inherit the same integrity with which he was created, provided he should continue in it; so Adam by his sad fall sinned not for himself only, but for the whole human race who were to be born 'of blood and the will of the flesh,' and lost the blessings promised in the covenant. We are of opinion, therefore, that the sin of Adam is imputed to all his posterity by the secret and just judgment of God. For the apostle testifies that 'in Adam all have sinned,' 'by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners,' and 'in Adam all die.' . . . Thus it appears, that original sin, by a strict discrimination, is two-fold, and consists of the imputed guilt of Adam's transgression and the inherent hereditary corruption consequent upon this. For this reason, we are unable to assent to the view of those who deny that Adam represented his posterity by the ordinance of God, and, consequently, deny that his sin is *immediately* imputed to them, and who, under the notion of a 'mediate' and consequent imputation, not only do away with the imputation of the first sin, but also expose the doctrine of innate and hereditary corruption itself to grave peril."

The following is a part of Dr. Shedd's comment on this, which seems clear enough of itself.

"According to this statement of Turretin and Heidegger, mediate imputation must rest upon immediate; and *both* impu-

tations must be asserted.* They did not consider it conformable to justice, to impute an effect without imputing the cause. The posterity could not properly be regarded as guilty for their inward corruption of heart and will, unless they were guilty for that primal Adamic act of apostacy which produced this corruption. The Adamic sin itself must, therefore, be imputable to the posterity, in order to legitimate the imputation of its consequences. And, furthermore, this act, they imply, must be imputed upon *real* and not nominal grounds. The imputation of Adam's sin must not be a 'gratuitous' imputation, for this would yield only a 'gratuitous' condemnation. Righteousness may be imputed when there is no righteousness; but sin cannot be imputed when there is no sin. 'David describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God *imputeth righteousness* without works: saying, Blessed are they whose *iniquities are forgiven*, and whose *sins are covered*. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord *will not impute sin*.' Rom. iv. 6—8. The imputation of righteousness when there is no inherent and real righteousness, according to this explanation of St. Paul, is simply the forgiveness of iniquity, or the non-imputation of sin. It is a gratuitous imputation, and a gratuitous justification. But when Placæus proposed to carry the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation, such as holds true of Christ's righteousness, over to Adam's sin, and proposed to impute the Adamic guilt without any real and inherent demerit upon the part of the posterity, in the same manner that the righteousness of Christ is imputed without any real and inherent merit upon the part of the elect, Turrettin and Heidegger opposed him. The doctrine of a gratuitous justification is intelligible and rational; but the doctrine of a gratuitous damnation is unintelligible and absurd. Hence the Formula Consensus taught that 'man previous to the commission of any single or 'actual' transgression, is exposed to the divine wrath and curse from his very birth, first, on account of the

* The author has the following also in a foot-note:

"Turrettin also asserts both imputations in his Institutes, upon two grounds, viz., the *natural* union between Adam and his posterity, and the *political* or *forensic* union whereby he is 'the representative of the whole human race.'"

transgression and disobedience which he committed in the loins of Adam.' The posterity must be really, and not fictitiously, in the person of the progenitor, in order that they may be 'immediately' and justly charged with a common guilt." Pp. 159—163.

Here it is to be noted again, that Dr. Shedd carries the idea that two imputations are in question, that of the "cause" and the "effect" of Adam's sin, (which, agreeably to his theory, he always calls the "Adamic sin,") and the inherent hereditary corruption of his descendants resulting from it. Now we have known of no dispute about the latter, unless as against Pelagianizing controveirtists, certainly not among reformed theologians. The only question about the imputation of sin to men, respects Adam's sin; whether it is to be imputed at all; and if so, whether that imputation is mediate or immediate. The latter was the only question among the reformed theologians. There can be no doubt on which side this was settled by their most authoritative creeds, especially when interpreted by the writings of their framers and recognised expositors and defenders. We know not why Turrettin is said to have maintained two imputations. Certainly he held that on the ground of his being the natural as well as federal head of the race, Adam's sin was, representatively, the sin of the race, and therefore imputed to them immediately. This is the only imputation in question between Turrettin and Placæus—the only imputation arising either from his natural or forensic headship, and supported alike by both, or more especially by the latter as having its reason in the former. It cannot be that Dr. Shedd, as his language in one place implies, means that Turrettin teaches a mediate and immediate imputation, which some have claimed to be proved by a mistranslation of the following passage, that expressly denies it: "Illi cum quibus hic agimus, vel negant absolute imputationem, vel mediatam tantum admittunt; Nos vero cum Orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus, et dari imputationem, et eam esse immediatam et antecedentem." *Loc. ix. Quæst. 9.* Some have strangely construed this as if *utrumque* referred to both mediate and immediate imputation, which are mutual contradicories, whereas it plainly refers to what follows, for the purpose of explaining, viz., both that imputation is true, and

that it is immediate. A like misconstruction appears when the author says that "Placæus proposed to impute the Adamic guilt without any real and inherent demerit on the part of the posterity." This, as we understand it, is the exact opposite of Placæus's doctrine, which was that Adam's sin was imputed in view and in consequence of inherent corruption and demerit as the antecedent and meritorious ground. He represents Turretin as opposing this doctrine, which he attributes to Placæus; whereas the former held, as we have seen, that the sin and guilt of Adam were imputed immediately, and antecedently to such inherent corruption, and constituted the judicial ground of abandonment to such corruption. And it is thus imputed, because it is treated as the sin of the race on trial in the person of its first representative.

When Dr. Shedd represents Turretin as holding that the imputation of Adam's sin is "upon *real* not nominal grounds;" that it is not "gratuitous;" that "the posterity must be really, not fictitiously, in the person of the progenitor, in order that they may immediately and justly be charged with a common guilt;" if he means to imply that this great theologian held that they were so in Adam as to participate in his sin literally, or in a realistic sense, or otherwise than representatively; or that such a representation in him was not a reasonable and just ground of its imputation to them, we think the contrary has been abundantly shown. We hold that such a relation to Adam affords a ground of imputation which is neither unreal, unjust, gratuitous, nor fictitious.

We object to the realistic solution of the fall of our race in Adam, because, 1. We object to the doctrine of Realism itself, on general grounds. This doctrine we understand to be, that the unity of a class, species, or genus, consists not merely in the similarity of the objects composing it, whereby they are generalized and denoted by a common term, but in a numerical oneness of substance pervading them—so that the abstract terms denoting conceptions of what is common to the class, or, in other phrase, denoting universals, denote not only such conceptions, but real universal entities that are numerically single. So manhood, humanity, animality, denote severally one substance pervading respectively all men, or all animals, and

making them such. This not only destroys individual substances, and subverts all personal identity and responsibility, but, in its last analysis, logically terminates in one substance in the universe. For all lower classes may ultimately be generalized into one, the *summum genus*, *i. e.* being, which comprehends all things. Now, if the unity of a class consists in their being one substance, then all things are but one substance in manifold manifestations. What this amounts to, we need not say, except that it is what Dr. Shedd abhors, *ab imo pectore*.

2. If what Adam did the race did, because all men are, by virtue of a common manhood, one substance with him, then this applies not only to his first sin, but to all his subsequent sins, by necessary and inevitable consequence. Not only so, but the acts of all other parents become the acts of their descendants. In fact, the acts of each and every man become the acts of all men. Our readers have seen that Dr. Shedd tries to parry this inference by putting a difference between the first man, the first pair, and all their descendants. But so far as the present point is concerned it is unavailing. If Adam's posterity participated literally in his sin, because his act was the act of the entity manhood common to him and them, the same effect follows every act of every man by virtue of this same community of substance. This confounds and vacates personal identity and responsibility.

3. We object to this solution of the relation of Adam's sin to the sin of the race, because it reacts upon the relation of Christ's righteousness to our justification, in consequence of the parallel drawn by Scripture between the two, Rom. v. 15—19. If then the way in which Adam's sin avails to our condemnation be, that we literally committed it, or that it is ours inherently and personally, then the way in which the righteousness of Christ becomes ours is that, by a community of nature, it is ours personally and inherently. Thus subjective righteousness or personal holiness becomes the ground of justification. Such, in our view, are the logical and historical tendencies of this realistic solution of original sin, which make us afraid of it, and lead us to cling to that upon which the Reformers ultimately settled, and which appears in the federal, representative, and public character assigned to Adam in their sym-

bols, and more fully in their great theological treatises, to explain the sin and fall of the race in him.

Yet, if one can bear the realistic philosophy, it must be confessed that it has its charms as a solvent of many of the difficulties connected with the doctrine of original sin. It enables one to adopt, in their utmost literality of meaning, all phrases of Scripture in regard to the fall of the race in Adam; and in like manner the strongest language of our Confession and Catechisms, if we except the federal and representative office ascribed to him. But surely none can say with greater sincerity than the realistic Calvinist, "All sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression." And they only, who have had a similar experience, can appreciate the attitude of mind of persons, who, like Dr. Shedd, have lived and moved and had their being in a region where original sin is widely decried, and the imputation of Adam's sin seldom spoken of, but as the climax of all absurdities. Those who have a Presbyterian training cannot understand the difficulty experienced by such persons in digesting the doctrine of imputation. When they come to those profounder scriptural and experimental views which radicate sin deeper and earlier than any conscious acts, by which character is formed in our present state, and look for a theory which will serve as a scientific frame for such views, the realistic hypothesis is extremely alluring. It seems to solve all difficulties, to conform, *quoad hoc*, to the language of Scripture and the creeds, to have the traditional dignity and authority given it by the adhesion of some of the greatest heathen philosophers and Christian divines—and withal to be arrayed in the united charms of mysticism and philosophy. We speak what we do know, and testify what we have seen in the conflicts of personal experience. But it must be remembered, that nearly all that we have said of the attractions of Realism, on this account, might be said of Pantheism. That too, on some of the most high and difficult doctrines, can adopt *ex animo* the literal statements of the Scripture and the creeds. But it can adopt and does include a great deal more, utterly inconsistent with other portions of Scripture and the creeds. Similar in its degree is the objection to Realism in the various departments of theology.

Here we close our examination of this high work, on the whole, so creditable to the author's learning, piety, and doctrinal insight. It is because of our sense of its great excellence, and probable influence, and because it generally takes so high ground in behalf of thorough orthodoxy, that we have felt constrained to indicate what we deem its chief error. This error, indeed, pertains rather to the circumference than the centre of Christian doctrine. It is embraced by the author all the more earnestly, because he regards it as a powerful means of holding fast that centre—of keeping true to what is so fundamental in the Christian system as the doctrine of Original Sin, and its correlates, Divine Redemption and Regeneration. We reject it, as untrue in itself, and as fraught with contrary tendencies. Notwithstanding this drawback, the work is, as a whole, among the strongest promoters of high-toned orthodoxy, which has been of late given to the public. In its grand exhibition of standard scriptural and historical theology, it will shed great light upon some boastful but narrow provincial schemes that vainly aspire to supplant that theology.

S H O R T N O T I C E S .

A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life; with a complete Bibliography of the subject. By William Rounseville Alger. Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 628 Chestnut street. 1864. Pp. 913.

This is a most elaborate work. It undertakes to present the views of all nations, ancient and modern, and of all creeds, concerning the state of the soul in a future world. The barbaric notions of uncivilized tribes, the Druidic, Scandinavian, Etruscan, Egyptian, Brahmanic and Buddhist, the Persian, Hebrew, Rabbinical, Greek, Roman and Mohammedan, doctrines are all passed in review. Then come up for consideration the teachings of the New Testament on this subject, and a protracted history of the doctrine in different ages of the church, with dissertations or additional discussions on future punishment, methods of salvation, recognition of friends in a future life, &c. This meagre statement of the contents of this volume show that it is without a rival for comprehensiveness of plan, and for laborious research in its execution. Mr. Alger's own doctrinal stand-point appears very far below that occupied by the great body of evangelical Christians, and his work is to be taken as a repository, and not as an authority. The most remarkable feature of this volume is the Index, prepared by Mr. Ezra Abbot, on the "Literature of the Doctrine of a Future State." This Index contains a classified catalogue of more than four thousand works, with the names of the authors, the time when they lived, and the editions of their writings. This catalogue alone would be well worth the price charged for the volume.

The Life and Times of John Huss; or, The Bohemian Reformation of the Fifteenth Century. By E. H. Gillett. In two volumes. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington Square. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. Pp. 632, and 651.

The Reformers before the Reformation; the men who comparatively alone, and without the support of princes and people, protested against the corruptions of the church, in doctrine, discipline, and morals, whose reward was the stake, have not had that place in history to which they are entitled. There is a debt of gratitude to them which remains unpaid. Mr. Gillett

has done a good work in devoting so much talent and labour to one interesting field of historical research, with the view of diffusing a knowledge of one of the most remarkable men, and one of the most important movements in ecclesiastical history. There have been to our view few more valuable contributions to our religious literature than these two volumes during the present century. The author of this work takes rank with Sparks, Bancroft, Irving, Prescott, Hopkins, and others, who have done so much to exalt the reputation of our country in the world of letters by their historical productions. The work is printed in the elegant style for which the Boston publishers are distinguished.

Geographical Studies. By the late Professor Carl Ritter, of Berlin. Translated from the original German, by William Leonhard Gage. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. Pp. 356.

This volume contains a sketch of Ritter's life, an account of his geographical labours, and a series of his essays on important subjects connected with the science of comparative geography. Ritter stood for years the acknowledged head of this department. To this his long and honoured life was almost exclusively devoted. To the students of philosophical geography, who desire to ascertain the laws which have determined the conformation of the earth's surface, this volume will be peculiarly welcome. This is a department of knowledge which our own Professor Guyot is doing so much to render familiar to the American public; and in which the labours of the lamented Dr. Robinson, so far as relates to the geography of the Holy Land, secured for him a reputation second to that of no living author.

George Morton and his Sister. By Catherine M. Trowbridge. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut street. 1864. Pp. 258.

This is the history of a neglected street wanderer, redeemed and elevated by well-directed efforts of Sunday-School teachers and friends. It is written in a lively and interesting style, and bids fair to take a high place in the class of works to which it belongs.

Family Sermons. By Horatius Bonar, D. D., Kelso. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 464.

These are short sermons, fifty-two in number, designed to illustrate the glorious gospel in some of its manifold aspects, by one of the most popular living writers of Scotland.

The Witness Papers. The Headship of Christ, and the Rights of the Christian People, a Collection of Essays, Historical and Descriptive Sketches, and Personal Portraitures, with the author's celebrated Letter to Lord Brougham. By Hugh Miller. Edited, with a Preface, by Peter Bayne, A. M. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. Pp. 502.

The *Edinburgh Witness* was for many years under the editorial management of Hugh Miller. Those accustomed to peruse the weekly issues of that paper, probably derived a higher idea of the varied attainments and of the mental power of the editor, than that produced by even his most celebrated works. Theology, ecclesiastical law, finance, general literature, physical science, seemed equally familiar to him. On all these topics he wrote with a simplicity, clearness, power, and beauty, which was a constant source of amazement and admiration to his numerous readers. We are glad that some of his remarkable contributions to the *Witness* have been collected in this volume. For ourselves, however, we can say that we have sometimes been as much impressed by the power of the man, as exhibited in an article of some four or five lines, as in his more elaborate productions. Hugh Miller belonged to the highest class of men, and everything he wrote is worthy of preservation.

“*I Will*,” being the determinations of the Man of God, as found in some of the “I wills” of the Psalms. By the Rev. Philip Bennett Power, M. A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Worthing; author of the “I wills” of Christ. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863. Pp. 404.

Fourteen thousand copies of this devotional book has been sold in England, which is sufficient evidence of its power. It is a fruitful topic. “I will not be afraid of ten thousands of people.” “I will lay me down in peace.” “I will fear no evil.” “I will not trust in my bow.” “I will call upon the Lord.” “I will trust in thee.” “I will abide in thy tabernacle for ever.” The reader may see from this selection of mottoes, how rich a field of instruction and consolation is opened in this volume.

The Desert Pathway. By the Rev. William Robertson, of Hamilton, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863. Pp. 404.

“This book,” says its author, “pretends to nought but a few simple thoughts written down in an interval of retirement, during which it has pleased God to withdraw the writer into a path of silence and trial.” Books written under such circumstances are apt to be genuine productions of the heart, and reach the hearts of those similarly tried.

The Jewish Tabernacle and its Turniture in their Typical Teachings. By the Rev. Richard Newton, D. D., Rector of the Church of the Epiphany. Philadelphia. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1864. Pp. 393.

This is a very attractive volume, as well on account of its subject, as the method in which the author's plan is carried out, and the appropriate beauty of its illustrations. The main idea of the book is, that "the tabernacle was designed of God, not only to foreshadow the gospel before it came, but also to illustrate it after it had come." For this typical character not only of the old economy in general, but of the ordering of the tabernacle and its service, we have the divine authority of the apostle in his epistle to the Hebrews. It is, therefore, important that this source of instruction should not be neglected, due care being taken that we do not substitute our own fancies for divine intimations.

Claude, the Colporteur. By the author of "Mary Powell." New York: Carter & Brothers. 1864. Pp. 316.

The scene of this interesting volume is laid in Switzerland, and brings into view the peasant life of that country.

The Risen Redeemer. The Gospel History from the Resurrection to the day of Pentecost. By F. W. Krummacher, D. D. Translated from the German, by John T. Betts. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 298.

Dr. Krummacher tells us that the object of this work is not merely devotional, but also apologetic. It is not only an exposition for spiritual edification of a portion of the evangelical history, but an answer to the objections of recent sceptical writers. It was published in Germany under the title of "The Easter Manual," and forms, with the writer's two preceding works on the Advent, and Passion of Christ, a trilogy for these ecclesiastical epochs.

Able to Save; or Encouragements to Patient Waiting. By the author of "The Pathway of Promise." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1864. Pp. 280.

This is another book written under the pressure of affliction, by a devout spirit, and designed to administer comfort to the weary.

Memoir of the Rev. Erskine J. Hawes, Pastor of the Congregational church, Plymouth, Connecticut. By his Mother. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 275.

"A mother's love, perhaps a mother's partiality, has prepared, and now gives to the public, this memoir of a beloved son." These touching words open every heart to receive this

tribute of maternal affection to a son well worthy of her love. The public have not forgotten the sad accident by which the subject of this memoir was cut off in the prime of his life and usefulness. His venerable father, the Rev. Joel Hawes, D. D., of Hartford, has been called to severe suffering in the loss of his children, but he has the great consolation of knowing that the memoir of one at least of the number, Mrs. Mary E. Lennep, has been, since her death, a means of extensive usefulness, and this life of his lamented son, will no doubt be also similarly blessed.

An Essay on the Improvement of Time. By John Foster, author of "Essay on Decision of Character." Edited by J. E. Ryland, M. A. With a Preface, by John Sheppard. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1864. Pp. 264.

As John Foster holds rank with the most distinguished English Essayists, the public will welcome this new edition of an essay which, although not published until after his death, is worthy of a place among his most elaborate productions.

The Great Stone-Book of Nature. By David Thomas Ansted, M. A., F. R. S., F. G. S., &c., late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, &c. Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 628 Chestnut street. 1863. Pp. 335.

The Stone-Book is the science of geology. "There is but one way," the author says, "in which geology can be understood, and that is, by a thorough familiarity with what is going on now both in the animate and inanimate kingdom of nature." This is the idea on which this book is constructed. It is a popular, instructive, and interesting exhibition of an important department of knowledge.

Milton's Paradise Lost. New York: Frank H. Dodd, 506 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 331.

A very handsome and passable edition of a standard work.

Hymns and Tunes for the Army and Navy, published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. Pp. 128.

Little Pilgrims. American Tract Society. Pp. 55.

Katy Seymour; or, How to make Others Happy. American Tract Society. Pp. 152.

Hannah's Path. By the author of the "Blue Flag," &c. American Tract Society. Pp. 118.

Harry, the Whaler. By the author of "Harry, the Sailor-boy," &c., from the Religious Tract Society, London. Published by the American Tract Society. Pp. 138.

Buster and Baby Jim. By the author of the "Blue Flag." American Tract Society. Pp. 107.

A Compendious History of English Literature and the English Language from the Norman Conquest, with Numerous Specimens. By George L. Craik, LL.D., Professor of History and of English Literature in Queen's College, Belfast. In two vols. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

These massive volumes constitute a thesaurus of information in regard to the development and shaping of our mother tongue, and the growth of English authorship, which will be invaluable to philologists, and men of letters, taste, and culture. The number of authors described and cited; the wide and varied field over which the work ranges; the changes in the vocabulary, grammatical structure; the literary, scientific, and esthetic capabilities of the language, which are here exhibited; the learning, skill, and judgment, displayed by the author, make it a repository so rich and instructive as to deserve a place in all well-furnished libraries.

An Outline of the Elements of the English Language, for the Use of Students. By N. G. Clark, Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in Union College. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

Professor Clark has here condensed within a small volume much of the matter which Professor Craik has presented more fully and minutely in his two heavy octavos. It is in a form and at a price within the reach of multitudes of young students, to whom the latter is inaccessible and useless. We do not mean that it is any mere compend or condensation of Professor Craik's work. It is entirely independent, and so far as we have noticed, may have been written without any knowledge of Professor Craik's book. It is quite adapted to the wants of the class for whom it is intended, both in its analysis of the gradual progress and development of our language, and in its quotations and critical comments upon leading authors. No process is more educating than the study of the history of words and their connotative import, and of genial, appreciative, but discriminating comment upon the English classics.

The Heidelberg Catechism, in German, Latin, and English; with an Historical Introduction. Prepared and published by the direction of the German Reformed Church in the United States of America. Tri-centenary edition. New York: Charles Scribner. Chambersburg, Pa.: M. Kieffer & Co. 1863.

This celebrated symbol will be sought with interest and avidity, not only by the German Reformed Church, and by theologians outside of it, but by all who take an interest in the doctrinal development which during the past twenty years has been going forward in that communion in this country. The three languages in which it is issued, the ability and care with

which it is edited by such scholars as Drs. Schaff, Gerhart, and Nevin, acting by the appointment of the church itself, all tend to give it authority and value. Nearly half the volume is occupied by the "Historical Introduction." This is prepared with the scholarly care and theological insight, but not without the constant ingenious effort to give it an extreme sacramentarian bias, and to compare it with our own and other similar symbols, to the disadvantage of the latter, which we might expect from its authors.

We wish to signalize the excellent typography and paper of this and most of Mr. Scribner's publications. It lessens the labour and heightens the pleasure of reading works full one-half, when they are printed like this and Dr. Shedd's new work, not to speak of others. We should rejoice to see a copy of our own standards in similar style.

Sermons Preached before his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, during his Tour in the East in the Spring of 1862, with Notices of some of the Localities visited. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, Honorary Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, Deputy Clerk of the Closet, Honorary Chaplain to the Prince of Wales. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863. Published by arrangement with the Author.

We are glad to observe, that as Dr. Trench has been promoted to the bishopric made vacant by the death of Archbishop Whately, so Dr. Stanley has been promoted to the deanery made vacant by this removal of Dr. Trench. This is a well-merited recognition of the distinguished contributions he has already made to letters and religion. His originality, freshness, sound judgment, classic simplicity, and elegance of style, appear in the sermons and descriptions of this volume, which possesses a high literary as well as religious interest and value. Those preachers who have never mastered the art of writing short sermons worth hearing, would do well to study this volume. In it there is much curious information, of value to the philologist, the exegete, the antiquary, and the common reader of the Bible.

My Father's House; or, the Heaven of the Bible. A Book of Consolation. By James M. MacDonald, D.D., Minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Princeton, New Jersey. Fourth edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

We have been accustomed to rank the contents of this book, both as we heard them originally delivered from the pulpit, and as they are now embodied in this neat volume, among the author's happiest efforts. It well deserves, and we doubt not

will continue to receive, the favour already bestowed upon it by those who mourn in Zion, or who love to foretaste heaven on earth.

The Federalist. A Collection of Essays written in favour of the New Constitution, as agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. Reprinted from the Original Text. With an Historical Introduction and Notes. By Henry B. Dawson. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

These celebrated state-papers have long been out of print, and comparatively unknown to our younger lawyers and politicians. Until a recent period, few thought themselves qualified to enter political life, or to aspire to a place in the national councils, who were not familiar with these masterly discussions on our national constitution, which exerted so powerful an influence in promoting its acceptance and ratification by the people, especially the people of New York, among whom a powerful party threatened to prevent the adoption of this benevolent instrument by that great State. These papers were written mostly by Hamilton, largely by Madison, and a few of them by John Jay. These, in connection with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, rendered by John Marshall, form the ablest and most decisive construction of this great national charter. We are glad to find them again in print. We do not doubt that, in this crisis of our national existence, when the mind of the nation is stirred to its depths in regard to the most elementary principles relative to national and state, legislative, executive, judicial, and military authority and prerogative, these expositions of our ablest statesmen, concerned in framing and defending it, will be sought and examined with avidity. The historical introduction and notes are valuable additions to the volume.

My Farm of Edgewood; a Country Book. By the author of "Reveries of a Bachelor." Eighth edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

The author, who has given to the public many entertaining books of fiction, here employs his graphic pen upon the various incidents connected with life upon a farm to which he has retired. The lights and shades sketched in his vivid style, are both instructive and entertaining in the inside view they give of fancy and real farming.

Music of the Bible; or, Explanatory Notes upon those Passages in the Sacred Scriptures which relate to Music. Including a Brief View of Hebrew Poetry. By Enoch Hutchinson. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1864.

This large volume is devoted to a single point of scriptural investigation, which is not treated at length in any accessible

volume known to us. The author makes searching inquiry into the portions of Scripture that touch, even in the most casual way, upon music, or musical instruments. Many interesting pictorial illustrations of the rude musical instruments mentioned in Scripture are given. The poetry of the sacred writers is also made the subject of interesting and profitable discussion. The work, as a whole, is characterized by judgment, learning, and piety.

The Mercy-Seat; or, Thoughts on Prayer. By Augustus C. Thompson, D.D., author of "The Holy Land," "Morning Hours at Patmos," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863.

A very thorough, evangelical, devout, and beautiful treatise on the great subject of communion with God. It is cast in a highly readable form. The author finds many of his best illustrations and examples in the great devotional compositions of the church. He abounds in sparkling imagery and choice anecdote, which lend to his successive chapters the charm of story, eloquence, and poetry. His fondness for figure and metaphor in rare instances outruns the limits of our own judgment and taste; as when, likening prayer to the telegraph, he speaks of "God's immediate presence" as the "Trinity Bay of the universe." P. 33.

Christianity the Religion of Nature. Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute. By A. P. Peabody, D.D., LL.D., Preacher to the University, and Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1864.

This work is an earnest defence of Christianity from the author's standpoint. This is considerably higher than has been common among the Unitarians or liberal Christians of Massachusetts. He is clear and strong in support of a supernatural, authoritative revelation attested by miracles. These are momentous truths. They are supported by Dr. Peabody with eminent ability, great force of argument, affluence of illustration, exquisite and enchanting beauty of style. Undoubtedly the book will be useful to many minds that are perplexed and wavering on these subjects.

But we are sorry to say that the work is marred by one serious and radical defect, which is partly foreshadowed in its title. We discover no recognition of the fall of man and of Christianity as a remedial provision for recovery from this lapse. So far as we have observed, in an examination of necessity cursory, the natural religion which he reasons out *a priori*, and which he contends is identical with Christianity, is a reli-

gion which does not require the vicarious penal sufferings of the God-man, or an inward new creation of the corrupt soul by the Holy Ghost. Hence, we find no higher attributes and offices ascribed to Christ than the "image," or "representative" of God, and the "faultless model" and "exemplar" of man. Pp. 164, 175. With this the work harmonizes in correlative subjects, and in it we have the key to the defects which mar the forementioned excellencies.

A Treatise on Regeneration. By E. C. Wines, D.D. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia, 1863.

The cardinal doctrine of regeneration is handled by the author, in this little volume, in a manner worthy of him and of the subject. The orthodox view is set forth, in all its parts, with great clearness and force, with ample and apposite scriptural proofs, with just psychological and metaphysical distinctions, with edifying practical applications, and in a style at once pure and attractive.

Views From Nature. Published by the American Tract Society.

One of the very best books for children and youth.

Kelly Nash, or I Didn't Think. By the author of "Blue Flag."

Amy's New Home; with the Blot of Ink, and the Picture Clock.

The Little Sea-Bird. By the author of "Mackerel Will," &c.

Gospel Workers; or a Plea for doing Good, for Everybody. By Rev. J. Cross.

The foregoing are neat little volumes published by the American Tract Society. The first three, of various merit, for children, the last designed and fitted to promote Christian activity.

Motives to the Missionary Work. A Sermon before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, at their meeting in Rochester, N. Y., October 6, 1863. By Elisha L. Cleaveland, D. D., Pastor of the Third Congregational Church, New Haven, Ct. Boston: T. R. Marvin & Son. 1863.

This is a model sermon for a great occasion, connected with the evangelization of the world. It is a clear and eloquent presentation of evangelical truth—far more appropriate and edifying than the splendid platitudes, remote from Christ and him crucified, which sometimes steal into such places.

Chronicles of the Schönbergh-Cotta Family. By two of themselves. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1864. Pp. 552.

The scene of this work is laid before and during the Reformation. It is an exceedingly interesting exhibition of the state of feeling and opinion among the Romanists at that period, and of the effect of the new doctrine taught by Luther.

Die Altpersischen Keilinschriften im Grundtexte mit Uebersetzung. Grammatik und Glossar, von Fr. Spiegel. 8vo. pp. 223.

This convenient and complete little manual sums up the results of the investigations of the last sixty years in regard to the Persian arrow-head inscriptions. The whole of these, so far as they have been copied by Europeans, are here given, both in their original text transcribed in Roman letters, and in a German translation. The longest and most important is the great Belûstân inscription, where Darius recorded upon the perpendicular face of the mountain rock, three hundred feet above the plain, his title to the throne, the extent of his empire, and the leading events of his reign. Next to this in length and consequence is another from the same monarch at Naksh-i-Rustam, engraved in a like inaccessible position. The rest are of smaller compass and of less intrinsic worth, though by no means devoid of interest and value, representing as they do, seven of the Persian monarchs, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes Ochus.

The inscriptions themselves are followed by critical and explanatory notes, together with a grammar of the language represented in the inscriptions, and a glossary of all the words which they contained. A concise but satisfactory history is also given of the deciphering of these inscriptions, and the successive steps by which it was accomplished, from the first fortunate conjecture of Grotefend in 1802. The name of the author, who is well known from other valuable contributions to our knowledge of ancient Iranic literature, is a sufficient guarantee of the ability with which his work is executed.

One very interesting fact connected with the Persian arrow-head letter, which may be of importance in tracing the history and development of writing, is that it is an alphabetic character formed upon the basis of syllabic characters previously existing. There are several systems of writing, which are classed under the generic name of the arrow-head character, because they all consist of the same elements, the wedge and angle, variously modified and combined. These are used in writing different languages, and some of them are exceedingly complicated. That in which the ancient Persian language is written appears to be the most recent, as well as the simplest of them. All the rest are syllabic, this alone is alphabetic, really and truly so, though still retaining traces of its syllabic origin. Thus there are three forms for *d* and three for *m*, corresponding to the three vowels *a*, *i*, or *u*, by which they may be followed. The explanation of this doubtless is, that *da*, *di*, and *du* were originally represented by separate charac-

ters denoting the consonant with its accompanying vowel. When these were subsequently used to represent the consonant alone, and a distinct sign was introduced for the vowel, that form of the consonant was naturally selected to accompany a particular vowel which had formerly included it in itself. If this method had been consistently followed out, it would have required three forms for every consonant. Some of these were, however, dropped as superfluous. Thus, besides the two letters already named which have three forms, *k*, *g*, *t*, *n*, and *r*, have two forms, one employed before the vowels *a* and *i*, and the other before *u*; *v* has two forms, one before *a* and *u*, and the other before *i*; *j* has distinct forms before *a* and *i*, but does not occur before *u*. The other letters have but one form before all three of the vowels. But here, as in Sanscrit, a consonant unaccompanied by another vowel is regarded as involving in itself the short vowel *a*.

Einleitung in das Babylonisch-Hebräische Punktation-System, nebst einer Grammatik der Hebräischen Zahlwörter von Abraham ben Ezra, aus Handschriften herausgegeben und Commentirt von S. Pinsker. 8vo. pp. xlix. (in German), and 192 (in Hebrew.).

The Historical and Antiquarian Society of Odessa received from a Karaite hacham in 1839 the present of a number of old Hebrew manuscripts, mostly Bibles and synagogue rolls. Among these were several, which were distinguished by a system of signs for the vowels and accents quite different from those in ordinary use. One is a Codex of the latter prophets, written upon two hundred and twenty-five folio leaves of good parchment. Each page has two columns, between which and on the margins are glosses like those of the Masora. This was described, and a fac-simile of the book of Habakkuk published by Dr. Primer in 1845. Besides this, there are fifteen fragments, making in all seventy-seven quarto leaves of a Pentateuch on cotton paper, accompanied with the corresponding Haphtaroth, or synagogue lessons from the prophets. Each verse of the Pentateuch is followed by the Chaldee translation of Onkelos, and each verse of the Haphtaroth by that of Jonathan. There are also twelve fragments, containing forty quarto leaves of another Pentateuch, on cotton paper, with the Haphtaroth and Targums.

In these manuscripts all the vowels with the exception of Shurek are written above the letters. The vowel Seghol is wanting, its place being supplied, according to circumstances, by Pattahh, Hhirik, or Tsere. Hhirik and Tsere preserve their accustomed forms in their altered position, Hholem has two dots vertically placed instead of one, and the other vowels

have undergone a considerable change of figure. Singularly enough, the sign for Kamets (*ā*) and Kamets Hhatuph (*ō*) is identical, as in the ordinary punctuation. Every vowel but Hholem and Shurek appears in three forms, which are determined by the character of the syllable and the position of the accent. In simple syllables, and in all syllables whether simple or not, which receive either the principal or the secondary accent, the vowel has its proper uncompounded sign. Methegh is not written in these manuscripts, though they thus attest the reality of the tone which it indicates. In unaccented compound syllables, as well as where a compound Sh'va would be expected, a horizontal stroke is drawn beneath the vowel sign. Before a doubled letter a like stroke is drawn above the vowel sign. This stroke unconnected with a vowel is used both for Raphe and Sh'va; its combination with a vowel sign bears an analogy to the compound Sh'vas in the current Hebrew orthography. The sign for Daghesh, both forte and lene, is the ordinary one. Pattahh furtive is not recognized.

The accentual system is somewhat simpler than that in common use. There are but eighteen accents, twelve disjunctives and six conjunctives, the former being invariably written over the tone syllable, and the latter beneath it. There are no post-positives or prepositives as in the ordinary punctuation.

This is called the Assyrio-Babylonish system of punctuation, because it is supposed to have prevailed among the Jews in Assyria and Babylonia, in distinction from that previously known, and which is attributed to the Masorites at Tiberias or in Palestine. Many interesting questions here arise, which cannot as yet be said to have found a satisfactory solution. Was one of these systems of writing the vowels and accents derived directly from the other? If so, which is entitled to claim the priority? Or were both alike descended from some simpler system which they have developed differently? There is too much similarity between them to admit of their being regarded as wholly independent in origin; and at the same time the diversity in principle and method is too great to have been simply fortuitous. Perhaps the further investigation of this subject may yet shed a welcome light upon that great mystery of Hebrew criticism, the introduction of the vowel signs, and exhibit to us the steps by which their present nicety and complication was attained, as well as the certainty of the basis on which they rest.

This little volume contains a fac-simile of the closing verses of Malachi, with the subscription by the copyist, and reproduces the text of various passages with its peculiar system of

signs, viz., 2 Kings i. 6, the Ten Commandments from Deut. v., Isaiah xxxix., Jer. i., Ezekiel xxvi. xxvii., Mie. iv. The grammar of the Hebrew numerals, by Abraham ben Ezra, which is added to it, occupies with Pinsker's Comments, sixty pages of the Hebrew portion of the book.

It may be added here, that there is a manuscript of the K'thubhim, formerly in Heidelberg now in Rome, which is described in the following terms: Vocalium puncta, quæ in Hebraicis infra poni solent, superposita, et quidem quinque præcipua. No careful examination of this Codex has been instituted, so far as is known; so that it is impossible to say whether it represents the same system of punctuation as the Odessan manuscripts or not.

The Board of Publication have recently made several valuable additions to their Sabbath-School Library, all of which are attractive in appearance, well printed, and beautifully illustrated. The following have been sent to us for notice.

Little Pearls from the Ocean of Divine Truth. 18mo. pp. 216. Price 35 and 40 cents.

Rays of Light from the Sun of Righteousness. 18mo. pp. 216. Price 45 and 50 cents.

The Sunbeam, and other Stories. 18mo. pp. 144. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The above works are selections of stories, some of which have appeared in the columns of our religious newspapers. They are of unequal merit; but all of them interesting and instructive, and not unworthy of preservation in their book form.

Jenny, the Crochet-Worker; or, the Path of Truth. By the late Sarah M. Fry, author of "The Lost Key," "The Young Hop-pickers," &c., &c. 18mo. pp. 130. Price 25 and 30 cents.

This is the story of a young pious girl, who was tempted by a fellow-servant to assent to a falsehood, which brought upon her disgrace and much unhappiness. The lessons taught flow naturally from the story, which is told with much simplicity and beauty.

Kate Stanley; or, the Power of Perseverance. By Abby Eldredge, author of "Ella Graham." 18mo. pp. 200. Price 35 and 40 cents.

This little volume is full of exciting incidents, which will doubtless make it a favourite with youthful readers; but there is an out-cropping of juvenility in the construction of the work, which prevents us from giving it our entire approval.

Little Annie's First Bible Lessons. 18mo. pp. 175. Price 35 and 40 cents.

This is a series of instructive conversations between a mother and her daughter upon some of the narratives contained in the book of Genesis.

Rebella; or, the Shining Way. By Nellie Graham, author of "Little Annie's First Bible Lessons." 18mo. pp. 144. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The subjection of the rebellious heart to the Saviour, and the introduction into it of holy desires and affections are here depicted allegorically, as a journey in the Shining Way from the Carnal City to the City of Light. It shows no little temerity to follow in the wake of the Great Dreamer, but the author has probably succeeded in all that she purposed, and produced a book which will interest and instruct children. The allegory is constructed with good taste and judgment.

Nina Grey, a Christmas Story of 1861. 18mo. pp. 164. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The Christmas story of 1861 will find only a wider need of its circulation in 1864, among the bereaved families of our country.

Bessie Grey; or, the Value of Little Labours. 18mo. pp. 128. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The story of "Bessie Grey" illustrates some of the ways in which little children can do good. Few boys or girls will read it without being made better by it.

Blind Annie Lorimer. By the author of "George Miller and his Mother," &c. 18mo. pp. 200. Price 35 and 40 cents.

Annie Lorimer, a blind girl, in an institution for the instruction of the blind, receives the truth into her heart in love, and returns to her family near the Adirondack Mountains, where her humble labours are much blessed in her own family, and in that wild neighbourhood. There is a life-like vivacity in some of the sketches, which leaves little doubt that they are copied from nature. The book is evidently the production of a person of well-cultivated mind, and will delight and instruct its readers.

Alice Barlow; or, Principle is Everything. A country village history. 18mo. pp. 280. Price 40 and 45 cents.

Alice Barlow was the child of irreligious parents, who received into her mind the seeds of Christian principle in a Sabbath-school, and amid the many trials and temptations incident to a life of poverty and labour, continued steadfast in her principles, and in a remarkable degree unswayed by selfish considerations.

It contains many graphic pictures of English village life, and is, we believe, a re-publication from the London Tract Society's catalogue.

Lessons in Flying, for our Home Birds. By the Rev. William P. Breed, author of "The Book of Books." 18mo. pp. 164. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The author of this little book has a rare and most happy faculty of putting his thoughts into a graphic form attractive to children. We have no doubt that this book will deeply impress some truths upon the minds of those who read it.

Try; Better Do it, than Wish it Done. By the author of "Annandale," "Clouds and Sunshine," "Cares and Comforts," &c. 18mo. pp. 244. Price 40 and 45 cents.

The heroine of this book suffered from "a want of self-reliance, and a tendency to be easily discouraged," but as she "passed Mr. Locke's, he was leaning on the fence, talking with some strange gentleman in a gig, and just as I came up, the stranger said, 'Try; better do it, than wish it done;' and it seemed to answer my thoughts so exactly that I almost supposed for an instant that he was speaking to me." This sentence she adopted as her motto, and in the book we have her application of it in various exciting circumstances. The work is well written, and will interest and instruct its readers.

The Wonderful Scene: or, the Curse turned into Blessing. 18mo. pp. 284. Price 40 and 45 cents.

An excellent book for young readers, abounding in admirable lessons, true to nature, and deeply interesting. It is the narrative of a lad reduced from affluence to poverty, by adversity led to seek the Saviour, and by the application of Scriptural principles in his life and labours doing much good, and raising himself again to comparative affluence.

The Three Homes; or, Three Ways of Spending the Sabbath. By Nellie Graham, author of "Diamonds Reset," "Little Annie's First Thoughts," &c. 18mo. pp. 216. Price 35 and 40 cents.

The book is designed and well adapted to impress upon youthful minds the unspeakable importance of a proper observance of God's holy Sabbath, and to show that he will bless those who honour him by honouring his day.

Grace Abbott; or, The Sunday Tea-Party. 18mo. pp. 144. Price 25 and 30 cents.

This work is intended for a younger class of readers than the above, and, like it, inculcates the duty of keeping the Sabbath-

day holy, and in a very touching and pleasing way depicts the early life of a little girl who was led and enabled by God's Spirit to do so, in spite of great temptations and obstacles thrown across her path.

Walter and Alice; or, the Mother's Prayer Answered. By Abby Eldredge, author of "Kate Stanley." 18mo. pp. 179. Price 35 and 40 cents.

This little volume illustrates the power of prayer. The prayer of a mother, who died in early childhood, is blest to the conversion of her son, after he has run a long course of wilfulness and sin, and he is brought, by the grace of God, back to Christ and duty.

Poor Nicholas; or, The Man in the Blue Coat. By Mrs. Sarah A. Myers. 18mo. pp. 316. Price 45 and 50 cents.

This is the history of a little boy and his pious mother, residing at Munich, in Bavaria, who passed through severe trials and straits, and were ultimately befriended by the good king Maximilian Joseph. In the book there are many interesting pictures of German life, and the object of the whole is to inculcate reliance upon the promises of God, and the certainty that he will not disappoint the faith of those who put their trust in him.

The Railroad Boy. By the author of "Poor Nicholas," &c. 18mo. pp. 180. Price 35 and 40 cents.

The scene of this story is laid in Prussia. Like "Poor Nicholas," by the same author, its leading incidents have been actual occurrences there. It is the history of a poor boy who loved God and trusted in the Saviour, and was brought through many trials into the ministry of the gospel. It will well repay a perusal.

Mattie's Story; or, The Blessing of the Pure in Heart. 18mo. pp. 116. Price 25 and 30 cents.

This is the real life of a young disciple. Its aim is to depict her religious experience, tracing her first approach to the Saviour, and her growth in grace and usefulness, until transferred to glory.

We respectfully acknowledge the receipt of many Sermons and Addresses, of which our limits forbid a specific notice.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

Sifra, Commentary on Leviticus, belonging to the beginning of the third century, with the explanations of R. Abraham ben David and Maseret Ha-Talmud, by J. H. Weiss. (In Hebrew.) Folio, pp. 230.

C. F. Keil, Biblical Commentary on the Prophetico-historical Books of the Old Testament. Vol. I. Joshua, Judges and Ruth. 8vo. pp. 382. This is a part of the Commentary upon the Old Testament to be prepared in concert by Keil and Delitzsch. The former, who is well known as an able and judicious expositor and critic, has now published three volumes of the series, the first two embracing the Pentateuch. The first volume by Delitzsch will be on Isaiah.

P. F. Keerl, The Unity of the Primeval History of the Bible, (Gen. i.—iii.) and the agreement of the narrative of the Creation with the natural relations of the earth pointed out with reference to the views of Dr. Delitzsch, Dr. Hölemann, and Dr. Keil. 8vo. pp. 218.

A. Kamphausen, The Psalms translated and provided with explanatory remarks. 8vo. pp. 288. Reprinted from Bunsen's Bible-work.

F. Hitzig, The Psalms translated and explained. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 312. To be completed in two volumes. A third edition has also appeared of his Commentary on the Minor Prophets. 8vo. pp. 413.

P. de Lagarde, Remarks upon the Greek version of Proverbs. 8vo. pp. 96.

J. Diedrich, The prophets Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi, briefly explained for attentive Bible-readers. 8vo. pp. 188.

A. Köhler, The Post-Exilic Prophets. Part 3. The Prophecies of Zechariah, chap. ix—xiv. 8vo. pp. 312. The preceding chapters of Zechariah and Haggai are discussed in the first two parts.

G. K. Mayer, The Messianic Prophecies Explained. Vol. II. Part 1. The Messianic Prophecies of Jeremiah. 8vo. pp. 133. The first volume contains the Messianic Prophecies of Isaiah.

E. Gerlach, The Prophecies of the Old Testament in the

writings of Flavius Josephus, and his alleged Testimony respecting Christ. 8vo. pp. 120.

A second edition of Hävernick's Lectures on the Theology of the Old Testament has appeared, with remarks and additions by Dr. H. Schultz. 8vo. pp. 285.

A. Hilgenfeld, The Prophets Ezra and Daniel, and the latest Treatises respecting them. 8vo. pp. 102. A discussion of the apocryphal book of 2d (or 4th) Esdras, principally in opposition to the views expressed by Volkmar in his Introduction to the Apocrypha; and an attempt to invalidate the evidences of the genuineness of the canonical book of Daniel; especially as presented by Zündel in his Critical Investigations respecting the date of its composition.

H. Ewald, The Fourth Book of Ezra in respect to its Age, its Arabic Versions, and a recent Restoration. 4to. pp. 100.

E. Meier, The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament translated and explained. Part 2. The Prophetical Books. 8vo. pp. 376. One of the wildest and most destructive of critics.

G. A. Freytag, The Symphony of the Gospels. A putting together of the genuine portions of the four gospels in a new translation, with scientific explanations. An Appendix containing the second chapter of the Acts and the Revelation in their original form. 8vo. pp. 290. Belongs to the same category with the preceding.

C. Tischendorf, Synopsis Evangelica. Editio II. emendata. 8vo. pp. lx. and 184.

P. Schegg, (Rom. Cath.) The Gospel according to Luke. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 644. This is the fifth volume in a series by the same author, entitled, The Holy Gospels Translated and Explained.

Jos. Grimm, The Unity of the Gospel of Luke. 8vo. pp. 204.

L. Klofutar, Commentarius in Evangelium St. Joannis. 8vo. pp. 326.

W. Bäumlein, Commentary on the Gospel of John. 8vo. pp. 196.

G. Böttger, The Testimonies of Flavius Josephus respecting John the Baptist, Jesus Christ, and James the Brother of the Lord. 8vo. pp. 32.

A. Bisping, Exegetical Handbook to the Gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles. Vol. I. Matthew. 8vo. pp. 576. A second edition of his Handbook to the Epistles of Paul, is in course of publication.

K. Kluge, The Epistle to the Hebrews. 8vo. pp. 220.

A. Messmer, (Rom. Cath.) Explanation of the Epistle of James. 8vo. pp. 85.

F. Steinfass, The Second Epistle of St. Peter. 8vo. pp. 101.

K. H. Neizsäcker, Criticism of the Epistle of Barnabas, from the Codex Sinaiticus. 4to. pp. 50.

J. C. K. von Hofmann, The Holy Scriptures of the New Testament connectedly investigated. The first part contains an introductory discussion of Gal. i. 11—ii. 14, and a Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians. The first division of the second part (8vo. pp. 242,) is occupied with a Commentary upon the Epistle to the Galatians.

The Illustrations of the Biblia Pauperum in a MS. of the 14th Century, preserved in the Convent of St. Florian. Published by A. Comesina. Explained by G. Heider. With thirty-four lithographed plates. 4to. pp. 20.

G. J. B. Guntner, *Introductio in Sacros Novi Testamenti libros historico-critica et apologetica.* 2 vols. 8vo.

J. Schwetz, *Theologia Dogmatica Catholica.* Vol. I. Editio 4to, emendatior. 8vo. pp. 451.

J. Schwetz, *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae.* Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 272.

J. Amberger, *Pastoral Theology.* Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 1334.

M. Benger, *Pastoral Theology.* Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 1047.

F. A. Philippi, *The Doctrine of Election and of the Person and Work of Christ.* 2d half. 8vo. pp. 356.

J. Klein, *De Jansenismi Origine, Doctrina, Historia.* Pars I. 8vo. pp. 143.

J. Wyclif, *Tractatus de Officio Pastorali.* 8vo. pp. 48. Published for the first time from the manuscript recently found at Vienna.

P. Neumayr, (Rom. Cath.) *The Origin of the Human Soul, Transmission of Original Sin, and our Justification through Christ.* 8vo. pp. 58.

Corpus Reformatorum. Vols. XXIX. Series Altera. J. Calvini Opera, quæ supersunt omnia. Vol. I. 4to. pp. lix. and 1152. Cum Calvini effigie.

M. Schneckenburger, *Lectures upon the Doctrinal Systems of the Minor Protestant Sects.* 8vo. pp. 251. Published from the author's manuscripts after his death.

H. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium, Coptorum, Syrorum, et Armenorum in administrandis Sacramentis.* Collected from the Assemani, Renaudotius, Trombellius, and other authentic sources, with prolegomena and critical and exegetical notes, with the concurrence of several theologians and orientalists. To consist of two volumes. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 500.

A. Tholuck's Works. Vol. I. *The Doctrine of Sin and of a Mediator.* 8th edition. 8vo. pp. 176.

C. J. Hefele, *History of Councils.* Vol. V. 8vo. pp. 1071.

G. von Zezschwitz, *The Catechisms of the Waldenses and of the Bohemian Brethren, as evidences of their mutual doctrinal interchange. Critical edition of the text, with investigation in ecclesiastical and literary history.* 8vo. pp. 270.

F. Uhlemann, *Chronological Tables of Church History from the first Century of the Christian Era to the Religious Peace of Augsburg.* 8vo. pp. 42.

F. C. Baur, *History of the Christian Church.* Vol. IV. 8vo. pp. 707. From the Reformation to the close of the 18th Century. Published after the author's death. One more volume is yet to be issued.

A. Hug, *Antioch and the Insurrection,* A. D. 387. 4to. pp. 30.

H. Hübsch, *The Ancient Christian Churches, and the influence of the early Christian style of architecture on the church-building of all later periods.* Folio, with plates. Ten numbers have appeared.

A. Tappehorn, *Life of St. Ausgar, the Apostle of Denmark and Sweden, and the History of the Spread of Christianity in the Scandinavian North.* 8vo. pp. 290.

M. V. von Fereal, *Mysteries of the Inquisition and of other secret societies of Spain, with historical remarks and explanations,* by M. Cuendas. 8vo. pp. 584.

A. Geiger, *Sadducees and Pharisees.* 8vo. pp. 48. The learned Rabbi maintains that the Sadducees were the aristocratic party, consisting of the old and noble families, especially of the priestly order, who attached themselves to the ancient and famous family of the Sons of Zadok, and to whom, in the time of Christ, the party of the Herodians were added; while the Pharisees were the popular party. The Karaites were descended from the former, the Rabbinical Jews from the latter.

Baer's new edition of Buxtorf's Hebrew Concordance is now complete.

Zunz, *The Hebrew Manuscripts in Italy, an admonitory call of justice and of science.* 8vo. pp. 20.

A second edition has appeared of Fürst's Hebrew and Chaldee Dictionary. And of Winer's Chaldee Reading Book, edited by Fürst. Also, the third and last part of Fürst's *Bibliotheca Judaica, or Bibliographical Handbook of all publications by Jews, or relating to Jews and Judaism.* 8vo. pp. civ. and 664.

A. Dillmann, *Lexicon Linguae Aethiopicæ.* Pars II. 4to. pp. 689—1168.

Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon. Pars prior. 4to. pp. 1104. Edited by M. Schmidt.

P. J. Junker, Contributions to the Chronology and History of Antiquity, especially in the Israelitish and Egyptian relations. 8vo. pp. 94.

J. B. de Rossi, Christian Inscriptions of the City of Rome, older than the Seventh Century. Vol. I. Folio, pp. clxvi. and 619.

T. Mommsen, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. Vol. I. To the death of C. Cæsar. Folio, pp. 649.

H. Steinthal, History of the Science of Language among the Greeks and Romans, with special reference to Logic. 8vo. pp. 712.

P. Pervanoghi, The Gravestones of the Ancient Greeks, specially investigated from the remains of the same preserved in Athens. 8vo. pp. 93.

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De locis sanctis quæ perambulavit Antoninus Martyr circa A. D. 570, ed. T. Tobler. 8vo. pp. 129.

F. Windischmann, Zorastrian Studies, Treatises on the Mythology and Legendary History of ancient Iran. Published after the death of the author, by F. Spiegel. 8vo. pp. 324.

Avesta, the Sacred Writings of the Parsees, translated from the original, with constant reference to tradition, by F. Spiegel. Vol. III. Khorda-avesta. 8vo. pp. 275.

R. Lepsius, The Original Zend Alphabet. 4to. pp. 91.

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H. Brugsch, Journey of the Prussian Embassy to Persia in 1860 and 1861. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 418 and 516.

H. Brugsch, Collection of Egyptian Monuments, drawn upon the spot. 4to. pp. 120. With 107 lithograph plates. Intended to be an explanatory supplement to the author's History of Egypt.

H. Brugsch, Account of a Medical Treatise, dating from the fourteenth century before our era, and contained in a hieratic papyrus of the Royal Museum at Berlin. 4to. pp. 20.

The first number of the *Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprach und Alterthums-kunde*, edited by H. Brugsch, appeared on the first of July last, and is to be issued semi-annually.

S. Reinisch, The Grave-stole of the Priest Ptah-Emwa, with an interlinear version and commentary. 8vo. pp. 15.

E. Schlagintweit, Buddhism in Thibet, illustrated by literary documents and objects of religious worship. With an account of the Buddhist systems preceding it in India. 8vo. pp. 403, with a folio atlas of twenty plates, and twenty tables of native print. In English.

H., A., and R. Schlagintweit, Results of a Scientific Mission to India and High Asia, undertaken between the years 1854 and 1858, by order of the Court of Directors of the honourable East India Company. Vol. III. 4to. pp. 293. In English.

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Library of Anglo-Saxon Poetry, with critical texts and a complete glossary, by C. W. M. Grein. Vol. IV. Part I. 8vo. pp. 304.

A. F. Pott, Anti-Kaulen, a Mythical Representation of the origin of nations and languages. With reviews of two linguistic treatises, by H. Ewald. 8vo. pp. 298. This treatise is mainly in reply to Kaulen's discussion of the Confusion of Languages at Babel, Gen. xi. 1—9, published two years since.

R. Rolle de Hampole, The Prick of Conscience. A Northumbrian poem, copied and edited from manuscripts in the library of the British Museum, with an introduction, notes, and glossarial index of R. Morris.

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THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

APRIL, 1864.

No. II.

ART. I.—*Platonis, et quæ vel Platonis esse feruntur, vel Platonica solent comitari, Scripta Græce omnia, ad Codices Manuscriptos recensuit, variasque inde Lectiones diligenter enotavit IMMANUEL BEKKER.* Eleven volumes, 8vo. London, 1826.

The Works of Plato, viz., his fifty-five Dialogues and twelve Epistles, translated from the Greek, by FLOYER SYDENHAM, and THOMAS TAYLOR, with occasional Annotations and copious Notes. Five volumes, quarto. London, 1804.

The Works of Plato; a new and literal version, chiefly from the text of Stallbaum. By HENRY CARY, M. A., HENRY DAVIS, M. A., and GEORGE BURGESS, M. A. Five volumes, 12mo. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1848.

To most of the editions of the works of Plato are prefixed brief sketches of the philosopher's life. The edition of Bekker contains four of these biographies in Greek, viz., those by Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Hesychius the Milesian, and Olympiodorus. The edition of Taylor has the sketch by Olympiodorus, translated into English. The translators of Bohn's edition propose to give, in an additional volume, what they call, "the three existing lives of the philosopher, and the introduction of Alcinous, all for the first time translated into English." Some of these have certainly been translated into English; whether all, we are not able to say.

Plato, though by descent an Athenian, was not born at Athens, but on the island of Ægina; at that time subject to the Athenians. Fable has made him the son of Apollo, and represented his mother as a virgin; but his real father was Aristo, and his mother's name was Parectonia. Among his remote ancestors may be reckoned Codrus, the last king of Athens, and the celebrated Athenian lawgiver, Solon. He was born some four hundred and thirty years before Christ, being contemporary with Nehemiah, and the latest of the Hebrew prophets. The poets tell us that, when he was yet an infant, his parents left him asleep on Mount Hymettus, while they went to the sacrifice; and that when they returned, the bees had filled his mouth with honey; but this story was not intended to be believed. His original name was not Plato, but Aristocles. He was surnamed Plato from the Greek $\pi\lambda\alpha\tau\omega\zeta$, on account of the extreme breadth of his forehead, shoulders, and breast.

In early youth, he gave indications of an extensive and original genius. He was instructed, like the rest of the Athenians, in grammar, music, and gymnastic exercises. Owing to the respectability of his connections and ancestors, he had many inducements to engage in politics; but the revolutions of the times, and the dreadful injustice which he saw continually perpetrated, discouraged him. His attention was early directed to painting and poetry. Before the age of twenty, he had produced an epic poem, which, after reading Homer, he had the good sense to destroy. He also wrote tragedies and lyrics, and might have excelled in this species of composition; but happening to meet with Socrates, he was so captivated by his reasoning and eloquence, that he resolved to abandon all other pursuits, and apply himself wholly to the study of wisdom.

For eight years together, he was a constant hearer and follower of Socrates. He always claimed to be a disciple of Socrates—and held his master in the highest honour; yet he was not satisfied simply to adopt his conclusions, and walk in his steps. From his own invention, and the teaching of others, he introduced considerable additions, not to say corruptions, into the Socratic philosophy. When Socrates was brought to trial for his life, Plato expected to plead his cause, and actually

commenced an argument in his defence, but owing to the partiality and violence of the judges, he was obliged to desist. The speech of Socrates in his own defence Plato has recorded, and it is still extant among his works. When Socrates had been condemned, Plato and his other followers endeavoured to procure a commutation of his punishment; but his judges were inexorable. Nothing would satisfy them but the life of this prince of ancient philosophers—this truly great and venerable man.

During the imprisonment of Socrates, Plato attended him, but was prevented by sickness from being with him at his death, and listening to his argument on the immortality of the soul. The substance of the argument, however, Plato has preserved in his beautiful dialogue of the *Phædo*.

Upon the death of Socrates, his followers were dispersed. Several of them, among whom was Plato, went to Megara, and attended upon the discourses of the philosopher Euclid.* From this period, we may date the commencement of Plato's travels. On leaving Megara, he visited that part of Italy called Magna Grecia, or Ionia, where a celebrated school of philosophy had been established by Pythagoras, and was still continued by his followers. It was here that he met with Timæus and Archytas, by whom he was initiated into the mysteries of the Pythagorean system, the subtleties of which he afterwards too freely blended with the simple doctrines of Socrates.

He next visited Theodorus of Cyrene, and became his pupil in mathematical science. When he had been sufficiently instructed in this branch of learning, he determined to make himself acquainted with the wisdom of Egypt. That he might travel with the greater safety, he assumed the character of a merchant, and as a seller of oils, passed through the domains of the ancient Pharaohs. In Egypt, Plato may have studied astronomy, and increased his knowledge of mathematics; but it is hardly likely that he was allowed to penetrate the mysteries of the Egyptian priests. Averse to the communication of their secrets to any one, and more especially to strangers, it is not probable that a foreign merchant would succeed in attracting much of their attention.

* Not the Mathematician. He flourished in Egypt at a later period.

Some have supposed that Plato, during his sojourn in Egypt, became acquainted with the doctrines of the Hebrews, and enriched his system with spoils from their sacred books. But this again is quite improbable. The Jews, at this time, were not numerous in Egypt; their sacred books had not been translated; nor is there any such agreement between the teachings of Plato and the Old Testament, as to warrant the supposition that the former was much, if at all, indebted to the latter.

From Egypt, Plato returned to his Pythagorean friends in Italy, for whom he seems to have entertained a very strong predilection. How long he remained with them at this time, we are not informed. It is evidence of his attachment to the Pythagorean peculiarities, that he purchased, at an enormous price, some of the manuscripts in which these doctrines were inculcated.

Thus furnished, Plato at length returned to Athens, and set about the execution of a design which, doubtless, he had long contemplated, of establishing a new school in philosophy. The place which he selected for this purpose was a public grove, called *the Academy*, from Academus, a venerable Athenian, who had given it, that it might be used for gymnastic exercises. Within this enclosure Plato purchased, for three thousand drachms, a small garden, where he proposed to receive all those who felt inclined to listen to his instructions. It is evidence of the value which he put upon mathematical studies, that he caused to be inscribed over his garden gate, "No one not acquainted with geometry can enter here."

No sooner was Plato's Academy opened, than it became in the highest degree celebrated. His personal attractions, his eloquence, the celebrity of his family, his long and honourable connection with Socrates, (whose memory was now as much revered at Athens as his person formerly had been despised,) and more especially his foreign travel in pursuit of wisdom, all contributed to extend his fame, and draw around him disciples in great numbers, and of the highest respectability. To be sure, some of his old acquaintances of the Socratic school envied him, and others laughed at him; but nothing could stay the tide of his increasing popularity. In the number of his

pupils we find the names of Demosthenes, Isocrates, Dion the Syracusan prince, and above all, Aristotle. As the customs of society forbade the attendance of females upon his lectures, it was no uncommon thing for ladies to appear there attired as men. This furnished some ground for scandal against not only the scholars, but the teacher; nevertheless, the purity of Plato's character was never seriously impeached.

Plato was renowned at this period, not only as a moral and religious instructor, but for political wisdom. His assistance was required by sovereign states in new modelling their respective forms of government. Applications of this kind from the Arcadians and the Thebans he rejected, because they refused to adopt the plan of his Republic, which required an equal distribution of property. He gave his advice in the affairs of Elis, and furnished a code of laws for Syracuse, which, however, was not adopted.

His repeated visits to Syracuse constitute the principal incidents in the latter half of his life. The professed object of his first visit was, to take a survey of the island of Sicily, and more especially to observe the wonders of Mount $\text{\textit{A}}\text{\textit{etna}}$. It was here that he became acquainted with Dion, brother-in-law of Dionysius the elder, who now reigned in Syracuse. He found in Dion an intelligent pupil and a faithful friend. We find the following testimony in respect to Dion, in one of Plato's Epistles. "He so acutely apprehended and readily embraced my doctrines, that he surpassed all the young men with whom I was ever acquainted. He was likewise determined to pass the remainder of his life in a manner superior to most of the Sicilians, in pursuing virtue rather than pleasure and luxury." Epis. vii.

Through the favour of Dion, the philosopher obtained an introduction to the tyrant Dionysius, when the following conversation is reported to have ensued:

Dion. Whom among men, Plato, do you consider happy?

Plato. Socrates.

Dion. What do you hold to be the business of a politician?

Plato. To make the people better.

Dion. And do you think it a small matter to decide *rightly* in judicial affairs?

Plato. A very small matter; the least part of good conduct. He who only *judges rightly* is like those who labour to repair tattered and worn-out garments.

Dion. Must not he who is a tyrant be bold and brave?

Plato. He is the most fearful of all men. He even dreads his barber's razor, lest he should be destroyed by it.*

The tyrant, inferring from these and similar answers, that he had no flattery or favour to expect from Plato, ordered him directly out of his dominions, and even formed a design against his life. He put him on board a vessel sailing into Greece, with directions to the master either to sell him into slavery, or put him to death. The master accordingly sold him at Ægina—the same island on which the philosopher was born. His situation, however, was soon discovered, when he was redeemed by a brother philosopher, and sent home to Athens.

After a short interval, Dionysius repented of his ill-placed resentment, and wrote to Plato, earnestly entreating him to return to Syracuse. But Plato gave him the following spirited answer: “Philosophy does not allow me leisure to think of Dionysius.”

After the death of the tyrant, and the accession of his son, Dionysius the younger, who was but a mere child, Plato received the most pressing invitations from his friends in Sicily to come over and undertake the education of the young king. The opportunity of usefulness seemed so promising that he could not decline it. He indulged the hope, and had some prospect, of being able to reform the government, and to introduce, in place of tyranny, his own theory of a Republic. Accordingly, he set sail for Sicily, where he was received with the highest honour. The young king took him into his own chariot, and sacrifices were offered in consequence of his arrival. New regulations were immediately introduced; the licentiousness of the court was restrained; moderation reigned in all the public festivals; the king assumed an air of benignity; philosophy was studied by the courtiers; and every good citizen assured himself of a happy revolution in the state of public morals. But the reformation so auspiciously commenced was of short

* Life of Plato, by Olympiodorus.

duration. Debauched and unprincipled men, who hung about the court, soon found access to the monarch's ear. They persuaded him that Dion, his uncle, by the help of Plato, was meditating designs against the government, and that a speedy revolution might be anticipated. Inflamed by suspicions of this sort, the king immediately imprisoned Dion, and afterwards banished him. Plato had an apartment allotted him in the palace, but a secret guard was placed about him, that no one might visit him without the king's knowledge. At length, upon the breaking out of war, Dionysius sent Plato back into his own country; promising, at the same time, that he would recall both him and Dion on the return of peace.

The philosopher and his friend Dion now found themselves together at Athens; and they together entered on those pursuits which were most congenial to their hearts. Never was royal pupil blessed with a more able and faithful teacher, and never was a teacher favoured with a more obedient and hopeful pupil.

It was not long, however, ere their happiness was interrupted by another request from Dionysius to Plato, that he would return to Syracuse. With this invitation, the philosopher was not at all disposed to comply. He pleaded his advanced age, and reminded the tyrant of the violation of his promise that, on the return of peace, Dion should be restored. Still, Dionysius would take no denial. He pretended to be inflamed with a love of wisdom, and had an unconquerable desire again to place himself under the instruction of Plato. The Pythagorean philosophers at Syracuse testified the same things, and united in the request that Plato would return. Indeed, Dion and his family urged him to undertake the voyage, hoping that he might be able to accomplish something in their favour.

Overcome by these solicitations, the philosopher at length consented. He put himself on board the splendid galley which Dionysius had sent for his accommodation, and was speedily wafted to Syracuse. The king met him in a magnificent chariot, and conducted him to his palace. The citizens rejoiced at his return, hoping that his wisdom would at length triumph over the tyrannical spirit of the prince, and that better times might soon be realized. Dionysius seemed divested of his for-

mer suspicions and resentments; listened with apparent pleasure to the philosopher's doctrines; and, among other expressions of regard, presented him with eighty talents of gold.

Still, Plato was soon satisfied that the monarch's favour was the result rather of vanity than of any substantial desire for improvement. He wished to have the credit of surrounding himself with learned men, and of affording them a liberal patronage, but was not inclined to reform either his government or his life. He utterly refused to recall Dion, and neglected the fulfilment of many other promises. The consequence was, that mutual distrust soon arose between him and the philosopher, each suspecting the other of evil designs, and each endeavouring to conceal his suspicions under the semblance of respect and kindness. Dionysius attempted to impose upon Plato, by condescending attentions, and Plato to deceive Dionysius by an appearance of confidence.

From the nature of the case, such a state of things could not be lasting. Plato soon requested permission to return into Greece, and when this was refused, to silence his complaints and reproaches, the tyrant put him under a guard of soldiers. His Pythagorean friends, however, interposed, and procured not only his liberation, but the king's consent that he should return to Athens. And as some atonement for the indignities which had been offered him, Dionysius gave him a splendid entertainment, and sent him away loaded with rich presents.

On his return to Greece, it was convenient for Plato to stop at Elis, and attend the celebration of the Olympic games. In this great and general assembly of the Greeks, his presence attracted universal admiration. By common consent, he seemed to be regarded as the first man in Greece.

Restored to his own country, Plato devoted the last years of his life to instruction in his beloved Academy. Possessing naturally a firm constitution, and having lived regularly and temperately, he enjoyed the happiness of a green old age. He died about the year 350 before Christ, at the advanced age of eighty-one. He was never married, and had no direct heirs, but left his estate to his brother Adimantus. He was buried in the grove and garden which had been the scene of his philosophical labours, amid the tears and lamentations of the wise

and good; statues were erected to his memory, and the day of his birth was long celebrated as a festival by his followers.

Much has been said as to unpleasant relations existing between him and Aristotle, but without any just occasion. In the structure of their minds, their tastes, and habits, they were very different, and could not regard each other as congenial spirits; but that Aristotle was a sincere mourner for him there can be no doubt. He caused a monument to be erected to his memory, on which he inscribed an epitaph, of which the following is a version:

“To Plato’s sacred name this tomb is reared,
A name by Aristotle long revered;
Far hence ye vulgar herd, nor dare to stain,
With impious praise, this ever-hallowed fane.”

The personal character of Plato has been very differently represented by his friends and his enemies; the former ascribing to it a more than human excellence, and the latter loading it with reproach and obloquy. The truth, undoubtedly, lies between them. His private character was not formed on Christian principles, nor will it bear comparison with those of Christian teachers generally. It was less pure and elevated than that of Socrates; and yet, compared with that of the eminent men by whom he was surrounded, there can be no doubt that it was a superior character. He sustained, and well sustained, both in principles and life, the character of a *Reformer*; one who sought to diffuse the light of truth, and recall his depraved contemporaries to the practice of virtue.

Several anecdotes of Plato are preserved, which reflect honour on his moral principles and character. Having raised his hand to correct a servant when in anger, he kept his arm fixed in that posture for a considerable time, and when inquired of as to the reason of his singular conduct, he replied: “I am punishing a passionate man.” At another time, he said to one of his slaves, “I would chastise you, if I were not angry.”

When told, at a certain time, that his enemies were slandering him, he remarked: “I will so live that no one will believe them.” A friend observing his studious habits, even in old

age, inquired how long he intended to be a scholar. "As long," said he, "as I have need to grow wiser and better."

The works of Plato consist of his Dialogues and Epistles. Of the former, there are commonly reckoned thirty-five; of the latter, twelve or thirteen. If, however, instead of regarding the Republic and the Laws as constituting but two Dialogues, we reckon them as twenty-two, (which is the number of books which they contain,) the whole number of Dialogues will be fifty-five; the same as given by Mr. Taylor.

Different opinions have prevailed among critics and commentators as to the *genuineness* of certain portions of Plato's works, some ascribing more to him, and some less. Into questions of this sort we shall have no occasion now to enter.

In reviewing his works, we shall not follow the great body of his admirers, in tracing out mystical and allegorical senses, and searching for a hidden wisdom. He is in general a plain and beautiful writer, and we shall suppose him to speak out plainly just what he means. Those passages (and there are a few such) in which he speaks *occultly* with design, we shall not attempt to decipher, choosing rather to leave them to those who have taste and leisure for such undertakings.

In his Dialogues, Plato rarely, if ever, speaks in his own name, but generally under the assumed name of Socrates. It is Socrates that we hear defining, questioning, reasoning, disputing, and sometimes narrating what he had heard from others. In a few cases, a third person narrates what he professes to have heard from Socrates, or from some other distinguished individual.

From the free use made of the name of Socrates in these dialogues, the casual reader might be led to suppose that the opinions inculcated were those of Socrates, and not of Plato. But such a supposition would be unjust to both the philosophers. The basis of the Platonic philosophy, more especially of the moral and ethical part of it, was undoubtedly derived from Socrates; but Plato treats of many things—he gives utterance to a variety of opinions—of which Socrates, in all probability, had nothing to say. Indeed, it was a complaint of Socrates himself, and of some of his followers, while he lived, that Plato put words into his mouth which he never used.

Thus, when Socrates heard Plato recite his *Lysis*, he is reported to have said, "How much this young man here imputes to me, which I never uttered!" Xenophon denies that Socrates ever taught natural philosophy, or any mathematical science, and charges with misrepresentation those who ascribed to him discussions of this nature; referring undoubtedly to Plato, in whose dialogues Socrates is repeatedly introduced as discoursing upon these subjects.

In reviewing the dialogues of Plato, we shall not have occasion to notice each and all of them particularly. We have not time for such a labour; nor is at all necessary. The "Introductions," in Bohn's edition, furnish sufficient preliminary information to enable the reader to pursue the discussions with advantage. Our endeavour will be to classify the dialogues, so far as practicable, and speak of such only, and make such extracts as will be of interest to the general reader.

We will first call attention to those which, in point of subject, are *political*. These are the *Laws*, the *Republic*, the *Polticus*, the *Theages*, the *Minos*, and the *Menexenus*.

The longest of Plato's dialogues, though supposed by some to have been written among the last, is *the Laws*. It consists of twelve books, and occupies, in Bohn's edition, 548 closely printed pages. The *dramatis personæ* are an Athenian guest, supposed to be Plato; Clinias, a Cretan; and Megillus, a Lacedemonian. The last two have it in charge to frame laws for a new city or colony in Crete, and the Athenian guest is called upon to advise with them in so important a matter. He becomes the chief speaker throughout the whole of the twelve books, in the course of which he treats of law in general—its foundation, reason, and object. He proves the existence of the gods, in opposition to Democritus, and other atheists, and lays down rules respecting their worship. He treats of marriage, and the education of children, commencing with the first moment of their existence in this world, and tracing them up to their maturity. He prescribes regulations for domestic affairs, even the most minute, and gives laws for the citizens, in youth and age, peace and war, and in all the various circumstances and relations of life. Many of the laws here recommended are judicious and excellent, particularly those which

enjoin respect for the aged, and for parents. Others are minute and frivolous, descending to concerns which should never be made the subject of law, but ought rather to be left to the discretion of families and individuals.

Some of Plato's enactments are of so peculiar a character, that it may be proper to notice them. He requires all the inhabitants of the proposed city to *marry*; and if any male inhabitant shall continue "unmarried for five-and-thirty years, such an one shall be fined every year. If he possesses a large estate, he shall be fined one hundred drachms," and less in proportion, according to his means.

Plato allows the existence of slavery in his community, and proposes a variety of laws for the regulation of it. Take the following as an example. "If a person shall kill a slave belonging to another, he shall indemnify the master of the dead slave, or be fined twice the worth of it; the value to be estimated by the judges. If any one shall kill his own slave, he shall be purified according to law, but shall not be treated as a murderer."

Our lawgiver prohibits the use of wine to slaves, to young persons, and to all classes while engaged in the more important concerns of life. It may be drunk moderately by persons of middle age; more freely by those advanced in years; but never to intoxication, *except at the Bacchanalian feasts*. "To drink to intoxication is at no time becoming or safe, except in the festivals of that god by whom wine is given us."

Plato was a believer in witchcraft, and declared the acknowledged witch to be worthy of death. "If any one, by allurements, or incantations, or such like enchantments, is found endeavouring to injure another; if he is a diviner or interpreter of prodigies, let him be put to death. But if any one is accused of witchcraft, without being a diviner, let his punishment be determined by the judges."

Plato had an abhorrence of beggars, and proposed a law that all such should be banished. "Let there be no beggars in the city; and if any one attempts to procure a living in this way, let the præfects expel him from the market-place, and the mayor drive him from the city, and the governor banish him

from every other part of the region, that the whole country may be free from such a pest."

The *Republic* is a dialogue, or rather a narrative of a dialogue, in ten books, and is supposed to have been written at an earlier period than the *Laws*. It is a description, not of any community that ever existed, but of Plato's *beau ideal* of a community. The narrator throughout takes the name of Socrates. He commences with a discussion respecting *justice*; holding that it can in no case be expedient to be unjust; and that justice and right in the individual and in a civil polity, are the same. He passes to a consideration of the poets, whom (without excepting even Homer) he pronounces unsafe and improper to be studied by the young. The fables of Homer, respecting the gods—their amours, their jealousies, their deceptions, and contentions—will lead, he thinks, to unworthy conceptions of the gods, and result in impiety, perhaps in atheism.

The prescriptions in the *Republic* on the subject of education, and in regard to internal domestic affairs generally, are very similar to those in the *Laws*. On some points, however, they are essentially dissimilar, and even opposite. The *Laws* enjoin marriage, and contemplate the possession of private property; but in the *Republic*, all things are made common, *not excepting wives and children*. The community is to constitute one great family. Men and women are to engage in the same amusements and employments, distributed to each according to his or her particular capacity and strength. Children, when born, become the property of the state; are to be educated for the state; and fathers, not knowing their own children, are to love all alike, and feel a parental regard for all.

In the latter part of the *Republic*, Plato speaks of the different forms of government, and points out the respective advantages and dangers of each. He shows how free governments, unless peculiarly guarded, are liable to become, first anarchical, and then tyrannical. In conclusion, he sets forth the rewards of justice, and the miseries of injustice, not only in this life, but in that which is to come. And in the absence of revelation to instruct him as to the future world, he tells a story of one Erus, a Pamphylian, who was slain in battle, and

returned to life, after twelve days, and of the account which he gave both of the happiness of the righteous, and the miseries of the wicked, beyond the grave.

Plato evidently set a high value upon that theory of a community which is detailed in the Republic. He repeats the substance of it more than once. He recommended it to the adoption of several of the surrounding states. The hope of seeing it tested by experiment in Sicily, perhaps more than any other consideration, induced him to make his repeated visits to the court of Dionysius.

In the *Theages*, one of the dialogues which we have ranked under the head of *Political*, Demodocus, a father, brings Theages, his son, to Socrates, seeking advice as to an instructor for him in political wisdom. Socrates dissuades the father from having recourse to the Sophists, and consents to associate the youth with himself, *i. e.*, if his dæmon do not oppose. Having thus incidentally spoken of his dæmon, Socrates explains to Theages what he means by it. "There is," says he, "a certain dæmoniacal power which has followed me, by a divine allotment, from childhood. This is a voice which, when it is given forth, always signifies to me that *I should abandon what I am about to do*; but it never, at any time, incites me. Hence, if one of my friends communicates any design to me, and I hear the voice, it signifies that the design is to be abandoned." Socrates goes on to speak of several instances in which his friends had consulted him respecting their plans, and he had heard the voice, and had warned them to desist; but they refused to listen, and had perished in their undertakings.

Much has been said and written respecting the dæmon of Socrates. The above is a plain account of it, as he understood it. In the phraseology of those times, the word dæmon did not signify exclusively a bad spirit, but more frequently, perhaps, a good one; and whatever explanation we may give of the matter, there can be no doubt that Socrates believed that he was attended by some such guardian angel, whose province it was, not to direct him, but to *warn him off*, whenever he was about to engage in any unpropitious or improper undertaking.

The next class of Plato's dialogues to which we call atten-

tion are the *ethical*, the *moral*, the *reformatory*. They are the eight following, viz., the first Alcibiades, the Philebus, the Meno, the Protagoras, the Clitopho, the Laches, the Charmides, and the Hipparchus. Of Plato's theory of morals, the following is the sum: That virtue is to be pursued as the true good of the soul, insuring to the individual practising it that tranquillity and internal harmony which constitute the mind's proper happiness; whereas vice is a disease of the soul, arising from delusion, or imperfect knowledge, or the corrupting influence of the body, resulting in a thorough derangement of all the faculties, and in the misery of its unhappy victim. He inculcates with much earnestness the practice of virtue, and would have the ordinary pleasures of life subordinated to this "chief end of man." These principles will not be found, indeed, on any one page of Plato, or in any one separate dialogue, but may be gathered from his moral teachings generally.

In the dialogues which are here grouped together, much is said respecting the excellence of virtue, and the manner in which this good is to be attained; and yet the questions most nearly connected with the subject are not, in any case, directly answered. Error is refuted, improper views and notions are corrected, the inquirer is cornered, and there, not unfrequently, he is left. It is no part of the teacher's object to decide questions for his pupil, but to stir him up to thought and inquiry, and thus prepare him to decide them for himself. In the Clitopho, for example, while the pupil praises his teacher for many things, he complains that he has not directly told him what virtue is, nor how it may be attained; and on this account he proposes to leave him and seek some other guide.

The class of dialogues here noticed were called by the ancients *tentative*, and *peirastic*. The principal object of them seems to have been, not so much to give instruction, as to try the pupil's strength, correct his errors, make him acquainted with unforeseen difficulties and objections, and thus check his confidence in his own, perhaps too hastily formed, conclusions.

The subjects of several of Plato's more important dialogues—as the Parmenides, the Timæus, the second Alcibiades, and the Euthyphro—are *metaphysical* and *theological*.

Parmenides was a venerable Pythagorean philosopher, who, with Zeno, came to Athens, when Socrates was a young man. They held a conversation, or more properly a discussion, which was listened to by Pythodorus, and by him related to Antiphon, who repeats it, as here recorded, to a circle of friends. The Parmenides is then a narrative, at second hand, of a dialogue between Parmenides, Socrates, and Zeno, at least such is the dramatic apparatus which the writer has chosen to employ. The dialogue properly consists of two parts; the first *metaphysical*, treating of ideas; and the second *theological*, referring to the gods. Plato's theory of ideas is here pretty fully unfolded. Ideas, with him, are certain *species* or *forms*, having a real subsistence, and existing primarily in the great First Cause. They are the *patterns*, the *exemplars*, according to which every thing in nature is made.

Like most of the ancient Theists, Plato believed in a *First Cause of all things*, whom he denominates the *One*, and the *Good*, who is super-essential, ineffable, inconceivable, whom no thought can reach, or words can adequately describe. The inferior gods are *progressions*, *emanations*, directly or indirectly, from the One; and they, not he, are immediately concerned in the formation and government of the world. Indeed, the world itself, according to Plato, is a god, being animated with a divine, indwelling soul.

Though the name of Socrates is perpetually recurring in the Parmenides, the philosophy of the dialogue is Pythagorean, and not Socratic. Both the phraseology and the reasoning are metaphysical, transcendental, and in some places occult, to the last degree. In other parts, the argument is clear, and constitutes a fine specimen of the dialectic of the ancient philosophers.

The subject of the Timæus is partly *theological*, and partly *physiological*. It treats of nature and of nature's gods. The principal speakers are Socrates, Critias, and Timæus; the last of whom is a Pythagorean, recently from Italy, who is now on a visit to the philosophers of Athens. Socrates commences by recapitulating the leading parts of the dialogue of the Republic. Critias next tells the story of the Atlantic island, of which Solon had been informed by the Egyptian priests.

Timæus follows, and unfolds, at great length, the Pythagorean cosmogony, or system of nature. He teaches that the visible universe had a cause; that its artificer was not the Supreme God, but one who had indirectly emanated from him, and is here called Jupiter; that he formed it, not out of nothing, but from a confused chaotic mass, and after a perfect *pattern* or *idea*, both of which had existed from eternity; that a divine soul at once entered into it, and animated it, and so the world itself became a god. Jupiter also generated time, and the heavenly bodies for the measurement of time, placing the moon nearest us, the sun next, the planet Venus next, &c. Timæus further speaks of the origin of human souls; of their happy state before coming into this world; of their descent into bodies; of their probation here; and of their destiny in a future life. He speaks of the different parts of the body, and of the elements of which they are severally composed. The eyes, he thinks, consist chiefly of fire; and he thus explains the fact of our seeing the images of things in a mirror: "From the communication of the external and internal fire with each other, such appearances are necessarily produced; the fire of the eye mingling itself with the fire diffused about the smooth and splendid surface of the mirror." Timæus here speaks expressly of the *circulation of the blood*, the discovery of which has been (it seems improperly) ascribed to Harvey. "The heart," he says, "is the fountain both of the veins and the blood, which is vehemently impelled through all the members of the body, in a circular progression."

In short, we have here a full system of *physiology* and *psychology*, as understood by the Pythagoreans, and as received by Plato. We have a description of every part of the body, and of the manner of its formation; also of the several diseases of the body, and of the causes that produce them. The different faculties, emotions, and affections of the soul are also considered, and directions are given, and motives urged, for the purification of the soul, and its due preparation for another life.

Before dismissing the Timæus, it will be necessary to consider more fully the story of the Atlantic Island. As remarked above, the tradition respecting it was received by Solon from the Egyptian priests. It is as follows: At a very remote

period, “the Atlantic sea had an island before that mouth of it which is now called the Pillars of Hercules, [the straits of Gibraltar] and this island was greater than both Lybia and Asia Minor put together, and afforded an easy passage to other neighbouring islands. It was also easy to pass from those islands to all the continent which borders on the Atlantic sea. In this great island a combination of kings was formed, who with mighty power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent. And besides this, they subjected to their dominion all Lybia as far as Egypt, and Europe as far as the Tuscan sea.” Against this confederated host, the Athenians and other Greeks went forth to battle. They repelled their incursions, chastised their insolence, and drove them back to their own land. “In after times, prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking place, and bringing with them desolation, all that warlike race, and the Atlantic Island itself, was swallowed up in the sea, and in the space of one day and night entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present unnavigable, owing to the impeding mud which the subsiding island produced.”

Such, for substance, is the tradition which Solon received from the Egyptian priests. There can be no doubt that Plato believed it; for he commenced a separate dialogue, which he did not live to finish, called *the Atlanticus*, in which he describes more fully the sunken island, its inhabitants, and laws, and speaks of the war, in which the Atlantics were vanquished by the Greeks.*

This story was also believed by the oldest interpreters of Plato. Crantor affirms that in his time, “it was preserved in Egypt, being inscribed on pillars.” Proclus quotes the following passage from Marcellus, the author of an ancient history of Ethiopia: “That so great an island once existed is proved by those who have written histories concerning the external sea. For they relate that, in their times, there were seven islands in the Atlantic sea sacred to Proserpine; and three others of great magnitude, one of which was sacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and the third to Neptune. The inhabitants of this

* See Plutarch’s Life of Solon.

last island preserved the memory of the great Atlantic island, and of its governing for a long period all the islands in the Atlantic sea."

Plato has three dialogues—the Phædrus, the Lysis, and the Banquet—on the universally interesting subject of *love*. Of these, the most amusing is the latter, which is called *the Banquet*, because it was delivered at a banquet, provided by a noble Athenian, whose name was Agatho. The speakers were six, viz., Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes the celebrated comic poet, Agatho their host, and Socrates. It would be too great a labour to go into an examination, or to present an analysis, of the several speeches on this joyous occasion. The following amusing theory of love was introduced by Aristophanes. The human race, he thinks, were originally formed double, the two sexes being united in a single person. Each one of them had four hands, four feet, two faces, and all the other members double. Thus constituted, their strength was prodigious, their minds haughty, and they undertook to invade the very heavens. They set about raising an ascent to the skies, with intention to attack the gods. Upon this, Jupiter and the other deities held a consultation as to what should be done to the rebels, but could decide upon no punishment proper to be inflicted. They could not resolve upon destroying them, as they did the giants, for thus the whole human race would be extinct; nor yet could they suffer them to persist in their designs. At length, after much consideration, Jupiter said: "I have a plan by which the race may be preserved, and yet an end be put to their mischief. I will divide every one of them into two, by which means their strength will be diminished, although their number will be increased. I will so divide them, that each one shall walk upon two feet; and if, after that, they are not quiet, I will divide them again, and they shall go hopping each upon one foot. And as he said, so he did. He cut the whole of the human race in twain, as people cut eggs to keep them in salt." The wounds thus inflicted he directed Apollo to heal, and mankind were placed at once upon a *footing* entirely new.

"When all the human race had been thus bisected, each section began to long for its fellow-half; and when these

chanced to meet together, they mutually embraced, and wished that they could grow together and be united. Thus deeply is mutual love implanted by nature in all the race; coupling individuals together; endeavouring out of two to make one; thus bringing them again to their pristine form."

"Every one of us is at present but the tally of a human creature, bisected like a polypus, and out of one made two. And hence it is that we are all in continual search after our several counterparts to tally with us; and whenever it happens that a man meets with his other half, the very counterpart of himself, they are both smitten with strong love; they recognise their former union; they are powerfully attracted by the consciousness that they belong to each other; and are unwilling to be again parted, though for a short time. And if Vulcan were to stand over them with his fire and forge, and offer to melt them down, and run them together, and of two to make them one again, they would both say that this was just what they desired."

Such was the theory of love propounded by Aristophanes, the old comic poet, at a banquet in Athens, more than two thousand years ago; and who will say that it is not ingenious and captivating? It beats even "the Indian philosopher," who held that souls were wedded in heaven, and that in their descent to earth, some "lost their fellows on the road."

In the time of Socrates, there was a class of men travelling over Greece, calling themselves *rhetoricians* and *sophists*. They were proud, boastful, and disputatious, professing to know almost every thing, and to be able to prove or disprove any proposition that might be announced. They trumpeted their own praises, drew disciples after them, and received large sums of money as the price of their instructions. Still, they were, in most instances, but mere punsters, playing on the meaning of words, and astonishing the common people with a show of wisdom which they did not possess. As might be expected, the sophists hated Socrates, and Socrates despised them. Some of the most amusing of the dialogues before us—as the greater and lesser Hippias, the Georgias, the Euthydemus, and the Sophista—are but reports of his contests and conversations with the sophists.

At a certain time Hippias, a versatile and flippant sophist, made his appearance in the Lyceum. He was vain of his person, his talents, his dress, and his ornaments, being tricked out in all the finery of the age. Presently Socrates meets him, and thus accosts him. “O Hippias, the fine and the wise! What a long time it is since you last touched at Athens!” To which Hippias replies, “It is because I have not had leisure, Socrates. For the Eleans, you know, whenever they have any public affairs to negotiate, always apply to me; for they consider me as the ablest person among them to form a right judgment of what is argued, and to make a proper report to them.”

After such an introduction, Socrates persists in plying Hippias with affected praises, just to draw out and expose the coxcomb's vanity, till at length they hit upon the principal topic of discussion, viz., *the beautiful*. “Can you tell me now,” says Socrates, “what is the beautiful?” “No difficulty,” replies Hippias; “the easiest thing in the world.” And so he undertakes, time after time, to make out a definition of the beautiful. These definitions the old philosopher sifts and refutes, till he makes them appear perfectly ridiculous. Once and again, he drives the little sophist to the wall, pins him there for a while, and then lets him loose, just to see how he will flounce and flutter. This game is continued, until Hippias, at length, loses all patience. He complains that his argument has been “cut and torn into a thousand pieces;” and concludes with gravely advising Socrates to have done with such “petty, paltry disputes,” and no longer continue “playing with straws and quibbles.” This must suffice as a specimen of Socrates' manner of dealing with the sophists.

We pass over quite a number of Plato's dialogues,* and hasten to those which relate to the trial and death of Socrates.

By his manner of teaching and his course of life, Socrates had incurred the bitter hatred of the sophists and sensualists at Athens, and of the multitude who acted under their influence.

* The dialogues passed over are the *Epinomis*, the *Theætetus*, and the *Rivals*, on the subject of philosophy or science; the *Io*, on poetry; and the *Cratylus*, on words or names. The authenticity of the *Epinomis* has been denied.

These men commenced their attack upon him by inducing Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Clouds, to bring the venerable philosopher into ridicule upon the stage. This having succeeded, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon—whose names of infamy should never be forgotten—stood forth formally and publicly to accuse him. He was charged with making innovations upon the religion of his country, and with corrupting the minds of youth; and was summoned to take his trial before the tribunal of Five Hundred. Plato expected and attempted to plead his cause, but the judges would not allow him to proceed. Socrates appeared, therefore, in his own defence; and his speech was recorded, at the time, by Plato, under the title of *The Apology of Socrates*.

The speech of such a man as Socrates when on trial for his life, reported, too, by such a man as Plato, should have great interest on the ground of mere curiosity. It is also a deeply interesting performance on account both of its matter and manner. We find here no splendor of diction, no fervid appeals to the passions, none of the tricks and artifices of oratory; but all is grave, simple, direct, dignified. Socrates addresses his judges much as he was wont to do in common discourse, proposing questions, stating facts, and pressing home upon them his conclusions. He begins by refuting the accusations of his enemies, such as that he was a mere sophist, whose object it was to pervert the truth, and make the worse appear the better reason; that he was a corrupter of youth, and an innovator upon the religion of his country. He affirms his belief in the Athenian gods, declaring that he not only worships them himself, but endeavours to persuade others, young and old, to do the same.* He assures his judges that he is above the fear of death; that he has pursued his particular course of life not with any view to personal emolument, but because he thought it right and just; and that he shall be deterred from it by no punishment which they have it in their power to inflict.

After the vote had been taken, and he had been condemned by a majority of three voices, he again addressed his judges

* A complete refutation of the pretence, that Socrates was not a worshipper of the heathen gods.

with the same calmness and dignity as before; assuring them that his death would soon be as much regretted as it was now desired, and warning his accusers that a terrible retribution awaited them—that they should come to a speedy and untimely end; which was actually the case.

In the closing part of his address, Socrates speaks of his death as a departure to the society of the good in another world, and then asks, “If this be true, O my judges, what greater good can there be than this? At what rate would not either of you purchase a conference with Orpheus and Musæus, with Hesiod and Homer? What would not any one give for an interview with him who led that mighty army against Troy; or with Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten thousand others, both male and female, that might be mentioned? For to associate and converse with them would be an inestimable felicity. Truly, I should be willing to die often, if these things are true.”

After the condemnation of Socrates, circumstances occurred which delayed the execution of his sentence some thirty days. During this period he was in prison, where he was often visited by his followers. Among those who came was Crito, his early patron, his oldest and best friend, and this introduces the dialogue of the *Crito*.

Crito came to urge Socrates to make his escape; assuring him that it could easily be done, using many arguments, and promising him all needed pecuniary assistance. Socrates thanks him for his kindness, but utterly refuses to accede to his wishes. He insists that we ought to despise the opinions of the vulgar, endure calamities patiently, and submit to the laws. As we enjoy the benefit of the laws, we ought to consent to bear the burthens, and meet the destiny which they impose. Such is the subject and substance of this dialogue. It is full of noble sentiments, altogether worthy of the venerable philosopher, and suited to the trying circumstances in which he was placed. “It is never right,” says he, “either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when suffering evil, to revenge it, by doing evil in return.”

At length, Socrates’ last day arrived. At the going down of the sun he was to drink the fatal hemlock, and pass away to that other life of which he had so clear and joyful an anticipa-

tion. In the morning of that day he was visited by his wife and children, whose lamentations distressed him, and he directed them to be removed. His philosophic friends then clustered around him, and the day was spent in discussing the most appropriate and interesting topics. These conversations were subsequently narrated by Phædo to Echarates, and the report of them constitutes the dialogue called the *Phædo*.

The great subject of this dialogue, or of the conversation between Socrates and his friends on the occasion referred to, is *the immortality of the soul*. Socrates had often adverted to this subject before, and had expressed his belief of it; but now he enters into a demonstration of its truth, and undertakes to free it from objections. As he had not the light of inspiration to guide him, or its voice to instruct him in any way, it may be interesting to know what kind of arguments he would employ, in proving the great doctrine of a future life.

1. The first argument which he urges is, that every thing in nature is produced or generated from *its opposite*. Thus, the worse proceeds from the better, and the better from the worse. From the state of wakefulness we pass to sleep, and from sleep to wakefulness. And as from being alive we go to the dead, so from being dead we enter into another life.

2. The soul must subsist after death, because it existed *prior to the present life*. Socrates here assumes the soul's pre-existence, and infers its continued existence when the body is dead.

3. The soul will exist for ever, because it is a *simple, unchanging substance*. If it were a compound, like the body, it must, like the body, be dissolved. But as it is one simple substance, and not subject to mutations like the body, the conclusion is that it will never be dissolved.

4. It belongs to the soul to govern the body, and not the body the soul; which proves that the soul is allied to divinity, and like that is immortal.

5. Into whatever the soul enters, it introduces *life*; which shows that life is essential to it, and that it can never be subject to the opposite of life, which is death.

These are all the arguments for the soul's immortality which occur in the *Phædo*. In different parts of Plato's writings we find other arguments. Take the following from

the Phædrus: "The soul is *self-motive*. That which is self-motive inherently and perpetually moves. But that which always moves with an inward motion, always lives. Hence the soul is immortal." Again: "If the soul is self-motive, it is itself the *principle of motion*. But the principle of motion must be unbegotten, and of course immortal." In the tenth book of the Republic, Plato argues the immortality of the soul from its *indestructible nature*. Nothing *foreign* to itself can ever destroy it; and its own evils, such as injustice and wickedness, cannot destroy it, since they render it, if possible, more alive and sensitive to suffering than before.

Socrates not only urges these arguments at length, and with a great variety of illustration, but he listens patiently to the objections of his friends, and obviates them to their satisfaction; thus preparing himself and them, in the best manner, for the solemn event which was so soon to separate him from them.

A little before sunset he went into the bath, saying that he preferred to wash himself before drinking the poison, rather than trouble the women to wash his dead body. His friend Crito inquired of him how he would be buried. "Just as you please," said he; "that is, if you can catch me," at the same time, smiling and saying, "Crito thinks that *I* am he whom he will shortly see dead; whereas *I*, *Socrates*, shall then have departed to the joys of the blessed."

He now took his final leave of his wife and children; for he had three sons. When the executioner came to administer the poison, he was so overcome with the calmness and fortitude of his victim, that he could not restrain his tears. And when his friends, the philosophers, saw him actually drinking it, they too were quite overwhelmed. They covered their faces with their mantles, and some of them wept aloud. But Socrates checked them, saying, "What are you doing, excellent men! I sent away the women, lest they should produce a disturbance of this nature. Is it not proper to die joyfully, and with propitious omens? Be quiet, therefore, and restrain your tears."

When the poison began to take effect, he laid himself down upon his couch, and closed his eyes. At length, opening them, he said: "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius. Discharge

this debt for me, and do not neglect it." These were his last words. The soul of great Socrates was soon released, and nought remained but his lifeless and (as he deemed it) his comparatively worthless body.

The grand source of that consolation which he felt in the dying hour, Socrates repeatedly explained. "Unless I thought," said he, "that I should depart to other gods who are wise and good, and to the society of men who have gone from this life, and are better now than when among us, I might well be troubled at death. But now I believe assuredly that I shall go to the gods, who are perfectly good; and I hope also to dwell with wise and good men; so that I cannot be afflicted at the thought of dying; believing that death is not the end of us, and that it will be much better hereafter for the good than the evil."

The Letters of Plato relate chiefly to the affairs of Dion and Dionysius, and are addressed, for the most part, to friends in Sicily. They are of little importance compared with the dialogues, and may be passed over in this brief review of his works.

The style of Plato's writings, except where it is rendered obscure by design, or by the nature of the subject, is remarkably clear. It is too diffuse to be nervous; but it is easy and natural in its structure; the words are well chosen and arranged; and the whole moves on, in a pure and lively current, bearing the reader forward to the object in view. In regard to it Cicero is reported to have said: "If Jupiter were to come down and speak to us in Greek, he would, doubtless, borrow the style of Plato."

In early life Plato wrote poetry; and through life he seems to have been as much a poet as a philosopher. Aristotle describes his dialogues as occupying "a middle region between verse and prose." His philosophical speculations, so far as they are his own, are in general *mere theories*, the creations of fancy, and not stable, logical *deductions*, based on the foundation of experiment and fact. And the reasonings on which he relied to support his theories are chiefly of an imaginative character. Comparisons are introduced; analogies are traced; sometimes fable or tradition is resorted to. There is in Plato very little of close, compact logic, of consecutive, syllogistic

reasoning and argument. In this respect he differs widely from Aristotle.

The mode of discussion more commonly pursued in Plato's dialogues is that which is still denominated the Socratic. Without doubt it originated with Socrates. After a brief introduction, the chief speaker or teacher usually commences with asking some simple question. The answer seems easy, and is promptly given. This prepares the way for another question, to which an answer is also given. And thus the questioning and answering go on, running backward or forward, as the case may be, proceeding from the simple to the complex, and from the plain to the more abstruse, till at length the respondent finds himself in deep water; entangled, it may be, in a net from which he cannot easily escape. And here, not unfrequently, the catechist leaves him, to meditate upon his situation, and extricate himself the best way he can.

Though generally clear in his style of teaching, we have said that Plato is sometimes obscure. After the manner of the Pythagoreans and Egyptians, he wraps himself up in a veil of intentional mysticism and darkness. Take the following passage from the Republic as an example: "The period to that which is divinely generated is that which the perfect number comprehends; and to that which is generated by man, that in which the augmentations, surpassing and surpassed, when they shall have received three restitutions, and four boundaries of things; assimilating and dissimilating, increasing and decreasing, shall render all things correspondent and effable; of which the sesquitertian progeny, when conjoined with the pentad, and thrice increased, affords two harmonies. One of these, the equally equal, is a hundred times a hundred; but the other, of equal length, indeed, but more oblong, is of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of pentads, each being deficient by unity; and from two numbers that are ineffable, and from a hundred cubes of the triad. But the whole geometrical number of this kind is the author of better and worse generations." This, it will be allowed, beats the Platonics, mystics, and transcendentalists of our own day.

If it shall seem strange to any that a man like Plato, whose mind was clear as the silver brook, and who was capable of

writing in a flowing, beautiful, and altogether perspicuous style, should so wrap up, and cloud, and confound his ideas; it is but just that we listen to his own apology. "It would be to no purpose," says he in his seventh Epistle, "to lay open to mankind at large the doctrines of philosophy, which are adapted to the comprehension of only a few intelligent persons; and *from obscure and imperfect hints, these will be able to conceive their full import.*"

In hope of obtaining light in regard to obscure passages in Plato, some have had recourse to his more ancient commentators, but they have been disappointed; for these not only make his obscure passages more obscure, but those which are perfectly clear, and need no explanation, they usually contrive to turn into darkness. Like some of the interpreters of our Bible, they discover mountains of sense and mountains of nonsense, under the simplest forms of speech. Take the following example, selected almost at random: "When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus, who introduced us to their brother Antiphon." This is the commencement of "the Parmenides"—a perfectly plain narrative sentence. Hear now the comment which Proclus makes upon it. "The departure from Clazomenia evinces an energy exempt from physical reasons; and the meeting with Adimantus and Glaucus indicates the dominion of the duad in united multitude. And their introduction to Antiphon denotes their returning to unity, by which they derive perfection, and a plenitude of divine goods. For in every order of gods, there is a monad, and the dominion of the duad; and the whole distributed is conjoined with the monad through united multitude; and the duad which it contains is the mother, and as it were the root, of this multitude." Such is the farrago of mystery and nonsense poured forth by a learned man, with a view to interpret and make plain one of the plainest, simplest passages in any language. And this is but one of a thousand specimens which might be quoted from the ancient scholiasts on Plato.

In entering upon a consideration of Plato's doctrines, it may be well to premise, that both he and Socrates regarded themselves as in some sense, *inspired*; so that whatever they taught came clothed with more or less of Divine authority. In

his *Apology*, speaking of what he had taught, Socrates says: "I am ordered to do thus *by divinity*; by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode in which anything was ever commanded to be done by man." So in the seventh book of the *Laws*, Plato represents the long discussion in which he had engaged as "not having been without *divine inspiration*." In the *Phædrus*, also, the claim to inspiration is repeatedly asserted.

That Plato, like Socrates, was an earnest believer in the popular religion of his country, no one at all acquainted with his writings can doubt. He had, indeed, his peculiar mode of explaining this religion, but that he believed and taught it, is unquestionable. Still, like most of the polytheists of Greece and Rome, the faith of Plato rested, ultimately, on *one supreme God*, the eternal source and great first cause of all. This doctrine of one God seems, however, to have had but little practical influence with Plato and his followers; for in their conceptions of him, they exalted him above all direct concern in the creation or government of the world; above all conception and thought; and (if words have any meaning) above *existence itself*. In the *Parmenides*, Plato thus speaks of him. "The One, therefore, in no respect *is*: For to say that he *is*, would be to ascribe to him being and essence; whereas he *is above being itself*." Again: "The One neither *is one*, nor *is*; neither does any name belong to him, nor discourse, nor science, nor sense, nor opinion. He can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor be perceived by any being." What idea could the Platonists form of a God, to whom language such as this was applicable? And what possible influence would the belief of such a God have upon them, unless it were to puzzle and confound them?

From this great Fountain of being—itself above all being—Plato taught that numberless inferior divinities of different orders had,—either directly or indirectly, and by an eternal emanation,—proceeded. We say by an *eternal emanation*; for Plato compared it to the light streaming forth from the sun, which is co-eval with the sun itself. The highest order of the gods—those which proceed directly from the Supreme—approach the nearest to his ineffable nature. Those which go forth directly from them, but indirectly from the great Fountain, are more unlike

him than their immediate progenitors. At about the third remove from the Supreme One, is Jupiter, the Demiurge, the former, the artificer, of the sensible universe. The materials or elements out of which the worlds were made, viz. earth, air, fire, and water, had existed, in a confused chaotic state, from all eternity. In the shaping of these materials, and their organization into the world we inhabit, three divinities seem to have been directly concerned. One contained within himself, and kept in view, the *idea*, the *pattern*, according to which every thing was to be fashioned.* Another performed the work of *fabrication*, according to the model thus presented. The third took instant possession of the new-made world, entered into it, animated it, became its soul, and thus constituted it a living thing, a god.

The earth, according to this philosophy, is the centre of the universe, and the heavenly bodies, placed at different distances, move round it; having been formed much as the earth was, except that their constituent element is more exclusively fire. They, too, are animated by appropriate divinities, and are also gods. It must be remembered, however, that the order of things here detailed is rather that of nature than of time; since the whole is represented as being alike eternal. Even the world we inhabit, according to Plato, has existed for ever.

The fact that three of the gods were concerned, as above stated, in the work of creation, has led some to imagine that Plato's theology involved the doctrine of the Trinity. But Plato believed in no Trinity, at least in the Christian acceptation of the term. He taught the existence of several *triads* among the gods. The one concerned, as we have seen, in the work of creation, is called the *fabricative* or *demiurgic* triad. But Plato's triads consist of *three distinct gods*; and they are all of them *inferior divinities*—*emanations*, directly or indirectly, from the One Supreme. Here, surely, is no strong resemblance to the doctrine of three *co-equal, co-eternal, personal distinctions in the one uncreated essence of the Godhead*, as this is held in the Christian church.

* By the New Platonists this personage was regarded as the *Divine Logos, the Reason.*

The thought that Plato's trinity bore any resemblance to the Christian Trinity seems first to have originated with the New Platonists, in the second century after Christ. They were a sect of philosophers who held that all religions are much the same, only differently expressed; and who, of course, were interested to trace out as many resemblances between Platonism and Christianity as possible.

Among the eternal emanations from the Supreme, were not only gods of different orders—the intelligible and intellectual, the supercelestial and mundane—but also *demons*, *heroes*, and *the souls of men*. The demons were an order of beings superior to ourselves, some good and some bad, occupying a sort of middle region between gods and men. Those honoured as heroes were thought to have had both a divine and a human origin; to have had one parent a god, or a demon, and the other some favoured individual of the human race.

The souls of men Plato believed had existed from eternity. Before descending into bodies, they dwelt each in his own star, enjoying a state of great purity and blessedness. "We were then," says Plato in the *Phædrus*, "initiated into and made spectators of, entire, simple, quietly stable, and blessed visions; residing in pure light, and being ourselves pure, and free from this surrounding vestment, which we call body, and to which we are now bound, like an oyster to its shell."

How long we dwelt in this beatific state, previous to our first connection with bodies, and through how many bodies we have already passed, Plato does not inform us. In the third book of the *Laws*, he represents this earth to have been inhabited, to have contained cities, and to have had political institutions, for a vastly long period of time—indeed, as he says, "for an infinity of time." But the moment the human soul first entered into a body—whenever this may have been, and from whatever cause—that instant it became contaminated. No doctrine is more fully or plainly inculcated by Plato than this, that *the body is the prison and corrupter of the soul*. In the seventh book of the *Republic*, he represents the soul, while here in the body, as in a *dark cavern, and in chains*. He says also in the *Phædo*: "So long as we are connected with the body, and *our soul is contaminated with such an evil*,

we can never sufficiently obtain the object of our desire." According to Plato, the great *apostasy* of the soul consists in its descent into this world, and its connection with the body. Its *redemption* will consist in its becoming purified, by the exercise of what he calls the *cathartic virtues*, from the defilements of a mortal nature, and its being restored to its primitive habit and state.

To effect this recovery, it may be necessary for the soul to pass through a great many bodies in time to come, as it may have done in time past; and peradventure it may not be restored at all. But when her pristine perfection is recovered (if it shall be) to as great an extent as is possible to an inhabitant of earth, she then returns, at death, to her kindred star, and enjoys a blissful life. Then, too, being winged, she unites with the gods in the government of the present world. But let her be careful how she uses her wings; for if they become mutilated or broken, she will be doomed to descend again, and go through with another probation in the body.

According to the Platonic theology, the *government* of the world, like its creation, belongs not to the One Supreme, but is left entirely to inferior divinities, who consequently receive nearly all the worship. Theirs are the supplications, the altars, the offerings. The One Ineffable can be approached only by the ultra-transcendentals, and by them only in holy silence. Proclus thus describes the worship of the Supreme.

"Let us now, if ever," says he, "remove from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. Let not only opinions, and fancy, and the passions be at rest, but let the air and the universe itself be still; and let all things conspire to raise us, by a tranquil power, to communion with the Ineffable. Having transcended the intelligible, and with eyes nearly closed, let us stand, and adore, and celebrate him, as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of gods, together with all the super-mundane and mundane divinities; himself the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities, as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence; as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible gods."

By Hades, Plato understood (according to the strict etymology of the term) the *unseen world*, the *world of spirits*, including both the good and the evil. The moment any one passes away from the present life, whatever his character or destiny may be, he finds himself in Hades, or the unseen world. He comes at once into the presence of his judge, by whom, if he is corrupt, he is sent down to Tartarus—a horrid gulf or prison in the bowels of the earth; but if righteous, he is dismissed to the islands of the blessed.

The sufferings of the wicked in the other world are variously described. Some of them are of the most revolting and terrific nature. Those who are not incurable are, after a destined period, sent into other bodies; it may be the bodies of animals, or even insects. In the Phædrus, we read of some who became grasshoppers. But such as have proved themselves incorrigible, are *never to be released*. On this point Plato is clear and positive. Thus, in the Phædo he says: “Those who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences,—because they have perpetrated either many and great sacrileges, or unjust slaughters which are contrary to law, or other things of this kind,—these, a destiny proportioned to their guilt hurls into Tartarus, from which *they will never be discharged*.” He says also in the Gorgias: “It is proper that every one who is punished should either become better, and derive advantage from his punishment, or *become an example to others*; that others, seeing his sufferings, may be terrified and made better. The former class are they who have been guilty of curable offences; but those who have acted unjustly in the extreme, and through such crimes have become incurable, serve as examples to others.”

The morality which Plato inculcated was as pure, perhaps, as the nature of his religion, and the customs of the country in which he lived, would permit. He could not prohibit intoxication at the Bacchanalian festivals, and he was obliged to pander to some other vices which the religion of the state tended rather to foster, than to discourage. But excepting some blemishes of this sort, the moral code of Plato had little tendency to sensualism, but leaned rather to the other side. The flesh must be mortified, sensual indulgences restrained, and the

influence of the body—that great corrupter of the soul—must be reduced to the narrowest limit.

Of Plato's doctrine of ideas, we have spoken already. He considered ideas, not as thoughts, perceptions, recollections, judgments, but as the *forms* or *images* of things, having a *real subsistence*, and much more to be depended on than sensible objects. The testimony of the senses he undervalued. Our impressions from this source can be regarded only as *opinions*; whereas our perceptions of ideas, especially those of the more general and abstract kind, those discovered by the reason, those elaborated and brought to light by the dianoëtic power—they alone are entitled to the appellation of *knowledge*. Hence he regarded pure *logic* or *dialectics*, which treats of ideas, and investigates abstract truth, as the first and greatest of all the sciences. Mathematics might be studied, and ought to be; but only as a discipline for the mind; as tending to prepare it to reason with the greater acuteness. To pursue mathematics, or any other science, as an aid to the business and the arts of life, would be quite beneath the dignity of a philosopher.

Like most ancient writers, Plato states many things, received probably by tradition, which go to confirm the early Scripture history. Thus his account of the golden age, the reign of Saturn, may have been a tradition, handed down from one period to another, of the state of man before the fall. He also states, in strict accordance with the Mosaic history, that the earliest form of government in this world was *patriarchal*. "Polities were first formed from *families* and *kindred*, in which the oldest person or ancestor ruled over the rest; and they, following and obeying his paternal mandates, were governed in a manner most just of all." Plato speaks also of an ancient deluge, in which "all cities perished," leaving the earth "in a state of infinite and dreadful solitude." None escaped, he says, but a "few shepherds—dormant sparks of the human race—who were preserved on the tops of the highest mountains."

Of the sources from which Plato drew his philosophy, something has been said already. For how much of it he was indebted to his own unaided invention, it is impossible now to say. It is certain that he had many opportunities and advan-

tages of acquiring knowledge from others. He was thoroughly versed in the old Grecian poets, Musæus and Orpheus, Hesiod and Homer, and had collected whatever of wisdom is found in them. He had also studied the political philosophers of his country, and made himself familiar with their teachings and laws. He had long listened to the discourses of Socrates; he had traversed Egypt in pursuit of wisdom; he had been associated with the most distinguished followers of Pythagoras, and had read their books. Having been favoured with such means of drawing from the resources of others, his philosophy, as might be expected, is not exclusively his own. It is rather an eclectic than an original system; and it has tasked the ingenuity of his admirers, from its first promulgation to the present hour, to make it, in all points, consistent with itself. His ethics, and his peculiar manner of teaching, Plato seems to have gained from Socrates; his dialectics he may have borrowed from Euclid of Megara; mathematics and astronomy he learned at Cyrene and in Egypt; for his natural philosophy and many points of his theology he was obviously indebted to the Pythagoreans; his political theories, laws, and plans, may have been chiefly the fruit of his own invention.

Nothing can be more evident to the student of Plato than the marked similarity, in several important particulars, between his teachings and those of the ancient *Orientals*, or *Gnostics*. The Supreme God of both is much the same kind of character—inconceivable, ineffable, exalted above all thought or concern about the affairs of mortals, and wrapped up in his own infinite, quiescent self. In both systems, the world is made and governed by inferior divinities—emanations from the One Supreme. It is made, too, according to both, of pre-existent base materials, from all eternity commingled in a rude, chaotic state. In both systems, the body is greatly undervalued, being regarded as the prison and corrupter of the soul; while deliverance from the polluting influence of the body, and finally from the body itself, is considered, in both, as the sum of redemption. Both systems inculcate the worship of inferior divinities by sacrifices and religious rites; while communion with the Supreme can only be enjoyed in mystic silence and contemplation. Both systems taught the existence of inferior æons or

demons, and also the transmigration of human souls. So many and so important points of resemblance could hardly have been accidental; nor is the manner in which they are to be accounted for so difficult as might, at first thought, be imagined. Plato had much intimacy with the Pythagoreans; and Pythagoras was, for his age, an extensive traveller. He not only traversed Greece, Phenicia, and Egypt, in pursuit of wisdom, but he penetrated far into the East, where he obtained, in all probability, the rudiments of the Oriental philosophy. These he would naturally incorporate into his own system, and inculcate upon his followers; from whom Plato, doubtless, received them during his residence in Ionia and Sicily.

The influence of Platonism was great at first; and it has never ceased to exert an influence from that time to the present. Drawing around him in the Academy princes and nobles—the most promising young men from every part of Greece—those who, in their turn, were to be the instructors of others, Plato exerted an influence, during his life, such as almost no other individual ever possessed. Nor was this current of influence materially diminished by his death. His disciples entered into his labours; they continued his school, and established others; they deemed it an honour to be called by his name; and with more or less of obsequiousness, they followed in his steps.

At the commencement of the Christian era, Platonism, under one form or another, had not only pervaded Greece and Italy, but it had penetrated into nearly every part of the Roman empire. It had infected the Jews' religion long before the coming of Christ; and no sooner did Christianity begin to be published in Asia Minor, in Greece, in Egypt, in Italy, than it came in contact with this venerable and imposing system of philosophy. The result of the contact was adulteration both ways. Christianity considerably modified Platonism, resulting in what was called Neo-Platonism; while Platonism more considerably modified and corrupted the pure system of the gospel. It is sometimes said that Platonism *originated* the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. On the contrary, it is true, that Platonism gradually *changed* and *corrupted* this doctrine. Its tendency was to lower the personal dignity, and lessen the authority of the Son of God. The Platonizing teachers, instead

of regarding him as one and equal with the Father, conceived of him as an *emanation* from the Father; a derived and inferior Being. A preparation of this kind for Arianism had long been in progress before Arianism itself was fully developed.

The school at Alexandria, from which pastors went forth into most of the churches of the East, was deeply infected with this philosophy. Its teachers wore the philosophic garb, and gloried in the name of Christian philosophers. Origen, with his numerous admirers and followers, seemed to think it an honour to Christianity to bring it into harmony with Platonism; and that this might be done without any prejudice to the gospel, they commenced allegorizing their sacred books, and turning them into fable.

Platonism continued to have influence in the Christian church, corrupting its doctrines and perverting and obscuring its holy oracles for some hundreds of years. But in the disputes of the fifth and sixth centuries respecting the Trinity and the person of Christ, the dialectics of Aristotle began to be studied, as being better calculated to sharpen the intellect, and prepare it for the controversies of the times; and from this period Platonism gradually declined.

But the influence of Plato, both in philosophy and religion, has reached to our own age. The dispute about *innate ideas*, in which Mr. Locke so much distinguished himself, was, on its best side, a controversy against the extremes of Platonism. Upon its other aspects we cannot now enter.

But though Mr. Locke escaped, and, in the opinion of many, more than escaped, from one Platonic error, he remained under the fascination of another. The theory of Plato as to the *nature of ideas*—that they are not thoughts, but something thought of, not perceptions, but something perceived, the *species* and *forms* of things;—this theory was retained by Locke and his school, and was not exploded, or scarcely questioned, till it fell under the scrutiny of the Scotch metaphysicians almost in our own times.

Platonism has been, in all ages, the fruitful source of *mysticism* and *spiritualism*. Mysticism is the religion of solitude, of silence, of inward musings, of rapt contemplation. In the judgment of the mystic, this is the way, and the only way, in

which to have divine light spring up in the soul—in which to become good and wise. It is amusing to watch the progress of this mystic spirit; see how it has been developed from age to age; and notice the forms under which it is appearing now. Whenever we hear a man in these days decrying the outer world, and extolling the inner; suspecting his senses, but paying the utmost deference to what he calls his interior consciousness; turning away from teachers, and books, and the phenomena of nature, and delving for wisdom into the recesses of his own spirit, expecting to dig it up there, like gold from the mine;—when we find such an one (as we commonly do) preferring *a priori* reasoning to those which proceed in the opposite direction, and abstract conclusions to such as are based upon substantial facts;—when we hear him talking mystically, unintelligibly, using “great swelling words of vanity,” and drawing those after him, who are sure to admire what they cannot comprehend; we expect, of course, that such an one will call himself a Platonist, and extol Plato, though he may never have read a page of Plato’s writings, and knows little about him except the name.

The Platonists of all time, from their great master downwards, unite in decrying the *inductive* philosophy; that which regards theory as of little worth, and bases its conclusions upon experiment and fact. With one voice, the more modern among them denounce Lord Bacon as a mere empiric and utilitarian, whose leaden intellect, with no wings to rise, could only grovel on the earth. In a work now before us, the followers of Bacon are represented as “nursed in the bosom of matter, the pupils of experiment, the darlings of sense, the legitimate descendants of that earthborn race who warred on the Olympian gods.”

The single impression which, more than any other, forces itself upon us, in bringing this review of Plato to a close, is that of the immense superiority, and consequent divine authority, of our Christian Scriptures. Certainly none of the writings of the ancients could better be brought into comparison with the Bible than those of Plato. An infidel of any adroitness, who was disposed to institute such a comparison, would select the writings of Plato on which to found it, in preference to those

of any other man. And yet what would be the issue of such a comparison? Look first at the *theology* of Plato. His supreme God exalted above all concern in the creation and government of the world—above all expression, conception, and thought; while inferior divinities perform all Divine works and receive Divine honours. Consider next the *philosophy* of Plato; for he was a professed philosopher, which the writers of our sacred books were not. He makes the world and all material things to consist of but four elements, earth, air, fire, and water. He fixes the Earth in the centre of the universe, with the heavenly bodies moving round it; the Moon nearest us, the Sun next, and Venus and the other planets next. In his view, the Earth and the heavenly bodies are each and all of them animated by indwelling divinities, and are in reality gods. He teaches that the Earth has not only existed, but has been inhabited by human beings, dwelling in cities, through “an infinity of time.” The Earth, too, is penetrated, through all its interior, by vast rivers, lakes, and gulfs, the most dreadful of which is Tartarus, the place of future punishment for the wicked. The human eye, he tells us, is constituted almost wholly of *fire*; and it is the fire of the eye, mingling with that of the atmosphere, which enables us to see the images of things in a glass. The human soul has existed from all eternity; has been connected with a vast many bodies already; and may be connected with as many more. Ideas, too, are *real subsistences*, the eternal forms and images of things; and most of our knowledge, in this world, is but a reminiscence of what we knew before we entered it.

Look also at the *morals* of Plato—that part of his system which, in the estimation of some, would scarcely suffer in comparison with Christianity. Drunkenness expressly allowed in the worship of one god; debauchery and licentiousness in that of another; and a community of wives and children recommended, as constituting the most perfect state of society!

Such then is the theology, the philosophy, and the morality of Plato. Such, certainly, are prominent and important parts of them. And now who will venture to bring such a system—contradicted at a thousand points by the decisions of reason, conscience, and truth—into comparison with the Christian

Scriptures? Could Platonism endure such a comparison for a moment? And yet Plato was a learned man; and most of the writers of our Scriptures were illiterate men. Plato was a noble Greek, trained in the very focus of ancient wisdom; while the writers of our Scriptures were poor, unlearned, and despised Jews. How then did these Jews attain to their superior, incomparable light and knowledge? How did they frame a system of theology and cosmogony, of morality and religion, of truths pertaining to this world and the next, which has borne the test of years, and the ever-prying scrutiny of restless man, and which reason and philosophy, branching out in all directions, and pursuing their onward course without embarrassment or restraint, have served only to confirm—never to contradict? How shall this question be answered? How can it be? Only one answer can possibly be given to it. *The writers of our Scriptures were taught of God.* The system they inculcate really is, what it professes to be, of *Divine original*.

In turning over the writings of Plato, we behold a great mind placed (to use one of his own comparisons) in a dark cavern, searching after the reality of things, but perceiving little more than empty shadows. He is “feeling after God, if haply he might find him;” and yet, though the true God is near, he finds him not. He is ever restless and active, inquiring, devising, theorizing, on all manner of subjects, and yet “wandering in endless mazes lost.” Or if, at any time, he lays hold of an important truth, like that of the soul’s immortality, he supports it by arguments the most strange and unsatisfying, and very likely, through ignorance, perverts it.

Such are the facts of the case presented to the eye of the Christian student, in turning over the volumes of Plato; and as he reads, the impression continually grows upon him—*The Bible is indeed above all price! It is a light unto my feet, and a lamp unto my path! It is a precious, glorious light, shining in a dark place, to which all who possess it should give diligent heed, until the day-star arise in their hearts!*

ART. II.—*History of Latin Christianity*; including that of the Popes, to the pontificate of Nicholas V. By HENRY HART MILMAN, Dean of St. Paul's. 8 vols. 12mo. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

THE Christian church, during the first three hundred years, or thereby, although consisting of a great number of free communities, under no external control going to enforce conformity to a common standard, made the nearest approach to a perfect catholicity. Heretics and schismatics there were, but not in such strength as seriously to impair the general harmony. In the next hundred years, it presented itself under the external form of a completely organized government, regulating both doctrine and discipline, covering the whole Roman empire, and recognising one common head in the emperor.

Those two periods are one as belonging to the true church catholic, by the term *catholic* distinguishing the great community adhering to a common scriptural faith, from dissentients in doctrine or discipline. Meletians, Donatists, and other schismatics, were comparatively small bodies; and the Arians, who were numerous, never separated from the rest of the church, and, in course of time, lost their importance.

Towards the middle of the fifth century, that great and impressive organization began to divide. First, the Nestorians, constituting the church of the further east, completely separated at once from the catholic church and from the empire, and took up a new position, under the protection of Persia. Then the great patriarchate of Egypt went off, on the ground of Monophysite doctrine, and defended its own ecclesiastical independence. The Greek and the Latin were still catholic. But progressive error, in different directions, introduced dissension between them. Both became more and more sectional, until all fellowship was broken off. And thus the visible church ceased to be catholic, and broke apart into sections. Of those sections the greatest were the church of the further east, that of Egypt, the Eastern, or Greek church, including all that remained of the empire, with Russia and the countries lying between them; and the Latin, or Romish

church, extending to all the southwest of Europe and northward into Sweden and Norway. Each one of these churches has a history of its own. But those of the east lay under two great disadvantages. They had to deal with a worn-out civilization, except in the north, where their work was late in beginning, and was impeded by other obstacles; and they were themselves subjects of the secular government, which was either unfavourable to them, or, in the case of the Byzantine empire, so weak as to involve them in the calamities of its own decay. The Latin church, on the other hand, except in Spain, was independent; and, although the nations of its jurisdiction were rude, ignorant, and some of them barbarous, they were those in whom was the force of a young and yet undeveloped vitality. That branch of the church was destined, under God, to have the principal hand in educating the people of the future civilization. And, consequently, although its work was very imperfectly done, even more imperfectly than man ordinarily does his work, it greatly surpassed, in point of historical importance, all its rivals of the middle ages. It is not improbable that the Greek church may yet take on a reformation and revive, while the Latin, in its present type, must go down; but, in as far as pertains to their mediæval history, the superiority of interest is largely with the latter.

Latin Christianity took its peculiar features from the Roman mind and the fashion of Roman life, operating, at first, in the non-essentials of religious observance. Its corruptions grew out of the same causes, accumulated with their decay and with the introduction of barbarian ingredients, and became exaggerated and monstrous as they carried Roman practices into a new civilization of a different style. From other branches of the church it is distinguished chiefly by features inherited from imperial Rome; centralization of authority, forcible execution of law, and the enormous growth of the western patriarchate, but also by the development of certain doctrines and the incorporation of certain practices of western nations.

Roman law, when every thing else was perishing, marked the second, fourth, and sixth centuries with evidences of healthiest vitality. With it did Christianity form the most intimate relations, gradually infusing into it much of her own

spirit; and adopting many of its forms into her own government and statement of doctrine. In that union lay the intrinsic strength of the great mediæval church system of which Rome was the head.

In the Greek world, the ally of Christianity was philosophy. The result was endless discussion of doctrine, and division and subdivision of sects, repressed only by Mohammedan invasion. A catholic system of theology was thereby determined, but an effective central force could not be maintained, except in as far as the Roman spirit was transferred to Constantinople. And that never went the length of reducing to obedience the great patriarchates of earlier foundation.

In the west, subtlety of discussion did not mark the early history of the church. But, there, the power of a central authority continued to increase, until it became a compulsion resting upon all classes of society. Before the civil law began to suffer diminution of its authority, the canon law was rising to a place beside it, when the western church alone was in condition to give it full effect and free development. And, what was of far more importance, the organization of the church had taken its structure from that of the state, and the spirit of its government was to a large extent adopted from that of Roman dominion. The real origin of Romanism in the church was Romanism in the state. St. Peter's chair was an after-thought, a fabrication to suit the circumstances. Rome's domination in the church of mediæval times was simply the offspring of Rome's dominion in the empire of ancient times. The question is no longer either mysterious or doubtful. Although we cannot discern the person of every successive bishop of that church, from the beginning, the general outline of its history is sufficiently plain.

In the early days of Christianity, the church, in any one city, was a small body. As it increased in numbers, it extended its organization over all, not by repeating itself, but by expanding. The idea of setting off new churches in other parts of the city, upon the model of the original church, and thereby perpetuating its simplicity of government, does not seem to have occurred to the early Christians. The method pursued by them was that which people would most naturally

adopt, without forecast or experience of its evils. They presumed that the church of one city must continue to be one. And when its members became too numerous to meet in one house, new congregations were assembled, and presbyters appointed in them, as belonging to, and carrying out its organization. It was the stem, and they were the branches, viewed as not having separate roots of their own, but as drawing their organism from it. There was only one church in one city, no matter how many congregations it might expand into.

It followed, almost inevitably, that the pastor of the original congregation became the presiding officer of the whole body of presbyters, and that the importance of his position increased with the number of congregations into which his church expanded. As he had become, in the first instance, sole pastor, by the act of his fellow-elders, who were also his co-pastors, gradually devolving the whole burden of duty upon him, or by the adoption of such an arrangement for convenience; so when other congregations arose out of his, their teaching elders still looked to him as in some sense their superior.

Christianity was first planted in cities, and the practices of the large city churches were naturally imitated in the smaller. And when congregations were formed in the suburbs of a city, what model more naturally followed than that of the system within the city? They were mission churches, still holding a filial relation to the original church within the walls.

The first bishop of Rome was, of course, like every other first bishop in those times, the pastor of a single congregation. Diocesan grew out of parochial episcopacy by such imperceptible process that it is perhaps impossible, in the case of any branch of the church, to say at what date the change was made, no historic importance being attached to the first step, and every succeeding one being not a change, but simply an extension of one already made.

When this system had fairly taken shape and grown to be familiar in the great cities and their vicinities, it was but consistent to appoint also a presiding bishop over a number of co-ordinate congregations in the little towns and villages in a district, and to carry out there the method of the city, and deny, for the sake of distinction, the title of bishop to all except to the pre-

siding bishop. When this step was reached, and the church reached it more or less completely about the middle of the third century, it is clear that a new ecclesiastical order had been created.

At that date there were great irregularities in the system; some bearing the name of bishop were still pastors of only one congregation, some were presiding ministers of several, and some had clergy bearing the title of bishop in congregations belonging to their charge, over whom they were beginning to arrogate the rights of a superior rank.

The church had admitted all this, not because it was scriptural, but supposing that it would be expedient. But now a lengthened debate arose on the pretensions of some bishops to superior rank.

Among the great cities, there were a few distinguished for political or commercial influence, or both. Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Alexandria, Rome, were from early time seats of flourishing churches. They were cities conspicuous for political or commercial importance. A church in such a city, if known at all to the general public, was necessarily more extensively known and observed than it would have been in any smaller or less important place. Among such conspicuous places the capital of the empire, of course, was the most conspicuous; and next to that must be the greatest commercial depot of the empire—provided the churches in them flourish only proportionately to the churches elsewhere. Accordingly, we find that Rome and Alexandria soon take their places as the most central points of ecclesiastical influence; and when the honours of the capital are divided between Rome and Constantinople, the honours of ecclesiastical distinction are divided also.

The Petrine character which has been claimed for the church of Rome, as another argument for its historic relation to Peter personally, is also a matter of growth subsequent to the days of the apostles; and is no less truly the native fruit of Rome. In no scriptural mention of that church does any peculiar Petrine feature appear, nor in the genuine writings of Clement, the first of post-apostolic authors, whose writings touch the matter. So far, the religious style is rather that of Paul. Nor does any thing peculiarly Petrine manifest itself in that church.

until subsequent time, when other agencies, going to produce that same style of religion, had for at least two or three generations been at work. The practical and legal habits of Roman life and thought naturally gave forth such fruits, and when that style of doctrine was formed, it was a matter of course to seek authority for it in an apostle. And in that type into which the Roman church naturally grew, there is abundant reason for its preferring the authority of Peter rather than of Paul, so that when it had assumed that type, it was a matter to be expected that it should, after some way or another, claim the sanction of Peter, and overlook that of Paul, who had really so much to do with its instruction. By the latter part of the second century this character was already formed, and corresponding claims were beginning to be put forth. Accordingly, it is in the latter part of the second century that we first hear of the connection with Peter and of the presence of Peter in Italy. The first intimation of the thing occurs in a very dubious passage of Dionysius of Corinth, written about a hundred years after the death of Peter, and quoted more than a hundred and fifty years later by Eusebius. And of three assertions implied in that passage two we know to be erroneous, to such a degree that if we did not know better from other sources, we should be misled by them. And Dionysius himself bitterly complained of the way in which his writings were interpolated and their meaning altered. The claim of being founded by Peter became more common in the Roman church as the distance of time increased, and as it became less easy to be refuted. In short, there is no such basis for that claim, as history can rely upon: while on the other hand, the growth of all that constitutes Romanism is most clearly traceable to Rome.

By one step after another in the progress of conversion, the churches and pastors of the great cities increased in authority. Early Christians recognised only one church in one city. And such was inevitable, both in the nature of Christian affections and the universal style of government in the empire. The Roman municipal system prescribed such an organization. In the Roman system of government the municipal idea ruled so strongly as almost to forbid any other. Christianity, from the beginning accepted it in every great city of the empire. But

Rome was the chief of cities, the head of dominion, whose municipal system was the origin of the whole.

The world looked to Rome for the model and authority of government. And the church at Rome, in the first ages, largely blessed in respect to numbers and piety, became, from the almost irresistible current of events, a high authority among the churches. Accordingly, as the pastors of the different city churches became diocesan bishops, and then the bishops of the greater cities assumed a higher dignity among bishops, it was in the order of things that the bishop of Rome should begin to claim the supremacy which belonged to his city. The purer spirit of early Christian piety, by its very simplicity, held a check upon that ambition, and the recognised equality of Christians was adverse to it.

There was in the Roman municipal system itself that which fostered more or less the idea of independence in the several cities. The general government of the state was an expansion of the municipal, maintained by the imperial authority and support of the army. But early Christianity was possessed of no elements corresponding to these latter, and consequently had no organization comprehending the whole, and recognised no ecclesiastical emperor. Thus, while bishoprics arose in all great cities—and Rome was the greatest—no superiority of one city church was admitted over another city church in the earlier times. But under such a system of civil government as that of the imperial, it was in the nature of secular corruption that the church should approximate more and more thereto.

The great cities having become the seats of such bishoprics, a similar method was, in course of time, adopted for the rural districts. In the middle of the third century, Rome, Ephesus, Alexandria, Carthage, and Lyons, occupied places of distinguished eminence in the church. An aristocracy of such bishops was already forming. No supremacy of one was yet admitted over the others, although he of Rome was ambitious of such a position. He was effectively restrained by his brethren in both east and west, and his presumption condemned at once in Spain, Asia Minor, and Northern Africa, as a similar attempt had previously been reproved by the bishop of Lyons.

As time passed on, the civil style of the Roman government

entered more and more into that of the church. The episcopal aristocracy divided into two ranks, higher and lower, while many of the country bishops were not classed with either, still retaining the place of simple pastors of one congregation. By that process the church was prepared in the time of Constantine to shape itself to the proportions of his constitution for the empire. Then was Christianity formally wedded to Roman legislation, and, as the state religion, accepted a division of territory and of ranks and authorities corresponding to those of the state. In some respects, both were modified under the constitution of Constantine. The state was to be less directly subject to the will of one, and the church more under the control of a few. The civil rulers of the four prefectures were to have their correspondents in rank, if not exactly in the bounds of jurisdiction, in the highest archbishops, or exarchs, of the church. In a short time, the bishop of Constantinople, called also New Rome, began to advance claims to a higher authority than the rest. Because his was the imperial city, he ought to hold imperial authority in the church. The claim was favoured by some of the emperors, and was entirely consistent with the system then in operation; but could not be admitted by the bishop of Old Rome, whose see had the advantage in antiquity of dominion. When the claim of supremacy, or of the rank of universal bishop, was advanced by the prelate of Constantinople, it was rejected by the church generally, and by none with stronger expressions of disapprobation than by his rival at Rome. But it was in the nature of the transformation then going on. Into this conflict for rank none could enter save the metropolitans of Old and New Rome. It was decided first in favour of the latter, and then of the former. The inheritance of a supremacy from Peter had nothing to do with the matter. It was a contest for rank growing out of the rank of the old and the new imperial cities. The bishop of Constantinople had no apostolic succession to claim, while the bishops of Antioch, of Ephesus, and of various Oriental cities, had historical succession from bishops appointed by apostles, yet the bishop of Constantinople was the first to obtain legal recognition as universal primate. And when afterwards the same honour was conferred upon the bishop of Rome, it was notori-

ously for the sake of obtaining political support in that quarter. Between these two dignitaries the question has never been settled. The eastern and western church ultimately separated, one accepting the rule of the Patriarch, and the other that of the Pope. Very different became their subsequent history, but it also grew out of the position of their respective cities. In the Greek or Oriental church were retained the forms of the empire, but the Latin spirit still made its residence in Rome. The spirit of the Latin empire had completely imbued the ecclesiastical system of the west.

After the time of Constantine, church government rapidly took on the likeness of that of the state. The forms of Christian worship were blended with many adopted from the heathen, and with no little of its spirit, and the originally simple discipline and rule of the church, with Latin law and the practices and ideas of Latin dominion. Upon the breaking down of the western empire, a new power was found to have assumed its place upon the old throne of the Cæsars at Rome, retaining many of the elements of their strength, in vital combination with new purposes, hopes, and aspirations. While the old territorial dominion was shattered, the spiritual was scarcely shaken, on the continent. As a general thing, it was either accepted or submitted to by the new nations who entered the bounds of its jurisdiction. It retained many features of the fallen empire; its firm basis in organization; its subordinate authorities and their ramification and mutual support; its elective, yet absolute head; its mingled strength and weakness; and inherited much of that impression of power which had been made upon the long-subject populations.

It was in the coronation of Charlemagne that the papacy reached the maturity of its earlier type. Reviving the ancient Jewish custom, according to which the king was anointed by the hands of the high-priest, the bishop of Rome assumed that his see had in some way inherited that primacy, which authorized him to dispose of imperial authority; as if, when Constantine withdrew and fixed his capital in the east, he had left the ruling power of the west resident in the bishop of Rome, or at his disposal.

According to that view, the Pope was superior to the highest
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secular authorities, even in secular affairs. And in the circumstances of the case there was much to justify that view to the popular mind of the time. Rome had never ceased to be held as the seat of dominion in the west. And when the emperor withdrew, the bishop inherited the prestige. From the days of Theodosius, at least, the bishop had been the chief authority there. He had, moreover, been constrained by the force of circumstances to exercise the functions of a civil as well as of an ecclesiastical ruler. And some of the bishops had also evinced very superior ability on such occasions. Rome and the vicinity learned to look to the bishop as their chief magistrate.

At the basis of this new power lay a crude composite idea formed of elements Hebrew, Heathen, and Christian, put together without any original intention to mislead, or to justify error, and, indeed, without any determinate purpose, by the force of circumstances unforeseen. Many to this day fail to discriminate between the dead types and the living truth which they typified. Heathen Rome had been accustomed to a splendid religious ritual, at the head of which was the high-priest; the high-priest of the Jews had been a chief power in the Jewish state, not always second to the king, sometimes his superior, and latterly held the place of king. Christianity had now taken the place of both, and, accordingly, the bishop of the old imperial city became, in the growth of this idea, a Pontifex Maximus, better entitled to all the honours and power of the office than either of his predecessors. Then the tradition that Peter founded the church at Rome was magnified into a claim of supremacy over the churches. And from the doctrine of supremacy in the church, the crude thinking of that time inferred a right to supremacy in the state. Because, it was assumed, the state is only an institution of man's device, and the church is appointed of God, therefore the church is higher than the state, and all the authorities of the state ought to be subject to the chief authority of the church. Pepin's application for papal sanction in usurping the throne of France, and Charlemagne's acceptance of the imperial crown at the hand of a Pope, went to mature and confirm the notion. There was no solid basis for it, no written documents upon which the claim could be

authoritatively established and defended in case of attack. For the time, popular conviction served the purpose. But by-and-by that lack was made up. A document professing to be from the hand of Constantine the Great was fabricated, in which that monarch appears as conferring all his western dominions, with all their honours, upon the Pope, that the papal may be superior to the imperial dignity, and somewhat later, though published earlier, came forth the papal decretals, professing to be original productions of popes of the first three centuries, embodying all the highest pretensions to absolute authority over the churches. And the right of the popes to civil, as well as to ecclesiastical sovereignty, was established on written documents professedly coming down from what were deemed the proper sources. It is a remarkable testimony to the state of intelligence in the middle ages, that those barefaced and clumsy fabrications passed as genuine, even with the most learned, for hundreds of years.

From the recognition of Pepin as king of France, in the middle of the eighth century, until the latter part of the ninth, the papacy was well sustained by the ability of the popes, and the general recognition of their authority by the western emperors and the people. Pepin, Charlemagne, and Lewis, were docile sons of the church, and the subsequent division of their empire conferred the greater proportionate power upon the papacy, which maintained its integrity. This was the first period of papal supremacy over the western, or Latin church, and by far the most successful in the enjoyment of authority neither overstrained nor resisted. It consisted of a little over one hundred years.

The Christian mind of the west was fully disposed to admit and sustain all the claims which the papacy yet put forth, and to bow with unqualified reverence to the Pope, as the divinely commissioned head of the church. Never were popes seated on a more secure and peaceful throne than that which they occupied from the middle of the eighth to the latter part of the ninth century. But security gave occasion to presumption. The papal chair had become one of the highest objects of worldly ambition. Party tactics were employed in disposing of its honours and emoluments. Persons were thereby elevated to the sacred

office who were every way unqualified. The degeneracy was rapid and continued long. Papal elections fell into the hands of the basest parties. For one hundred and fifty years they were controlled by almost any other motive than the interest of the church, and during the greater part of that time by a party in which certain lewd women were the chief actors. A century and a half of papal profligacy, with hardly an exception, save the four years of Sylvester II., must have shaken its dominion more seriously had it occurred at any other period. But the state of popular intelligence was at its lowest ebb. The most humble degree of scholarship was rare. A man who could read a foreign tongue, or knew a little mathematics, was thought to be in league with the devil. News travelled slowly and reached very few points. The priest of a parish, the bishop of a diocese, was the immediate object of reverence to his people. The ecclesiastical system was strong in its own laws and practices, and went on of itself. The Pope was conceived of as far away in Rome, a sort of mythical perfection, and the head of all. But of his personal character, or the moral and religious nature of his immediate surroundings, the great public were slow to learn any thing. And thus the companions of debauchees and the favourites of harlots occupied the seat of authority in the church, and received the allegiance and reverence of Christian Europe. But even in the tenth and eleventh centuries, such a course of profligacy could not be carried to such a length without impairing the authority to which it belonged, and gradually sending its reputation abroad, to some extent, among the nations. In Italy the scandal became notorious, and it soon spread into the adjoining portions of Germany. Papal elections had been entirely in the hands of Italian parties, mostly of Rome and its vicinity. The emperor was induced to interpose, and put a check upon their shameless proceedings. Some improvement in the character of the popes was effected thereby. But the Romans became jealous, and a conflict arose between them and the emperor, in the course of which sometimes one and sometimes the other prevailed; and sometimes the conflict between them was fully as disgraceful as the preceding pornoocracy.

Such corruption at the head was not without injurious effects

upon the whole body of the church. It was indispensable to the dignity and perpetuation of the papal power that vigorous measures of reform should be adopted. The appointment of German popes, and the interference of the German emperor, were also unpopular at Rome. The work of reforming the elections, and restoring the papacy to its place of former respectability, was undertaken by Hildebrand, a young Roman monk, who appears in history in connection with the pontificate of Gregory VI. and as a leader in the Italian party. Four great objects did he propose to himself and consistently keep in view throughout his public career: namely, to reform the papal elections and regulate them on firm ecclesiastical principle; to complete the organization of the clergy, and make the whole dependent upon Rome and separate from ordinary social relations; to wrest all ecclesiastical authority out of the hands of laymen, and to establish the supremacy of the papacy over both church and state. His success, although far from complete within his own lifetime, was certainly surprising; and his policy, consistently followed by others, ultimately realized almost the whole design. Circumstances, both internal and external, were favourable, and the ambition of a long series of gifted popes improved them to the utmost. And the culmination of all was reached in the peculiarly fortunate pontificate of Innocent III. His successor, Honorius III., peacefully enjoyed the fruit of that success. That summit of prosperity extended to about thirty years. Then, and then alone, did the papacy really seem to approximate to the summit of its ambition. Monarchs and nobles of the west were either docile, or were reduced to obedience; the clerical organization was in the utmost completeness it ever attained; the papal cause was sustained and defended by the ablest class of scholastic theologians; the canon law had reached the verge of maturity in the recently published *Decretum of Gratian*, in which the papacy was at last furnished with a scientific code of its own, a rival to the civil law; the crusades were still hopeful, and by the misdirection of the fourth, Constantinople had been brought under Latin rule, and for a time furnished to the Pope plausible ground for treating the Patriarch as a subject. Moreover, the great mass of the nations was so deeply sunk in ignorance and superstition as to be entirely sub-

missive, and the most reliable allies of the Pope in giving effect to his authority. An exception, it is true, there was. In that belt of country, running from the Pyrennees, round the gulf of Lyons to the Alps and the valley of the Po, a young literature was rising in the form of popular song, associated with views of the religion of Christ somewhat simpler than those presented by Rome. By order of Innocent III. the alarming freedom was extinguished in blood and desolation. And yet, terrific as it was, that crusade against the Albigenses failed to effect its desired end. Its triumph was more apparent than real. It laid waste Provence, but was ineffectual to crush out the new life, which, beneath the frozen soil during that dreary winter, was striking deep its roots, and preparing to send forth its blade to meet the coming spring. Ere the lapse of an hundred years, the Pope was an exile in that very country desolated by the crusade. A child born in the pontificate of Honorius III. lived to see the first effective blow stricken at the papacy itself, under which it began its long protracted decline.

When Boniface VIII. attempted to deal with Philip the Fair of France, as his predecessors had dealt with many sovereigns, he found that a new combatant had entered the field against him, and that the forces formerly his own were divided. The system of which he was the head embraced, and largely consisted of a vast mass of Hebrew and heathen notions and observances, and of practices and pretensions of its own, gradually accumulated; but its great strength lay in what it contained of Christian doctrine and of Roman legislation, together with the prestige of Rome. And in Rome, at the date when ecclesiastical took the place of civil superiority, the civil law was still in full force. The canon law grew up after its example, and in the course of time assumed precedence. It was upon the basis of law that the papal see sought to erect its supremacy. And where genuine laws were not found to suit, such as would suit were fabricated. During the long period when the civil law was almost unknown in the west, the fabrications passed for real. Ecclesiastical Rome was sustained upon the impression existing in the public mind that her authority was created by law both civil and canonical. For a long time, and that the time when the papacy was strongest,

civil law, as a separate branch of knowledge, was almost lost sight of in western Europe. All that was practical in government, was that which had in one way or another received the sanction of the church.

Had the popes consistently observed the alliance of their proper authority with the civil law, their prosperity might have extended to a greater length. But security in power tempted absolutism. Measures of aggrandizement were taken on the most questionable principles of canon law. So strong and broad was the basis in popular belief that the structure long withstood the shock of such imprudences. At the summit of its greatness the papacy realized, in the ruling conviction that it was sustained by law, all the practical benefits of a real legal right. And that popular conviction was no doubt largely due to another doctrine, inculcated with more obvious solicitude, that the Pope, as occupying the chair of St. Peter, was the vicar of God, and miraculously defended from error. The local laws of separate countries could not be accepted as counterbalancing, when they did in any way differ from the universal law of the church, which was also that of the empire. In all the great claims of mediæval Rome we find this union of Christ—or rather the apostles—and the empire, the chair of Peter, the donation of Constantine—the doctrines of Scripture, the sanction of the emperor, until all finally merge in the decrees of councils and decisions of popes. In that union lay its power. The papacy, notwithstanding the profligacy into which it sank in the tenth and eleventh centuries, as well as at many other less protracted periods, never beheld a successful attack upon the system whereby it governed, until the revival of the study of civil law showed how far it had departed therefrom. And the most notable feature in the history is the weight which the public mind immediately attached to the civil law, even where it was proved to be at variance with the will of a Pope, and the claims of his order. Philip the Fair and his lawyers were sustained by the people of France, both lay and ecclesiastic. The great elements of papal strength had begun to part company; and as soon as they were publicly proved to have done so, even on a few points, the structure began its decline.

The obstinacy of Philip might have been resisted by Boniface, as that of Henry IV. by Gregory VII., or that of King John of England by Innocent III., had his cause not been put upon the foundation of the civil law, and had it not been shown that the Pope had transcended his authority as granted by the law. When the papacy arrayed itself against the empire, it committed an act of infatuation, overthrew its own naturally, and left itself no friendly power wherewith to counterbalance the throne of France; but when it ventured to defy the civil law it committed suicide, violating one of the fundamental elements of its own being. The lawyers became its first successful opponents.

The next blow, and it followed fast in time as in logical succession, was suffered in the removal from Rome. Both were aimed at the same vital part, and inflicted a deadly wound, which, though subsequently healed to some extent, exposed an incurable weakness. The papacy can never flourish elsewhere than in Rome, and in Rome only in as far as that city retains the prestige of ancient or existing empire.

The defeat of Boniface VIII. in his controversy with the king of France, the retraction of his successor, and the removal of the pontifical chair to Avignon, wrought an immediate and serious reduction of power, which was further aggravated, at the end of seventy years, by the succeeding schism, during which antagonist popes, two or three at a time, divided the ecclesiastical allegiance of Europe, and presented the scandalous exhibition of men, claiming to be infallible vicars of God, excommunicating and anathematizing one another. The Council of Constance, in superficially healing these injuries, impaired the papal strength in another way. In assuming to decide upon the right of popes to reign, and to put down one and set up another, it declared a general council to be the supreme power in the church, which the new Pope was constrained to admit, in order to hold his own election valid. By those events of the fourteenth and early years of the fifteenth century, popular effects were produced, which the recuperated papacy never overcame. Multitudes had been emancipated from its spiritual fetters, who could never be reduced to them again; and ideas

had got abroad which could not be recalled. Demands for reform of ecclesiastical abuses were heard from every quarter, and did not cease until, as reform was not granted by authority, it was seized by force. Nearly a half of its jurisdiction thus reft from Rome within one generation failed to suggest either a purer practice or a wiser policy. The Council of Trent, called in that emergency, determined her position more adverse to reform and unscriptural than before. Reactionary influences, chiefly in the hands of the new order of Jesuits, restored the papal strength to some degree, by exacting a more implicit obedience on the part of the nations which still recognised it, and exercising a more cruel severity towards dissenters within their grasp. Furious was the wrath evinced by the declining despot against all intelligence, scriptural piety, and freedom.

But reaction found its limits, and the success of Protestant countries put a check upon violence, beyond which it was not permitted to go. The middle of the seventeenth century saw its utmost extent, and the early part of the eighteenth found it again in decline. It had leagued itself with tyranny in the state, and unintentionally, but by natural process, with social hypocrisy and practical unbelief, to degrade the industrial classes of every nation under its jurisdiction. The issue was a third disaster to the papacy. Philip the Fair had attacked the secular supremacy, the council of Constance shook the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Pope; the Reformation rejected both, and the European revolution, in the end of the eighteenth century, decided that both had been overstrained within the area which still recognised them. A revolution carried, like that, to an extreme, will always recoil. And the papacy, profiting thereby, enjoyed a few years of reactionary prosperity again, within narrower bounds and under stronger external restraint. But the reflux was brief. And the revolution of 1848 fell like the hand of death upon the staggering athlete. Rome herself rejected her Pope, as the embodiment of an obsolete system, and the feeble reaction was effected and is sustained only by a foreign army. More than once before has Rome endeavoured to shake off the papal incubus; but now that purpose has more pertinacity and consistency and is of much higher significance. Accustomed to be a seat of power, Rome

sees her importance dwindling away, the Pope is one of the pettiest of sovereigns. His sway is obsolete. Its restoration is hopeless. The state of the world is changed since kings humbly obeyed his command, and deemed themselves honoured to kiss his foot, and is not likely to return to that same infatuation. Italy, in the meanwhile, has become free and united. Rome alone, humbled under an effete despotism and foreign arms, writhes beneath the pity of the civilized world. Rome—the old imperial Rome—in this humiliating attitude before the nations whom she one time ruled, has a motive now for rejecting her ecclesiastical master very different from that of the days of Arnold or of Rienzi.

This system, of which the Romish hierarchy is the head, is appropriately designated Latin Christianity; inasmuch as its peculiar features are due to its connection with the Latin branch of the Roman empire. By those features it is distinguished from Greek and Oriental Christianity, on the one hand, and from Protestantism, on the other. It has long ago forfeited the right to be called catholic. In ancient times the catholic church was that which held to the whole body of revealed truth, and recognised all believers in the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ as belonging to its communion, no matter where they lived, in the east or in the west, within the empire or beyond it, and was thereby distinguished from societies of errorists and narrow exclusive sects. That primitive and beautiful catholicity did not long withstand the union of church and state. The church soon partook of the division of the empire into East and West, and into Prefectures. Differences on points of doctrine and of government ensued. The Eastern church divided her jurisdiction with heretics, and the Western, although suppressing heretical sects, sank into a course of internal degeneracy. Before the tenth century, primitive catholicity was no more. The church had separated into Greek, Oriental, and Latin. And so far from being catholic, in the sense of embracing all believers in the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Latin church had adopted a new term of communion, excluding all who could not submit to the authority of the Pope, and recognise his claims. Every succeeding step in its history went to degrade it more and more from the standard of

a catholic church. In the deep degeneracy of practice, the whole body of revealed truth could not be consistently retained. And with a traditional reverence for Augustin, the Latin church gradually sank towards the doctrines of his opponent Pelagius. The additional errors, which received its sanction, narrowed its character even as a section. The multitude of dissenting bodies, which arose in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, such as to defy coërcion, all exclaimed against the departure from the true catholic standard, and demanded return to it. Notwithstanding the efforts of some to comply, the Latin hierarchy, upon the whole, obstinately persisted in making their church more exclusively Romish. And after the Reformation had proved the effect of that policy, the Council of Trent drew around them still more closely the limitations of a sect, which have been further contracted by the edicts of later popes, until within our own day, when the Romish church occupies such a position as would exclude from her communion the greatest divines and the best Christians of both ancient and mediæval times. The Latin church has long ago ceased to be catholic. It is narrowly Romish, and the most exclusive of sects. There is sound meaning in the popular use of the adjective *Roman* as qualifying catholic when applied to that system of which the Pope is the head. The catholic church must now be sought wherever they are who worship God in spirit and in truth, according to His Holy Word.

In reaching the position which it now occupies, the Romish church has departed, in a great measure, from the true object of Christian worship, dividing between God and a multitude of creatures what is due to God alone. In this respect, it differs as much from the practice of the early catholic church as from the teaching of Holy Scripture. The practice of creature worship was gradually introduced, and in the face of much opposition. Several ancient councils declared against it, and after it was introduced, a long continued warfare was waged against it, which did not come to an end until near the middle of the ninth century. The decision of the second Council of Nice in 787 A. D., confirmed by that of the Council of Constantinople in 842, determining image worship to belong to Christian orthodoxy, was one in which both the Greek and Latin churches were con-

cerned, but it took effect most completely in the latter; and succeeding centuries added largely to the objects of adoration.

At the head of this system of creature worship stands the Virgin Mary. A commendable respect for the memory of one so highly honoured among women existed in the church from the beginning. In the latter part of the fourth century it reached the length of calling her the Mother of God. But the Collyridians, a small sect who made offerings to her as a divine person, were condemned as heretics. And great numbers dissented from the use of the blasphemous epithet which was becoming common. It was one of the points on which the Nestorian controversy turned in the second quarter of the fifth century. The greater weight of the church decided in favour of it; but the dissentients were numerous enough to take from the catholic church the whole jurisdiction of the further east, from the western borders of Armenia and Mesopotamia. In the increase of veneration paid to saints and their images during the succeeding four hundred years, the Virgin Mary had the larger share, including the institution of various festivals in her honour. By one of those festivals, introduced about the close of the sixth century, she was regarded as having been raised from the grave by angels, and carried bodily to heaven. By the tenth century, hymns began to be written to her praise. In the thirteenth century those productions had accumulated to such a number that a regular psalter was composed or compiled for the worship of Mary alone. It consisted of one hundred and fifty psalms, parodied chiefly from the scriptural psalms, and applying to the Virgin Mary the epithets and praises which Scripture pays to God. The book long passed, and among Romanists perhaps still passes, under the name of Bonaventura. Also, during the same period, one day of the week, namely, Saturday, was set apart to her worship, and a special service prepared for it. It was hardly an additional step in the progress of this idolatry, when the *Ave Maria*, in connection with the use of the Rosary, became a daily prayer. From that time onward, in the Latin church, Mary received more worship than God. True scholastic theologians distinguished between the kinds of worship. To God it was *Latria*; to the saints, *Dulia*; and to the Virgin Mary, *Hyperdulia*.

But, practically, there could be no difference in the popular mind. Mary was now the Queen of Heaven instead of Christ, contemplated as the most effective mediator, and worshipped more frequently, and with more ardent devotion than God. But it was reserved for our own day to behold the crowning act of this idolatry, in the promulgation of the dogma of the immaculate conception.

On the subject of the sacraments vague notions certainly prevailed, and unguarded language was used by writers of the fourth and fifth centuries. And, as the reign of ignorance closed in, that unguarded language was accepted in all its breadth, and rhetorical figures were construed into doctrines. In the end of the sixth century, Gregory I. held that the sacrificial death of Christ was truly repeated in the sacrifice of the mass, and the forms of expression touching the Lord's Supper in the liturgies, were shaped more in favour of transubstantiation. But that doctrine was, for the first time, fully advanced about the middle of the ninth century. It was controverted and refuted by the best theologians of the time. Two hundred years wrought a great change of opinion. At the end of that interval, the same doctrine was again assailed by Berengarius of Tours, when the church, both clergy and laity, were almost unanimous in defending it. Transubstantiation was asserted to be the doctrine of the church, and in 1215 A. D. it was accepted as such by the fourth Lateran Council. Adoration of the elements, held to have passed through that change into the substance of the body of Christ, was almost inseparable from that doctrine, and the withholding of the cup from the laity very naturally consequent upon it. It was more difficult to account for the retaining the use of it for the clergy.

In like manner, the Romish number of the sacraments was the fruit of gradual growth. And not until the influence of Peter Lombard determined it, was it conclusively limited to seven, as subsequently sanctioned by the Council at Florence, in A. D. 1439.

The doctrines of Theology and Anthropology held their ground more firmly as embodied in the ancient symbols of the church and writings of the fathers, especially of Augustin; but in that department the practical heresy of the Latin church

has also been great and progressive. Pelagianism, when it appeared in the early years of the fifth century, was generally condemned by the provincial councils and highest ecclesiastical authorities, and completely refuted by Augustin, who was held by the catholic church as having defined the true meaning of Scripture on the points in dispute. Especially in the Latin church was Augustinianism accepted as catholic orthodoxy. And yet the prevailing doctrine of the middle ages tended more or less towards Pelagianism. Subsequently to the Reformation, Augustinianism, when revived by the Jansenists, was condemned, and its advocates suppressed by papal authority, under the influence of the Jesuits.

An early question touching the state of the soul after the death of the body, agitated for many ages, at last, about the beginning of the seventh century, settled down into the admission of an intermediate state. Under the schoolmen it became a well-defined doctrine. That intermediate state consisted of three regions, of which the most important was Purgatory, in which "the souls of all pious persons, who died without having made full satisfaction for their sins," were to be purified from all remaining defilements; and out of which they could be delivered by means of private masses and indulgences.

From the practice in the early church of re-admitting back-sliders into communion upon intercession of confessors, the idea arose that confessors and martyrs had influence as intercessors with God. They were held to have done more good works than necessary for their own salvation, and, therefore, to have some merit to spare, which was available for others, who had too little. In the course of scholastic discussion, this idea was more fully developed and defined. According to its more mature form, as thus ripened, it presented a vast treasury of merit accumulated by the piety of the saints. Of that treasury the Pope had the disposal, and in the distribution it was reasonable that his agents should be paid for their trouble, or that some holy design should be carried forward by way of compensation.

When these doctrines were once established, and people were persuaded of the existence of Purgatory, and the efficacy of masses to rescue the souls there confined, and the virtue of

treasured merit in the gift of the Pope, the market of indulgences was fully prepared. The system sanctioned by papal authority as early as the thirteenth century, it continued in full force, and to increase in boldness, activity, and shamelessness, until the Reformation. The prerogative of God to pardon sin was openly arrogated, and its exercise proffered for money. A lower depth could not well be attained in that direction. After the Reformation, the extravagance of that abuse was abated, but the error has not been retracted nor abandoned. It is still one of the features by which Romanism differs from ancient catholicism.

In like manner the tradition, which, in course of time, was elevated as an authority above revelation, was, in the main, from the time of the Council of Chalcedon, Latin tradition. After the difference between the eastern and western churches, on the Procession of the Holy Spirit and other points, in 879 A. D., there was little intercourse between them; and the subsequent development of the Latin church became more exclusively Romish. The Reformation, returning to the old ground of the primitive church catholic, left the reactionary Latin branch in a still narrower Romanism. Although still containing much doctrinal truth, that church is now so thoroughly adulterated and sectionalized that it is beyond reformation by ordinary means. It needs to be completely taken down and rebuilt with sounder material. It contains valuable grains of gold, but so impracticably imbedded in earth and quartz that the whole mass must be ground to powder and subjected to living water, that the pure metal may be separated from the baser particles, and made available for its proper purposes.

Another feature of Latin Christianity is the relation which it advocates between the church and the state. On that point it differs from the Greek and Oriental doctrine, as well as from that which is generally held by Protestants, and entirely from the primitive catholic church.

Whatever may be said about the methods of sustentation in the early church, there can be no dispute about the fact that it held no such relation to the civil authority as to be in any sense a recognised partner in government. The primitive

church catholic had, in that sense, nothing more to do with the state than any other subject of it. But when Constantine established his constitution for the general government, the church was comprehended as a part of the plan, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was made parallel with the civil, and the empire distributed accordingly; ministers of the gospel belonged to the organization as truly as lawyers and soldiers, and bishops were a class of the nobility of the empire. In short, the church was constituted after the manner of a department of state, of which the great metropolitans were prime ministers, and the emperor himself was the head. Such continued to be the relation until the downfall of the empire in the west; in the east it continued throughout, and is recognised as the true relation between church and state to this hour. In the west a change was brought about by the dismemberment of the civil authority, in the course of repeated barbarian invasion. The church meanwhile held its ground. Most of the invaders were professing Christians, and recognised the ecclesiastical authority, while overturning the civil. And when they finally settled upon the lands of their conquest, the outlines of church government remained nearly as before. The system not only stood the shock, but, like a framework of iron, embraced the various invading nations, and moulded them to its own forms. But the head of the system, as far as the west was concerned, was no longer the emperor at Constantinople, but the hierarch of the old capital, the bishop of Rome. And very naturally, in such an order of events, did the idea suggest itself to him that the church should be the highest among the powers of earth; that instead of being a department under the state, it should hold the state as a subordinate authority. That principle once adopted, was never lost sight of. It became the dominant idea of the Latin church. For it took, at the same time, a practical shape. Not merely was the ecclesiastic to be superior to the civil, but it was the Romish church which was to wield that superiority. Every effort of the most gifted popes was put forth to secure the realization of that claim. In their success, it was loudly asserted, and often intemperately exercised, and in their depression, it was never abandoned; and even at the present time, it is clung to with the grasp of desperation. It

was one of the intolerable evils against which the Reformation protested.

Thus, while the Eastern churches holds to the superior authority of the state over the church, and Protestants either agree with them, or advocate the coördination of powers, or return to the position of the primitive church, in the entire separation of church and state, the Latin church adheres to their union, with the superiority of the ecclesiastical over the civil.

In the religion of Christ, the governing principle is the fundamental one of human society. Love to man, as subordinate to love of God, is the far-reaching law which is to shape all the relations of life aright. It is a religion formed for society. And whatsoever goes to divide, or in any degree to impair, the unity and harmony of society, belongs to the contradictory of the gospel of Christ. In the Romish church, since the earliest date of its mediæval history, the governing element has been monastic. In this remark we have less reference to the monastic orders than to the essentially monastic spirit of the Romish ecclesiastic system. Although, it is also true, that from Gregory I., in the end of the sixth century, down through the middle ages, the popes who did most to advance the interests of their see were actually taken from the cloisters; and of the men who otherwise devoted themselves with the greatest zeal and success to the defence or extension of the cause, the greater number were regular monks. The church through all that time, and through the church the world, was ruled by monks.

It would be the height of injustice to deny the value of the services done to the world by monks during the middle ages; but it was a woful state of the world which had need of them: and it was a state which the madness of their early predecessors had done much to bring about.

By the dominance of the monastic spirit, the ministers of religion were cut off, as far as men discharging duties among men could be cut off, from society, and with all their interests merged in the system of ecclesiastical government. An ecclesiastic was to have no relations to the world in which he lived, except through his duties to Rome.

Eastern monachism became wildly fanatical, and betook itself to the desert. Western monachism took a more practical turn, and became an organization of celibates, separated from society for the purpose of ruling it, and establishing their system in it. Upon the basis of that broad platform, various orders arose in conformity with their respective rules of severer asceticism; the greater number, no doubt, men of piety, according to their knowledge. A few ambitious minds in each generation were enough to turn the earnest convictions of the many to the account of the worldly power, which such a system was capable of wielding.

When the monastic spirit pervaded the whole body of the clergy, and entered into all the instructions of the church, it was inevitable that the best institutions of intellectual culture should also be monastic, and the work of education as well as of religion was made a ground of separation from common society. The number of orders increased, and as long as the severity of their discipline secured popular respect, the whole system was strengthened thereby. The profligacy of the papacy, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, was counterbalanced by the virtues of Cluny. And the coöperation of the revived papacy with the revived monasteries, and the more general and severe enforcement of monastic principles upon all ecclesiastical ranks, built up the power of mediæval Rome to its highest prosperity. And consistently, the relaxation of order, and the dissoluteness of monks, first provoked the tongue of popular censure. After the Reformation, the Romish reaction was instituted, and carried forward by the new order of Jesuits, and declined in their overthrow. Their restoration attended the new reaction, and their depression once more brought it to an end. The motive and ruling power, or agency in the papal system, has all along been monastic—the *esprit du corps* of a body of men harmonized in interest separate from general society. In this respect, consequently, its spirit is directly antagonist to that of Christ.

But, enough: the peculiarities, whereby Latinism in the church has gradually compressed itself into the bounds of a section, are not to be exhausted in an article. And yet, although the Latin church has no claim to be regarded as the

church catholic, the relations which it held to the world, and to revealed religion, during the middle ages, rendered it by far the most interesting and important section for that period. It alone maintained an ecclesiastical superiority above the adaptations, conveniences, or impositions of the civil government; and, even at its worst estate, bore testimony to the existence of a religious power, which the state had never made; and, while accumulating error in its practical operations, it still preserved, in the works to which it professed allegiance, the fullest exposition of truth. In keeping up the aggressive spirit and work of Christianity, in publishing to the nations, wherever access to them could be secured, the way of salvation, as then understood, and in surrounding them by its own laws and authority, it acted as an important check upon absolute heathenism: and it always contained a great number of faithful witnesses for the truth, in opposition to the vices by itself contracted and persisted in. As educator of the young nations of Western Europe, and while remaining in harmony with them, it received as well as gave support, energy, and enterprise, not elsewhere then existing in the church: and even from the depths of its lowest degeneracy, it sent forth the Reformation.

So well defined, so naturally limited, and of such varied interest, is the subject which Dean Milman has chosen for the most extensive of his works. It is also a subject, which in all its important proportions belongs to the past. In order to exhibit them truly in its maturity, and green old age, it was not necessary to follow it into the protracted feebleness of senility. And, when speaking of a work on church history, it is not unnecessary to add that it is not a text-book; that it is not a graduated series of ecclesiastical annals, nor an argument from history, nor an attempt to preach history; but a genuine work of historic art, in which the proportions and relations of the subject are symmetrically exhibited. The author justly accepts the papacy as the centre of interest, and his guiding line. He opens with the pontificate of Damasus, but enters into the full current of his narrative only with the first half of the fifth century, a period which began with Innocent I., and closed with Leo I., the real founders of that singular power.

He consistently dwells upon those features by which Latin Christianity went on to differ more and more from primitive catholicism, and finally separating entirely from the East, became a section. The larger part of the work is properly expended upon the period lying between the middle of the eleventh century and the opening of the fourteenth, during which Latin Christianity was both most exclusive and most successful. The narrative contracts as it enters the period when councils assumed authority over the Pope, and the northern mind began to overbalance the Italian: and comes to an end, on the verge of the Reformation, when that northern, or Teutonic element, put a check upon the further development of the Latin, and seriously curtailed the dimensions of its reign. A new division was then made of Christendom, with the predominance of a new civilization, upon the basis of a free gospel.

As thus treated, the subject is possessed of symmetry and completeness; but it is not yet the whole of Latin Christianity. Its long decline, with alternate sinkings and revivings, its fierce wars with Protestantism, its futile, and yet prolonged and sometimes alarming strife with the civilization of the modern world, and the spirit of intelligence and liberality, remains, when it shall have accomplished its final fall, an interesting, though different style of theme for some future pen.

ART. III.—*Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature.* By THOMAS H. HUXLEY, F. R. S., F. L. S., Professor of Natural History, &c. London. American edition, New York, 1863.

IT is the object of Professor Huxley to prove that man is so related, in structure and other physical aspects, to the apetribes, that both are to be placed in the same division of the great class of mammals. The order, Primates, of Linnæus, is the Professor's place of man in nature. He adds, also, the probability that man was *developed* from the ape family by

some fortunate operations of the laws that direct the changes of matter.

About a hundred years ago, the Hon. James Burnett, a scholar, philosopher, and lawyer, who was raised to the Scottish bench by George II., under the title of Lord Monboddo, the name of one of his estates, maintained a similar but inferior view of the ape tribe, in his great work on the "Origin and Progress of Language." The announcement was then considered as an eccentric conceit of a fanciful mind, breaking away from fixed principles and established modes of reasoning. Though Lord Monboddo designed in that work to maintain and "vindicate the honour of Grecian literature," he overlooked or repudiated the doctrine of his honoured masters, of Socrates and Plato, and especially of Aristotle, that man forms a race distinct from the mere animal world, and even the highest animals. He doubtless believed, as he distinctly stated, that the Orang-Outan belongs to the human species, and that the want of speech is merely accidental; the animal not having been taught articulate language, and so did not speak. He elevated the Orang above the place assigned him by Linnæus in 1766, and nearly as high as Professor Huxley fixes his place. The notion of Lord Monboddo was so opposed to the deductions of common sense on the rank of man, as immeasurably superior to that of the highest animal, that it found no favour with intelligent minds. But the times have changed.

This work of Professor Huxley may have been published in consequence of the following circumstances.

In 1857, Professor Owen maintained before the Linnæan Society, London, that among the divisions of the brain, that of man was distinguished from that of the ape-tribe, by three structures, the *posterior lobe*, the *posterior cornu*, and the *hippocampus minor*. On the differences in the brain he made a new arrangement* of the mammals, and placed man in the sub-class, Archen-cephala, (Brain-Ruler.) Thus he raised man even above that of Cuvier's classification, and needed to take only half a step to remove man into a separate class from

* On the Classification and Geographical Distribution of the Mammalia, by Richard Owen, F. R. S. London. 1859.

the other mammals. An important and active controversy ensued, in which Professor Huxley offered proof that those three parts are equally prominent in the brain of many, or of all the apes, and even more prominent in some. He calls to his aid a great weight of authority in the statements of continental zoölogists, and declares that his statements are fully supported by his own and their examination of the different ape brains, though Professor Owen has not admitted the fact. Even if these were so, Professor Owen would find proof enough of the correctness of his sub-class, in the admitted difference of the form and magnitude of the human brain and its case, compared with that of the ape-tribe. A brief history of this controversy is given in the work now to be examined, (pp. 133—8,) nearly to 1863. Much of the work had already been delivered in Six Lectures to the Working Men of London, and in other places, so that the truth or errors of the work have had opportunity to produce no little evil or good.

Let us turn to the work for the conclusion which Professor Huxley derives from his examination of the anatomical relations of man and the ape-tribe. It is, "that the structural differences which separate man from the gorilla and chimpanzee are not so great as those which separate the gorilla from the lower apes." P. 123. It must be recollectcd that Cuvier, in his finished work of 1829, had placed *man* in Order 1, of the Mammalia; *apes* in Order 2; *bats* in Order 3, and so on. This system had been received by zoölogists as a great improvement on the revised classification of Linnæus in 1766, though it treated of man as a mere animal, or made no account of his intellectual and moral powers, the highest and the exclusive powers of the race, in the arrangement.

As Professor Huxley maintains that the classification of Linnæus should replace that of Cuvier in relation to man and apes, it is necessary to give, in part, the Linnæan system, that all may clearly see the difference. Taking the same class, Mammalia, Linnæus divided it into Order 1, *Primates*; Order 2, *Bruta*, as ant-eaters, armadillo, &c.; Order 3, *Feræ*, dog, cat, bear, and so on. Under Order 1, *Primates*, Linnæus placed four genera; as 1, *Homo*, *man*; 2, *Simia*, *apes*; 3, *Lemur*, *sub-apes*; and 4, *Vespertilio*, *bats*. From these Professor Hux-

ley excludes *Vespertilio*, the bat-tribe. This change being made, he declares that "a century of anatomical research brings us back to his (the Linnæan) conclusion, that man is a member of the same Order (Primates) as the apes and lemurs." P. 124. He contends for the substitution of Primates, diminished by the bat-tribe, for Order 1, *man*, and Order 2, *apes*, of Cuvier's classification. Half a century after the completion of the *Systema Naturæ*, Cuvier placed man in a distinct division at the head of the highest class, Mammalia; but a century after that work appeared, as Professor Huxley states, the progress of "anatomical research" backwards arranges man in the same Order with the ape-tribe! Thus Professor Huxley divides the Order, Primates, into *first*, man alone; *second*, the man-like apes; *third*, the new world apes chiefly, and so on.

Having settled the arrangement in this manner, no one could have anticipated his statement, that "perhaps no order of mammals presents us with so extraordinary a series of gradations as this,—leading us insensibly from the crown and summit of the animal creation (man) down to creatures, from which there is but a step, as it seems, to the lowest, smallest, and least intelligent of the placental" (highest form of) "mammalia." Pp. 124–5. If there is this vast difference in the intelligence, and the Professor should have conjoined with the intellectual, the moral power, of creatures so similar in structural form, and in all perceptible organization, can their rational and psychical powers or qualities be dependent on structure? Have philosophers been mistaken in asserting a corresponding difference in organization, as the indication of higher mental powers? If they have made a mistake, who can maintain that the fish, or lobster, or oyster, has not a noble endowment of reason and taste, of morality and religion? Either there is a vast difference in the kind and quality of the psychical endowments, or the system of structural zoölogy is an absurdity, as it does not and can not present the grand distinctions between creatures as rational and irrational, as mortal and immortal, as ignorant of the Divine energy and goodness, or as admiring and rejoicing in both.

Though Professor Huxley speaks of the "animal creation," and of the animals as "creatures," it is to be feared that he

does not admit^{*} the existence of a Creator of all things, as he denies "the intervention of any but what are termed secondary causes in the production of all the phenomena of the universe." P. 128. Still, man's proximity to the ape, which never had a thought of creation, or of its own existence as created, and never knew, or aspired to know, the beneficence with which the Creator has surrounded it, must be maintained and believed from their organization. Then the Professor proceeds to read to proud and lord-like man, who presumes to glory in his higher being and endowments as the lord of creation, the only moral lesson in the book, viz: "It is as if nature herself had foreseen the arrogance of man, and with Roman severity had provided that his intellect, by its very triumphs, should call into prominence the slaves, admonishing the conqueror that he is but dust." P. 125. What a wise and benevolent agent nature, not God, its Creator, is, to teach arrogant and extravagant man that he is formed of the same material, and moulded into the same structure as the brute ape; that is, he is organized dust, or matter, and no more; the fit associate of his elder brother, the ape: and that the conqueror and the conquered are subject to the same law, "dust to dust."

Thus, Professor Huxley gives us *his* "Man's Place in Nature." Let us consider the reasoning, by which he excludes Cuvier's arrangement of man, and revives the "Primates" of Linnæus, to the head of which he restores man. It is a comparison of certain structural parts of the anthropoid, or man-like apes, with the same in the human race. These apes are four: 1, Hylobates, the gibbon, or long-armed ape; 2, Orang-Outan; 3, Chimpanzee; and 4, Gorilla. All are brutes; "thoroughly brutal." P. 10.

In accordance with the views of Owen, Wyman, and other distinguished anatomists, Professor Huxley states, that the chimpanzee and the gorilla show the nearest resemblance to the organism of man.

The common characters of the man-like apes are, 1st, the same number and kinds of teeth as man; 2d, "their nostrils have a narrow partition, and look downwards," hence "called catarrhine apes;" 3d, their "arms always longer than their legs," or in the Orang as $14\frac{1}{2}$ to 10; Gibbon $12\frac{1}{2}$ to 10,

Gorilla 12 to 10, and Chimpanzee 11 to 10; 4th, hands, with a thumb, terminate their fore-limbs; 5th, foot with a thumb-like great toe, ends the hind limbs; 6th, all tail-less, and without cheek-pouches. Pp. 34-5. Their teeth are not level like man's, and their canine are large and long projecting tusks. P. 98.

It is admitted also, that the higher mammalia and man are closely alike in "the mode of origin, and the early steps of development," as well as in their birth, and the contrivances for respiration, nutrition, and growth. But the different orders of mammalia are not distinguished by these general properties, or structures, but by differences of a less general kind. As animal existences, there must be striking points of resemblance and contrivances, which, however, do not exclude structural and physiological differences which shall separate the Orders from each other, and even man from the Order in which the apes should be placed. These must have often occurred to every intelligent observing mind.

Professor Huxley's argument contains a careful comparison of numerous and important resemblances, and differences, in their structures. We need to trace these comparisons only for a few particulars, to apprehend their force.

He treats first of the proportions of the body and limbs, having found that the "vertebral column of a full grown gorilla measures twenty-seven inches." To make the comparisons more obvious and tangible, we give in a tabular form the lengths of the several organs mentioned.

Relative Length of certain Organs, the Spinal Column of Gorilla taken as 100 inches.

Names.	Spinal Column.	Arm.	Leg.	Hand.	Foot.
Gorilla,	100	115	96	36	41
Male Bosjesman,	100	78	110	26	32
Female do.	100	83	120	26	32
European,	100	80	117	26	35
Chimpanzee,	100	96	90	43	39
Orang,	100	122	88	48	52
Gibbon,	100	173	133	50	52

The variations in these organs are very striking, but the mere lengths, or relative lengths, have little value, and the true esti-

mate is to be found in their adaptation to the animal in its mode of living and acting. It may be curious that the length of the arm (115) of the gorilla is nearly a mean proportional between those of the gibbon (179) and of the Bosjesman, or $\frac{173}{115} = \frac{115}{96}$ nearly; and that the gibbon's leg (133) is to that (110) of the Bosjesman, as this last (110) is to the leg (96) of the gorilla nearly, or that $\frac{133}{110} = \frac{110}{96}$ nearly. In other cases the ratio is very different. The truth is, that the uses, or physiological considerations, must be the great point. In the four animals, the arms are long for aiding in locomotion, so that the ape may move nearly in a half-erect position; and to effect this, the lengths must be adjusted to the length of the spinal column and of the legs, and even of the hands. This will be seen under their locomotion.

Professor Huxley compares their vertebral column, ribs, and pelvis; their skulls in shape, articulation, and quantity of brain; their teeth; their hand and foot, and so on. He holds their foot to be a *foot*, and not a *hand* ever. P. 112.

The conclusion is then stated by Professor Huxley: "Thus, whatever system of organs be studied," we must come "to one and the same result—that the structural differences, which separate man from the gorilla and the chimpanzee, are not so great as those which separate the gorilla from the lower apes." P. 133. Here, then, is his reason for retaining the Order, *Primates*, of Linnæus, of which man is made the first genus and family, (p. 124,) in opposition to the generally received arrangement of Cuvier.

This conclusion of Professor Huxley is extravagant, and is not sustained by more extended views of the comparisons. This may appear in the following examination.

1. Consider other statements in his work.

He takes special care to deny that "the differences between man and even the higher apes are small and insignificant," and asserts "distinctly" that "they are great;" and he adds, "that in the present creation, at any rate" (and of what other creation does Professor Huxley pretend to have *any knowledge?*) "no intermediate link bridges over the gap between Homo (man) and Troglodytes" (gorilla or chimpanzee.) Again, he asserts, "there is no existing link between man and the

gorilla." Pp. 123, 124. If this is the fact and the truth, then ought man to be placed by himself in an order distinct from the ape-like tribe, for there are obvious links which connect the gorilla, and all the man-like apes, with the other divisions of the ape family. Of these there has never been a doubt, and cannot be a denial. And, if their differences are greater than those between man and the gorilla, and this is to be the law of classifying, let new orders be formed for them, and not man be excluded from his due position because the apes have not been properly classed. This is the obvious and the logical course. Besides, on what principle are equal differences between the Orders required? who has done it? where has it been effected? It is enough for the Orders, that they contain animals which have certain common relations, as *all carniverous*, *all ruminants*, *all pachyderms*, *all bimana*. Thus the Linnæan division of Primates would disappear, as Cuvier saw it ought, and Professor Huxley's "Man's Place in Nature" be heard of no more.

Let us hear the Professor once more. While he states that *no structural or physical distinction* can be found to separate man from the animals, he says, "At the same time no one is more strongly convinced than I am of the vastness of the gulf between civilized man and the brutes; or is more certain that whether *from them* or not, he is assuredly *not of them*." The words in italics are marked by him. Man is separated by a *vast gulf* from them, and is possessed of such high powers that he is *not of them*, but is raised far above them, so as not to belong to them.

If no structural or physical difference exists, as he asserts, then he admits there are other differences which separate man from the brutes, even from the highest apes. He states one such difference. "No one is less disposed to think lightly of the present dignity, or despairingly of the future hopes of the only consciously intelligent denizen of this world." Pp. 131, 132. Here Professor Huxley actually points out the complete separation of man from all the animals by his being "*the only consciously intelligent*" being of earth. This is a difference neither physical nor structural, as he clearly maintains. Whatever he understands by it, it is a mighty and the noblest distinction,

belonging to man only of the creatures of the earth. What a miserable, falsifying natural arrangement is that, which unites beings of such exclusive powers, with the animals only a step above "the lowest, smallest, and least intelligent" of the true mammals.

Still further; while Professor Huxley states that "man is, in substance and in structure, one with the brutes," which means only that man has truly an animal nature, which no one in this age denies, he adds, that man "alone possesses the marvellous endowment of intelligible and rational speech." Here is another entire separation of man from the animals, and by a different power from that before assigned by him. But, if "the possession of articulate speech is the grand distinctive character of man," (p. 122) there must be a *correspondent difference in the organism*, as well as in the psychical endowment. The structure for "articulate speech" must be formed, and the intellect to use it must be given. Man has both; the mere animal has neither. Of the numerous tribes of men, all have possessed "intelligible and rational speech;" but of the mere animals in their myriads, not one form ever known, from the wondrous polyp, which elaborates its coral dome in the ocean, to the curious ape family, which simulates some human actions, not one has uttered "articulate speech," not one has been structurally or intellectually fitted to have this "grand distinctive character of man." The parrot has been taught to make the sound of every letter of the English alphabet, and to speak certain imitations of short sentences; but that bird has never expressed one thought from its "endowment of intelligible and rational speech." Here, then, is a difference in the structure which separates man from the manlike apes as completely as from the lower apes, or from the polyp itself. In this case, the great conclusion of Professor Huxley signally fails. Man is separated from the gorilla and chimpanzee by an organism of inestimable value, and in respect to which the man-like apes do not differ from the rest of the ape family. There is then palpable reason from the structure, for the location of man by Cuvier in an Order from which all apes are excluded.

There is no evading this result. Surely, Professor Hux-

ley will not deny to man the organism by which he forms that “intelligible and rational speech,” and enjoys that interchange of thought to which the brute is a stranger, because of its destitution of the structure, and, of course, also of the mental power, which could never be used. Led to this view by the admission of Professor Huxley, who will not wonder that the Professor does not admit and glory in that moral power, which is more grand and important than articulate language; that apprehension and enjoyment of goodness, purity, and wisdom, and that discovery and love of the infinite perfections of the Creator, in these his glorious works. This is the distinction to be gloried in. Speech and high reason were given to man for the most beneficent action of the moral power, that man might be subject to his nobler spiritual nature.

2. Differences in posture and locomotion.

The articulations of the body of man fit him to stand erect, and to walk or run erect, without any support or help. The balancing of the body, as it stands on so narrow a base, and with the centre of gravity between the hips, and over that base, is unique and singularly beautiful. The curve of the spine, the articulations at the head and hips, and extending from the pelvis to and through the foot, and the placing of his foot flat upon the earth, have no parallel in the animals.

As this is an important matter, let us take the latest descriptions of the man-like apes, and pursue the marked differences, especially in those said the most to resemble man. The quotations are made from Professor Huxley’s work, occasionally naming the authors he uses as authority.

The CHIMPANZEE: native name *Enché-eko*, corrupted into jocko; scientific name *Troglodytes** *niger*, black Hole-creeper, as it lives in caves or under rocks, builds nests in trees. Western Africa from lat. 15° N. to 10° S.

The chimpanzee, at rest generally sits, “sometimes seen standing or walking;” takes “to all-fours” on detection, and “flees.” Their organization is such “that they cannot stand erect, but lean forward,” balancing themselves by “their hands clasped over the occiput, or the lumber region.” P. 56.

* *Homo troglodytes*, Lin., or *Simia troglodytes*, Blum.

"The toes of the adult are strongly flexed, and turned inwards," so that "the full expansion of the foot, as is necessary in walking, is unnatural. The natural position is on all-fours, the body anteriorly resting upon the knuckles," which are greatly enlarged, "and thickened like the sole of the foot." P. 56.

"They are expert climbers;" "in their gambols they swing from limb to limb at a great distance, and leap with astonishing agility." P. 57. "Biting is their principal art of defence," for which their *strong canines* are well fitted weapons: in their natural state, not carnivorous. P. 57. The chimpanzee is evidently a quadruped, a mere brute. It has "arms which reach below the knees; its hair is black," and the "skin of the face is pale."

The GORILLA: native name *Engé-ena*, (or "Pongo," probably from the country, Mpongwe, on the banks of Gaboon river); lives in the interior of Lower Guinea;" scientific name, *Troglodytes gorilla*, the *Gorilla gina* of I. G. St. Hilaire, as the natives on the Gaboon call it *gina*.

"About five feet high,"* very broad shoulders, large limbs and body "covered with coarse black hair, becoming gray," or "dark gray or dun hair;" "arms very long, reaching some way below the knee;" "chest and shoulders very broad," fully double the size of the Enché-eko (chimpanzee); head of "great width and elongation of face," and of "comparative smallness of the cranial portion." P. 61-2.

"The gait is shuffling; the motion of the body, which is never upright as in man, but bent forward, is somewhat rolling, or from side to side. The arms being longer than of the chimpanzee, it does not stoop as much in walking," but advances "like that animal, by thrusting its arms forward, resting the hands on the ground, and then giving the body a half-jumping, half-swinging motion between them," extending its fingers and "making a fulcrum of the hand." "It is said to be much inclined" to take the "walking posture," and balances "its huge body by flexing its arms upwards." It seems to be

* The full-grown specimen examined by the writer of this article was just 4 feet 6 inches high.

obliged to use its hands to aid in walking, being "never upright as in man." The gorilla "rises to his feet when making an attack, though he approaches his antagonist in a stooping posture." He strikes his antagonist, or "dashes him upon the ground, and lacerates him with his tusks." Pp. 60-66.

It needs no critical knowledge of anatomy to understand the vast difference of the joints and articulations of the gorilla's foot, ankle, pelvis, spinal column and head, from those of man. These descriptions show him to be a terrible brute, a quadruped, separated from man in structure. Such are the anthropoids of Africa.

The Asiatic species, the gibbons and orangs, have been longer and better known.

The GIBBON: scientific name, *Hylobates*, from the Greek, which means, Wood-traverser; inhabits Java, and the adjacent lands; the tallest little exceed three feet, and their slender bodies are far smaller in proportion. Their muscular power is wonderful, as seen in their gambols and feats of hanging, jumping, and throwing themselves from and through the branches of trees. *Hylobates agilis* is so named for its feats. "The gibbons are the smallest, slenderest, and longest-limbed of the man-like apes; their arms are longer in proportion to their bodies, so that they can touch the ground when erect." P. 35. Mr. Martin says of the gibbons generally, "They walk erect, with a waddling or unsteady gait, but at a quick pace; the equilibrium of the body requiring to be kept up, either by touching the ground with the knuckles, first on one side, then on the other, or by uplifting the arms so as to poise it." Pp. 40-41.

Another eye-witness, Dr. Lewis, says, "Their progression was not by placing one foot before the other, but by simultaneously using both, as in jumping." This is confirmed by S. Miller, p. 40. Dr. Burrough states; "They walk erect; and when placed on the floor, or in an open field, balance themselves very prettily by raising their hands over their heads, and slightly bending the arm at the wrist and elbow, and then run tolerably fast, rocking from side to side; and if urged to greater speed, they let fall their hands to the ground, and assist

themselves forward, rather jumping than running, still keeping the body, however, nearly erect." P. 40.

These testimonies from Professor Huxley show, that the structure or articulation, or both, make the posture and progression of the gibbons exceedingly different from that of man: in other words, that the gibbon is a brute quadruped, and man is a man.

The ORANG-OUTAN, or Utan: *wood-man*, man of the woods; scientific name, *Simia satyrus*, and later, *Pithecius* (ape) *satyrus*: inhabits Sumatra and Borneo; about four feet high, said to be sometimes five feet, with large and heavy body, "covered with reddish-brown hair." The arms of the orang "reach to the ankles in their erect position." P. 35. "An orang climbs so slowly and cautiously, as in this act to resemble a man more than an ape," but "in climbing he moves alternately one hand and one foot." In this respect he moves like the common quadrupeds. P. 49.

"On the ground, the orang always goes laboriously and shakily, on all fours." "In walking, the body is usually directed straight forward, unlike the other apes, which run more or less obliquely, except the gibbons." P. 49.

"The orang cannot put its feet flat on the ground, but is supported upon their *outer edges*, the heel resting more on the ground," but the "hands are held in the opposite manner, their *inner edges* serving as the chief support." To this he adds, "The orang never stands on its hind legs, and all the pictures representing it are as false as the assertion that it defends itself with sticks, and the like." Pp. 50-51.

From these statements on the "two Asiatic man-like apes," Professor Huxley concludes that "such an ape may readily move along the ground in the erect, or semi-erect position, and without direct support from its arms." P. 55. Yet, it is in the evidence that the gibbon, though erect, has to maintain itself in that posture, either by bringing its long arms and hands to the ground, or by using them as a balancer; and that the orang *never stands on the hind feet*, but walks on all-fours, the leaning posture being natural on account of the length of the fore legs. The difference in the erect position and walk of man, and his running also, from all this, is too palpable to need remark.

So also, it must be seen in the African man-like apes. The gorilla is much like the orang, and neither stands erect. The chimpanzees are "sometimes seen standing or walking," but on discovery "immediately take to all-fours. Such is their organization, that they cannot stand erect," and must run only on all-fours. P. 56.

3. The next point of difference is the adaptation of the arms or upper extremities of man to the use of the head, and not of the body or locomotion chiefly. In the man-like apes, as has been shown, the grand action of the arms and hands is for movement or progression, slower or faster; yet in man they are not so employed except indirectly, but used to carry out the objects of thought. "In man the anterior (limbs) are transferred from the *locomotive* to the *cephalic* series. They serve the purposes of the *head*. The *cephalization* of the body here reaches its extreme limit. Man in this stands *alone** among mammals."

The fore-limbs of man have *two* uses; 1. "The *inferior*, depending on the demands of the appetite through the mouth;" and 2. "The *superior*, depending on the demands of man's higher nature," even "a spiritual nature, in which the brute has no share. The raising of the fore-limbs from the ground, for esthetic, intellectual, and spiritual service, is in direct harmony with such a spiritual endowment."† This has led Professor Dana to rank man as the first division or subclass of mammals, more than sustaining the first Order of Cuvier; as he thus states. "The *intellectual*" (and let us add, *psychical*) "character of man, sometimes thought to be too intangible to be regarded by the zoölogical systematist, is thus expressed in his material structure. Man is, therefore, not one of the Primates alongside of the monkeys; he stands alone, the *Archon‡* of mammals." He is the ruler, chief, head, of the lower creation.

This view is sustained by facts. It places man in a high and striking position from structure, though it is not the most characteristic position, as this would introduce his *psychical* char-

* Dana in *Silliman's Journal*, 1863, Jan., p. 65, and May, p. 452.

† Dana's *Geology*, 1863. Pp. 422 and 573.

‡ Classification, p. 50. Dr. Owen.

acters, and make them the base of the zoölogical system. But it is superior to that of *Encephala* of Owen, were it supported on perfectly tenable facts, as it can be; for it is more accessible than the brain can be, and, being an external character, it is manifest to the plainest and most direct examination.

Professor Owen had adverted to this cephalization* where he states the "favorable position of the upper limbs, now liberated from the service of locomotion, with complex joints for rotary as well as flexible movements, and terminated by a hand of matchless perfection of structure, the fit instrument for executing the behests of a rational intelligence and a free will."

These structural and physiological differences, which are most important and distinctive, separate man so much farther from the man-like apes, than these higher apes are separated from the lower ape-tribe, that one sees at a glance that the *Primates* of Linnæus cannot be sustained, and that even Order 1, of Cuvier, is below "man's true place" in zoölogy based on structure.

4. Differences in the skull and brain.

As the brain is the admitted organ of the mind, and as man possesses vastly greater powers of mind than the apes, we may here find great disparity in several respects.

So Professor Huxley writes, "The differences between a gorilla's skull and a man's are truly immense." These appear in the form or shape, the position, and the cavity. The form of the skull is in man more round, or slightly oblong, the *brachycephalic* of Retzius; in others, as the negro, more oblong, the *dolichocephalic* of the same author. In the gorilla, the skull is lengthened and flattened far more.† "In man, the occipital

* Classification, p. 50. Dr. Owen.

† In the full grown gorilla, which the writer examined, the statements of Professor Huxley were palpably true. The flattening and lengthening of the skull securing the smallness of the brain-cavity, and yet the enormous size of the head, with the indications of brutal properties beyond those of ox, horse, dog, tiger, or grizzly bear, were all most striking, even with the fine covering of blackish or dun hair. The upper or brain-cavity of the skull occupies a very great proportion of the head of man, while that of gorilla takes a very small proportion of his head. In Huxley's figures of the man-like apes, the brain-cavity is shown to be very small. Then the jaws of the gorilla, with their large incisors and their huge canines or tusks, indicate mere brute and

foramen is placed just behind the centre of the base of the skull, which thus becomes evenly balanced in the erect posture; in the gorilla, it lies in the posterior third of that base," (p. 93,) which is not suited or fitted to the erect posture, in consistency with the statement already given, "which is never upright as in man."

"The absolute capacity of the cranium is far less than that of man," and even with "the great width and elongation of face" it has "comparative smallness of the cranial portion." The *smallest* human skull, measured by Dr. Morton, has the capacity of 63 cubic inches; but the *largest* skull of gorilla has only $34\frac{1}{2}$ cubic inches. The largest *human* skull given by Morton, contained 114 cubic inches, and the mean of his European skulls is about 90 inches; the former being four times nearly greater, and the latter towards three times greater than that of the maximum gorilla. The skull of Cuvier is stated to have been 114.3 cubic inches. The minimum skull of the gorilla is only 24 cubic inches; so that the skull of a Bosjesman (62 inches) is twice and a half greater than that; and of the European mean (90 inches) is nearly four times larger; and of Cuvier is more than four and a half times larger.

Hence Professor Huxley states, "There is a very striking difference in absolute mass and weight between the lowest human brain and that of the highest ape—a difference which is all the more remarkable when we recollect that a full grown gorilla is probably pretty nearly twice as heavy as a Bosjesman, or as many a European woman," (p. 123,) and even as some men. He adds, "that an average European child of four years old has a brain twice as large as that of an adult gorilla." The mean of five children of four years is 69.2 inches, more than double that of the maximum ($34\frac{1}{2}$ inches) brain of the full grown gorilla, as already given, and nearly three times that of the minimum (24 inches) gorilla brain. Finally, we may notice particularly his statement, that the "cranial capacities of some of the lower apes, fall nearly as much, relatively, below those of

terrible powers. The articulation of the head to the spine, with the short neck and huge muscles, make the brute dreadful. The posture of the specimens was more erect, and more independently erect, than the statements of Professor Huxley will sustain.

the higher apes as the latter fall below man." P. 95. His proposition, however, was, *that they fall MORE below.*

Whatever may be the difference in the volume of the brain of the ape-tribe, it is clear that the skull and brain should form a full separation of man from the apes, higher or lower, and thus place him in a division by himself. Yet Professor Huxley deprecates this structural distinction of man from the apes. He admits "that all difference of function is the result of difference of structure" in the general, and yet denies "that the vast intellectual chasm between the ape and man implies a corresponding chasm in the organs of the intellectual functions," because "intellectual power depends" not "altogether on the brain," (p. 122,) but also upon the organs on which the brain exerts its influence, through the nerves which depend on the brain. Let this be true; yet the higher animals have to their due extent this *same accessory influence* of their brain, but they have not begun to exercise the intellectual powers of the whole family of man. Leaving out of consideration the depressing influence of disease, want of a sense, as the *hearing*, defective structure, or actual enervation, here is man, in all his races, with relatively capacious brain and appropriate nervous structure; and here is the highest ape, in contrast, with his inferior brain and essential nervous modifications corresponding to his wants and adaptations; here are thousands of animals and myriads of men, and between the two, there is a "vast intellectual chasm." Either the brain, or the delicate structural organism that no science can discover and trace, makes this difference, if the function depends on structure; or there is in men an altogether superior endowment of intellect without corresponding difference of organism. In either case, there is palpable proof that man should form a separate Class, or a distinct Order at least.

If to the intellectual we add the moral power, which is as certain and clear as the intelligence itself, so much stronger does science require the separation of man from any and all animal tribes, as the result of original and vast differences, the endowment by creative power and wisdom. And yet Professor Huxley found it "easy to comprehend," in his "Lectures to the Working men in 1860," that an "inconspicuous structural

difference may have been the primary cause of the immensurable and practically infinite divergence of the Human from the Simian stirps."* P. 122. "*May have been*," not at all probable, if indeed possible; *may not have been*, far more reasonable, and even necessary, if Infinite Wisdom directed. His simple illustration of the two watches is more than absurd; for we must compare, for any valuable purpose, not the perfect and strong with the imperfect and weak, not the complete with the defective either in structure or from some physical or even accidental cause, but those equally well qualified in their kind, the usually endowed race of man with the relatively well qualified race of apes. In such case, no one can doubt the difference in the power of brain and mind in the two palpably distinct kinds of being. Professor Huxley admits the "immense difference between a man's intelligence and an ape's," but leaves his readers ignorant of any adequate cause. The reason for this is, that he turns his thought backward and downward into the impenetrable depths of his supposed ancestral origin from some parental ape, and closes his eyes against the light which illuminates the works of infinite Intelligence and Goodness.

As Professor Huxley discards real creative power, he turns

* It may be easy to utter such a thought; but who, judging from the present and the past in nature, has, or can have, any conception of such a possibility? For, could that "inconspicuous structural difference" arise from the powers and operations of the animal nature it possessed? Certainly not; because the nature must act in consistency with itself, and continue its own nature. What originated its animal structures, its organs, and their operations? It could not originate itself, organs, or operations, nor have any volition, desire, appetite or tendency in the case. The *causality* must come from *without*. Could *chance* have been the cause? Then chance must have worked with design and contrivance, for these are indisputable in all organic structures. Such is not chance, or accident, or casualty, or fatuity, which is *happening without a cause* for its beginning and its action. Could it come from the laws of matter? What power of matter is known to produce any such effect? It cannot be gravitation, or cohesion, elasticity, or any known property; not chemical attraction or electricity, heat or light. There remains only intelligent, designing power, a thinking cause, which adapts means to ends, and secures definite and certain results. The operations will be consistent with the given nature, and must perpetuate it. The "inconspicuous structural difference" would be against its nature. We cannot but coincide with Professor Owen's view; such development "is physiologically inconceivable."

to Darwin's "natural selection," or "selective modification," as the only propounded "physical causation," which has "any scientific existence." P. 125. He admits his want of knowledge that the "genera and families of ordinary animals" and plants, are produced by any such cause. Besides "structural distinctions" in plants and animals, he sees that they "exhibit physiological characters," so that they are "either altogether incompetent to breed one with another; or, if they breed, the resulting mule, or hybrid, is unable to perpetuate its race with another hybrid of the same kind." P. 126.

This great fact in favour of original and distinct species, Professor Huxley admits, and declares that his "acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis must be *provisional*, so long as *one link in the chain* of evidence is wanting;" and "that link will be wanting," till there is "proof that physiological species may be produced by selective breeding." P. 128. He knew not any such instances; no one has known them.

Considering the position of Professor Huxley and his strong proclivities towards the adoption of "selective modification," his belief in the paucity of hybrids, and in the non-existence of fertile hybrids, deserves high consideration; it is the admission of convincing argument over a reluctant mind. This unbelief in the fertility of hybrids is doubtless well founded and correct. How few, if any, are known to be fertile, compared with those *not hybridous*. How few real hybrids are known to exist. Even Dr. Morton, in his article in favour of Hybridism* in animals and plants, admits "that hybrids, as a general law, are contrary to nature." He quotes with approbation the language of Pritchard, "that there is in nature some principle, which prevents the intermixture of species, and maintains the order and variety of the animal creation." This is the "physiological character," or, as Pritchard calls it, "a natural repugnance." Dr. Morton also says that barrenness "is usually the case with mules," meaning *hybrids*, and asserts "that domestication evolves the faculty of hybridity." Of this point Professor Agassiz has lately said, "the experiments upon domesticated animals and cultivated plants, are entirely foreign

* *Silliman's Journal*, vol. iii., 1847, May and July.

to the matter in hand, since the varieties thus brought about by the fostering care of man are of an entirely different character from those observed among wild species.”*

But, after all the progress in zoölogy and comparative anatomy, how little has been learned on points of organism which solve the mysteries of our birth and growth, and the activities of our minds. What has the dissecting knife, the analysis of the chemist, or the microscope, revealed to us of that constitution of the brain which fits it to be the organ of mind. Professor Huxley shows some of the differences and resemblances in the form and sections of the brain of man and the apes; that both have all the great, and some subordinate divisions of the brain, as well as other points of interest; but, on what constitution of the brain it is, that the one belongs to the ape and develops its powers, and moves the interests centering in a tree or den, and the other is fitted for him whose intellect and heart move nations and convulse the world, he has made no discovery, and even excludes them from his system. Professor Huxley also states, that “the mode of origin and the early stages of the development of man are identical with those of the animals immediately below him in the scale,” p. 83, and he might have added those considerably removed from him; yet, who has discovered on what organic constitution it is that the egg of the bee becomes only a bee, that of the fly changes into a fly, that of the dog producing a dog, that of the ape only an ape of that particular tribe and species, and that of a man is developed only into a man. Here is a law of *production after its kind*, constant and universal as the law of gravitation. The cause for wonder increases with the knowledge that the general structure of the eggs of the higher animals at least is precisely the same, and that the nascent young cannot early be recognised, not indeed till the tissues begin to take on their special form. These facts are thus presented by Professor Huxley; that the nascent chick, “at one stage of its existence, is so like the nascent dog, that ordinary inspection would hardly distinguish the two,” and that in a more early stage this distinction is impossible; or, as he states,

* *Method of Study, &c., p. v., 1863.*

"it is very long before the body of the young human being can be readily discriminated from that of the young puppy."

This will satisfy the careful student of nature, as in the case of the brain, that an unerring Power has planned these works, and is moving onward their operations according to his purpose of manifesting his wisdom and goodness through his works; that not *mere matter* is engaged in the causes and changes, but that the Infinite is thus revealing himself to the finite mind.

The human brain may be the larger, to indicate the higher powers of its possessor, and it may be of finer structure also, adapted to the nobler psychical characters of the man. Thus we come to that organization in the vegetable, through which it is nourished and propagates its species: to that organism in the animal, of a higher structure, to which is added the power of sensation and voluntary motion, and many other adjunct properties belonging to the mere animal; and to that organization in man in which we find these two previous endowments associated with another of a purer and more exalted kind, the moral sense, and the appreciation of Infinite goodness. From the last two, it is certain there is a radical difference between man and the ape, or any brute. Though Professor Huxley admits this fact, in the "immeasurable and practically infinite divergence" of man from the ape, he maintains there is no *structural difference* to account for it, or to lay a foundation for it, while he ought, on the admission, to separate man from the other Primates, and allot the far higher place to man.

Finally, Professor Huxley is aware of the "repugnance with which the majority" of men do and will "meet the conclusions" to which he has honestly come, and which they honestly oppose and reject. This "repugnance" is well founded, and highly honours our race. It is because men in general *see in others the exercise, and are conscious in themselves of the possession*, of powers intellectual and moral, ever shown by man, but of which they have never known the least indication in the whole range of brutes, whatever the structures may be, or to whatever extent these may agree or differ. Though some animals may be trained to perform surprising acts, they still *are brutes*, and continue to *be brutes*; the chasm

remains in all its immensity, established in the constitution of things, palpable, and has its parallel in things equally well known. There is a great chasm between inorganic and organic matter. They do not come into the same category. The chasm is still greater between vegetable and animal peculiar properties. Between the mere animal life and the human soul the chasm is yet wider and deeper. Men feel it in that moral power, in particular, which they never see in the brute. "We are men and women," and not brutes, because we are moral beings, separated from the brute by an immeasurable distance both in *quality* and in *kind* of powers. This repugnance must exist; the reason and the conscience sustain it. Give to each, man and brute, its own proper place, as the Creator has shown in his works. This is the nearly universal demand, because it is the voice of God in the consciousness of men. Often as the false philosophy occurs and bewilders some minds, the chasm is seen and felt, and men stop before the yawning gulf. The battle is fought; the victory is won. In view of such an animal origin of man, which was held by some long ago, Owen quotes Sir Henry More as writing in 1662: "It is sufficient for a good man that *he is conscious unto himself* that he is more nobly descended, better bred and born, and more skilfully taught by the purged faculties of his own minde."

ART. IV.—*The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.* Translated by GEORGE LONG. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1864.

THIS volume allows us the privilege of protracted and leisurely interviews with a very remarkable man; and one placed in such circumstances that what he has to say is of much more than common interest. Our visitor is nothing less than a Roman Emperor, of the second century of the Christian era, while Rome was still mistress of the world, and at the same time blessed with the highest civilization and knowledge that men had ever attained. Greece had gone before, with her

literature, her science, her lofty speculations, and her beautiful arts. The human mind had been vigorously applied to the great questions that naturally present themselves to men not favoured with divine revelation duly authenticated, and had done as much toward their solution as could be justly hoped from mere reason in our fallen estate. Homer had sung, Herodotus had appeared as the father of history, Socrates had discussed almost every topic of prudence and wisdom in the conduct of life, Plato had soared into the highest regions of speculation, Aristotle had taught the art of formal reasoning, and established many truths of natural science, and Demosthenes had exhibited the loftiest powers of rhetoric; while many lesser lights had reflected and further displayed the brightness of these chief luminaries of the intellectual world. The treasures thus accumulated had become the inheritance of Rome, and were enjoyed as such in the time of this Antoninus, to a participation of whose best and deepest thoughts we are now so freely invited.

Of the Emperor himself, Gibbon thus speaks, in a few lines which we may safely quote.

After his sketch of the character of Antoninus Pius he remarks: "The virtue of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus was of a severer and more laborious kind. It was the well-earned harvest of many a learned conference, of many a patient lecture, and many a midnight lucubration. At the age of twelve years he embraced the rigid system of the Stoics, which taught him to submit his body to his mind, his passions to his reason; to consider virtue as the only good, vice as the only evil, all things external as things indifferent. His meditations, composed in the tumult of a camp, are still extant; and he even condescended to give lessons of philosophy, in a more public manner than was perhaps consistent with the modesty of a sage, or the dignity of an emperor.* But his life was the noblest commentary on the precepts of Zeno. He was severe to himself, indulgent to the imperfections of others, just and

* "Before he went on the second expedition against the Germans, he read lectures of philosophy to the Roman people, during three days. He had already done the same in the cities of Greece and Asia. *Hist. Aug. in Cassio, c. 3.*" (*Gibbon.*)

beneficent to all mankind. He regretted that Avidius Cassius, who excited a rebellion in Syria, had disappointed him, by a voluntary death, of the pleasure of converting an enemy into a friend; and he justified the sincerity of that sentiment, by moderating the zeal of the senate against the adherents of the traitor. War he detested, as the disgrace and calamity of human nature; but when the necessity of a just defence called upon him to take up arms, he readily exposed his person to eight winter campaigns, on the frozen banks of the Danubé, the severity of which was at last fatal to his constitution. His memory was revered by a grateful posterity, and above a century after his death, many persons preserved the image of Marcus Antoninus among those of their household gods."

Decline and Fall, chap. iii.

We may ask then, with a feeling of no slight interest, how did the world, how did the universe look to this Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus? Nor is our curiosity the less, when we call to mind that he was speculating, often, in regions of thought where the true light of the gospel had been for some time shining, and where he might have gained the clearest views of things, that to him were yet covered with impenetrable darkness. Much reason have we to be thankful that such darkness is not ours.

Antoninus, it is true, might have been a Roman emperor, in these same circumstances, and yet have been able to put in no claim to our regard: for he might have been a mere lover of pleasure, or power, a mere warrior or statesman, and so have had the appearance of seeing nothing with other eyes than those of a day-labourer in the great factory of this world's operations. But, as we have already seen, he was a man of nobler mould. His meditations could not be those of a mere earth-worm; nor were they those of a mere speculator—they were the thoughts of one who had been compelled to seek whatever helps contemplation and philosophy could afford, in the conduct of a life filled with cares and perils of the gravest kind. He was even a teacher of religion, in such sort as he could be, standing in a position where, although the "true light" was not clearly shining, yet not a little of the darkness of the vulgar superstitions had been chased away—in part perhaps by the

same glorious light, which even this prudent and knowing man still rejected. Nor is it the part of a wise man, even in our circumstances, to despise all that such an one may have to say. We may not indeed ask his advice on topics directly concerning our highest interests: but even in the conduct of the Christian life, as it must be in part regulated by the precepts of experience in the conduct of body and mind, we may well sit at the feet of one who, if not blessed with all the light of heaven, has at least used with the utmost skill, the best that this world can afford. Certain it is, that many calling themselves Christians, do not display, in actual life, nearly as much wisdom as did this heathen philosopher; do not bear its trials as well as he apparently did; do not perform the common duties of their stations, nearly as well as they would by the adoption of the maxims set down in the volume before us. It would be a grievous error to assume, that because the Bible teaches all that is necessary to our salvation, we need not, therefore, trouble ourselves about such details of practice, and such lower maxims of prudence, as earthly wisdom may suggest. Be it that "only by celestial observations can terrestrial charts be well constructed," these charts are necessary for our guidance on earth, and true assistance in laying them down may sometimes be had from those who had not the benefit of the highest observations.

We will now formally introduce this illustrious personage to such of our readers as happen not to be acquainted with his history. For this purpose we shall avail ourselves of the sketch, which we find at the beginning of the volume here in hand.

"M. Antoninus was born at Rome, A. D. 121. His father, Annus Verus, died while he was prætor. His mother was Domitia Calvilla, also named Lucilla. The Emperor Antoninus Pius married Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annus Verus, and was consequently Antoninus' uncle. When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius, and declared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus, the son of Ælius Cæsar, and M. Antoninus, whose original name was M. Annus Verus. Antoninus took the name of M. Ælius Aurelius Verus, to which was added the

title of Cæsar in A. D. 139. . . . When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped the name of Verus and took the name of Antoninus. Accordingly he is generally named M. Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. Antoninus.

“The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. He had the happy fortune to witness the example of his uncle and adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his work (i. 16, vi. 30) the virtues of this excellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young Romans, he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric.” Pp. 7, 8.

We append such sketches of his life as may suit our present purpose.

“When he was eleven years old, he assumed the dress of philosophers, something plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most laborious, abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhetoric for philosophy, attaching himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, as a preparation for the high place which he was to fill. It is to be presumed also that he did not neglect the discipline of arms, so necessary for the part that he was subsequently to play.” P. 8.

“Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chæronia, a grandson of Plutarch. . . . His favourite teacher was Q. Junius Rusticus, a philosopher, and also a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was the adviser of Antoninus after he became emperor.” P. 9.

“Hadrian died in July A. D. 138, and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably about A. D. 146; for he had a daughter born in 147. M. Antoninus received from his adoptive father the title of Cæsar, and was associated with him in the administration of the state. The father and adoptive son lived together in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a dutiful son, and the emperor loved and esteemed him.”

“Antoninus Pius died in March 161. The senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to take the solemn administration of the

empire; but he associated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure, and unworthy of his station. Antoninus, however, bore with him, and it is said that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect due to his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived together in peace, and their alliance was strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his daughter Lucilla." P. 10.

"In A. D. 169, Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered the state alone." P. 11.

We do not here attempt anything like a complete sketch of the life of this emperor. On one point, however, a reader not familiar with the portion of history here in view, will naturally ask information. How did this emperor, so wise and good in so many respects, stand affected towards Christianity?

It has been already noted that he enjoyed all the light that the sages of Greece and of Rome before his day, could afford him: but for the moral philosopher, how feeble was all this compared with the light of the gospel? How was he affected by that? Or, if not profited by it, how did he conduct himself toward its adherents?

In the first place, it does not appear that he really knew anything of the Christian doctrine, or felt any respect for its adherents. From a passage in his *Meditations* (xi. 3,) we should infer that he had noticed the readiness of Christians to suffer martyrdom, without being at all aware of the spirit in which they acted. He reflects, "What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished, or dispersed, or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a man's own judgment, not from mere obstinacy as with the Christians, but considerately, and with dignity, and in a way to persuade another, without tragic show."

Little did the good emperor know of St. Paul, and those like him, who judged of their "own judgment," knowing the truths of the gospel, that all else, yea, one's own life, should be esteemed as the vilest thing compared with salvation through

Christ. Little could he conceive of the glorious vision which sustained Stephen in his “obstinacy” under the shower of stones, which gave him sleep from an earthly life to wake in heavenly blessedness.

To us it is clear, that with some exceptions, (if such are shown,) the early Christians gave up their lives to their persecutors, just as “considerately,” with just as much “dignity,” and just as fitly “to persuade others,” as could have been asked by the highest wisdom of philosophy itself. As a mere matter of prudence, such as men always commend, they preferred an infinite portion of spiritual good, to any that time and sense could offer them.

In the second place, it is certain that during the times of M. Antoninus, the Christians were repeatedly persecuted in different parts of the empire; and the most that can be said in the way of apology, perhaps, is that the emperor adopted the policy of his predecessors; and this, in some measure, of necessity: for he was not an autocrat; but rather a constitutional sovereign—checked by the senate, and by the established usages of his imperial functions.

To us it may seem that he was hardly excusable for not knowing more of Christianity; and we might be disposed to say, that if he had taken just pains to come at the truth, he would have embraced it, and made himself a martyr, rather than allow others to be put to death for obeying their God and Saviour. So it may be reasonable to think: but a definitive judgment in the case must be reserved for a higher tribunal.

We here append a single item, in respect to the emperor’s death. During his campaign against the Germanic nations, A. D. 179, “he was seized of some contagious malady,” “of which he died in the fifty-ninth year of his age.” This was in the camp at Sirmium on the Save in Lower Pannonia, or, as some authorities have it, at Vindobona, (Vienna.)

The Second Part of the volume before us is entitled “The Philosophy of Antoninus.” This is derived partly from two essays, referred to on p. 41, and partly from the Meditations themselves. The topics embraced are, of course, Physics, Theology, and Ethics—this latter being especially the conduct of life.

In physical science we cannot expect to learn much from any philosopher of old. The questions which exercised their minds are now mostly obsolete. We have to content ourselves, in respect to the origin of things, with the revealed statement, that "In the beginning," *i. e.*, originally, "God created the heavens and earth;" and in the belief, (*knowledge*, we may call it,) that HE has so constituted matter and mind that all these *phenomena* with which we are especially concerned follow by the exercise of his power. Phenomena, with their laws of concomitance, antecedence, and consequence, or the relations of things in time and space, have been found the only productive studies in nature; and from them we learn all that is needful in the use of such materials and faculties as have been given for our benefit here on earth.

Antoninus, it seems, did not hold to the *creation* of matter. In his theory, that also of Zeno, "God is eternal, and Matter is eternal. It is God who gives to matter its form, but he is not said to have created it. According to this view, which is as old as Anaxagoras, God and matter exist independently, but God governs matter." To those who have the light of revelation the independent existence of matter may seem an absurdity: but mere reason would find it just as difficult to account for the existence of a Spirit eternal, as for that of Matter eternal. We need not then be surprised by such opinions of the ancients: if *we know* better, it is by the teaching of such an Instructor as even a Socrates hoped would at some time come to our relief.

On the subject of cause and effect, we remark by the way, Antoninus seems to have known just as little, and about as much, as we do ourselves. We quote a single passage respecting his views. "He tells us (xii. 10) to look at things and see what they are, resolving them into the material ($\delta\lambda\eta$), the causal ($a\tilde{\iota}\tau\iota\omega\nu$), and the relation ($\delta\pi\alpha\varphi\omega\rho\alpha$), or the purpose, &c. The word cause ($a\tilde{\iota}\tau\iota\omega$) is the difficulty. There is the same word in the Sanscrit (*hétu*); and the subtle philosophers of India and Greece, and the less subtle" (?) "philosophers of modern times have all used this word, or some equivalent, in a vague way. Yet the confusion may sometimes be in the inevitable ambiguity of language, rather than in the mind of

the writer, for I cannot think that some of the wisest of men did not know what they intended to say.” P. 52.

“The word cause is the difficulty.” Exactly so; and the secret of it is not in the ambiguity of language, but rather in our minds—in the minds of all men alike. This word always suggests something that we cannot find. Facts we can know—their relations in time and space, as of concomitance antecedence, and consequence, we can learn—beyond this, save as we refer to God, the so-called Transcendent Cause, we never get. We seem compelled to content ourselves with the fact that God has so constituted things, that such and such results follow from such and such relations of matter and spirit in time and space. One *wills* the motion of his hand, for example, and it follows, *i. e.*, God has so ordered it that the movement should follow upon the volition. We may put in some intermediate facts about brain, and nerves, and muscles, but the *cause* is just as much a mystery to the philosopher as to the peasant. *Where* the power is, except in God, we do not know, and apparently can never know. The fiction of some third thing to operate *ab extra*, as gravitation in bringing masses together, (save as a name for a mere fact,) gives us no help: for then we want something else as a nexus between the new relatives thus brought together.

We quote again: “Antoninus’s conviction of the existence of a divine power and government was founded on his perception of the order of the universe. Like Socrates (*Xen. Mem.* iv. 3.) he says that though we cannot see the forms of the divine powers, we know that they exist, because we see their works.” P. 55. Just as our Saviour has taught us that we reason from the effects of the wind; which all invisible as it is, yet makes itself known by its works. And just as St. Paul teaches, (*Rom.* i. 20): “For the invisible things of him from (*i. e.* in, or by) the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.” Or, as Antoninus again says: “To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods? or how dost thou comprehend that they exist, and so worshipest them? I answer, in the first place, that they may not be seen with the eyes; in the second place, neither have I seen my own soul, yet I honour it. Thus then,

with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate them." P. 55.

This argument for the existence of God still holds: but when we put *gods* in the place of the Infinite One, we cannot wonder at the perplexities which ever and anon must have assailed the mind of every pagan philosopher; for how could he know *which* of the gods existed? Or, may we suppose that Antoninus, as also Socrates and Plato, with others before him, used the plural number merely in compliance with the popular fancies? However this may have been, it leads us to reflect, How glorious the light which was shining even in the time of this Roman, and about to dispel for ever the darkness, in which alone a Jupiter or Apollo could exist! Has there ever been such a change in the world's history; or can there be another, like that in which the whole Pantheon of Greece and Rome passed away, never again to be thought of, except as the fables of sin-darkened minds? Well may we hope that all other false religions will ultimately lose their power, and cease to exclude the light of the gospel from the world.

Of the nature of God, Antoninus wisely has attempted to tell us nothing. Had he been asked, What is God? he would not have been less perplexed than was Simonides, who, when asked by Hiero of Syracuse, first required one day to consider, then two more, &c., finally giving for reply as to his hesitation, "The longer I reflect on the subject, the more obscure does it appear to be." No one without the revelations of the Bible could ever be in a position to utter the sublime reply of the Shorter Catechism: "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." In any fair sense of the words, this we conceive is telling us much of the divine nature—as much, perhaps, in reality, as we know of ourselves or of things around us. Our just concern is with what God is in his manifestations of himself, and what he does in the works of his hand and continued providence.

That the soul of man is in some sense an efflux from the deity, and that the divinity dwells in us, is a standing thought of these Meditations. There is also frequent reference to what

is so well known as the dæmon of Socrates. This, most clearly, is what the scientific moralist calls conscience: but what the pious in all ages have preferred to represent in a livelier way, if not with more precise truth, as God in us, or as the voice of God in the soul of man. Socrates continually speaks of it as a personal existence—Antoninus does the same. Nor is this a mere difference in language. The mere psychologist, atheist he may be, finds the moral sense among our faculties: but this may be far enough from giving it the authority of a present God, of one continually dwelling in us, prompting to the right, and warning us from the wrong.

We find continually in these thoughts, the idea that Bishop Butler makes so much of in discussing the question, whether it is likely that the dissolution of the body will be the destruction of our living powers; or, in a word, the destruction of the soul: the idea, to wit, that the body and its members stand related to the soul merely as a dwelling to its tenant, and as instruments to him that employs them. When one wishes to reach a thing distant a couple of feet, he uses his arm—to reach a distance of ten feet, he must take a pole to supplement his arm's length. In either case it is a material instrument for the soul's use; and the one may, in simple truth, be no more closely related to the mind, or spirit, than the other. The body then is not one's self, nor should be so esteemed in our daily regards. It may suffer much harm, which may be converted to our great benefit—it may experience considerable satisfactions, only to leave us, our real selves, in a worse condition than before.

We quote another passage of this exposition of the Emperor's philosophy.

"From all that has been said, it follows that the universe is administered by the providence of God, and that all things are wisely ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or states different possible theories of the constitution and government of the universe, but he always recurs to his fundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a Deity, we must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well, (iv. 27; vi. 1; ix. 28, &c.)" P. 61. "But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what we call

evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, 'what we call evil,' we have partly anticipated the Emperor's answer." P. 61.

The substance of this answer would be, The universe is a whole, not merely a totality of related or unrelated parts: but like an organized whole, in which nothing that happens may be rightly viewed by itself; but everything with relation to the whole system. The partial views, therefore, that we take in the world of sense, and with the lower understanding, are not at all to be regarded as apprehensions of the real truth of things. To us, and at any given moment, that may seem a great evil, which to a higher intelligence, or even to our own minds at another time, may appear as an indispensable good. So it may be that all which men usually term evil, as the occasion of present suffering, may be really but the form in which some greater good is brought to pass. So it is possible, that while we may not for a moment lose the sense of moral evil, as 'truly such, and in such sense that we must shun it, as if absolutely and only evil, God has so constituted, and so regulated the universe, that all partial disturbances of what would seem to us the best order, shall be found in the end the most appropriate means of giving stability to the whole, and of evolving good in its highest possible forms.

Here we may quote some passages from Antoninus himself. Thus he says, (viii. 55,) "Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it, as soon as he shall choose." This latter assertion must be explained by the doctrine of the Stoics, that that only is evil to us which we have in our power; and this apparently resting upon the notion that there is no real evil for us except in the depraved choices of our nature. But when we consider that the ills inflicted upon us by others are often the occasion of enhancing our own wickedness, we hardly feel at liberty to push our thoughts to this length.

We find in a previous section, (viii. 46.) "Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to an ox

which is not of the nature of an ox, nor to a vine which is not of the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each both what is usual and natural, why shouldest thou complain? For the common nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee."

Such consolations, however, lose a part of their apparent value, when we consider that the ills which we encounter are so often the manifest result of our own moral depravity. In respect to these, even if we could fully apply the Stoic doctrine as here set forth, there must still remain the torture of a troubled conscience; and this must be relieved by methods that mere philosophy knows little of. Pardon from him who made us, on the known ground of a sufficient atonement for sin, is in this case the only full remedy for the sense of evil endured.

In the next section, we find a related topic treated with some wisdom, and yet leaving room for grave questions. "If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. But if any thing in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion?"

But we ask, has God constituted us so, and put us into such relations with the works of his hands, that we can dismiss external evils in this summary way? The Bible surely puts us upon a very different plan. We are taught indeed to consider them as no real evil: but not on the score of their being the mere products of our own judgment of them. The true ground of consolation is in this: "All things shall work together for good to them that love God." Then, in respect to things in our own disposition that give us pain, the remedy is not in any direct thrusting out of the evil by a mere volition, but in a method much less flattering to our pride, *i. e.*, in the use of means divinely appointed, and in reliance upon the aids of Divine power. The Stoic might shut his eyes and say, the evil is gone: but not thus would he always get rid of its troublesome, and even mischievous visitations.

Another passage touching this subject we give at greater length:

"Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this

very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among men, if these are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods, or devoid of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in a man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to fall into it. Now that which does not make a man the worse, how can it make a man's life the worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having the knowledge, but not the power, to guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and life, honour, and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil." (ii. 11.)

This seems in perfect harmony with the Scripture doctrine that "No evil shall befall the just;" and ought, therefore, to be so applied in our daily thoughts as to save us from much that we ordinarily suffer, as if our feelings and natural apprehensions were in full accordance with the truth.

But how wonderful, again, the discord between such views and those of the late German philosopher, Schopenhauer. In his creed, a legitimate product of his atheism, *nothing is good.* "Pessimism," a reviewer of his life calls it, and with apparent justice. "He pants to tell us there is no hope, and preaches his bad news with the fervour of an evangelist. The opposite doctrine provokes his ire." Specially "hateful in his eyes are they who profess Optimism." "It appears to me," he says, "not only an absurd, but a *ruthless* doctrine, a bitter mockery of the nameless sorrows of humanity," i. e., to find in our existence any real good. The reviewer also says: "We doubt if west of the Himalaya there was ever a philosopher, whose

deliberate views and studied theory of life were so steeped in pessimism as those of Schopenhauer. Since the curse of Faust, since the wail of Ecclesiastes, there has been no verdict on human things so full of despair." He has, in one of his works, a chapter, entitled "The Nothingness and Sorrows of Life," aiming to show, "by facts and citations from authors of renown, that existence is an evil, and something that ought not to be."*

In such darkness may a learned man, among Christian people in this nineteenth century, immerse himself, by finding a universe without a God. Into such depths of night may one, trusting merely to his own reason, plunge himself, with the light of heaven shining in full blaze upon his path.

To return to Antoninus. His Ethical Philosophy has for a ruling precept, *Live according to nature.* This would naturally follow from his idea of nature as the system and course of things as ordered by Deity. The universe, in his view, is so constituted, and the general processes of things so regulated, that every creature falling into this harmony must exactly fulfil the ends of its being. Here then we find a comprehensive rule for the entire life of man. To act in conformity with his own nature and that of the universe, is to make sure of all the good that he can attain. But in his own nature we must observe, not merely the bodily senses and their appetites, not merely the intellect and its wants, not even the better affections and their proclivities alone, but especially the ruling faculty—the conscience, as we call it. This, we must ever keep in mind, is just as truly a part of our nature as the lower appetites and passions. But the office of this faculty, endowment, or whatever we may call it, is, with the aid of reason, (and, as a Christian must add, with the light of revelation,) to rule our whole being. He then that rebels against this rule is acting against his nature, as truly as if he would attempt to dwell in the fire, or in the waters of the ocean.

But for practice, we may observe, the rule thus supplied, whether as expounded by a heathen philosopher, or a Christian divine, as Bishop Butler, encounters this difficulty—*Our nature*

* *Christian Examiner*, January, 1864.

is depraved; so depraved, that we can with difficulty learn what it originally was. In this way we are brought to the necessity of a divine revelation, to tell us distinctly what we were as created, and what we ought now to be; or, as we may express it, *what our nature really is.*

Hence, we may add, that if we make the attempt *to live by nature*, we must not therefore rely upon *the light of nature*. What this may bring us to, we see in the case of a Hume, a Rousseau, or a Schopenhauer. This light, unless followed in a different spirit from that which is common, reveals to us no God, no immortal spirit, no treasures better than those of earthly possessions and earthly attainments.

"Antoninus's opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His doctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does not perish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The opinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides; what comes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven, the divinity, returns to him that gave it. But I find nothing clear in Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death, so as to be conscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of clay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatsoever is best and consistent with the whole." Pp. 77, 78.

This is what we might anticipate. Mere human reason, we are thoroughly persuaded, can never determine the immortality of the soul. If it be part of the Deity, it must be imperishable in substance, but not in its individual form. If it be an emanation of divinity, it may continue as a portion of light sent off from the sun, or it may return to its own source and become indistinguishable from the common mass. If, as Brahminism teaches, it be a mere efflux of the divine nature, taking shape as does the air that issues from the key-hole of a wind instrument, the separate existence is a transient phenomenon, and is lost when the afflatus ceases; or may be viewed as absorbed (drawn back) into the original source, the absolute existence, (Brahma,) or unconscious fountain of being.

What mere reason can do in these modern times, we see in the case of the Positivists. They do not know, even that we

have a soul. Their instruments of vision disclose no such entity. The very word *I* is a nuisance in their sight. They are obliged to tolerate its use: but are jealous of what it naturally implies. What they can understand, is that thinking, for example, is somehow done within the circumference of human form, as is also breathing, digesting, and other involuntary acts: but to refer it to an immaterial principle, which might exist out of the body, is to them an illogical procedure.

Even in better schools of philosophy, and except as men dread annihilation, the argument for the soul's immortality is always felt to be inconclusive. Many, no doubt, even where the light of the gospel has been wanting, have been sure of the fact, but not of the argument to support their belief. To the Bible, and especially to our Lord and Saviour, are we indebted for a final and decisive bringing of "life and immortality to light."

We shall now let the Emperor speak more directly for himself; reserving, however, the right to criticise or argue with him, as a due regard to truth and correctness of sentiment, or practical wisdom, may require.

The first book of what we shall call his *Meditations** tells us in detail what he learned from different relatives and teachers. But when he says he "learned" so and so, from one and another, we understand that he was taught thus, by precept or example: not that he was thereby enabled by mere rule, and forthwith to do all the good things proposed, or shun all the faults in practice, against which he was warned.

"1. From my grandfather Verus [I learned] good morals and the government of my temper." [Note.—The verb, in this and some of the following sections is wanting: but in most cases, *I learned* will give the sense.)

"2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a manly character.

"3. From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but also from evil thoughts; and further simplicity in my way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.

* Written in Greek; the true title not known. For some critical information we may refer to this volume, page 30, &c.

"4. From my great-grandfather," (perhaps on his mother's side, Catilius Severus,) "not to have frequented public schools, and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things a man should spend liberally.

"5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party in the circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights. From him, too, I learned endurance of labour, and to want little, and to work with my own hands, not to meddle with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to listen to slander.

"6. From Diogenetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incantations and the driving away of dæmons and such things; not to breed quails [for fighting] nor to give myself up passionately to such things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become intimate with philosophy, . . . and to have written dialogues in my youth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline.

"7. From Rusticus (Q. Junius) I received the impression that my character required improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who practices much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to make a display; and to abstain from rhetoric and poetry, and fine writing; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily disposed to reconciliation, as soon as they have shown a readiness to be reconciled, and to read carefully, and not to be satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily to give my assent to those who talk over much, and I am indebted to him for being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated to me out of his own collection.*

* Epictetus did not write himself: we are indebted to his pupil Arrian for "Reminiscences" of what he taught.

"8. From Apollonius (of Chalcis) I learned freedom of the will and undeviating steadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason; and to be always the same in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness," &c.

Which last, we may safely affirm, is neither profitable, were it possible, nor possible were it to be desired. On the very principle of the Stoics, that we must live according to nature, and always in obedience to reason, we should require instruction different from this. It is according to nature, our own and that of the universe, that we should feel the pains and griefs of life, and that our demeanor should be more or less affected by our feelings. Some very important ends of nature, so far as we can see, can be properly gained only by such means. Nor is it in any way unreasonable that we should be variously affected by the various circumstances in which we are placed. Must all forms of matter be subject to various impressions, in order to the various ends to be accomplished by the several kinds and relations of its masses, and yet men, while themselves partly material, be susceptible of no impressions whatever? We may indeed be told that this is more than the Stoics meant—that they merely required us to preserve our equanimity in all circumstances: but in this alone, they would not have found anything to distinguish their rules from those of other prudent men. They evidently meant that we should reduce the present sense of grief to the least possible, partly by stern resolutions not to feel it, and partly by various rational considerations touching its occasions and character. To this we shall have occasion to refer in some other places where the methods of calming ourselves in times of trouble are suggested.

But here let us add, observation and experience show, that even for the present enjoyment of life, and especially for the cultivation of the graces and virtues of our nature, stoicism is not the most successful teacher. Find us one of these cold-hearted creatures, to whom all things are the same, and we will show you a man that has less satisfaction in his present state, and shows less truly the virtues of which we are capable, than persons of ordinary sensibility, and under rules not more rigid

than those of the Christian religion. It is the part of wisdom, not to cast out all sense of pain and grief, but to bear with fortitude all that God may lay upon us, with the full assurance that in the end all shall be well with those that do their Master's will.

Of Antoninus himself, we do not mean to insinuate that he succeeded in deforming his own character, as some of his precepts might seem to require. What the precepts are, we must judge, not merely from isolated expressions of them, which might be reduced to common notions of prudence, but from the system to which they belong.

We shall give some further extracts from this first book, particularly as they give us touches of character and biography, and thus make us more familiar with the times of Antoninus than we should be through general statements.

"9. From Sextus,* a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after the interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those who form opinions without consideration: he had the power of readily accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly venerated by those who associated with him; and he had the faculty both of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate: and he could express approbation without noisy display, and he possessed much knowledge without ostentation."

"15. From Maximus† I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by anything: and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness; and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity, and to do what was set before me without complaining. I observed that everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in all he did he never

* Sextus of Cheronea, a grandson or nephew of Plutarch.

† Claudio Maximus, a Stoic philosopher.

had any bad intention; and he never showed amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing anything, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation; nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious. . . . I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he was despised by Maximus, or even venture to think himself a better man."

In the following section, which, however, is too long for us to quote, he gives a most interesting account of his adoptive father Antoninus Pius' character and habits. His character was one of rare excellence. Well may he have been surnamed the *pius*, the good. From his example, as here set before us, many a Christian might learn much for the daily conduct of life.

"17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a disposition, which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do something of this kind; but through their favour, there was never such a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. . . . I thank the gods for giving me such a brother,* who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance over myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by his respect and affection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body; that I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I had seen that I was making progress in them, &c. . . . —that I received clear and frequent impressions about living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and through not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long in such a kind of life;

* His only brother was L. Verus, by adoption.

that I never touched Benedicta or Theodotus; and that, after having falling into amatory passions, I was cured," &c.

At the end of this book we find written, "Among the Quadi at the Granua." This must have been during his campaign in the southern part of Bohemia and Moravia. Granua is thought to be what is now called the Graan, a stream flowing into the Danube.

In the quotation above, it will be remarked that the Emperor was thankful that he did not make proficiency in *rhetoric*, and certain other studies; because, had he been deeply interested in them, he might have been diverted from the higher purposes of his life. And here we think he was wise. *Non possumus omnia omnes*: even if we had the intellectual abilities, we cannot all become adepts in all studies. Here, too, we may find a very common error, as we esteem it; especially among American students. We often attempt too much; and, as a natural consequence, accomplish less than we ought. This is especially the case in the Christian ministry. The studies of the college and seminary open to us such wide fields of literature and science, that we are strongly tempted to the culture of far more than we can properly attend to, while tied to the duties, not merely of a laborious profession, but of one requiring continued supplies of fresh energy for active labours, and for labours, too, where the heart must be in vigorous play in order to any real efficiency. One who does not resolutely ignore many of the studies that attract him, can hardly be successful in any of the common spheres of our ministry. In this matter, we think the reflections of Cecil just and pertinent. "Nothing seems important to me but so far as it is connected with morals. The end—the *cui bono?* enters into my view of everything. Even the highest acts of the intellect become criminally trifling when they occupy much of the time of a moral creature, and especially of a minister. If the mind cannot feel and treat mathematics and music and everything else as a trifle, it has been seduced and enslaved. Brainerd, and Fletcher, and Grimshaw were men. Most of us are dwarfs." For others this may require some qualification: but hardly for ministers with cure of souls for their daily work. For them, the rule can hardly be less strict than for an emperor himself. In the mere

pursuit of knowledge, too, there is wisdom in Goethe's saying: "It is better to know all of something, than something of all."

Of the Second Book we quote only the last section. "Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping the *dæmon* [the good spirit] within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature.

"This in Carnuntum." (A town about thirty miles east of Vindobona, (Vienna,) where it is said the Emperor remained three years during the war with the Marcomanni.

We give such an extract rather as revealing to us the aspect of things from the Stoic's point of view, than for any light it may throw upon the conduct of life, where the light of the gospel is enjoyed. With us, the soul especially, appears in a different aspect. Its activities are a very different thing from "a whirl"—its apprehensions much better than a dream. "The firmest thing in this inferior world," says Leighton, "is a believing soul."

From the Third Book we select the following reflections.

"12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following

right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract thee, but keep thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldest be bound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is able to prevent this."

Here is true wisdom, and a just correction of some common faults of our conduct in daily life. We are too apt to work at the thing before us, bearing a burden of imagined future ills, and suffering thus a considerable diminution of the energies that might be brought to bear upon the present task. Too little do we regard such wisdom as we find in the Brahmin's proverb, "Fix thy mind on what thou doest, and not upon its consequences: miserable is he that looks to them. Wisdom rests in action." Or this again of a modern sage: "Duties are ours; events are God's." (*Remains of Richard Cecil.*)

Again: how few, even among Christians, keep the soul in such a state that it may seem fit, at any moment, to render back to him that gave it! How few even aim at this!

"13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary."

Higher wisdom than this has rarely reached the human mind: the only possibility of giving it a clearer lustre, is by putting it truly in practice; which by the Holy Spirit's aid alone can we hope to do.

"16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the impression of forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals; to be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and to have the intelli-

gence that guides to the things that appear suitable belongs also to those that do not believe in the gods, &c. If then everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, follow it obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. . . .”

We proceed to notice two or three passages respecting the soul, from which it would appear that its future condition was with the Emperor a matter of considerable uncertainty.

He remarks, (iv. 14,) “Thou existest as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which produced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal principle by transmutation.”

Again, (iv. 21,) “If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from eternity?” [This proceeds on the supposition of their occupying space; and so being in some sense material.] “But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these bodies after a certain continuance, and their dissolution make room for other dead bodies; so the souls which are removed into the air, after subsisting for some time, are transmuted, and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh souls that come to dwell here. And this is the answer which a man might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist.”

We observe (xi. 2) a passage of very erroneous philosophizing. “Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by this; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it, &c. In all things then, except virtue and acts of virtue, remember to apply thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to value them little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life.”

So a melody, or harmony, must be slightly esteemed, because

the several sounds have no ravishing power: so a human countenance is to give us no pleasure in the beholding because in the separate lines and hues we could see no distinguishing beauty; and in the same way the grandest piece of machinery, or of natural organization, is to be little admired, because the several parts are insignificant. But this would virtually destroy all things, where the qualities or activities depend upon a whole of related parts, and not on the single powers or qualities of each. It might seem very convenient thus to get rid of some of the troubles of life: but to put our joys, and all objects of interest into this same crucible, would be as little consonant with our nature as any false estimate that we can possibly make of them. That Antoninus himself could have been so unwise in practice, we do not suppose: but his doctrine is plainly expressed, and must be rarely capable of any good application.

A favourite topic of these Meditations is thus set forth, (xi. 18.) "Consider that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be displeased; but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and in 'Ignorance.'" [Not quite the opinion of Jeremy Taylor, by the way, who has somewhere remarked to the effect, that "men clearly know how to do right, or they would not so persistently do wrong."] "For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word, wrong-doers to their neighbours."

We find also, (vii. 63,) "Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of truth; consequently it is deprived in the same way, of justice, and temperance, and benevolence, and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to bear this constantly in mind; for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards all."

In such reflections there is a measure of truth; but the doctrine of the Bible is, that "men" have "loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil." Clearly, too, their want of specific moral virtues is rather a fault than a misfortune. Still there is no room for doubt that we are prone to

judge men too harshly, and allow too little for defects of intelligence and conduct, as dependent upon circumstances over which they have had no control.

The sentiment of several passages, which we cannot now quote, is, that our feelings towards others should not be determined by their outward acts, but by a reference to their principles, motives, and designs. We would go even farther, and say that we should judge men by their conduct towards themselves, rather than by anything they may do to us. The man who is habitually bad to himself can hardly be good to others; and one who treats himself well, in main respects, will not intentionally or knowingly injure his fellow-men. In the highest sense, one may say, a good man will not harm us—a bad man cannot.

Here we must close. We would not have our readers imagine that we have given them more than a sample of the contents of this volume. In its great variety of thoughts, which we have but partially indicated, they will find subjects for profitable reflection, and many suggestions for the conduct of life well worthy of their attentive regard.

For the curious reader, and one almost sated with the stereotype forms of modern thought, we know few volumes more inviting. The stoical philosophy stands out here as an actual scheme of life; and exhibits, so far as we can judge, the very best rule and discipline ever devised by the mere wit of man. Nor is it unworthy of remark, that the same philosophy has made its impress upon the Christian mind, wherever classical literature has reached, and found a contemplative disposition to work upon. Its great deficiencies, as compared with the religion of the Bible, are too evident to require even specification. In contemplating these deficiencies, we find new reason for gratitude for the “true light” that has come into the world; and that we are not left without the sight of its glories.

NOTE.—We would have spoken of the beauties of this volume in paper and typography: but it seems enough to say that it comes from the house of Ticknor & Fields.

ART. V.—*History and Ecclesiastical Relations of the Churches of the Presbyterial order at Amoy, China.* New York, 1863.

THIS pamphlet treats of a somewhat novel case in the work of Christian Missions, and one that teaches lessons of general interest. We need not enter into the history of these churches, nor of the discussions to which they have given rise in a respected body of our Presbyterian brethren—this publication showing that the questions at issue are hardly yet settled; but we may state that the peculiarities of the case grow out of the fact, that the missionaries concerned belong to two different ecclesiastical bodies, one American, the other English, though these bodies hold the same views of doctrine and church order. It was to be expected that these brethren would labour together in a spirit of Christian harmony, and their labours, by the blessing of God, have resulted in the gathering of several churches in Amoy and its vicinity. Should these churches be connected with the churches in England or America, or be independent of foreign control? This is the main question here discussed. A connected question is also discussed. Should the missionaries at Amoy become members of the ecclesiastical organization, which embraces these native churches, or retain their connection with their presbyteries at home? The writer of the pamphlet, who is a respected American missionary of Amoy, contends earnestly for the separation of the churches from all foreign ecclesiastical relations, and for the missionaries remaining in their church relations at home. A particular point which he endeavours to make is, that these native churches should not be so connected with the American Synod, whose missionaries are on the ground, as to separate them from equal connection with the English brethren. And the conclusion of his argument is, that “all the branches of the great Presbyterian family in the same region in any heathen country, which are sound in the faith,” should “organize themselves, if convenient, into one organic whole, allowing liberty to the different parts in things non-essential.”

The subject has received the consideration of the chief judicatory of the church with which the author is connected, and we do not feel called to review their decision in the case, which was adverse to his wishes. We may respectfully suggest, however, that as both the home churches can endorse each other's soundness in the faith and general ecclesiastical position, some method might perhaps be devised by which the native churches could remain in the same presbytery, and yet sustain relations to the churches at home sufficient for needful purposes; while the missionaries of both bodies might be members of the Amoy presbytery, but with unbroken relations to their home churches respectively. We see how complex this looks, and yet if both these respected churches could adopt some well considered *joint* regulation on the subject, it might be found that no serious practical difficulties would be met with. Considering the past course and present status of the case, taking it as it stands, as described in this pamphlet we suppose correctly, and not as it might have been if the missionaries had pursued a somewhat different course, we are disposed to think it would be expedient to sanction now what cannot well be changed at this late day. We express this opinion, not only with deference to the views of others, but with some hesitation, because it may appear to uphold the arguments of the pamphlet. Some of these are just and weighty, but others are the reasonings not of Presbytery, but of Independency. We found our suggestion on grounds of Christian expediency, no true principle of Presbyterianism seeming to be involved, and this expediency as shown by the facts here reported.

We pass from the case of these churches at Amoy to the general subject of the superintendence of foreign missions. This will lead us to consider the relations of missionaries and of mission churches to each other and to the mother church, as these relations affect the question of supervision. We may have occasion to refer to some things in this pamphlet, but our topic is one not of local, but of general interest. We shall look at it from the point of view occupied by our church. Other churches have their respective methods of superintending the work of missions, methods formed or modified by doctrinal or ecclesiastical views; with these we have no quarrel. Christian

union is nowhere more important than on missionary ground, and it is nowhere more practically exemplified; while yet denominational preferences are manifested there, as they must be everywhere else so long as men are not agreed in their views of doctrine or church order. It is not possible to give the gospel in the abstract to the heathen; men can no more disregard questions of church order and of doctrine in China than in America; they present themselves whenever a child is to be baptized, a church to be organized, or a minister to be ordained. Christian union is not to be promoted by throwing down denominational lines, but in the good old way of spreading the truth as it is revealed—doing this more and more in the loving spirit of the great Teacher, and then when men are agreed they will walk together.

In the meantime our missionary work must, from the nature of the case, conform to the views of truth and church order which are held by those who engage in it. Missions are but the outgrowth of Christian piety in the churches at home, streams from fountains in distant countries, and the distance to which they flow will not make them rise higher than their source. It will be found unwise for missionaries to adopt measures that are much in advance of the home position of their churches on union with other churches. It is doubtful whether Christian union has been promoted by the course pursued at Amoy, the brethren there having outrun their churches at home, or at least one of these churches, causing not a little painful feeling, of which we do not yet see the end. We are indeed warmly in favour of the union of all Christians, and especially of all Presbyterians, but we see clearly that it must be union founded on agreement in the truth—in the doctrines of grace, and agreement also, though not so completely, in respect to the order of the church.

The work of missions needs superintendence of some kind. It is, indeed, a work divinely simple in its objects and resting on the principle of faith; but it is vast in its extent, and it is carried on in different countries, and among people of various languages; it relates to preaching, teaching, translating the Scriptures, organizing churches, transforming the moral elements of society; it involves a considerable expenditure of

money, which is given by numerous and widely separated donors, each of whom is entitled to be well assured that his gift is expended to the best advantage of the great object in view; it includes many details, and often it must be accomplished in new and perplexing circumstances. The missionaries are at first usually young men, necessarily possessing but little experience, needing counsel; and they are mostly men of such excellence that they welcome, within proper limits, the assistance and direction of their brethren. It is never the best and ablest missionaries, so far as our observation goes, who say, "Send out the best men, supply them with all the funds they need, and then let them do all the good they can." It is not any missionary of our church, we have reason to believe, who could make the remark of a letter writer in this pamphlet, "that your Boards at home should be content to consider themselves a committee to raise and send on the funds." It is not necessary to dwell longer, however, on the importance of the superintendence of missions. It should be properly regulated, and by no means irresponsible; it should be intelligent, wise, considerate, and eminently forbearing; but that it should not be real and sufficient, we see no more reason for believing in the work of missions than in the work of the ministry at home. Indeed, our church system is pervaded with this salutary influence in all its parts. Sessions watch over the members of the church, and these over each other in a brotherly spirit; presbyteries watch over churches and all persons under their care, and so of all our church courts. Congregations watch over their pastors, informally but really, with sympathy, kindness, and prayer it ever should be. Our professors, secretaries, and committees, are all men under law, and not independent; and we see not why missionaries should be considered an excepted class, and, so far as we are informed, it is not the missionaries of our church who would covet an independent position.

How then shall this superintendence be conducted? In a full reply to this inquiry, the home and the foreign aspects of the subject might be separately discussed, but we need not pay much attention to this division; the principles involved are of common value in the home or executive administration of the work, and in the performance of the work on missionary

ground, as will be apparent further on. Our reply to the question is, that so far as the supervision of the work of missions is official, it should be made through our church courts, and through such committee of missions as the General Assembly may appoint. To the former part of this answer no Presbyterian will object. In practice, the missions of our body are conformed to our theory; both missionaries and churches are connected with the church at home, amenable to its authority, and fully enjoying the benefits of its supervision. Where there are ministers enough in the mission they are organized as a presbytery, and it is an object of desire to have presbyteries formed in every missionary field as soon as the number of ministers will permit. We need not dwell on the subject of presbyterial superintendence, the same substantially in all parts of the world, and familiar to our readers. So far as the work of missions is concerned, it includes whatever is necessary in the relations of missionaries and their churches, both to each other and to the church supporting the mission.

While this supervision of presbytery is not repudiated in discussions such as we find in this pamphlet, it suffers loss from two opinions; indeed these virtually set aside the home superintendence of our Presbyterian system. One of these opinions maintains that the missionaries should not become members of presbyteries in the mission field, but should retain their connection with presbyteries at home; the other maintains that the native churches should be independent of our churches. According to one of these opinions, the church at home could exercise no ecclesiastical supervision whatever over the native converts of her missionaries; and according to the other, the missionaries would be virtually irresponsible to the church at home in their ecclesiastical relations, for no presbytery in this country could exercise much more than a nominal supervision over brethren living on the other side of the world. The situation of the native churches in this matter is in some respects peculiar. Too far distant to send commissioners to the General Assembly, speaking a different language, mostly in very straitened pecuniary circumstances, it is obvious that these native brethren cannot enjoy the full benefit of our presbyterial system; nobody claims this on their behalf. But this should

not preclude their enjoying such advantages as may be within their reach—the sympathy, care, and appellate jurisdiction of our synods and assemblies, so far as the nature of the case permits. Practical matters of great moment may be brought before the higher church courts from the missionary presbyteries without personal representation, and from individual members also in many instances, just as in similar cases at home. It is not to be conceded that a native appellant or memorialist would not receive justice at the hands of the distant court of his brethren; and we are surprised at the reference in support of this imputation, on page 61 of the pamphlet, to a native pastor in India, as finding “some insuperable difficulty in getting his case before the General Assembly.” This is a mistake. The reference is, not to the “but one native pastor” of our church in that country, but to the only one out of three who felt aggrieved for a time, having been led to think that his ordination made him a member of the “Mission,” as distinguished from the presbytery. The former in its theory is but a sub-committee of the home executive committee, entrusted with certain business matters, and no more including all the missionaries in a particular field than the executive committee includes all the ministers in the presbytery of New York. Our native brother, who is now entered into his rest, did forward a complaint to the General Assembly touching this matter; but our information is that it was not received in time to be laid before that body, and before its next meeting he had become convinced of his error. It is certain, however, that he laboured in harmony with his brethren many years thereafter, even until his lamented death.

The relation between the native churches and their far distant mother church, moreover, is only temporary and transitional. While they are children, let them enjoy whatever benefits they may be able to derive from their friends in another land; it will be the prayer of all that they may soon be able to dispense with aid from abroad. Happy for them and for us, the hour when they can stand alone as a native church! In the meantime, we are glad to think of the native church members and office-bearers, at Corisco, at Ningpo, at Lodiana, and at other missionary stations, as Christian brethren of our commu-

nion, holding the same doctrines, worshipping God in the same order, and represented more or less completely in the same ecclesiastical system.

The other opinion would keep the missionaries in connection with the presbyteries at home, and separate them from any ecclesiastical relations with the native churches. This view seems to us objectionable on various grounds, while we can see hardly anything to be gained by it. If, indeed, the local presbytery were not connected with the General Assembly, it might happen that the foreign members, being outnumbered by the native members, would suffer inconvenience from being subject to brethren less educated and less qualified to judge than themselves; but this is to suppose an improbable case. It is altogether likely that the missionaries would always possess quite as much influence in presbytery as they ought to have; indeed, the practical danger would be that of their having too much influence. They would need to guard against overshadowing their native brethren, and to be watchful to put honour upon them in presbyterial proceedings; and if irregular measures should be adopted by them against the voice of the missionaries, a corrective influence might be drawn from the appellate action of the church in this country, and at any rate the missionaries could easily be shielded from serious injury.

Let us take a good example, as to both these points and others also. We see a company of missionaries landed on the island of Corisco, brought together from different presbyteries at home. After some time they can preach in Benga, and they are called to organize churches, to train and license candidates for the ministry, to ordain ministers of the gospel, some as evangelists, others as pastors of churches. Here is presbyterial work to be done. Let the missionary presbyters constitute themselves into the presbytery of Corisco for its orderly performance, under the rules of the General Assembly which provide for such cases. *Minutes of General Assembly*, 1838, p. 42; 1848, p. 21. *Baird's Digest*, book v., sects. 122—125. The membership of this presbytery will consist of all the ministers and an elder from each church in a certain district, agreeably to the well known order of our standards. We would not restrict clerical membership in this body to native ministers; we

would not exclude the foreign ministers, the founders of the churches, because, 1. According to our theory, these ministers are all of official parity—no matter for their diversity of gifts, or their difference of race. We repudiate the idea that the missionaries have some quasi episcopal functions as evangelists, or any official superiority over their native brethren, and that they are to stand aloof from them, and to be regarded by them as of a superior order. Presbyterians have not so learned Christ and his church. These ministers at Corisco, as the ministers of Christ, occupy the same grade in his house, neither higher nor lower, because some of them are Americans and others Bengas.

2. These ministers can, as members of the same presbytery, best watch over each other's ministerial character and conduct. Obviously this is true as to the native ministers, who are as yet inexperienced, but partially educated, in need of counsel and coöperation, and whose wants in these respects can be supplied as occasion requires in the wide circle of circumstances and duties which occupy the attention of presbytery. The deliberations and proceedings of this body will afford to them an excellent school of ministerial training, and its fraternal intercourse will prevent or remove misunderstandings between the foreign and the native ministers.

The benefits of this common presbyterial union of the missionaries must not be considered as only one-sided. The foreign minister may derive much advantage from membership in the local presbytery, especially as compared with membership in a presbytery in a distant country. He may learn much from being thus brought into close official contact with his native brethren; he may be shielded sometimes from reproach; excited to greater fidelity, and comforted by brotherly sympathy; he may be aided in overcoming the peculiar temptations which assail him. An example may be cited here, without impropriety. An ordained missionary, not at Corisco, but in another part of Africa, was permitted to fall before temptation. He was connected with an interior presbytery in the southern part of our country, and after long delay, owing to the difficulty of action by a presbytery so far distant, he was eventually suspended from the ministry. Probably this minis-

ter might have been kept from falling, if he had been surrounded by the kindly restraints and benefits of a presbytery on the ground. It is pleasant to add, that the suspension was subsequently removed by a new presbytery formed in that country.

3. In this manner the best supervision of the native churches can be secured. It would be difficult to say whether the foreign or the native element could be eliminated from presbytery in respect to this supervision with least injury to the churches. The questions of casuistry, the cases of discipline, the measures for the spread of the gospel, all need the united action of both. Each may be helpful to the other, not only in private unofficial intercourse, but in presbyterial proceedings. We do not believe, however, that the foreign ministers should long act as pastors of the native churches. At first they must do so from necessity, but the continuance of this relation is not to be desired. In too many respects do the foreign ministers differ from their native brethren—in previous training, in social habits and usages, in all interior associations; besides, they have other and wider spreading work, which precludes their being long restricted to the care of a native church. On the other hand, the native minister is well qualified to be the under-shepherd of the flock; and only with such a pastor can any native church learn the duty of supporting the ministry of the gospel. Yet in many things the native pastor will long need the counsel and assistance of his foreign brethren, and it may be their protection also, as members of the same presbytery. In all these matters the aim of the missionaries should be so to mould and direct the native Christian community, clerical and lay, as to dispense with foreign dependence and assistance at the earliest possible period.

We need not dwell on this point, though we must add that it is not an objection to the foregoing outline, to say that these missionary presbyteries are and will be mainly American in their membership. At first, of course, they are; but will they so continue? Surely not, if God be still with his servants in their work. How soon these temporary relations between the churches in Africa, India, China, and elsewhere, and our General Assembly will be dissolved, by their advance in growth

and strength, we do not venture to predict. In some cases it will be at an earlier day than in others. If the intercommunication of nations continues to increase in speed and facility, the difficulties of the present relations between the missionary churches and their mother church will diminish; but nevertheless both parties should pray for the day of their happy separation. In the meantime, while our church will still be the church in the United States, its representation may include her sons and their spiritual offspring in other countries, as the civil government of the country extends its protection over our citizens and their children in foreign lands. It would be no impossible thing for a distinguished leader of one of our great armies to be elected as our chief magistrate, though he was born in Spain; neither do we see any insuperable difficulty in the way of a venerable Chinese or Hindu minister of the gospel, speaking our language as well as do many of his countrymen, being called thirty years hence to preside in our highest Assembly, and doing this with dignity and grace.

We shall not enter at any length on the second official way of exercising missionary supervision, through such committee or board of missions as the General Assembly may appoint, and subordinately through what are called missions—or sub-committees of the executive committee—in the missionary fields. This kind of supervision is regarded with jealousy by some. We may readily concede that an irresponsible committee, or one amenable only to public opinion, might wield its superintendence injuriously, while those who suffered thereby would have little hope of redress; and we also concede that any committee may make mistakes, even though it be composed of men who are under law, and who are governed by the best motives. But on the theory of our church, these committees do not supersede in any way our regular church courts, nor in the least degree interfere with their proper action; in fact, these committees or boards are but business organizations, created by the General Assembly, subject to its modification, and liable to be dissolved at its pleasure. All their proceedings, moreover, pass annually under the review of the Assembly; and it is easy for any missionary, or even for any member amongst the hundreds of thousands of our communicants, to obtain in an

orderly way an examination of alleged grievances or misuse of power. Let application be made in a Christian spirit to those who are intrusted with the oversight of the work of missions—first, to the executive officers; next, if need be, to the Board. If further examination is needed, then let application be made to the General Assembly, through the usual forms. It speaks well for the Board and its executive committee and officers, and for the missionaries; or rather it speaks well for the correctness of our missionary system, that in the period of more than thirty years since the work of foreign missions was entered upon in its present methods by the Synod of Pittsburgh, no complaint has been laid before the General Assembly touching the administration of the missionary interests of our church.

Let it be remembered that the Board, as appointed by the General Assembly, is not an ecclesiastical body, but a kind of permanent or standing committee of that body, "to which, for the time being, shall be entrusted, with such directions and instructions as may from time to time be given by the General Assembly, the superintendence of the foreign missionary operations of the Presbyterian church." *Minutes of General Assembly* 1837, p. 452. This board or committee might be dispensed with, and its functions performed by the General Assembly itself, if requisite attention could be given by that body to many matters of business which are involved in the missionary work. Or a presbytery, two or more presbyteries, a synod, or several synods, might engage directly in this work; but they would soon find great inconvenience in attending to its business matters, and to the superintendence of missionary affairs in the field of labour. These would be found indeed so onerous as to prove a fatal hinderance in most cases to the prosecution of the work by such bodies, in their formal action as church courts—at least so we are persuaded. The Board becomes an indispensable part of our agency. This Board might be appointed or constituted in different methods. The simpler these are, the better; and the more closely the Board is connected with and dependent on the General Assembly, undoubtedly the better it will prove for all parties, and all the interests of the cause of missions; but we need not here enter further into the consideration of these points.

We take the Board as it stands, charged with "the superintendence of the foreign missionary operations" of our church. These include the choice of missionary fields, the appointment of missionaries, making provision for their support and that of their work, the general oversight of their proceedings, as well as of many matters of detail connected with the welfare of families so far separated from their friends and country. A more singularly miscellaneous class of duties and interests can be found in no part of our commercial metropolis than is found to centre at the Mission House, and many of these interests are of the highest importance. Besides the various matters abroad which require supervision, the home department of the work must receive due attention; this includes the care of missionary funds, the preparation of annual reports, the publication of missionary intelligence, a remarkably varied correspondence, &c. The least inspection of this list will suggest questions concerning details, which we must pass by with the remark that these administrative affairs are so performed and made matters of record, as to admit of being readily understood. The accountability of those engaged in these things is complete.

Looking now on the duties entrusted to the Board with particular reference to the superintendence of the missions, we note, 1. It is not ecclesiastical; it does not take into its purview any ecclesiastical questions whatever. 2. It follows mainly the line of pecuniary outlay. Is it proposed to send out a new missionary, to establish a new mission, to occupy a new station, to erect a dwelling-house, to open a school? All of these are things calling for the expenditure of the missionary funds of the church, and in all of them the committee not only may with propriety, but must of necessity, if they would be faithful in their "superintendence," be satisfied as to the expediency of such expenditure. Were there but one mission, or but a single missionary, the funds of the church might be devoted to the work in progress with less need of minute supervision. It would then be practicable to transmit the money without much scrutiny of the way in which it would be expended—though even then inquiry, deliberation, and judgment on the part of the home executive officers could do no harm;

but the case is different when several missions and numerous missionaries are supported by the church. The apportionment of the missionary funds becomes then a question of relative importance, and one that, from the nature of the case, must be decided by the central committee, after viewing the whole field of labour; the appointment of missionaries to different missions must be made also from this same central point of view. As to their posts of labour, however, the missionaries are always consulted, and usually the reasons which lead the executive committee to propose to them the occupancy of a particular field, will be found to be such as will satisfy their judgment; besides, none are appointed to any mission without their consent. All this has much to do with the future supervision of their work, as from the beginning the relations between the missionaries and the executive officers are those which should exist between Christian brethren who are engaged in a common enterprise.

The distribution of funds among different missions, and to each mission separately, is also conducted on the basis of a common interest, though here a somewhat different responsibility attaches to the labourers in the missionary rooms and those in the fields abroad. In usual practice, the subject is found to be arranged without friction. The missionaries make estimates of the expenditures of the coming year, giving details specifying their own support, that of their native assistants, and the expenses of the various departments of the work. These estimates from all the missions are considered by the home committee, acting with such particular knowledge of most if not all the matters concerned, as enables them to form an independent judgment of their expediency; in this way a wise conclusion is reached as to the amount of funds that should be transmitted to each mission, or rather the amount that can be sent in view of the probable income of the Board. Two things are obvious here, 1. That there must be a central or home committee to take the executive charge of these matters; and 2. That this committee and its officers stand in a twofold relation—on one side, to the churches at home; on the other, to the missionaries abroad.

It will readily be seen that in the oversight of matters of

such moment, and particularly of a somewhat large pecuniary outlay, in so many different countries and ways, there is need on the part of the home agents of a wise discretion; of firmness also, coupled with self-distrust and a reliance on the guidance of Divine grace. But inasmuch as all engaged in the missionary work, at home and abroad, are men actuated by the mind and spirit of Christ, as they hold the same views of doctrine and church order, as they have had very much the same religious and social training, they will probably adopt the same views of missionary procedure; and thus the supervision of the work of missions will usually be a matter of quiet and pleasant duty, involving no unreasonable exactions on the one side, and complied with on the other in that spirit of good regard for order which characterizes our body. And on both sides, it is of course well understood that the General Assembly is a common appellate and controlling body—the true Board of Missions in our church, whose decisions of all questions are open, conformed to well-known rules, and as likely to be fair and correct as could be expected in view of the imperfection of all things in this world. This statement of the subject will tend to show that the superintendence of the missionaries and the mission churches, or the relations of these to the church at home, will in most cases be conducted in a manner that will prove acceptable to all parties; and this, as we have already remarked, is the result as attested by the history of thirty years. Excepted cases will occur, and such have occurred, and as extreme cases test the principles involved in ordinary routine, let us glance for a moment at one referred to above. It was a case of scandal. There was no presbytery on the ground to deal with it; for various reasons the action of the presbytery at home could not be had without much delay. The facts were placed before the executive committee on testimony that could not be reasonably doubted; but this committee, not being an ecclesiastical body, could take no steps of judicial process. They could, however, protect the interests of the mission and the missionary funds of the church, by dissolving the relation of the offending missionary to the Board; and this was done, while the facts of the case were transmitted to his presbytery. It was a grave proceeding on the part of

the committee, one not taken without full consideration, and one for which they stood prepared to answer, if necessary, at the highest tribunal of the church. The subsequent action of the presbytery fully sustained that of the committee; but if it had not, then the case would have necessarily been transferred to the decision of the General Assembly. All this proves clearly that the ecclesiastical, and the business or executive, supervision of the missions are, 1. Distinct from each other; 2. Substantial and real; 3. Harmonious; or if not in the first instance, in agreement, then 4. In the end all will be ordered aright by our highest church authority.

We have said nothing of the other methods of keeping the missions under proper supervision, and of regulating the whole missionary work, methods of which some profess to make exclusive use—such as the appointment of men as missionaries who are of the right stamp, trusting to the piety of the church, depending on public opinion, relying on the grace of God. Assuredly, we do not undervalue nor disparage any of these things, when we put honour on the ecclesiastical and executive arrangements of our body. It is our happiness to enjoy all that the most “voluntary” of our Christian brethren could claim in these respects, and in addition thereto the settled and wise order of our church. But we hesitate not to avow that our chief trust for harmony and efficiency, in all our missionary labours and the superintendence thereof, in the intercourse of missionaries with each other and with the executive committee, and in the care of the churches, is found in the fulfilment of our Lord’s gracious promise, “Lo, I am with you always”—a promise given expressly to encourage the missionary work of his people. It is the mind of Christ in his servants, that lowly mind so wonderful in the Lord of glory, that disposition not to please himself, that humility and love which led him to wash his disciples’ feet, that devotedness which made him account it as his meat and his drink to do the will of his heavenly Father; it is these gracious dispositions that will best guard both the missionaries and their brethren at home against occasions of offence, just as it is Divine aid and power that will give sure success to this work of their hands.

ART. VI.—*Life and Letters of John Winthrop*, Governor of the Massachusetts-Bay Company at their emigration to New England, 1630. By ROBERT C. WINTHROP. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1864. Pp. 452.

IT is not fair in this title to create the expectation of a complete biography of Governor Winthrop; for just as the author comes to the point most interesting to the American reader—the embarkation for New England—the book is done, and we are left with a very indefinite intimation that sooner or later the remainder may possibly be forthcoming. But we are too thankful for these nineteen charming chapters, to file any complaint against the editor, except with a view to a sort of literary *subpæna duces tecum*, requiring him speedily to produce the residue of the papers in his possession. The public will not allow him to evade this demand by pleading (p. 400) what the works of Bancroft and Palfrey have already done; for those admirable historians had not the custody of the “very large collection of original family papers” (p. 7) from which the greater number of these pages have been copied, and which extend over the last nineteen years of Winthrop’s life, as well as the preceding forty-two.

But the object which ‘justifies a “Biblical” review of the work is sufficiently attainable from the materials before us. That object is to present to our times a specimen of the character which, in the early settlement of our country, recommended men to public office, and a specimen of the happy results to the commonwealth which responded to such selections. Coincident with this purpose is the illustration of piety, as capable of manifesting itself in the entire career, domestic, official, as well as ecclesiastical, of its possessor, as giving complexion and substance to the man in his sum total—the man of business, of family, of politics, as well as of the pew and communion-table; the son, husband, father, neighbour, magistrate, statesman; and this not merely the moral sort of religiousness demanded by common (or what two hundred and fifty years ago was common) integrity in public life—Jethro’s “able men, such as fear God;

men of truth, hating covetousness"—but the evangelical piety nourished by constant resort to the Divine oracles, and cultivated with prayer, and rigorous application of the word to the conscience, and thence to the life.

The volume before us, which will prove, we trust, to be but the first of the "Life and Letters," is largely composed of that matter which, as the prefatory chapter well remarks, belongs unquestionably to the best sources of biography, viz., "that which has been written, accidentally and unconsciously, as it were, in familiar letters or private journals." The large collection of manuscripts of Winthrop, which have been preserved with such remarkable safety till they have come into the hands of his worthy descendant of the seventh generation, contain records of his "Christian experience," journals, letters to his wives and children, and other relatives. The attractions and usefulness of his domestic correspondence, as well as their illustrations of his character, are delightfully augmented by the preservation of many letters which he received from his family. He was first married when only three months more than seventeen years of age, and his wife died within eleven years afterwards. His second marriage was dissolved by death at the close of the first year. His third wife was spared to him for nearly thirty years; and many a one who has now the opportunity of indulging the pardonable intrusion on the privacy of Margaret Winthrop's tender, dutiful, and sensible communications "to her most dear husband," will be often disposed to say with him, "thy sweet letters, how welcome they were to me, I cannot express." Of these letters of Winthrop, the biographer well observes, "Most striking evidence do they bring to that deep-seated and prevailing love of God in his heart, which strengthened and purified all his other affections, and which seemed itself to be purified and strengthened in turn, even by those very earthly ties and domestic attachments which have so often estranged other hearts from the highest objects of their love." P. 140. And of the whole family correspondence we would say with him again, "It would not be easy, we think, to find private domestic correspondence of the same period, or indeed of any period, which would better bear

exposure, or which would reflect more credit on the character of the writers." P. 158.

With most readers it will detract from the interest of nearly all the selections, to find them edited so exactly as to retain the quaint orthography and abbreviations of the autographs. We do not see what good object is gained by this antiquarian practice, that compensates for the interruption in reading. A specimen or two might be given to show the peculiarities of old style, but there is nothing pleasing or characteristic in being stopped at every line to decipher short-hand, and guess out obsolete spelling. A good many of these various readings, too, are the result of imperfect education; and if we take the liberty of reading and printing the most hasty private papers of the departed, we need not expose their grammatical slips, or use their manuscripts for the press without the correction that all other "copy" receives. The old words should not be changed. "Contentation" should still stand for *contentment*—"commodity" for *benefit*—"painful" for *laborious*—"well-willer" for one who is paying his addresses—"profanes" as a noun—"intentive," "dumpishness," "goodman," &c.—but what, save annoyance, is there in the perpetual recurrence of *ffrynd, bycawse, yewthe, nuse, it twilbe*, or of such varieties as *write, rite, right, wright, wrote, wrought, ritten, righting*, or of such symbols as "&rch" for *anarchy*? To be sure, we may blunder sometimes in undertaking to interpret the signs; as Mr. R. C. Winthrop was near doing with his ancestor's "purpose to send up £10 for my A. B.," if his inclination to set this down as a high price for a University degree, had not been suddenly arrested by discovering that the ten pounds were for "Aunt Branch." The retention of so much that requires to be spelled out, is particularly to be regretted in the printing of matter so excellent as to deserve every facility for its practical use. In our quotations we shall have not only to transcribe but to translate.

JOHN WINTHROP was born in the county of Suffolk, England, January 22, 1588. The family-seat was Groton Manor. Their ecclesiastical connection was with the Established Church: though Winthrop, as Bancroft says of him, was "in England a conformist, yet loving gospel purity, even to Independency."

The first traces of his spiritual life are given by his own hand. "About ten years of age, I had some notions of God: for in some frightening or danger I have prayed unto God and found manifest answer; the remembrance whereof, many years after, made me think that God did love me; but it made me no whit the better. After I was twelve years old, I began to have some more savour of religion; and I thought I had more understanding in divinity than many of my years; for in reading of some good books, I conceived that I did know divers of those points before, though I knew not how I should come by such knowledge; (but, since, I perceived it was out of some logical principles, whereby out of some things I could conclude others.) Yet I was still very wild and dissolute. . . . I would, as occasion required, write letters, &c. of mere vanity; and, if occasion was, I could write savoury and godly counsel. About fourteen years of age, being in Cambridge, I fell into a lingering fever which took away the comforts of my life: for, being there neglected and despised, I went up and down mourning with myself; and, being deprived of my youthful joys, I betook myself to God, whom I did believe to be very good and merciful, and would welcome any that would come to him, especially such a young soul, and so well qualified as I took myself to be; so as I took pleasure in drawing near to him."

His imprudently early marriage broke off his college-life at Cambridge, but was the means of introducing him to the preaching of the curate of his wife's family, in the county of Essex: "And living there sometimes, I first found the ministry of the word come home to my heart with power, (for in all before I only found light); and, after that, I found the like in the ministry of many others; so as there began to be some change, which I perceived in myself, and others took notice of. Now I began to come under strong exercises of conscience, (yet by fits only): I could no longer dally with religion. God put my soul to sad tasks sometimes, which yet the flesh would shake off and outwear still. I had, withal, many sweet invitations, which I would willingly have entertained; but the flesh would not give up her interest. The merciful Lord would not thus be answered; but notwithstanding all my stubbornness, and

unkind rejections of mercy, he left me not till he had overcome my heart to give up itself unto him, and to bid farewell to all the world, and until my heart could answer, ‘Lord! what wilt thou have me to do?’ ”

There is something instructive in the notices which the married boy of eighteen takes of “the foxes, the little foxes, that spoil the vines;” as in these entries of 1606. “Where there is not a reverent trembling at the committing of small sins, and those but in thought or word, there is no fear of God; and where there is no fear, there is no faith: therefore, mark this.” “It is wonderful how the omission of the least duty, or commission of evil, will quench grace, and estrange us from the love of God.” “I found that on Saturday in the afternoon, deferring reading and prayer till three o’clock, for the performing of a needless work, my heart was very much unsettled. On Sunday, being at sermon, I let in but a thought of my journey into Essex, but straight it delighted me; and being not very careful of my heart, I was suddenly, I know not how, so possessed with the world, as I was led into one sin after another, and could hardly recover myself, till taking myself to prayer, before I was too far gone, I found mercy.”

How many journeys to Essex are made every Lord’s-day, by older Christians than this, but which, if noticed at all, or with the least compunction, are passed over as but natural infirmities! The Puritan strictness of watchfulness over the inner as well as the outer man, was thus early forming the habits of Winthrop’s religion, and laying their foundation in principle and experience, as well as profession. If we meet with some occasional signs of an over-scrupulous conscience, and some, at least unusual, minuteness in observing special providences, these extremes are good to be set in contrast with the recklessness of times when almost no corruption is too great to be winked at, and scarcely the most prominent events are sufficient to make men know the Lord. Such searchings of heart as are put into the following memoranda (1611), seem to have been habitual:

“Getting myself to take too much delight in a vain thing, which I went about without the warrant of faith, I was by it, by degrees, drawn to make shipwreck of a good conscience and the love of my Father, so that my heart began to grow hard-

ened, and inclining to a reprobate mind: prayer and other duties began to grow irksome; my confidence failed me; my comfort left me; yet I longed after reconciliation, but could not obtain it. I earnestly sought to repent, but could not get a heart unto it; I grew weary of myself, unprofitable to others; and God knows whether ever I shall recover that state which I lost. Oh that this might be a warning to me to take good heed how I grieve the good Spirit of my God, and wound my conscience; and that as the penning of this is in many tears, so the reading of it, when occasion shall be, may be a strong motive unto sobriety."

"I find that often sinning brings difficulty in repenting, and especially the bold running out against knowledge and conscience." "After the committing of such sins as have promised most contentment and commodity, I would ever gladly have wanted the benefit, that I might have been rid of the sin. Whereupon I conclude that the profit of sin can never counter-vail the damage of it; for there is no sin so sweet in the committing, but it proves more bitter in the repenting for it."

"I have trembled more at the committing of some new sin, although but small in comparison, than at the doing of some evil that I have been accustomed to, though much greater; therefore I see it is good to beware of custom in sin, for often sinning will make sin seem light."

"God will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and when and how seems best to his wisdom and will. And his mercy is free, mere mercy, without any help of our own worth or will: so that for all good actions, we add nothing either to the deed or the doer. But as a man shooting a bird through a hedge or a hole in the wall, the hedge doth no more but cover the author, though the bird may think the blow came from the hedge, so surely the Lord hath showed me, (in prayer and meditation, whereunto he himself only drew and enabled me, sending the affliction, and sanctifying it to that end,) that there never was any holy meditation, prayer or action that I had a hand in, that received any worth or furtherance from me, or anything that was mine. And until I saw this, and acknowledged it, I could never have true comfort in God, or sound peace in my own conscience, in any the best that I could per-

form. But when sometimes I fell into a holy prayer, meditation, etc.; if I happened but to let my affections cast an eye towards myself, as thinking myself somebody in the performance of such a duty in such a manner, such a thought would presently be to my comfort and peace, as cold water cast upon a flame; whereby I might see that God by such checks would teach me to go wholly out of myself, and learn to depend upon him alone; which he himself of his mere favour give me grace to do constantly. For it is not possible that any good thing should come from me as of myself, since the very least conceit that ascribes anything to my own worth or ability in the best duty, not only takes away all merit from it, but makes it loathsome and sinful in God's sight."

Hear how a civil magistrate may attend to the duties of his court, as well as those of the Lord's house, with a Christian mind. "Our sessions were [took place], against which (fearing greatly mine own frailty) I did prepare myself by earnest prayer, etc., and my time, as I rode, I spent as well as I could in good meditations, and kept my course of prayer, etc., as well as conveniently I could while I was there, refraining my mouth, eyes, and ears from vanity, as well as I could, and so it pleased God that I brought home my peace and good conscience with me. Yet my love of goodness somewhat abated, which I perceived not till a day or two after, when I began to be somewhat loath to prayer and good communication; the flesh beginning to favour itself. But it pleased God by prayer to quicken me again. When I was at sessions I kept a continual watch (as near as I could); but yet when I saw and heard the great account and estimation that the wisdom, glory, wealth, pleasure, and such like worldly felicity was in with all, methought I heard all men telling me I was a fool to set so light by honour, credit, wealth, jollity, which I saw so many wise men so much affect and joy in, and to tie my comfort to a conversation in heaven, which was nowhere to be seen, no way regarded, which would bring myself and all my gifts into contempt. These and the like baits did Satan lay for me, and with these enemies he did oftentimes sore shake my faith; but Christ was in me and upheld my resolution, and he will uphold it (I trust and pray) that my faith shall never fail. O Lord,

keep me that I be not discouraged, neither think the more meanly of the portion I have chosen, even to walk with thee and to keep thy commandments, because the wise ones of this world do not regard but contemn these things."

And of what sort were the Judge's meditations on such journeys? "Amongst other things I had a very sweet meditation of the presence and power of the Holy Ghost in the hearts of the faithful; how he reveals the love of God in our hearts, and causeth us to love God again; how he unites all the faithful indeed and in affection; how he opens our understandings in the mysteries of the gospel, and makes us to believe and obey; and of the sweet consent between the word and the Spirit, the Spirit leading and directing us in all things according to the word. I am not able to express the understanding which God gave me in this heavenly matter, neither the joy that I had in the apprehension thereof. Other meditations I had of my sin and unworthiness, of the exceeding mercies of God towards me; and now and then to refresh me when I grew weary, I had a prayer in my heart, and sometimes I sung a psalm. I found it very hard to bring my heart hereunto, my eyes were so eager of wandering, and my mind so loath to be held within compass; but after I got into it, I found great sweetness therein; it shortened my way and lightened all such troubles and difficulties as I was wont to meet with."

His business helped—not hindered—his spiritual mind. "Settling myself to walk uprightly with my God and diligently in my calling, and having a heart willing to deny myself, I found the godly life to be the only sweet life, and my peace with my God to be a true heaven upon earth. I found God ever present with me, in prayer and meditation, in the duties of my calling," etc.

"My conscience did especially accuse me for my remissness in my calling of magistracy, in that I had not been painful in the finding out and zealous in the punishment of sin. . . . Thereupon I prayed earnestly unto the Lord for pardon, and for grace to hate these my sins and to amend them; and I promised and covenanted with the Lord to be more zealous and diligent, and to walk more constantly with him, and I desired the Lord that whosoever I should decline from this covenant,

that I might not have any peace, but feel his anger until I were returned again."

"I plainly perceive that when I am not held under by some affliction, either outward or inward, then I must make my flesh do its full task in the duties of my calling, or such other service wherein it takes no pleasure. Otherwise it will wax wanton and idle; and then finding sweetness in earthly things, it will grow so weary of God's yoke, that it will not be borne any longer, except the flesh, by strong hand, be brought under again."

"So it is that it hath pleased the Lord to call me to a farther trust in this business of the Plantation, than either I expected, or find myself fit for, being chosen by the Company to be their Governor. The only thing that I have comfort of in it is, that hereby I have assurance that my charge is of the Lord, and that he hath called me to this work. Oh that he would give me a heart now to answer his goodness to me and the expectation of his people. I never had more need of prayers; help me, dear wife, and let us set our hearts to seek the Lord and cleave to him sincerely."

A chapter of the Life (pp. 90-122) is devoted to passages from the secret records of these communings with himself, which, for discriminating judgment and skilful application of the scriptural tests, may be placed without disparagement to the layman, along side of the standard writers on experimental religion of the seventeenth century. We can cull but a few sentences, and this not so much in the fashion of reviewing, as for the edification of our readers.

"Sometimes when my heart hath been but weakly prepared to prayer, so that I have expected little comfort, yet God hath filled me with such power of faith, sense of his love, etc., as hath made my heart melt with joy. Again, at another time, when I have settled my heart unto prayer, of purpose to quicken up my drowsy affections, and to strengthen my faith, yet I could not, with all my labour, although continuing longer and in greater fervency than ordinary, get my faith strengthened, or my heart humbled and broke, or the feeling of the love of God shed abroad in my heart, but the rather more doubtings and discouragements. Yet when I have been forced

with weariness to give over, even in the very parting Christ hath shown himself unto me and answered all my desires. And hereby he hath taught me to trust to his free love, and not to the power of selfworth of my best prayers, and yet to let me see that true prayer, humble prayer, shall never be unregarded."

"I saw plainly that the usual cause of the heaviness and uncomfortable life of many Christians is not their religion, or the want of outward comforts, but because their consciences enforce them to leave some beloved unlawful liberty, before their hearts are resolved willingly to forsake it."

"When I had some time abstained from such worldly delights as my heart most desired, I grew very melancholy and uncomfortable; for I had been more careful to refrain from an outward conversation in the world, than to keep the love of the world out of my heart, or to uphold my conversation in heaven; which caused that my comfort in God failing, and I not daring to meddle with any earthly delights, I grew into a great dullness and discontent; which being at last perceived, I examine my heart, and finding it needful to recreate my mind with some outward recreation, I yielded unto it, and by a moderate exercise herein was much refreshed. But here grew the mischief. I perceiving that God and my own conscience did allow me so to do in my need, I afterwards took occasion, from the benefit of Christian liberty, to pretend need of recreation when there was none; and so by degrees I ensnared my heart so far in worldly delights, that I cooled the graces of the Spirit by them. Whereby I perceive that in all outward comforts, although God allow us the use of the things themselves, yet it must be in sobriety, and our hearts must be kept free, for he is jealous of our love, and will not endure any pretences in it."

"Disuse in any good thing causeth the greatest unwillingness and unfitness. I saw it was safest for me ever to be well-doing, and to be fully resolved of God's good allowance of all that passeth either mouth, heart, or hand."

"There is no confession so frank as that which comes from the sense of free pardon."

"An unruly horse will more weary himself in one mile's

travel, than a sober horse in ten. So it is when we go about any duty where our hearts look for their liberty."

"I think it good wisdom for me to keep to a mean in my joys, especially in worldly things; moderate comforts being constant and sweeter, or safer, than such as being exceeding in measure fail as much in their continuance; for they, being wasted by passion, are resolved into pain, even as the body is most sensible of cold, when it hath been thoroughliest warmed by the heat of the fire."

"My heart getting loose one Sabbath-day, through want of due watchfulness and firm resolution, it got so deep into the world that I could not get it free, but it followed me to church and home again. But here was not all the hurt of it, for I found evidently that this suffering my heart to take liberty to the profaning of the Sabbath, made it utterly unfit for duty all the week following; so that it cost me much strife and heart-smart before I could bring it into order again; therefore I purpose, by God's grace, to keep a better watch over my heart upon the Sabbath."

"Oh, I see if we leave, or slightly exercise ourselves in the word, faith will starve and die, and our hearts embrace any dotages of man's brain sooner than God's eternal truth."

"Oh, that I might ever have a care to look to my faith, as I would do to my life."

"Such trials as fall within compass of our callings, it is better to arm and withstand them, than to avoid and shun them."

"A Christian man may as well be without the unprofitable and sure-fading favour of the world, as a gentleman may spare a kennel of hounds."

"I am thoroughly persuaded that the love of the world, even in a small measure, will cool, if not kill, the life of sincerity in religion, and will abolish the very memory of heavenly affections."

We add some good things from other chapters.

"It is a policy of Satan to discourage us from duty by setting before us great appearances of danger, difficulty, impossibility, which, when we come to examine or make trial of, are found indeed to be nothing so. But even as a fool, being tied

by a thread or a straw, thinks himself impossible to stir, and therefore stands still, so doth Satan make advantage of our foolish and *fearful* disposition. In these discouragements it is sufficient oftentimes to set us at liberty, if we do but consider that it is the tempter, &c."

"I have found that a man may master and keep under many corrupt lusts, by the mere force of reason and moral considerations (as the heathen did), but they will return again to their former strength. There is no way to mortify them but by faith in Christ and his death: that as he, when sin had him at the greatest advantage in the grave, yet then got the full victory over sin by rising from under it; so a Christian, being in him by faith, is made really partaker of his conquest."

The spirit of our times is such, that we have cause to look back with admiration to the ages when it was more common for the family to bear a distinctive, manifest impress of Christianity as the seal of all its relations; when "thou and thy seed" was a more conspicuous clause to those who read the covenant. The letters of Winthrop to his wife Margaret, and to his sons, and theirs to him, constitute one of the most instructive features of his biography, in the use we are making of it for our own pages. If any should want a practical exegesis of the phrase, "in the Lord," as applied in the New Testament to marriage, and to filial duty, and by inference to all the domestic relations, we commend them to these letters. We should not say so, if they were letters *on* family religion; or a "Letter-writer" of precedents for solemn epistles to help inexperienced correspondents; or genuine family-letters, but expected to be read and admired, and haply at length published. But the correspondence in this volume took place before the family had come to such dignity as could suggest to them that what they wrote would ever have a public interest. It was not the household of a clergyman—a Philip or Matthew Henry—who were reminded at every turn of what was becoming to be said or written by or to the ordained and installed minister of religion. The effusions of the Winthrops, now presented for the first time to public view, show, so far as any writing can be trusted, the actual, prevailing religious sentiment in a private family—the habitual and

practical standing which Christianity had in the home and among themselves.

“When I considered,” wrote Winthrop, in one of his touching allusions to his first wife, “when I considered of such letters as my wife had written to me, and observed the scribbling hand, the mean congruity, the false orthography, and broken sentences, etc., and yet found my heart not only accepting of them, but delighting in them, and esteeming them above far more curious workmanship in another, and all from hence that I loved her”—he goes on to a beautiful inference that Christ will “accept the poorest testimony of my love and duty towards him.” But we quote the sentence as literally descriptive of the homely sincerity of the testimony of the letters to the place of religion in their domestic life.

We will first give specimens of the husband’s letters. He began well. While yet only espoused, and signing himself “thy husband by promise,” he wrote in a strain, and at a length, which would have justified her in saying of the letters of the wooing period, what she said of those received eleven years after their marriage—“those serious thoughts of your own, which you sent me, did make a very good supply instead of a sermon.” It is not often that page after page of such a correspondence is filled with scriptural text and argument, to draw the spouse’s mind from her “well-willer” and her earthly prospects, to Christ and the spiritual life: “O my sweet spouse, can we esteem each other’s love as worthy the recompence of our best mutual affections, and can we not discern so much of Christ’s exceeding and undeserved love, as may cheerfully allure us to love him above all?” “Cheer up thy heart in the Lord, for thou knowest that Christ, thy best husband, can never fail thee. He never dies, so that there can be no grief at parting. He never changes, so that once beloved, ever the same. His ability is ever infinite, so that the dowry and inheritance of his sons and daughters can never be diminished. As for me, a poor worm, dust and ashes, a man full of infirmities, subject to all sins, changes and chances which befall the sons of men,” &c.

But let us turn to the conjugal letters.

“Oh what great cause have we to love Him above thousands

whose portion in all good things is far inferior to ours; although this alone were sufficient to enforce us to love him with all our hearts, that he hath redeemed us from hell, and appointed us to eternal happiness, when we were as deeply under the curse as the most reprobate. Let our prayer be, my good wife, that he would quicken up the faith and feeling of these things in us, that at length we might come to take as much delight in the meditation and exercise of heavenly things, as the most covetous earthling doth in his lands and goods."

"I am here where I have all outward content, most kind entertainment, good company, and good fare; only the want of thy presence and amiable society makes me weary of all other accomplements, so dear is thy love to me, and so confident am I of the like entertainment my true affection finds with thee. Oh that the consideration of these things could make us raise up our spirits to a like conformity of sincerity and fervency in the love of Christ our Lord and heavenly husband; that we could delight in him as we do in each other, and that his absence were like grievous to us."

"The grace and blessing of the Lord be with thee ever, and with us both, for the continuance and increase of our mutual love in all truth and holiness; whereunto let us strive by prayer and stirring up each other, that we may have full assurance of our being in Christ, by our liveliness in Christianity; that we may live that life of faith which only affords true peace, comfort, and contentation. And if by this means the world shall disclaim us as none of hers, and shall refuse to hold out to us such full breasts as she doth to others, this shall not need to trouble us, but rather may give us matter of joy in that being strangers here, we may look for our inheritance in a better life."

"Oh! the riches of Christ! Oh! the sweetness of the word of grace! It ravisheth my soul in the thought thereof, so that when I apprehend but a glimpse of the dignity and felicity of a Christian, I can hardly persuade my heart to hope for so great happiness. Let men talk what they will of riches, honours, pleasures, let us have Christ crucified, and let them take all besides. For indeed he who hath Christ, hath all things

with him ; for he enjoyeth an all-sufficiency which makes him abundantly rich in poverty, honourable in the lowest abasements, full of joy and consolation in the sharpest afflictions, living in death, and possessing eternity in this vale of misery."

"Seeing the Lord calls me into his work, he will have care of thee and all ours, and our affairs in my absence. Therefore I must send thee to him for all thou lackest. Go boldly, sweet wife, to the throne of grace. If any thing trouble thee, acquaint the Lord with it. Tell him he hath taken thy husband from thee, pray him to be a husband to thee, a father to thy children, a master to thy household. Thou shalt find him faithful. Thou art not guilty of my departure. Thou hast not driven me away by any unkindness or want of duty ; therefore thou mayest challenge protection and blessing of him."

"I must now begin to prepare thee for our long parting, which grows very near. I know not how to deal with thee by arguments ; for if thou wert as wise and patient as ever woman was, yet it must needs be a great trial to thee, and the greater because I am so dear to thee. That which I must chiefly look at in thee, for a ground of contentment, is thy godliness. If now the Lord be thy God, thou must show it by trusting in him, and resigning thyself quietly to his good pleasure. . . . The best course is to turn all our reasons and discourse into prayers ; for he only can help who is Lord of sea and land, and hath sole power of life and death."

We have room for one more only of the husband's letters, and it shall be the one which he supposed would be the last before the ship sailed for America. The *Arabella* was now riding at the Cowes. "Remember Monday and Friday between five and six," is more than once repeated in the latest letters, to remind the wife, who was to be left in England for a time, of their mutual agreement upon an hour for devotion.

"And now, my sweet soul, I must once again take my last farewell of thee in old England. It goeth very near to my heart to leave thee, but I know to whom I have committed thee, even to Him who loves thee much better than any husband can ; who hath taken account of the hairs of thy head, and puts all thy tears in his bottle ; who can and (if it be for his glory) will bring us together again with peace and comfort.

Oh how it refresheth my heart to think that I shall yet again see thy sweet face in the land of the living!—that lovely countenance that I have so much delighted in, and beheld with so great content. I have been hitherto so taken up with business that I could seldom look back to my former happiness; but now, when I shall be at some leisure, I shall not avoid the remembrance of thee, nor the grief for thy absence. Thou hast thy share with me, but I hope the course we have agreed upon will be some ease to us both. Mondays and Fridays, at five of the clock at night, we shall meet in spirit till we meet in person. Yet if all these hopes should fail, blessed be our God that we are assured we shall meet one day, if not as husband and wife, yet in a better condition. Let that stay and comfort thine heart. Neither can the sea drown thy husband, nor enemies destroy, nor any adversity deprive thee of thy husband or children. Therefore I will only take thee now and my sweet children in my arms, and kiss and embrace you all, and so leave you with God. Farewell, farewell. I bless you all in the name of the Lord Jesus!"

Now for a few of the beautiful photographic lineaments of the wife—Margaret Tyndal.

"I have no way to manifest my love to you but by these my unworthy lines, which I would entreat you to accept from her that loveth you with an unfeigned heart. I shall now know what it is to want a loving husband, that I may more prize and esteem him when I have him. My mother is coming to you about a week or fortnight hence, and so I shall be deprived of you both. I pray God I may by faith lay hold on Christ Jesus and his benefits, that he may be instead of husband and mother and all other friends by the comfort of his Holy Spirit."

"My good husband, I thank you for putting me in mind to be cheerful, and to put my trust in my good God, who hath never failed me in time of need. I beseech him to continue his mercy still to me, and grant that my sins may not provoke his anger against me; for he is a just God, and will punish offenders. The Lord give me grace to make my peace with him in Jesus Christ our Lord and only Saviour, who sitteth at the right hand of God a mediator for us."

"Your love to me doth daily give me cause of comfort, and doth much increase my love to you, for love liveth by love. I were worse than a brute beast if I should not love and be faithful to thee, who hath deserved so well at my hands. I am ashamed and grieved with myself, that I have nothing within or without worthy of thee, and yet it pleaseth thee to accept of both and to rest contented. I had need to amend my life and pray to God for more grace, that I may not deceive you of those good hopes which you have of me—a sinful woman, full of infirmities, continually failing of what I desire and what I ought to perform to the Lord and thyself."

"What can be more pleasing to a wife than to hear of the welfare of her best beloved, and how he is pleased with her poor endeavours. I blush to hear myself commended, knowing my own wants. But it is your love that conceives the best, and makes all things seem better than they are. I wish that I may be always pleasing to thee, and that those comforts we have in each other may be daily increased, so far as they be pleasing to God. I will use that speech to thee that Abigail did to David, 'I will be a servant to wash the feet of my lord.' I will do any service wherein I may please my good husband. I confess I cannot do enough for thee; but thou art pleased to accept the will for the deed, and rest contented. I have many reasons to make me love thee, whereof I will name two. First, because thou lovest God; and, secondly, because that thou lovest me. If these two were wanting, all the rest would be eclipsed."

"You do daily manifest your love to me and care for my spiritual good, as well as temporal, which is best of all. I desire of God I may choose the better part which cannot be taken from me, which will stand me in stead when all other things fail me."

"The true tokens of your love and care of my good, now in your absence, as well as when you are present, make me think that saying false, 'out of sight, out of mind.' I am sure my heart and thoughts are always near you, to do you good and not evil, all the days of my life. I hope, through God's blessing, your pains will not be altogether lost which you bestow upon me in writing. Those serious thoughts of your own which you sent

me, did make a very good supply instead of a sermon. I shall often read them, and desire to be of God's family, to whom so many blessings belong, and pray that I may not be one separated from God, whose conscience is always accusing them."

"I know not how to express my love to thee, or my desires of thy wished welfare, but my heart is well known to thee, which will make relation of my affections, though they be small in appearance. My thoughts are now on our great change and alteration of our course here, which I beseech the Lord to bless us in. And, my good husband, cheer up thy heart in the expectation of God's goodness to us, and let nothing dismay or discourage thee. If the Lord be for us, who can be against us? My grief is the fear of staying behind thee, but I must leave all to the good providence of God."

We would fain breathe longer this patriarchal atmosphere, but can only delay a few moments more to hear the father, as we have been hearing the husband. And first come the letters to his eldest son, John, the future Governor of Connecticut, beginning when he was, at the age of seventeen, a student at Trinity College, Dublin. They deserve the attention in these days of parents as well as children.

"Because I cannot too oft put you in mind of those things which concern your good, as if you were nearer to me, it must be your care the better to observe and ruminate those instructions which I give you, and the better to apply the other good means which you have. Especially labour by all means to imprint in your heart the fear of God; and let not the fearful profaneness and contempt of ungodly men diminish the reverent and awful regard of his Great Majesty in your heart."

"I do usually begin and end my letters with that which I would have the Alpha and Omega of all thy thoughts and endeavours, viz., the blessing of the Almighty to be upon thee, not after the common valuation of God's blessings, like the warming of the sun to a hale, stirring body; but that blessing which faith finds in the sweet promises of God and his free favour, whereby the soul hath a place of joy and refuge in all storms of adversity. I beseech the Lord to open thine eyes, that thou mayest see the riches of this grace, which will abate the account of all earthly vanities; and if it please him to give

thee once a taste of the sweetness of the true wisdom which is from above, it will season thy studies and give a new temper to thy soul. Remember, therefore, what the wisest saith, ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.’ Lay this foundation, and thou shalt be wise indeed. You must have special care that you be not ensnared with the lusts of youth, which are commonly covered under the name of recreations, &c. I remember the counsel of a wise man, *Quidquid ad voluptatis seminarium pullulat, venenum puta.* Think of it, dear son, and especially that of Paul to Timothy: ‘Exhort young men that they be sober-minded.’”

“I bless God for the continuance of your health, but especially for the good seed of his true fear which, I trust, is planted and grows daily in you. I perceive you lose not your time nor neglect your study; which, as it will be abundantly fruitful to my comfort, so much more to your future and eternal happiness, and especially to the glory of him who hath created you to this purpose. . . . He who hath begun that good in you, will perfect it unto the day of the Lord Jesus: only you must be constant and fervent in the use of the means, and yet trust only to God’s blessing.”

“Let it suffice for the present, that I humbly praise our heavenly Father for his great mercy towards thee in all respects: especially for the hope which I conceive that he hath pleased to make thee a vessel of glory for thy salvation in Christ Jesus. And I heartily rejoice that he hath withdrawn thy mind from the love of those worldly vanities where-with the most part of youth are poisoned, and hath given thee to discern of, and exercise thyself in, things that are of true worth. I see, by your epistle, that you have not spent this year in idleness, but have profited even beyond my expectations. The Lord grant that thy soul may still prosper in the knowledge of Jesus Christ, and in the strength of the Spirit, as thy mind is strengthened in wisdom and learning; for this gives the true lustre and beauty to all gifts, both of nature and industry, and is as wisdom with an inheritance.”

“Be watchful, and remember that though it be true in some cases, that *principium est dimidium totius*, yet in divinity, he who hath attained beyond the middest must still think himself

to have but new begun: for, through the continual instigation of Satan and our own proneness to evil, we are always in danger of being turned out of our course; but God will preserve us to the end, if we trust in him, and be guided by his will."

"There is nothing in this world that can be like cause of private comfort to me, as to see the welfare of my children; especially when I may have hope that they belong to Christ and increase his kingdom, and that I shall meet them in glory, to enjoy them in life eternal, when this shade of life shall be vanished. I am glad also to hear that thou declinest the evil company and manners of the place thou livest in, and followest thy study with good fruit. Go on, and God will still prosper thee. To fall back will be far worse than never to have begun; but I hope better of thee."

"My true desire is that you may be a good proficient in your studies, but my most earnest prayers and wishes are that you and your studies may be consecrated to Christ Jesus and the service of his church; for which end I beseech the Lord to furnish you with all meet gifts, and to sanctify you throughout. For I doubt not but if it please the Lord to reveal himself once in you, and to let you taste and see how good he is, and what the worth of Christ is to those who find him—what riches, what pleasures, what wisdom, what peace and contentation is to be found in Christ alone—you will willingly forsake all to follow him, and with Paul, those things which sometimes seemed great advantage to you, to account them lost for Christ's sake. I can give you but a taste of these things. Be constant in hearing, prayer, reading, and meditation, and the good Spirit of God shall reveal unto you this great mystery of godliness, and shall show you more than any tongue or pen can express."

When the object of these affectionate and pious counsels entered the naval service of his country, and accompanied the expedition under the Duke of Buckingham for the relief of the French Protestants at Rochelle; and when afterwards he was pursuing his travels in the East, the same paternal care followed the man that had watched over the boy. Here again

the wisdom of 1627 can be fitly appropriated in 1864—and to the army as well as navy.

"Only be careful to seek the Lord in the first place and with all earnestness, as he who is only able to keep you in all perils, and to give you favour in the sight of those who may be instruments of your welfare. And account it a great point of wisdom to keep diligent watch over yourself, that you may neither be infected by the evil conversation of any that you may be forced to converse with, neither that your own speech or behaviour be any just occasion to hurt or ensnare you. Be not rash upon ostentation of valour to adventure yourself to unnecessary dangers; but if you be lawfully called, let it appear that you hold your life for him who gave it you, and will preserve it unto the farthest period of his own holy decree. For you may be resolved, that while you keep in your way, all the cannons or enemies in the world shall not be able to shorten your days one minute."

"Should not a man trust his Maker and rest upon the counsel of his Father before all other things? Should not the promise of the holy Lord, the God of truth, be believed above all carnal false fears and shallow ways of human wisdom? It is just with God to harden men's hearts in their distrust of his faithfulness, because they dare not rely upon him. But such as will roll their ways upon the Lord, do find him always as good as his word."

The same strain continues to characterize every letter of the father, whether of business ("in great straits of leisure") or common familiarity, down to the parting messages as he is waiting for a fair wind to carry him across the Atlantic. "The Lord pour down his blessings upon you, both the blessings of the right hand and the left, and let the blessings of your father be increased above the blessings of your ancestors upon the head and heart of my dear son." "I do much rejoice and bless God for that goodness I find in you towards me and mine. I do pray and assuredly expect that the Lord will reward it plentifully in your bosom; for it is his promise to prolong their days (which includes all outward prosperity,) who give due honour to their parents. Trust him, son, for he is faithful. Labour to grow

into nearer communion and acquaintance with him, and you shall find him a good God, and a Master worth the serving. Ask of any who have tried him, and they will justify him in his kindness and bounty to his servants. Yet we must not look that he should always give us what we think might be good for us; but wait, and let him take his own way, and the end will satisfy our expectation."

It is pleasant to know that this child of Christian nurture and admonition did not depart from "the way he should go," and that he has been described as "the heir of all his father's talents, prudence, and virtues, with a superior share of human learning." Nor was John the only example of the proverb. A younger brother—Forth—began, at the age of thirteen, to write as follows—not to his father, where it might seem more exacted—but to his brother, only three years older than himself.

"Although the distance of place hath severed us one from another, yet I trust that neither sea nor land can break off nor diminish our true love and affection one towards each other, which hath ever been; and I trust that the sun shall cease his course before our love shall be abolished. And as we do thus love one another, how unfeignedly should we love God for his Son Jesus Christ! He loved us when we were enemies, not brethren. How, how, I say, should we love him! Let us take heed that we lose not our first love, as Laodicea did, or begin well, with the Galatians, but should not go on well, but should have cause to fear, with the apostle, lest we are turned from God; and I hope mountains or hills should sooner be cast into the sea, than that we should lose our first love." "Many men who in their youth have neglected learning and goodness, in their age, when it should do them any, nay, most good and stead, then they cry out of all, their parents, themselves, and all, and wish that they had never seen the sun."

Of this son, Mr. R. C. Winthrop says (p. 186): "We will not anticipate his early fate;" and afterwards (p. 362), "We shall see but too soon what was the end of all his plans of domestic happiness;" but the relation must have been reserved for another volume, as it is not to be found in this.

In following these ramifications of religious influence through the public and private lives of this family, we seem to have found that much of whatever of *method* was concerned in it, lay in these two entries in his journal—made when he was about thirty years of age. The first is this: “Having been long wearied with discontent for want of such employment as I could find comfort and peace in, I found at last that the conscientious and constant teaching of my family was a special business, wherein I might please God, and greatly further their and mine own salvation; which might be as sufficient encouragement to my study and labour therein as if I were to teach a public congregation. For as to the pleasing of God, it was all one; and I perceived that my exercise therein did stir up in me many considerations and much life of affection, which otherwise I should not so often meet with: so that I purpose, by God’s assistance, to take it as a chief part of my calling, and to intend it accordingly.” P. 119.

The other reflection runs as follows: “It appears by divers precepts of God to Israel, of talking with their children about God, and by the practice of the faithful in the times of persecution, that we should have religion in as familiar practice as of eating and drinking, dealings about earthly affairs, &c., and not to tie it only to the exercises of Divine worship, which makes that there is so little free speech of heavenly matters, and that men are ready to blush at the speaking or hearing thereof, as if it were some straining of modesty.” P. 147.

There is some obscurity about Winthrop’s professional life. We have noticed the allusion to his magistracy almost as soon as he attained his majority. In 1622 he appears to have had business in London, as a lawyer, and in 1626 was one of the attorneys of the Court of Wards and Liveries. This office was “gone” in 1629—the fourth of Charles I.—whether by resignation, or, as the editor suggests, by his being displaced on account of “his opposition to the course of the Government at this period, and his manifest sympathy with those who were suffering under its unjust exactions and proscriptions.”

In that year are found the earliest indications of the turning of his mind towards the providential openings in America for a

refuge from political and religious intolerance; and what were the uppermost considerations in Winthrop's mind may be seen in his "Reasons for justifying the undertakers of the intended Plantation in New England"—the first of which is, "it will be a service to the church, of great consequence to carry the gospel into those parts of the world, and help on the coming of the fulness of the Gentiles, and raise a bulwark against Anti-christ." 2d. To make a place in the wilderness for the persecuted church to fly to. 3d. For the redress of social evils which were perverting the domestic relations in the old country. 4th. To cultivate a portion of "the Lord's garden" lying waste, while the general commission to the sons of men was to replenish the earth and subdue it. 5th. To give trades and arts an advantage which the extravagance of the times denied to the honest labourer. 6th. To afford purer fountains of learning and religion. 7th. To raise and support "a particular church while it is in the infancy." 8th. The example of godly persons forsaking their wealth and prosperity for the hard and mean condition of adventurers for such reasons as the above, would produce a great moral effect. 9th. The signs of the Divine direction and favour as seen in the disposing of so many ministers and others to the enterprise. Divers objections to the proposed Plantation were met, by the same hand, with cases—not from the Reports—but such as those of Ephron the Hittite and Abraham, Jacob and Hamor, Jacob and Laban, the servants of Abimelech and of Isaac; his arguments were to the principles of Divine judgments, the evangelizing of the nations, and the coming of the kingdom of Christ. In fact, the whole reasoning of the matter is more in the spirit of a discussion of the Executive Committee of our Foreign Missions, than of a company of colonists going to seek their fortune and establish a government. Such was the politics, such the politicians, of the earliest settlements in the northern district of what, in less than one hundred and fifty years, arose as the independent United States of America. But long before 1776 was the germ of the confederate Republic found in the compact of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven, as the "United Colonies of New England"—each member reserv-

ing its local jurisdiction with a *sine qua non*, which shows that "State rights" were claimed as fundamental in the embryo republic of 1643.

It was determined by the Company of the Massachusetts Bay, that the government of the Plantation should be vested in the inhabitants, and not continue in subordination to the Company in England. Upon this proviso, Saltonstall, Dudley, Vassall, Winthrop, and eight other associates, entered into obligation to cross, within a designated period, to Massachusetts, and to reside there as their home. Winthrop was chosen governor for the first year, and sailed from Yarmouth in the beginning of April, 1630, and here the volume shuts. About eight hundred crossed in the Arbella and its consort, with Winthrop. On the voyage he wrote, "A Model of Christian Charity." The new emigrants found hardships and discouragements that turned some homeward, but the Governor, while waiting for his beloved Margaret to join him, wrote to her, "We here enjoy God and Jesus Christ, and is not this enough? I thank God I like so well to be here as I do not repent my coming. I would not have altered my course, though I had foreseen all these afflictions. I never had more content of mind." He was annually elected Governor or Deputy Governor for most of the years that followed his landing until his death in March, 1649. Down to that date he kept the "Journal of the transactions and occurrences in the settlement of Massachusetts, and the other New England colonies," which (now under the title of "The History of New England from 1630 to 1649,") is so much cited by all historians of America.

ART. VII.—*St. Jerome.**

ST. JEROME was the greatest scholar—though by no means the greatest divine—and at the same time the most zealous monk among the church fathers of the fourth and fifth century, and the connecting link between Eastern and Western learning and religion. His life belongs almost with equal right to the history of theology and the history of monasticism. Hence the Catholic artists generally represent him as a penitent in a reading or writing posture, with a lion and a skull, to denote the union of the literary and anchoritic modes of life. He was the first learned divine who not only recommended, but actually embraced the monastic mode of life, and his example exerted a great influence in making monasticism available for the promotion of learning. To rare talents and attainments,† indefatigable activity of mind, ardent faith, immortal merit in the translation and interpretation of the Bible, and earnest

* I. S. EUS. HIERONYMUS: *Opera omnia* ed. Erasmus (assisted by Ecolampadius), Bas. 1516—20. 9 vols. fol. (first edition, often reprinted, but now antiquated); ed. (Bened.) Martianay, Par. 1693, 5 vols. fol. (incomplete); ed. Vallarsi & Maffei, Veron. 1734—42. 11 vols. fol., Venet. 1766 (best edition). Comp. especially the one hundred and fifty Epistles (the chronological order of which Vallarsi, in tom. I. of his edition, has finally established.) The Epistles have often been separately edited, both in the original Latin and in modern translations. The order differs considerably in different editions. Hence the confusion in quotations from Jerome.

II. For extended works on the life of Jerome see DU PIN (*Nouvelle Biblioth. des auteurs eccles.* tom. iii. p. 100—140); TILLEMONT (tom. xii. 1—356); MARTIANAY (*La vie de St. Jerome*, Par. 1706); JOH. STILTING (in the *Acta Sanctorum*, Sept. tom. viii., p. 418—688, Antw. 1762); BUTLER (sub Sept. 20); VALLARSI (in *Op. Hieron.*, tom. xi., p. 1—240): SCHRÖCKH (viii. 359 sqq., and especially xi., 3—254); ENGELSTOFT (*Hieron. Stridonensis, interpres, criticus, exegeta, apologeta, historicus, doctor, monachus.* Havn. 1798); D. v. CÖLLN (in Ersch and Gruber's *Encycl.*, sect. ii., vol. 8); COLLOMBET (*Histoire de S. Jérôme.* Lyons, 1844); and MILMAN (*Hist. of Lat. Christianity*, Bk. iii., c. xi: *Jerom and the Monastic System.*)

† As he himself boasts in his second apology to Rufinus: “Ego philosophus (?), rhetor, grammaticus, dialecticus, hebreus, græcus, latinus, trilinguis.” Erasmus had an enthusiastic veneration for Jerome, and placed him even far above Augustine, partly no doubt from theological sympathy with Jerome's semi-pelagianism.

zeal for ascetic piety, he united so great vanity and ambition, such irritability and bitterness of temper, such vehemence of uncontrolled passion, such an intolerant and persecuting spirit, and such inconstancy of conduct, that we find ourselves alternately attracted and repelled by his character, and now filled with admiration for his greatness, now with contempt or pity for his weakness.

Sophronius Eusebius Hieronymus was born at Stridon,* on the borders of Dalmatia, not far from Aquileia, between the years 331 and 342.† He was the son of wealthy Christian parents, and was educated in Rome, under the direction of the celebrated heathen grammarian, Donatus, and the rhetorician Victorinus. He read with great diligence and profit the classic poets, orators, and philosophers, and collected a considerable library. On Sundays he visited, with Bonosus and other young friends, the subterranean graves of the martyrs, which made an indelible impression upon him. Yet he was not exempt from the temptations of a great and corrupt city, and he lost his chastity, as he himself afterwards repeatedly acknowledged, with pain.

About the year 370, whether before or after his literary tour to Treves and Aquileia is uncertain, but at all events, in his later youth, he received baptism at Rome, and resolved thenceforth to devote himself wholly, in rigid abstinence, to the service of the Lord. In the first zeal of his conversion he renounced his love for the classics, and applied himself to the study of the hitherto distasteful Bible. In a morbid ascetic frame he had, a few years later, that celebrated dream, in which he was summoned before the judgment-seat of Christ, and, as a heathen Ciceronian,‡ so severely reprimanded and scourged, that even

* Hence called *Stridonensis*; also in distinction from the contemporary but little known Greek Jerome, who was probably a presbyter in Jerusalem.

† Martianay, Stilting, Cave, Schröckh, Hagenbach, and others, place his birth, according to Prosper, Chron. ad ann. 331, in the year 331; Baronius, Du Pin, and Tillemont, with greater probability, in the year 342. The last infers, from various circumstances, that Jerome lived not ninety-one years, as Prosper states, but only seventy-eight. His death is placed in the year 419 or 420.

‡ "Mentiris," said the Lord to him, when Jerome called himself a Christian, "Ciceronianus es, non Christianus, ubi enim thesaurus tuus, ibi et cor

the angels interceded for him from sympathy with his youth, and he himself solemnly vowed never again to take worldly books into his hands. When he woke, he still felt the stripes, which, as he thought, not his heated fancy, but the Lord himself had inflicted upon him. Hence he warns his female friend, Eustochium, to whom several years afterwards he recounted this experience, to avoid all profane reading: "What have Christ and Belial, the Psalms and Horace, the Gospels and Virgil, the Apostles and Cicero, to do with one another? We cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of the devil at the same time." But proper as this warning may be against overrating classical scholarship, Jerome himself, in his version of the Bible and his commentaries, affords the best evidence of the inestimable value of linguistic and antiquarian knowledge when devoted to the service of religion. That oath, also, at least in later life, he did not strictly keep. On the contrary, he made the monks copy the dialogues of Cicero, and explained Virgil at Bethlehem, and his writings abound in recollections and quotations of the classic authors. When Rufinus of Aquileia, at first his warm friend, but afterwards a bitter enemy, cast up to him this inconsistency and breach of a solemn vow, he resorted to the evasion, that he could not obliterate from his memory what he had formerly read;—as if it were not so sinful to cite a heathen author as to read him. With more reason he asserted that all was a mere dream, and a dream-vow was not binding. He referred him to the prophets, "who teach that dreams are vain, and not worthy of faith." Yet was this dream afterwards made frequent use of, as Erasmus laments, to cover monastic obscurantism.

After his baptism Jerome divided his life between the east and the west, between ascetic discipline and literary labour. He removed from Rome to Antioch with a few friends, and his library, visited the most celebrated anchorites, attended the exegetical lectures of the younger Apollinaris in Antioch, and then (374) spent some time as an ascetic in the dreary Syrian desert of Chalcis. Here, like so many other hermits, he underwent a

tuum." Ep. xxii. ad Eustochium (ed. Vallars.) C. A. Heumann has written a special treatise, *De ecstasi Hieronymi anti-Ciceroniana*. Comp. also Schröckh, vol. vii. p. 35 sqq., and Ozanam: "Civilisation au 5e siècle," i. 301.

grievous struggle with sensuality, which he described ten years after with indelicate minuteness in a long letter to his virgin friend Eustochium.* In spite of his starved and emaciated body his fancy tormented him with wild images of Roman banquets and dances of women; showing that the monastic seclusion from the world was by no means proof against the temptations of the flesh and the devil. Helpless he cast himself at the feet of Jesus, wet them with tears of repentance, and subdued the resisting flesh by a week of fasting, and by the dry study of Hebrew grammar, (which, according to a letter to Rusticus,† he was at that time learning from a converted Jew,) until he found peace and thought himself transported to the choirs of the angels in heaven. In this period probably fall the dream mentioned above, and the composition of his few ascetic writings full of heated eulogy of the monastic life.‡ His biographies of distinguished anchorites, however, are very pleasantly and temperately written.§ He commends monastic seclusion even against the will of parents; interpreting the word of the Lord about forsaking father and mother, as if monasticism and Christianity were the same. “Though thy mother”—he writes to his friend Heliodorus, who had left him in the midst of his journey to the Syrian desert—“with flowing hair and rent garments should show thee the breasts which have nourished thee; though thy father should lie upon the threshold; yet depart thou, treading over thy father, and fly with dry eyes to the standard of the cross. This is the only religion of its kind, in this matter to be cruel. . . . The love of God and the fear of hell easily rend the bonds of household asunder. The holy Scripture indeed enjoins obedience to parents; but he, who loves them more than Christ, loses his soul! . . . O desert, where the flowers of Christ are blooming! O solitude, where the stones for the new Jerusalem are pre-

* Ep. xxii., tom. i. p. 91, ed. Vallars. † Ep. cxxv., ed. Vallars.

‡ *De laude vitæ solitariæ*, Ep. ad Heliodorum. The Roman lady Fabiola learned this letter by heart, and Du Pin calls it a masterpiece of eloquence. (*Nouv. Bibl. des auteurs eccl.* iii. 102,) but it is almost too declamatory and turgid. He himself afterwards acknowledged it overdrawn.

§ Gibbon says of them: “The stories of Paul, Hilarion, and Malchus, are admirably told; and the only defect of these pleasing compositions is the want of truth and common sense.”

pared! O retreat, which rejoices in the friendship of God! What doest thou in the world, my brother, with thy soul greater than the world? How long wilt thou remain in the shadow of roofs, and in the smoky dungeon of cities? Believe me, I see here more of the light." Similar descriptions of the attractions of monastic life we meet with in the ascetic writings of Gregory, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Cassian, Nilus,* and in the beginning of the fifth century, Isidor. "So great grace," says the venerable monk Nilus of Mount Sinai (Ep. lib. i. ep. 1, as quoted by Neander, Am. ed. ii. 250,) "so great grace has God bestowed on the monks, even in anticipation of the future world, that they wish for no honours from men, and feel no longing after the greatness of this world; but, on the contrary, often seek rather to remain concealed from men: while, on the other hand, many of the great who possess all the glory of the world, either of their own accord, or compelled by misfortune, take refuge with the lowly monks, and, delivered from fatal dangers, obtain at once a temporal and an eternal salvation." Jerome's eloquent appeal to his friend failed of the desired effect; Heliodorus entered the teaching order and became bishop.

The active and restless spirit of Jerome soon brought him again upon the public stage, and involved him in all the doctrinal and ecclesiastical controversies of those controversial times. He received the ordination of presbyter from the bishop Paulinus in Antioch, without taking charge of a congregation. He preferred the itinerant life of a monk and a student to a fixed office, and about 380 journeyed to Constantinople, where he heard the anti-Arian sermons of the celebrated Gregory Nazianzen, and translated the Chronicle of Eusebius and the homilies of Origen on Jeremiah and Ezekiel. In 382, on account of the Meletian schism, he returned to Rome with Paulinus and Epiphanius. Here he came into close connection with the bishop Damasus, as his theological adviser and ecclesiastical secretary,* and was led by him into new exegetical

* As we infer from an occasional remark of Jerome in a letter written A. D. 409, Ep. cxxiii. : c. 10, ed. Vall., "Quum in chartis ecclesiasticis (i. e., probably in ecclesiastical documents; though Schröckh, viii. p. 122, refers it to the Holy Scriptures, appealing to a work of Bonamici unknown to me,) "juvarem

labours, particularly the revision of the Latin version of the Bible, which he completed at a later day in the East.

At the same time he laboured in Rome with the greatest zeal, by mouth and pen, in the cause of monasticism, which had hitherto gained very little foothold there, and met with violent opposition even among the clergy.

In the Latin church, in virtue partly of the climate, partly of the national character,* the monastic life took a much milder form, but assumed greater variety, and found a larger field of usefulness, than in the Greek. It produced no pillar-saints, nor other such excesses of ascetic heroism, but was more practical instead, and an important instrument for the cultivation of the soil, the diffusion of Christianity and civilization among the barbarians.† Exclusive contemplation was exchanged for alternate contemplation and labour. "A working monk," says Cassian, "is plagued by one devil, an inactive monk by a host." Yet it must not be forgotten, that the most eminent representatives of the eastern monasticism recommended manual labour and studies, and that the eastern monks took a very lively, often rude and stormy, part in the theological controversies. And, on the other hand, there were western monks, who, like Martin of Tours, regarded labour as disturbing contemplation.

Athanasius, the guest, the disciple, and subsequently the biographer and eulogist of St. Anthony, brought the first intelligence of monasticism to the west, and astounded the civilized and effeminate Romans with two live representatives of the

Damasum, Romanæ urbis episcopum et orientis atque occidentis synodis consultationibus responderem," etc. The latter words, which Schröckh does not quote, favour the common interpretation.

* Sulpitius Severus, in the first of his three dialogues, gives several amusing instances of the difference between the Gallic and Egyptian stomach, and was greatly astonished, when the first Egyptian anchorite, whom he visited, placed before him and his four companions a half-loaf of barley bread and a handful of herbs for a dinner, though they tasted very good after the wearisome journey. "Edacitas," says he, i. c. 8, "in Græcis *gula* est, in Gallis *natura*."

† "The monastic stream," says Montalembert, "which had been born in the deserts of Egypt, divided itself into two great arms. The one spread in the East, at first inundated everything, then concentrated and lost itself there. The other escaped into the West, and spread itself by a thousand channels over an entire world which had to be covered and fertilized."

semi-barbarous desert-sanctity of Egypt, who accompanied him in his exile in 340. The one, Ammonius, was so abstracted from the world that he disdained to visit any of the wonders of the great city, except the tombs of St. Peter and St. Paul, while the other, Isidore, attracted attention by his amiable simplicity. The phenomenon excited at first disgust and contempt, but soon admiration and imitation, especially among women, and among the decimated ranks of the ancient Roman nobility. The impression of the first visit was afterwards strengthened by two other visits of Athanasius to Rome, and especially by his biography of Anthony, which immediately acquired the popularity and authority of a monastic gospel. Many went to Egypt and Palestine to devote themselves there to the new mode of life; and for the sake of such, Jerome afterwards translated the rule of Pachomius into Latin. Others founded cloisters in the neighbourhood of Rome, or on the ruins of the ancient temples and the forum, and the frugal number of the heathen vestals was soon cast into the shade by whole hosts of Christian virgins. From Rome monasticism gradually spread over all Italy, the isles of the Mediterranean, and even the rugged rocks of the Gorgon and the Capraja, where the hermits, in voluntary exile from the world, took the place of the criminals and political victims whom the justice or tyranny and jealousy of the emperors had been accustomed to banish thither.

Ambrose, whose sister Marcellina was among the first Roman nuns, established a monastery in Milan,* one of the first in Italy, and with the warmest zeal encouraged celibacy even against the will of parents; insomuch that the mothers of Milan kept their daughters out of the way of his preaching, whilst from other quarters, even from Mauritania, virgins flocked to him to be consecrated to the solitary life.† The coasts and small islands of Italy were gradually studded with cloisters.‡

* Augustin Conf. vii. 6: “Erat monasterium Mediolani plenum bonis fratribus extra urbis mœnia, sub Ambrosio nutritore.”

† Ambr.: De virginibus, addressed to his sister Marcellina, about 377. Comp. Tillem. x., 102–5, and Schröckh, viii. 355 sqq.

‡ Ambr.: Hexaëmeron, l. iii. c. 5. Hieron.: Ep. 84 (or 30) de morte Fabiolæ.

Augustine, whose evangelical principles of the free grace of God as the only ground of salvation and peace were essentially inconsistent with the more Pelagian theory of the monastic life, nevertheless went with the then reigning spirit of the church in this respect, and led, with his clergy, a monk-like life in voluntary poverty and celibacy,* after the pattern, as he thought, of the primitive church of Jerusalem; but with all his zealous commendation he could obtain favour for monasticism in North Africa only among the liberated slaves and the lower classes.† He viewed it in its noblest aspect, as a life of undivided surrender to God and undisturbed occupation with spiritual and eternal things. But he acknowledged also its abuses; he distinctly condemned the vagrant begging monks, like the Circumcelliones and Gyrovagi, and wrote a book (*De opera monachorum*) against the monastic aversion to labour. But Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine, as also St. Martin of Tours, (died A. D. 400) whose life and miracles were described in fluent and pleasant manner by his disciple, Sulpitius Severus, were only the forerunners of western monasticism. Jerome laboured more zealously and more effectively than all for this mode of Christian virtue and piety, especially in Rome, during his three years' residence in that great centre of ancient history.

He had his eye mainly upon the most wealthy and honourable classes of the decayed Roman society, and tried to induce the descendants of the Scipios, the Gracchi, the Marcelli, the Camilli, the Anicci, to turn their sumptuous villas into monastic retreats, and to lead a life of sacrifice and charity. He met with great success. "The old patrician races, which founded Rome, which had governed her during all her period of splendour and liberty, and which overcame and conquered the world, had expiated for four centuries, under the atrocious yoke of the Cæsars, all that was most hard and selfish in the

* He himself speaks of a monasterium clericorum in his episcopal residence, and his biographer, Possidius, says of him, *Vita*, c. 5: "Factus ergo presbyter monasterium inter ecclesiam mox instituit, et cum Dei servis vivere cœpit secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam, maxime ut nemo quidquam proprium haberet, sed eis essent omnia communia."

† *De opere monach.* c. 22. Still later, Salvian (*De gubern. Dei*, viii. 4,) speaks of the hatred of the Africans for monasticism.

glory of their fathers. Cruelly humiliated, disgraced, and decimated during that long servitude, by the masters whom degenerate Rome had given herself, they found at last in Christian life, such as was practised by the monks, the dignity of sacrifice and the emancipation of the soul. These sons of the old Romans threw themselves into it with the magnanimous fire and persevering energy which had gained for their ancestors the empire of the world. ‘Formerly, says St. Jerome, according to the testimony of the apostle, there were few rich, few noble, few powerful among the Christians. Now it is no longer so. Not only among the Christians, but among the monks are to be found a multitude of the wise, the noble, and the rich.’ . . . ‘The monastic institution offered them a field of battle, where the struggles and victories of their ancestors could be renewed and surpassed for a loftier cause, and over enemies more redoubtable. The great men whose memory hovered still over degenerate Rome, had contended only with men, and subjugated only their bodies: their descendants undertook to strive with devils, and to conquer souls. . . . God called them to be the ancestors of a new people, gave them a new empire to found, and permitted them to bury and transfigure the glory of their forefathers in the bosom of the spiritual regeneration of the old world.’*

Most of these distinguished patrician converts of Jerome were women—widows, as Marcella, Albinia, Furia, Salvina, Fabiola, Melania, and, the most illustrious of all, Paula, and her family; or virgins, as Eustochium, Apella, Marcellina, Asella, Felicitas, and Demetrias. He gathered them as a select circle around him; he expounded to them the Holy Scriptures, in which some of these Roman ladies were very well read; he answered their questions of conscience; he incited them to celibate life, lavish beneficence, and enthusiastic asceticism; and flattered their spiritual vanity by extravagant praise. He was the oracle, biographer, admirer, and eulogist of these holy women, who constituted the spiritual nobility of Catholic

* Montalembert, himself the scion of an old noble family in France, *Monks of the West*, i. p. 388, sqq. Comp. Hieron. Epist. xxiv. *De obit. Paulinæ*, and Ep. xxx.: “Illi vicerunt corpora . . . haec subjugavit animus.”

Rome. Even the senator Pammachius, son-in-law to Paula, and heir to her fortune, gave his goods to the poor, exchanged the purple for the cowl, exposed himself to the mockery of his colleagues, and became, in the flattering language of Jerome, the general-in-chief of Roman monks, the first of monks in the first of rites.* Jerome considered marriage incompatible with genuine holiness; even deprecated first marriage, except so far as it was a nursery of the brides of Christ; warned Eustochium against all intercourse with married women; and hesitated not to call the mother of a bride of Christ, like Paula, a “mother-in-law of God.”†

His intimacy with these distinguished women, whom he admired more, perhaps, than they admired him, together with his unsparing attacks upon the immorality of the Roman clergy and of the higher classes, drew upon him much just censure and groundless calumny, which he met rather with indignant scorn and satire, than with quiet dignity and Christian meekness. After the death of his patron Damasus, A. D. 384, he left Rome, and in August, 385, with his brother Paulinian, a few monks, Paula, and her daughter Eustochium, made a pilgrimage “from Babylon to Jerusalem, that not Nebuchadnezzar, but Jesus, should reign over him.” With religious devotion and inquiring mind he wandered through the holy places of Palestine; spent some time in Alexandria, where he heard the lectures of the celebrated Didymus; visited the cells of the Nitrian mountain; and finally, with his two female friends, in 386, settled in the birth-place of the Redeemer, to lament there, as he says, the sins of his youth, and to secure himself against others.

In Bethlehem he presided over a monastery till his death, built a hospital for all strangers except heretics, prosecuted his literary studies without cessation, wrote several commentaries, and finished his improved Latin version of the Bible—the noblest monument of his life—but entangled himself in violent

* Epist. ad Pammach.: “Primus inter monachos in prima urbe . . . archistratego monachorum.”

† Ep. xxii. ad Eustochium, “de custodia virginitatis.” Even Rufinus (Opp. Hieron. iv. 223) was shocked at the profane, nay, almost blasphemous expression, *sorcor Dei*, and asked him from what *heathen* poet he had stolen it.

literary controversies, not only with opponents of the church orthodoxy, like Helvidius (against whom he had appeared before in 384,) Jovinian, Vigilantius, and Pelagius, but also with his long-tried friend Rufinus, and even with Augustine.* Palladius says, his jealousy could tolerate no saint beside himself, and drove many pious monks away from Bethlehem. He complained of the crowds of monks whom his fame attracted to Bethlehem.† The remains of the Roman nobility, too, ruined by the sack of Rome, fled to him for food and shelter. At the last, his repose was disturbed by incursions of the barbarian Huns and the heretical Pelagians. He died in 419 or 420, of fever, at a great age. His remains were afterwards brought to the Roman basilica of Maria Maggiore, but were exhibited also, and superstitiously venerated in several copies in Florence, Prague, Clugny, Paris, and the Escurial.‡

The Roman church has long since assigned him one of the first places among her standard teachers and canonical saints. Yet even some impartial Catholic historians venture to admit and disapprove his glaring inconsistencies and violent passions. The Protestant love of truth inclines to the judgment that Jerome was indeed an accomplished and most serviceable scholar, and a zealous enthusiast for all which his age counted holy, but lacking in calm self-control, and proper depth of mind and character, and that he reflected, with the virtues, the vices also of his age and of the monastic system. It must be

* His controversy with Augustine on the interpretation of Gal. ii. 14, is not unimportant as an index of the moral character of the two most illustrious Latin fathers of the church. Jerome saw in the account of the collision between Paul and Peter in Antioch an artifice of pastoral prudence, and supposed that Paul did not there reprove the senior apostle in earnest, but only for effect, to reclaim the Jews from their wrong notions respecting the validity of the ceremonial law. Augustine's delicate sense of truth was justly offended by this exegesis, which, to save the dignity of Peter, ascribed falsehood to Paul, and he expressed his opinion to Jerome, who, however, very loftily made him feel his smaller grammatical knowledge. But they afterwards became reconciled. Compare on this dispute the letters on both sides in Hieron. Opera ed. Vall., tom. i. 682 sqq., and the treatise of Möhler in his "Vermischte Schriften," vol. i., pp. 1-18.

† "Tantis de toto orbe confluentibus obruiimur turbis monachorum."

‡ The Jesuit Stilting, the author of the Vita Hieron. in the Acta Sanctorum, devotes nearly thirty folio pages to accounts of the veneration paid to him and his relics after his death.

said to his credit, however, that with all his enthusiastic zeal and admiration for monasticism, he saw with a keen eye, and exposed with unsparing hand, the false monks and nuns, and painted in lively colours the dangers of melancholy, hypochondria, the hypocrisy and spiritual pride, to which the institution was exposed.

Most Roman Catholic biographers, as Martianay, Vallarsi, Stilting, Dolci, and even the Anglican Cave, are unqualified eulogists of Jerome. (See the "selecta veterum testimonia de Hieronymo ejusque scriptis," in Vallarsi's edition, tom. xi., pp. 282-300.) Tillemont, however, who on account of his Jansenist proclivity sympathizes more with Augustine, makes a move towards a more enlightened judgment, for which Stilting sharply reproves him. Montalembert (*Monks of the West*, vol. i. 402) praises him as a man of genius inspired by zeal and subdued by penitence, of ardent faith and immense resources of knowledge, yet he incidentally speaks also of his "almost savage impetuosity of temper" and "that inexhaustible vehemence which sometimes degenerated into emphasis and affectation." Dr. John H. Newman, in his opinion before his transition from Puseyism to Romanism, exhibits the conflict, in which the moral feeling is here involved with the authority of the Roman church: "I do not scruple to say, that, were he not a saint, there are things in his writings and views, from which I should shrink; but as the case stands, I shrink rather from putting myself in opposition to something like a judgment of the catholic (?) world in favour of his saintly perfection." (*Church of the Fathers*, 268, cited by Robertson.) Luther also here boldly broke through tradition, but, forgetful of the great value of the Vulgate even to his German version of the Bible, went to the opposite extreme of unjust derogation, expressing several times a distinct antipathy to this church-father, and charging him with knowing not how to write at all of Christ, but only of fasts, virginity, and useless monkish exercises. Le Clerc exposed his defects with thorough ability, but unfairly, in his "Quæstiones Hieronymianæ," (Amstel. 1700, over 500 pp.) Mosheim and Schröckh are more mild, but the latter considers it doubtful, whether Jerome did Christianity more good than harm. Among later Protestant historians opinion has

become somewhat more favourable, though rather to his learning than his moral character, which betrays in his letters and controversial writings too many unquestionable weaknesses.

Of Jerome's many female disciples the most distinguished is St. Paula, the model of a Roman Catholic nun, who deserves a fuller notice in this connection. With his accustomed extravagance he opens his eulogy after her death in 404, with these words: "If all the members of my body were turned into tongues, and all my joints were to utter human voices, I should be unable to say anything worthy of the holy and venerable Paula."*

She was born in 347, of the renowned stock of the Scipios and Gracchi and Paulus Æmilius,† and was already a widow of six-and-thirty years, and the mother of five children, when, under the influence of Jerome, she renounced all the wealth and honours of the world, and betook herself to the most rigorous ascetic life. Rumour circulated a suspicion, which her spiritual guide, however, in a letter to Asella, answered with indignant rhetoric: "Was there, then, no other matron in Rome, who could have conquered my heart, but that one, who was always mourning and fasting, who abounded in dirt,‡ who had become almost blind with weeping, who spent whole nights in prayer, whose song was the Psalms, whose conversation was the gospel, whose joy was abstemiousness, whose life was fasting? Could no other have pleased me, but that one, whom I have never seen eat? Nay, verily, after I had begun to revere her as her chastity deserved, should all virtues have at once forsaken me?" He afterwards boasts of her, that she knew the Scriptures almost entirely by memory; she even learned Hebrew, that she might sing the Psalter with him in the original; and continually addressed exegetical questions to him, which he himself could answer only in part.

Repressing the sacred feelings of a mother, she left her

* Epitaphium Paulæ matris, ad Eustochium virginem. Ep. cviii., ed. Vallarsi. (Opera, tom. i., p. 684.)

† Her father professed to trace his genealogy to Agamemnon, and her husband to Æneas.

‡ This want of cleanliness, the inseparable companion of ancient ascetic holiness, is bad enough in monks, but still more intolerable and revolting in nuns.

daughter Ruffina and her little son Toxotius, in spite of their prayers and tears, in the city of Rome,* met Jerome in Antioch, and made a pilgrimage to Palestine and Egypt. With glowing devotion, she knelt before the re-discovered cross, as if the Lord were still hanging upon it; she kissed the stone of the resurrection, which the angel rolled away; licked with thirsty tongue the pretended tomb of Jesus, and shed tears of joy as she entered the stall and beheld the manger at Bethlehem. In Egypt she penetrated into the desert of Nitria, prostrated herself at the feet of the hermits, and then returned to the Holy Land, and settled permanently in the birth-place of the Saviour. She founded there a monastery for Jerome, whom she supported, and three nunneries, in which she spent twenty years as abbess, until 404.

She denied herself flesh and wine, performed, with her daughter Eustochium, the meanest services, and even in severe sickness slept on bare ground in a hair shirt, or spent the whole night in prayer. "I must," said she, "disfigure my face, which I have often, against the command of God, adorned with paint; torment the body, which has participated in many idolatries; and atone for long laughing by constant weeping." Her liberality knew no bounds. She wished to die in beggary, and to be buried in a shroud which did not belong to her. She left to her daughter (who died in 419) a multitude of debts, which she had contracted at a high rate of interest for benevolent purposes.†

Her obsequies, which lasted a week, were attended by the bishops of Jerusalem and other cities of Palestine, besides clergy, monks, nuns, and laymen innumerable. Jerome apostrophizes her: "Farewell, Paula, and help with prayer the old age of thy adorer!"

* "Nesciebat se matrem," says Jerome, "ut Christi probaret ancillam." Revealing the conflict of monastic sanctity with the natural virtues, which God has enjoined. Montalembert also quotes the objectionable passage with apparent approbation.

† Jerome says, Eustochium hoped to pay the debts of her mother—probably by the help of others. Fuller justly remarks: "Liberality should have banks, as well as a stream." And John Wesley's excellent maxim was: "Make all you can, save all you can, give all you can."

S H O R T N O T I C E S .

The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, &c. Collected and edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Eddis and Douglas Denon Heath, (all of the University of Cambridge.) Vol. VIII. Boston: Taggart & Thompson.

We have repeatedly called the attention of our readers to this beautiful, complete, and convenient edition of the works of Lord Bacon. The work has passed from the hands of Messrs. F. A. Brown & Co. into those of Taggart & Thompson. All of the fifteen volumes are now published except one, which is shortly to appear. The price must, as the publishers announced, be necessarily raised after the work is completed. No more convenient, or, for its style, cheaper edition of the works of the great philosopher can anywhere be procured.

Present Truths in Theology. Man's Inability and God's Sovereignty, with their relation to gospel doctrine and moral responsibility. By James Gibson, D. D., Professor of Theology and Church History, Free Church College, Glasgow. Glasgow: Thomas Murray & Son. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1863. Vols. I. and II. Pp. 446 and 450.

This extensive and valuable work was received at too late a period to allow of any extended examination of its contents. A very slight inspection of its contents, however, reveals two things: first, that all the great questions concerning grace are brought under discussion; and, second, that the author has a wide field of vision—the views of the later, as well as of the older theologians, German as well as English, are submitted to examination. We do not doubt, therefore, that it will prove highly instructive to all interested in theological discussions. We regret that we have not had the opportunity to gain a better acquaintance with these volumes, to authorize us to speak of them more fully and intelligently.

Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians. With a revised Translation. By Charles J. Ellicott, B. D., Dean of Exeter, and Professor of Divinity, King's College, London. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1864.

This volume forms the fifth part of Professor Ellicott's Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, a work distinguished by

exact and elegant scholarship and familiar acquaintance with the whole field of exegetical literature. It answers accurately to its designation—critical and grammatical commentary.

Redeemer and Redeemed. An Investigation of the Atonement and Eternal Judgment. By Charles Beecher, Georgetown, Mass. Boston: Lee & Shepherd, 149 Washington street. 1864. Pp. 354.

The public papers have doubtless rendered our readers acquainted with the general character of this book. Mr. Beecher seems to belong to that class of men in whom reason and faith are subordinate and obedient to the imagination. To him that is true of which he can make an *anschauung*. His theory of preëxistence, and all he builds upon it, is a pure imagination.

Text Book of Geology. Designed for Schools and Academies. By James D. Dana, LL.D., Silliman Professor of Geology and Natural History in Yale College, &c. Philadelphia: Theodore Bliss & Co. London: Trübner & Co. 1864. Pp. 354.

Although this is an abridgment of Professor Dana's extended and elaborate work on geology, it is not a mere collection of extracts. It has been rewritten and thrown into a new form, in order to adapt it to its special purpose, and give it the unity of an independent work. It is specially important that elementary works on science should be prepared by masters in the department of which they treat. Too often such books are compiled by mere learners. Teachers and pupils who may use this work of Professor Dana, know they can follow him with confidence, as he is one of the first living authorities in all matters connected with geology.

Thoughts on Sabbath-schools. By John S. Hart, LL.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Price 75 cents.

We have been gratified with the perusal of this interesting little volume. It is the fruit of long and thoughtful acquaintance with the subject of which it treats. In its style gentle, yet spirited, unpretending, yet laden with valuable truth, and clear as light, one cannot fail to perceive the evidence of a genuine didactic mind. The views of education presented in it, also recommend themselves to us as both philosophically just, and practically addressed with precision to difficulties which a teacher is likely to encounter, and throwing light upon points of method where he is sometimes at a loss to decide. Under this head, we would especially instance the chapters on "teaching children what they do not understand," on "faith as an educational power," and on "the proper use of authority in

teaching," in all of which the remarks are eminently judicious and expose the error of the opposite doctrines which, of late years, have met with too much acceptance among us.

We notice the following additions made to the Sabbath-school Library of the Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Aunt Betsy's Rule, and How it Worked. 18mo. pp. 396.

Aunt Betsy was a poor and uneducated woman, who had two orphan children cast upon her care, but by the faithful application of only two rules brought them up in a way that made them more respected by their neighbours than many children that enjoyed what are commonly thought to be much greater advantages. The book deserves a wide circulation in families as well as in Sabbath-school libraries.

Good for Evil, and other Stories. Written for the Board of Publication, by Nellie Browning. 18mo. pp. 132.

Several pleasant stories for the junior classes in a Sabbath-school.

The Young Recruit; or, Under which King. By Sarah H. Myers, author of "Poor Nicholas," "The Railroad Boy," &c. 18mo. pp. 216.

The reader in this work is treated to several voyages on the Rhine, with an intelligent description of the magnificent scenery upon its banks, but this is only a secondary matter. Its great aim is to depict the reign of grace in the soul, and the struggles with the corrupt nature; and the trials and temptations to which a "young recruit" was exposed, after leaving the service of Satan and an earthly monarch, to serve the King whose kingdom is not of this world. There is much good sense interspersed in the work, and it has our hearty commendation.

The Pastor's Bible-class; or Familiar Conversations concerning the Sacred Mountains. 18mo. pp. 214.

It is very natural for a traveller, as he passes through a country, to tell you all that is known about the places he visits, and in this book you have the same process, but you skip from mountain to mountain. Knowledge is good in whatever way imparted, but we prefer it in a more connected chain. Otherwise, the book is instructive and interesting.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

Midrash Rabboth on the Pentateuch and Megilloth, with the Commentaries, which are printed in the Frankfort edition, (1732,) and in addition that of Sol. Isaac on Genesis. Folio, pp. 678. In Hebrew.

The Song of Solomon, translated by Willeram, explained by Rilindis and Herrat, abbesses at Hohenburg in Elsace, (1147 —1196,) published from a MS. in the imperial library at Vienna, by Joseph Haupt. 8vo. pp. xxiv. and 180. This commentary has the strange peculiarity of expounding this song of the Virgin Mary instead of the Church.

F. A. Löwe, Biblical Studies. No. 1. Contributions to the understanding of the Prophet Hosea. 8vo. pp. 40.

L. Reinke, Contributions to the Explanation of the Old Testament. Vol. V. 8vo. pp. 387. This volume contains eleven treatises on various matters connected with the exposition and criticism of the Old Testament.

F. Böttcher, New Exegetical and Critical Gleanings in the Old Testament. Part 1. Genesis to 2 Samuel. 8vo. pp. 268.

E. Riehm, The particular significance of the Old Testament for the religious Knowledge and religious Life of the Christian Church. 8vo. pp. 50.

Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Gospel of John is completed by the publication of the third volume. 8vo. pp. 409. A few pages at the end are devoted to the discussion of the aim of this gospel, its relation to the preceding, the readers for whom it was intended, the time when it was written, and its accuracy in recording the discourses of our Lord.

Lange's Bibel Werk. 11th Part. The Pastoral Epistles and the Epistle to Philemon. Second edition. 8vo. pp. 155.

C. F. Schmid, Biblical Theology of the New Testament. 3d edition. 8vo. pp. xxvii. and 626.

G. L. Hahn, The Doctrine of the Sacraments in its Historical development in the Western Church until the Council of Trent. 8vo. pp. 447.

K. Werner, History of the Apologetic and Polemic Literature of Christian Theology. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 766.

Decretales Pseudo-Isidorianæ et Capitula Augilramni, from

the Manuscripts, with a preliminary dissertation by P. Hinschius. 8vo. pp. 771.

A. Merx, Bardesanes of Edessa, with an investigation into the relation of the Clementine Recognitions to the book of the Laws of the Countries. 8vo. pp. 131.

F. Böhringer is preparing a new edition of his Church of Christ and its Witnesses, a Church History in Biographies.

John Chrysostom's Homilies in Armenian. 3 vols. 8vo. pp. 924, 918, and 942. In the judgment of the editor, the homilies on Matthew and the commentary on the Epistles of Paul were rendered into Armenian by the same translator, in the fifth century of the Christian era; and none of the homilies were translated later than the seventh century.

J. C. Schenck, John Calvin's Merits in the Department of Education and Instruction. 8vo. pp. 31.

E. Stähelin, The Life of John Calvin. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 644, 479. These volumes form part of a series now in the course of publication, entitled, The Lives and Select Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the Reformed Church.

D. Martini Lutheri Colloquia, meditationes, consolationes, judicia, sententiæ, narrationes, responsa, facetiæ, from a manuscript in the Orphan House at Halle, with Prologomena, by H. E. Bindseil. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. cxix. and 465.

J. Döllinger, Fables relating to the Popes of the Middle Ages. 8vo. pp. 159. This volume contains a series of investigations preliminary to a history of the Papacy. They relate to certain imaginary persons and transactions, which gained a measure of repute, as though they belonged to authentic history, viz. the female Pope, Pope Cyriacus, Pope Marcellinus and the Synod of Sinuessa, the baptism of Constantine by Pope Sylvester, the donation of Constantine, the heresy of Pope Liberius, the monophysite leanings of Pope Anastasius, Gregory II. enticing the Italians to revolt against Leo the Isaurian, and the suspicions entertained respecting Sylvester II.

P. B. Gams, The Church History of Spain. Vol. I. The first three centuries. 8vo. pp. 422.

Brother Hans's Hymns to Mary, belonging to the 14th century, from a manuscript hitherto unknown in the imperial public library at St. Petersburg. Edited by R. Minzloff. 8vo. pp. 364. A number of acrostics on the Ave Maria and other hymns to the Virgin. The language indicates that they were written in the Netherlands. The introductory hymn is very artificial in its structure, the successive lines being composed in four different languages, German, French, English, and Latin.

E. A. Zuchold, *Bibliotheca Theologica*. List of books in the department of evangelical theology, which have appeared in Germany from 1830 to 1862. 8vo. pp. 960.

F. von Raumer, *Handbook of the History of Literature*. 8vo. pp. 640.

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Babylonish Talmud, with all the ancient and some modern commentaries. Vol. I. The tract Berachoth. 8vo. pp. 367. In Hebrew.

J. L. Bensew, *Hebrew-German and German-Hebrew Dictionary*. 8vo. pp. 756.

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ART. I.—*The Donatist Controversy.*

1. *The External History.*

DONATISM was by far the most important schism in the history of the ancient church, and involved important principles and measures concerning the true nature and discipline of the church, which reappear from time to time in active conflict, although under ever new forms and aspects; since history never repeats itself except in its general laws of Divine appointment and under providential control, and in its general tendencies of human nature and Christian life. For a whole century this schism divided the Christians of North Africa into two hostile camps. Like the earlier schisms in the preceding age of Cyprian, during the middle of the third century, it arose from the conflict of the more rigid and the more indulgent theories of discipline in reference to the restoration of the lapsed. But through the intervention of the nominally Christianized state since Constantine, it assumed at the same time an ecclesiastico-political character. The rigoristic penitential discipline had been represented in the previous period, especially by the Montanists and Novatians, who were still living;

while the milder principle and practice had found its most powerful support in the Roman church, and, since the time of Constantine, had generally prevailed.

The beginnings of the Donatist schism appear in the Dioclesian persecution, which revived that controversy concerning church discipline and martyrdom. The rigoristic party, favoured by Secundus of Tigisis, at that time primate of Numidia, and led by the bishop Donatus of Casæ Nigræ, rushed to the martyr's crown with fanatical contempt of death, and saw in flight from danger, or in the delivering up of the sacred books, only cowardice and treachery, which should for ever exclude from the fellowship of the church. The moderate party, at whose head stood the bishop of Mensurius and his archdeacon and successor Cæcilian, advocated the claims of prudence and discretion, and cast suspicion on the motives of the forward confessors and martyrs. So early as the year 305 a schism was imminent, in the matter of an episcopal election for the city of Cita; but no formal outbreak occurred until after the cessation of the persecution in 311, and then the difficulty arose in connection with the hasty election of Cæcilian to the bishopric of Carthage. The Donatists refused to acknowledge him, because in his ordination the Numidian bishops were slighted, and the service was performed by the bishop Felix of Aptungis, or Aptunga, whom they declared to be a *traditor*, that is, one who had delivered up the sacred writings to the heathen persecutors. In Carthage itself he had many opponents, among whom were the elders of the congregation (*seniores plebis*), and particularly a wealthy and superstitious widow, Lucilla, who was accustomed to kiss certain relics before her daily communion, and seemed to prefer them to the spiritual power of the sacrament. Secundus of Tigisis and seventy Numidian bishops, mostly of the rigoristic school, assembled at Carthage, deposed and excommunicated Cæcilian, who refused to appear, and elected the lector Majorinus, a favourite of Lucilla, in his place. After his death in 315, Majorinus was succeeded by DONATUS, a gifted man, of fiery energy and eloquence, revered by his admirers as a wonder-worker, and styled THE GREAT. From

this man, and not from the Donatus mentioned above, the name of the party was derived.*

Each party endeavoured to gain churches abroad to its side, and thus the schism spread. The Donatists appealed to the emperor Constantine—the first instance of such appeal, and a step which they afterwards had to repent. The emperor, who was at that time in Gaul, referred the matter to the Roman bishop Melchiades (Miltiades) and five Gallican bishops, before whom the accused Cæcilian and ten African bishops from each side were directed to appear. The decision went in favour of Cæcilian, and he was now, except in Africa, universally regarded as the legitimate bishop of Carthage. The Donatists remonstrated. A second investigation, which Constantine intrusted to the Council of Arles (Arelate) in 314, led to the same result. When the Donatists hereupon appealed from this ecclesiastical tribunal to the judgment of the emperor himself, he likewise declared against them at Milan in 316, and soon afterwards issued penal laws against them, threatening them with the banishment of their bishops, and the confiscation of their churches.

Persecution made them enemies of the state whose help they had invoked, and fed the flame of their fanaticism. They made violent resistance to the imperial commissioner, Ursacius, and declared that no power on earth could induce them to hold church fellowship with the “rascal” (nebulo) Cæcilian. Constantine perceived the fruitlessness of the forcible restriction of religion, and, by an edict in 321, granted the Donatists full liberty of faith and worship. He remained faithful to this policy of toleration, and exhorted the catholics to patience and indulgence. At a council in 330 the Donatists numbered two hundred and seventy bishops.

Constans, the successor of Constantine, resorted again to violent measures; but neither threats nor promises made any impression on the party. It came to blood. The Circum-

* “Pars Donati, Donatistæ, Donatiani.” Previously they were commonly called “Pars Majorini.” Optatus of Mileve seems, indeed, to know of only one Donatus. But the Donatists expressly distinguish Donatus Magnus of Carthage from Donatus a Casis Nigris. Likewise Augustine: *Contra Cresconium Donat.* ii. 1; though he himself had formerly confounded the two.

celliones, a sort of Donatist mendicant monks, who wandered about the country among the cottages of the peasantry,* carried on plunder, arson, and murder, in conjunction with mutinous peasants and slaves, and in crazy zeal for the martyr's crown, as genuine soldiers of Christ, rushed into fire and water, and threw themselves down from rocks. Yet there were Donatists who disapproved this revolutionary frenzy. The insurrection was suppressed by military force; several leaders of the Donatists were executed, others were banished, and their churches were closed or confiscated. Donatus the Great died in exile. He was succeeded by one Parmenianus.

Under Julian the Apostate, the Donatists again obtained, with all other heretics and schismatics, freedom of religion, and returned to the possession of their churches, which they painted anew, to redeem them from their profanation by the catholics. But under the subsequent emperors, their condition grew worse, both from persecutions without and from dissensions within. The quarrel between the two parties extended into all the affairs of daily life; the Donatist bishop, Faustinus of Hippo, for example, allowing none of the members of his church to bake bread for the catholic inhabitants.

2. *Augustine and the Donatists—Their Persecution and Extinction.*

At the end of the fourth century, and in the beginning of the fifth, the great St. Augustine, of Hippo, where there was also a strong congregation of the schismatics, made a powerful effort, by instruction and persuasion, to reconcile the Donatists with the catholic church. He wrote several works on the subject, and set the whole African church in motion against them. They feared his superior dialectics, and avoided him wherever they could. The matter, however, was brought, by order of the emperor in 411, to a three days' arbitration at

* "Cellas circumientes rusticorum." Hence the name *Circumcelliones*. But they called themselves *Milites Christi*, or *Agonistici*. Their date and origin are uncertain. According to Optatus of Milevi, they first appeared under Constans, in 347.

Carthage, attended by two hundred and eighty-six catholic bishops, and two hundred and seventy-nine Donatist.*

Augustine, who, in two beautiful sermons before the beginning of the disputation, exhorted to love, forbearance, and meekness, was the chief speaker on the part of the catholics; Petilian on the part of the schismatics. Marcellinus, the imperial tribune and notary, and a friend of Augustine, presided, and was to pass the decisive judgment. This arrangement was obviously partial, and secured the triumph of the catholics. The discussions related to two points: 1. Whether the catholic bishops Cæcilian and Felix of Aptunga were traditors; 2. Whether the church loses her nature and attributes by fellowship with heinous sinners. The balance of skill and argument was on the side of Augustine, though the Donatists brought much that was forcible against compulsion in religion, and against the confusion of the temporal and the spiritual powers. The imperial commissioner, as might be expected, decided in favour of the catholics. The separatists, nevertheless, persisted in their view; but their appeal to the emperor continued unsuccessful.

More stringent civil laws were now enacted against them, banishing the Donatist clergy from their country, imposing fines on the laity, and confiscating the churches. In 415 they were even forbidden to hold religious assemblies, upon pain of death.

Augustine himself, who had previously consented only to spiritual measures against heretics, now advocated force, to bring them into the fellowship of the church, out of which there was no salvation. He appealed to the command in the parable of the supper, Luke xiv. 23, to "compel them to come in;" where, however, the "compel" (*ἀνάγκασον*) is evidently but a vivid hyperbole for that holy zeal in the conversion of the heathen, which we find, for example, in the apostle Paul.

New eruptions of fanaticism ensued. A bishop, Gaudentius, threatened that, if the attempt were made to deprive him of his church by force, he would burn himself with his congrega-

* Augustine gives an account of the debate in his *Breviculus Collationis cum Donatistis*. (Opera, tom. ix. p. 545—580.)

tion in it, and vindicated this intended suicide by the example of Rhazis, in the second book of Maccabees, chap. xiv.

The conquest of Africa by the Arian Vandals in 428, devastated the African church, and put an end to the controversy, as the French Revolution swept both Jesuitism and Jansenism away. Yet a remnant of the Donatists, as we learn from the letters of Gregory I., perpetuated itself into the seventh century, still proving in their ruins the power of a mistaken puritanic zeal, and the responsibility and guilt of state-church persecution. In the seventh century, the entire African church sank under the Saracenic conquest.

3. Internal History of the Donatist Schism—Dogma of the Church.

The Donatist controversy was a conflict between separatism and catholicism; between disciplinary rigorism and disciplinary latitudinarianism; between the idea of the church as an exclusive community of regenerate saints, and the idea of the church as the general christendom of state and people. It revolved about the doctrine of the essence of the Christian church, and, in particular, of the predicate of holiness. It resulted in the completion by Augustine of the catholic dogma of the church, which had been partly developed by Cyprian in the conflict with a similar schism.

The Donatists, like Tertullian in his Montanistic writings, started from an ideal and spiritualistic conception of the church as a fellowship of saints, which, in a sinful world, could only be imperfectly realized. They laid chief stress on the predicate of the subjective holiness or personal worthiness of the several members, and made the catholicity of the church and the efficacy of the sacraments dependent upon that. The true church, therefore, is not so much a school of holiness, as a society of those who are already holy; or at least of those who appear so; for that there are hypocrites, not even the Donatists could deny, and as little could they in earnest claim infallibility in their own discernment of men. By the toleration of those who are openly sinful, the church loses her holiness, and ceases to be the church. Unholy priests are incapable of administering sacraments; for how can regeneration proceed

from the unregenerate, holiness from the unholy? No one can give what he does not himself possess. He who would receive faith from a faithless man, receives not faith but guilt.* It was on this ground, in fact, that they rejected the election of Cæcilian—that he had been ordained bishop by an unworthy person. On this ground they refused to recognize the catholic baptism as baptism at all. On this point they had some support in Cyprian, who likewise rejected the validity of heretical baptism, though not from the separatist, but from the catholic point of view, and who came into collision, upon this question, with Stephen of Rome.

Hence, like the Montanists and Novatians, they insisted on rigorous church discipline, and demanded the excommunication of all unworthy members, especially of such as had denied their faith, or given up the holy Scriptures under persecution. They resisted, moreover, all interference of the civil power in church affairs; though they themselves at first had solicited the help of Constantine. In the great imperial church, embracing the people in a mass, they saw a secularized Babylon, against which they set themselves off, in separatistic arrogance, as the only true and pure church. In support of their views, they appealed to the passages of the Old Testament, which speak of the external holiness of the people of God, and the procedure of Paul with respect to the fornicator at Corinth.

In opposition to this subjective and spiritualistic theory of the church, Augustine, as champion of the catholics, developed the objective, realistic theory, which has since been repeatedly reasserted, though with various modifications, not only in the Roman church, but also in the Protestant, against separatistic and schismatic sects. He lays chief stress on the catholicity of the church, and derives the holiness of individual members and the validity of ecclesiastical functions from it. He finds the essence of the church not in the personal character of the several Christians, but in the union of the whole church with

* Aug. contra literas Petil. l. 1. cap. 5 (tom. ix. p. 208): "Qui fidem a perfido sumserit, non fidem percipit, sed reatum; omnis enim res origine et radice consistit, et si caput non habet aliiquid, nihil est."

Christ. Taking the historical point of view, he goes back to the founding of the church, which may be seen in the New Testament, which has spread over all the world, and which is connected through the unbroken succession of bishops with the apostles and with Christ. This alone can be the true church. It is impossible that she should all at once disappear from the earth, or should exist only in the African sect of the Donatists.* What is all that they may say of their little heap, in comparison with the great catholic christendom of all lands? Thus even numerical preponderance here enters as an argument; though, under other circumstances, it may prove too much, and would place the primitive church at a clear disadvantage in comparison with the prevailing Jewish and heathen masses, and the Evangelical church in its controversy with the Roman Catholic.

From the objective character of the church as a divine institution flows, according to the catholic view, the efficacy of all her functions, the sacraments in particular. When Petilian, at the Collatio cum Donatistis, said: "He who receives the faith from a faithless priest, receives not faith but guilt," Augustine answered: "But Christ is not unfaithful (*perfidus*), from whom I receive faith (*fidem*), not guilt (*reatum*). Christ, therefore, is properly the functionary, and the priest is simply his organ. My origin," said Augustine, on the same occasion, "is Christ, my root is Christ, my head is Christ. The seed, of which I was born, is the word of God, which I must obey, even though the preacher himself practise not what he preaches. I believe not in the minister by whom I am baptized, but in Christ, who alone justifies the sinner and can forgive guilt."†

* Augustin. ad Catholicos Epistola contra Donatistas, usually quoted under the title: *De unitate ecclesiæ*, c. 12 (Bened. ed., tom. ix. p. 360): "Quomodo cœptum sit ab Jerusalem, et deinde processum in Judæam et Samariam, et inde in totam terram, ubi adhuc crescit ecclesia, donec usque in finem etiam reliquas gentes, ubi adhuc non est, obtineat, scripturis sanctis testibus consequenter ostenditur: quisquis aliud evangelizaverit, anathema sit. Aliud autem evangelizat, qui periisse dicit de cætero mundo ecclesiam et in parte Donati in sola Africa remansisse dicit. Ergo anathema sit. Aut legat mihi hoc in scripturis sanctis, et non sit anathema."

† Contra literas Petilianæ, l. i. c. 7. (*Opera*, tom. ix. p. 209): "Origo mea Christus est, radix mea Christus est, caput meum Christus est." . . . In the

Lastly, in regard to church discipline, the opponents of the Donatists agreed with them in considering it wholesome and necessary, but would keep it within the limits fixed for it by the circumstances of the time and the fallibility of men. A perfect separation of sinners from saints is impracticable before the final judgment. Many things must be patiently borne, that greater evil may be averted, and that those still capable of improvement may be improved, especially where the offender has too many adherents. "Man," says Augustine, "should punish in the spirit of love, until either the discipline and correction come from above, or the tares are pulled up in the universal harvest."* In support of this view, appeal was made to the Lord's parables of the tares among the wheat, and of the net which gathered together of every kind. (Matt. xiii.) These two parables were the chief exegetical battle-ground of the two parties. The Donatists understood by the field, not the church but the world. According to the Saviour's own exposition of the parable of the tares,† the catholics replied, that it was the kingdom of heaven, or the church, to which the parable referred as a whole, and pressed especially the warning of the Saviour not to gather up the tares before the final harvest, lest they root up also the wheat with them. The Donatists, moreover, made a distinction between unknown offenders, to whom alone the parable of the net referred, and notorious sinners. But this did not gain them much; for if the church compromises her character for holiness by contact with unworthy persons at all, it matters not whether they be openly unworthy before men or not, and no church whatever would be left on earth.

On the other hand, however, Augustine, who, no more than

same place: "Me innocentem non facit, nisi qui mortuus est propter delicta nostra et resurrexit propter justificationem nostram. Non enim in ministrum, per quem baptizos, credo; sed in eum qui justificat impium, ut deputetur mihi fides in justitiam."

* Aug. contra Epistolam Parmeniani, l. iii. c. 2, § 10—15. (Opera, t. ix. p. 62—66.)

† Breviculus Collat. c. Don. Dies tert. c. 8, § 10. (Opera, t. ix. p. 559): "Zizania inter triticum non in ecclesia, sed in ipso mundo permixta dixerunt; quoniam Dominus ait, *Ager est mundus.*" (Matt. xiii. 38.) As to the exegetical merits of the controversy, see Trench's *Notes on the Parables*, p. 83, seq. (9th Lond. edit. 1863,) and Lange's *Commentary on Matt. xiii.*

the Donatists, could relinquish the predicate of holiness for the church, found himself compelled to distinguish between a *true* and *mixed*, or merely apparent, *body of Christ*; forasmuch as hypocrites, even in this world, are not in and with Christ, but only appear to be.* And yet he repelled the Donatist charge of making two churches. In his view it is one and the same church which is now mixed with the ungodly, and will hereafter be pure, as it is the same Christ who once died, and now lives for ever, and the same believers, who are now mortal, and will yet put on immortality.†

With some modification we may find here the germ of the subsequent Protestant distinction of the visible and invisible church; which regards the invisible, not as another church, but as the ecclesiola in ecclesia, (or ecclesiis,) as the smaller communion of true believers among professors, and thus as the true substance of the visible church, and as contained within its limits, like the soul in the body, or the kernel in the shell. Here the moderate Donatist and scholarly theologian, Tychonius,‡

* *Corpus Christi verum atque permixtum, or verum atque simulatum.* Comp. *De doctr. Christ.* iii. 32, as quoted below in full.

† *Breviculus Collationis cum Donatistis, Dies tertius, cap. 10, § 19 and 20.* (*Opera, ix. 564*): “*Deinde calumniantes, quod duas ecclesias Catholici dixerint, unam quæ nunc habet permixtos malos, aliam quæ post resurrectionem eos non esset habitura: veluti non iidem futuri essent sancti cum Christo regnaturi, qui nunc pro ejus nomine cum juste vivunt tolerant malos. . . . De duabus etiam ecclesiis calumniam eorum Catholici refutarunt, identidem expressius ostendentes, quid dixerint, id est, non eam ecclesiam, quæ nunc habet permixtos malos, alienam se dixisse a regno Dei, ubi non erunt mali commixti, sed eandem ipsam unam et sanctam ecclesiam nunc esse aliter tunc autem aliter futuram, nunc habere malos mixtos, tunc non habituram . . . sicut non ideo duo Christi, quia prior mortuus postea non moriturus.*”

‡ Or Tichonius, as Augustine spells the name. Although himself a Donatist, he wrote against them, “*qui contra Donatistas invictissime scripsit, cum fuerit Donatista,*” (says Aug. *De doct. Christ.* l. iii. c. 30, § 42.) He was opposed to re-baptism, and acknowledged the validity of the catholic sacraments; but he was equally opposed to the secularism of the catholic church and its mixture with the state, and adhered to the strict discipline of the Donatists. Of his works only one remains, viz. *Liber regularum* or *de septem regulis*, a sort of Biblical hermeneutics, or a guide for the proper understanding of the mysteries of the Bible. It was edited by Gallandi, in his *Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum*, tom. viii. pp. 107—129. Augustine notices these rules at length in his work, *De doctrina Christiana*, lib. iii. c. 30, sqq. (*Opera, ed. Bened. tom. iii. p. 57, sqq.*) Tychonius seems to have died before the close of

approached Augustine; calling the church a *twofold body of Christ*,* of which the one part embraces the true Christians, the other the apparent.† In this, as also in acknowledging the validity of catholic baptism, Tychonius departed from the Donatists; while he adhered to their views on discipline and opposed the catholic mixture of the church and the world. But neither he, nor Augustine, pursued this distinction to any clearer development. Both were involved, at bottom, in the confusion of Christianity with the church, and of the church with a particular outward organization.

ART. II.—*Modes of Evangelization.*

IT has come to be a question of no small interest, and one the importance of which will increase as the activities of the church are aroused, What is the proper method of directing these activities, or in other words, what is the proper mode of evangelization? It is manifest that much of the efficiency of our efforts must depend on the manner in which they are carried on. It is not sufficient to attempt to do a thing—we must know how to do it. We may, with the best desires, take hold of any reform, and accomplish but little, simply from wrong plans, just as one might wish to heal a sick person, and labour with the best of motives, and yet be of no service. Knowledge

the fourth century. Comp. on him Tillemont, *Mémoires*, tom. vi. p. 81, sq., and an article of A. Vogel, in *Herzog's Real-Encyclopædie*, vol. xvi. pp. 534—536.

* “Corpus Domini bipartitum.” This was the second of his rules for the true understanding of the Scriptures.

† Augustine objects only to his mode of expression, *De doctr. Christ.* iii. 32, tom. iii. 58: “Secunda [regula Tichonii] est de Domini corpore bipartito: non enim revera Domini corpus est, quod cum illo non erit in æternum; sed dicendum fuit de Domine corpore vero atque permixto, aut vero atque simulato, vel quid aliud; quia non solum in æternum, verum etiam nunc hypocritæ non cum illo esse dicendi sunt, quamvis in ejus esse videantur ecclesia. Unde poterat ista regula et sic appellari, ut dicatur de permixta ecclesia.” (Comp. also Dr. Baur, *K. G. vom 4—6 Jahr.*, p. 224.)

is necessary as well as the disposition. In manual labour knowledge contrives the best method of expending its strength. A machine simplifies and magnifies the result. In mental and moral labour a plan is of the same advantage as a machine in physical labour. It sets the labour in motion in the right direction, and with the most advantage to secure the result. The advantage of some well-contrived plan is more manifest the larger the object to be secured. A sickle and a scythe did very well around the rocks and in the small farms of New England, but when prairies were to be reaped and armies fed, then the harvest needed to be more speedily gathered, and with less expenditure of human strength. So in ordinary cases the care of the sick can be left to individuals and families, but when a battle leaves its thousands on the field, then the hospital, and all the efficiency of directed and organized labour are needed. In efforts, likewise, for the good of others, individuals may do their part, but when long-continued and wide-extended efforts are necessary, there must be some combination to set the right agencies at work, and in the most efficient manner.

The three distinct methods, into one or the other of which all plans of evangelization may be classed, are, 1. Where the work is carried on by individuals; 2. By societies organized for the purpose; or 3. By the church under its own organization.

The first of these has the advantage of promptness and dispatch. There is no necessity of waiting for the movement of others. Its basis also is good, that every individual should be active, and seek to accomplish all he can for the benefit of others. And in no case, and under no plan, should the responsibility of individual exertion and influence be lost sight of. In many cases also, if a man is alone, it is necessary for him to act alone. If the church around him is dead, if those who should coöperate with him will not, then there is no other resort but to act single-handed. Perhaps this may account for those individual agencies in Germany, such as that of Wichern in his Rough House, and of Gossner in his foreign missionary efforts. The wonderful success which has attended these and similar efforts, shows what men single-handed may

do.* If the right sort of a man takes hold of an enterprise, it is often carried forward with earnestness and dispatch. There is uniformity of plan. The disadvantages, however, are serious. There is a lack of responsibility. One man may abuse the power and means put in his hands, as he could not do if his actions were reported and open to the scrutiny of others. Important plans, too, are made to hang upon the life of a single individual, and upon his death are liable to serious interruption, if not entirely broken up. The confidence reposed in the founder of some institution, which perhaps has been the fruit of a long and laborious life, is seldom transferred to a successor. But the most serious objection is, that it is not in harmony with the idea of an active church, which supposes fellow-labourers and a common share in the work of evangelization. These disadvantages are so great, that this method is seldom adopted in a work of any magnitude, except in isolated cases in other countries, where men, feeling certain wants deeply themselves, and not finding others ready to coöperate with them, have been obliged to go forward alone.

A second method is to organize societies. A necessity is felt for a given reform, or to carry on some scheme of benevolence, and individuals associate themselves together for that purpose. This seems a simple and obvious method, and has often been resorted to with abundant success. It may indeed be questioned whether so great a degree of activity could, in the early stages of Christian zeal, have been imparted to the church on any other plan. Certain it is, that it has been almost universally adopted. Whether it is or ought to be outgrown and superseded, is a question which we wish to consider. This will be determined by the character of the objections, and by the fact whether there is any better plan. One obvious objection to this plan is, that the machinery of evangelization becomes multiplied and complicated. A society for every reform and project makes their number endless. Another more important objection is, that it connects the idea of Christian activity, not with the body to which it properly belongs,

* Those interested in evangelistic work in Germany, as it has been carried on by individuals, will be well repaid by reading "Praying and Working," by Stevenson of Dublin, and republished by the Carters.

but with some other organization. Our interest and affection naturally flow out for the object for which we labour; and the society-room and its work often take the place of the church. Persons are active not as members of some church, but as members of some society. It is not felt as an indispensable part of our connection with Christ's visible body, that we are to be zealous for him, but as something which we may take up or not, as it suits us, by uniting with some other organization.

A full consideration of this objection involves, however, a consideration of the third method of evangelization. This considers the church as organized with this object, among others, to direct and control the activities of its members. The great object or design for which the church exists, is the work of evangelization. It was intended, of course, to embrace the body of believers; but the object of their being united together is not merely to observe the ordinances and hear the word, but also to teach and disciple others—to be the light of the world, the salt of the earth. The Old Testament church was intended to preserve and keep alive the truth in the Jewish nation, until, in the fulness of time, Christ should come in the flesh. Then, and after that, the great object of the New Testament church, according to Christ's great commission, was to scatter the truth abroad, to proclaim the glad tidings to every creature. The primary object of the special outpouring of the Holy Spirit was to endue them with power from on high, that they might be witnesses for Christ in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost parts of the earth. That this is the work of the church may not be questioned; but a doubt may exist in the minds of some, whether it was intended that it should be done by the church in its organized capacity. This is precisely the point which we wish to present, that the church was organized for the work of evangelization, and that its Divine Head intended that it should act through its own organization for this purpose.

In attempting to establish this position, we may learn a lesson from God's dealings with the church under the old dispensation. The children of Israel came up out of the land of Egypt an undisciplined multitude. They went out in haste, very much, we may suppose, as the inhabitants would rush out

of a city when suddenly attacked, without any order, each one seeking to secure his own person and goods. This motley host was to be reduced into an army of invasion. The very first step towards such an end was organization. A year was spent in its accomplishment at the foot of Mount Sinai. The centre of that organization was the church, or the tabernacle and its worship. This, and the temple afterwards, or Jerusalem, was the centre of the old economy, showing the place which the church should occupy in the world and among the nations, as the centre of attraction and influence. In this organization, the worship and the service to be performed were not left to the discretion and choice of each individual or family; but a tabernacle was set up, which was to be made after the pattern shown in the mount. Particular persons were assigned to take charge of the sacrifices and ceremonial ritual. While the main service was to be performed by the priests, yet the Levites were to assist; and when they came to go forward in their journeys, the carrying of the tabernacle and its furniture was assigned to different heads of families, or elders, in which work the princes of the tribes assisted by their offerings of wagons, and the whole nation, now an organized host, instead of a promiscuous crowd, marched as they encamped, with reference to their position about the tabernacle.

These facts, which are given with great minuteness, are evidently written for our instruction. They teach that organization was necessary; that the centre of it was the church; that its duties were to be performed by its own officers, and not left to the choice or plan of men; that there was a complete division of labour, so that the work, as well as the honour, was shared by one whole tribe, and through them by the whole nation. It is important to notice that this Divine method was to be adhered to; not only was this positively enjoined, but departure from it was punished. Thus David, in the reëstablishment of the old economy, found that the prescribed plan was to be strictly followed. When he first attempted to bring up the ark to Jerusalem, it was not carried by the Levites, but put into a cart, as the Philistines had done; and when the oxen stumbled, and Uzzah put forth his hand to hold it, God smote him that he died. On the second attempt, David called

upon the Levites to sanctify themselves, and to bring up the ark, "for," he says, "because ye did it not at the first, the Lord our God made a breach upon us, for that we sought him not after the due order."

When the time came for another change and expansion of the outer visible church, in order to adapt it to its more enlarged sphere, organization was as necessary as before. No sooner did Christ enter upon his ministry, than he chose twelve apostles, who, by their number, connected the foundations of both dispensations. The two sacraments which represented and were connected with the sacrificial and the cleansing rites of the old economy, were also instituted. In the work of establishing his kingdom, Christ did not labour alone, though so infinitely superior in his qualifications to those whom he called to assist him. Besides the twelve, he appointed other seventy also, who were to go before him; and called upon them, in view of the greatness of the harvest, to pray for more labourers. After the ascension of our Saviour, the apostles began the work of organization by completing their own number; and as occasion demanded and the work increased, other officers were added—the idea never seeming to depart from their minds that the work of the church was to be done by the church, through its appointed officers. Of this organization, the Apostle writes, "God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers; after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues." (1 Cor. xii. 28.) Again, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, the organization of the church is spoken of as one of the ascension gifts of our Saviour, necessary for the perfection of his body. "He gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." (Eph. iv. 11.) One great object to be accomplished by organization, is here stated to be the perfecting and the unity of the church itself; but as necessary to this, comes first the gathering of the church, or the work of

evangelization. This object Christ exemplified in his own labours. The distinction between the old and new dispensations was manifest in passing from John the Baptist, the last of the Old Testament prophets, to Christ. John preached in one locality, the people flocking unto him; Christ went about doing good, visiting all the cities of Galilee, setting the example which is to be followed by his people, of scattering abroad the seed. In accordance with this fundamental idea, the twelve disciples were called *apostles*, or those *sent forth*. The great commission settled this object or duty of the church definitively; and the labours of the apostles and early Christians, as recorded in the Acts, show how it is to be obeyed. We find, then, that the New Testament church was organized by God or Christ, and the distinct work or duty of evangelization committed to it. The inference, therefore, is too strong to be overlooked or disregarded, that the *church, through its own organization*, is the divinely appointed plan for evangelizing the world.

If this is the divinely appointed plan, then certainly it ought not to be departed from, except for the clearest and plainest reasons. God of course greatly prefers activity and zeal in any form, to coldness and deadness. While he loves order and regularity, mere formality his soul abhors. Phinehas, in his zeal for the Lord, when defection seemed universal, acted promptly as an individual, taking the law into his own hands, and was commended for it. Moses refused to forbid those that prophesied in the camp, instead of about the tabernacle. He would have rejoiced to have seen all the Lord's people prophets. So also a greater than Moses would not heed the wish of his disciples, who would forbid those who cast out devils in their Master's name, and yet followed him not. Just so now, there may be circumstances justifying a departure from the appointed method. It may be necessary for an individual to act alone, if the church cannot be aroused to do its duty; or there may be duties to be performed which cannot be reached so well by individual churches, or those associated together in one denomination; in any such case, where obedience to the spirit is better met by going beyond the letter, then we are to use the liberty which God grants to his children. But in all

ordinary cases, and as a general rule, we are; as David found to his cost, to seek God after the due order. God's work is best carried out according to his own plan. It is certainly to be expected that he would adapt the church in its external organization for the work which it is to perform; and it would be strange if man should make any improvement on that method. If we rightly judge, the ordinary and constant departure from this method has been of great damage to the church. To a great extent, the appropriate work of the church has been taken out of its hands by societies of various descriptions; and the result has been that, as two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time, coldness and indifference have crept into the church. Activity and zeal have been divorced from the church as an organization; and those who unite with it often act as though their only object in that connection was to secure safe transportation to the heavenly shore. They wish to get aboard to ride quietly as passengers, without a thought of the responsibility resting upon them. But the ark, though in one sense a correct representation of the church, is not the only one. Even the church in the wilderness was to prepare itself to act as an army of invasion; and under the new dispensation, it is most frequently compared to something which represents life, as a body, or a vine and its branches. Christ is the living head, and the church is his body, which, in its external organization, should conform to the representations made of it, as a living, active, fruitful church. But in practice we separate the two. The ministry are chosen not for zeal, experience, or wisdom, as leaders of God's people, but often solely from their supposed ability to please a popular audience. Church officers are frequently known to most only as those who carry around bread and wine on communion Sabbaths, and perhaps they never meet together except for the purpose of admitting or dismissing members. This observation might be extended to higher church courts, which often sit as though their only object was to dispatch, as quickly as possible, a dull routine of business, instead of also seeking, as our constitution requires, "to enter into common measures for promoting knowledge and religion, and for preventing infidelity, error, and immorality." (*Form of Government*, chap. 10, sect. 1.) The

church, through its officers, is not expected to have any direct right or share in the work of evangelization; and this idea, reacting upon the church itself, leads to the almost total neglect of the duty. Certainly no more effectual method could be devised of reducing the church to a mere form, without any life, than by giving it nothing to do.

Let us, however, suppose a return to, and an acting out of, the method of the early church, in carrying on the work of evangelization through its own officers, and by its own organization, and we should have as our result, life and activity connected with the body to which it properly belongs. Christ required of his followers that they should seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness. They were to bring forth fruit, to be the light of the world. They were to be living branches of the true vine. This being the normal condition of his followers, why should not this idea be expressed in their organization? Shall it be required of each individual to be active, and yet the body itself be dead? Is there to be no way or method by which this life can express itself? Are we not to suppose that the church, in its external form, would be shaped to suit this internal vitality? Certainly it is not in accordance with God's usual method, if the church is not fitted to manifest the life and activity which are required of its members. He fits the instrument for the work to be accomplished by it—the external form of everything in the world around us for the kind of life which it is to contain. And so we believe of the church. It is fitted for the work which God organized it to perform. And it is putting dishonour on him who established it, not to use his method. And though it should even seem foolishness, yet the foolishness of God is wiser than men.

Another result would be increased activity on the part of church members. Now, though the propriety and necessity of zeal be pressed upon men, yet they know not how to act or what to do. Many are backward in devising schemes themselves, but if a plan is made for them and their part assigned, they are ready and willing to bear their share. Besides, organization gives a person authority. He goes not in his own name, but in that of the church, and many a one will go

where he is sent, and it is made his duty, when he would not go alone. Just as a man might, as an individual, desire to quell a tumult, and yet hesitate, but if made his duty as a civil officer, would go forward at once, and without fear. His directions, too, would be more heeded. So, in its own sphere, those who act under the authority of church organization would be emboldened to undertake that which they might hesitate to do as individuals, and their words would be better heeded by those to whom they were addressed.

The duty here is reciprocal. Let each one, when he takes the vows of God upon him, feel that he has something to do for God, and let the church through its officers give each one something to do. And Christian activity will be no fitful transient thing, but a power in the church which will make its influence and its progress irresistible. It is as yet a latent power, but organized and set in motion, it will be like the change in an undisciplined host to an army with banners—like the change of the children of Israel fleeing from Egypt, and the same people marshalled with their men of war around the ark of God, and ready to take possession of the promised land.

Another result, we doubt not, will be the blessing of God. If God has chosen and ordained certain methods, it is disobedience and dishonouring him when we do not follow them. We may say our plan is good—that it is just as well to carry the ark in a cart as on men's shoulders, but David and all who sincerely wish God's favour will inquire as to the due order, and find it not only best adapted to secure the desired end, but, the path also of promised blessing. Just as some may say, what is the use of joining the church? why not be a Christian without? so it may be said, why make the church the channel of Christian activity? To both it is a sufficient reply, that it is God's method. This is the place where the Christian and the outflow of Christian life belong. We do not say that there is no salvation out of the visible church, neither do we say that God will not recognise deeds of charity not in connection with church organization. But this we do say, that the full measure of God's blessing can only be properly expected when we comply with his requirements, and seek to carry out his plans.

This method of action would also tend to place the church in its proper position as the great central agency in the work of evangelization. God has promised to honour and exalt the church, as the bride, the Lamb's wife, as the body of which Christ is the head. It may be said that these promises belong to the church invisible. This is doubtless true in their highest meaning. But how is the church invisible to be honoured, at least here on earth, except through the church visible? Though it is convenient and necessary to make the distinction, yet the two are often blended. The church as the body of Christ, the church to whom were given apostles, prophets, teachers, &c., is to be organized and built up until it comes to a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. The church is to be exalted with Christ its living head. It is to be the grand centre, just as the tabernacle was in the wilderness. All the tribes were to be pitched around it. So the church is to be the centre of attraction and influence to all nations. It is not to be the influence of a mere name, but of a power acting upon the world, and which will one day be seen and acknowledged. This influence will be the more powerful, the more it is organized and put in service. The church needs to be marshalled for aggressive work. It must not only be pure in doctrine and fair in graces, but irresistible in its might. As Solomon looks forward to her in her glory, "Who is she that looketh forth as the morning, fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners?" When, like an army, she gathers her members and organizes them for the work, more irresistible will be her progress than that of any army the world has ever seen. Then she will properly be the church militant, and not until after that takes place, can we expect to see here the church triumphant—that is as a victorious power here on earth.

The question will doubtless arise, How is the church to go to work? and what is she to do as an organization? This, of course, can only be answered in the general. The work which God calls each church to do is determined partly by his providence. The fields of labour are not all alike. There are, however, some features in which they are similar. The first

thing is to organize,* feeling that there is a work to be done. How it is to be done will require much thought and prayer. Let us briefly indicate, in general, the method which might be taken. Of course it is necessary to its success, that the officers of the church, and its members, feel that a responsibility rests upon them, as well as their pastor, in building up Christ's kingdom; and with this there must be a disposition to work in harmony, and with united council. Let the pastor, then, as the under-shepherd, apportion to the elders their part of the work; as, for instance, let the congregation be divided into districts, with one elder for each district. If meetings or Sabbath-schools are to be held in these districts, let the elders have the oversight. Where there is only one Sabbath-school, let not that be a separate organization, independent of the church, but under the direct control of its officers, who should take charge of its government and instruction. We see not why, also, the work of visitation should not be performed in some measure by the elders. In connection with visitation might be associated the circulation of religious books or tracts and papers, especially such as would give information of the advance of Christ's cause, with which, as a necessary consequence, could be introduced giving, or collections. Effort should also be made in every church to reach the unevangelized, and this effort should be reduced to some system, or it will be neglected. No church is thoroughly aggressive until harnessed for the war. The work, as thus indicated, will require labourers. The officers of the church will find it necessary to associate others with them. It is, in fact, doubtful whether we have the number and variety of church officers which they had in the New Testament churches. Besides apostles, workers of miracles, and those who spoke with tongues, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers, are distinguished; also helps and governments. Whether there were deaconesses or not, we do not stop now to inquire; but the

* This is not meant *de novo*, for our Presbyterian system we believe to be not only scriptural, but admirably adapted for fulfilling the duties required; but simply to use this organization, giving it vitality and force, and filling up its outlines, as we believe the Scriptures warrant us in doing, by appointing additional officers and assistants if required.

apostle speaks "of those women which laboured with him in the gospel," (Phil. iv. 11,) and in the sixteenth chapter of Romans we find the names of several who thus laboured mentioned. So also they followed our Lord, ministering to him of their substance, (Luke viii. 3.) Their labour and assistance are as important now as then. But whatever be the precise plan for distributing this labour, it must be seen that the work is too vast and arduous for the ministry ever to hope to overtake it alone. As Moses's father-in-law said to him, when he saw him bearing the burden of the people alone, "The thing that thou doest is not good. Thou wilt surely wear away;" and he advised him to "provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness; and place such over them, to be rulers of thousands, and rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens." This advice was followed, and was incorporated in the whole economy. Christ and his apostles also laboured not alone. And if it were possible for the ministry to accomplish this work alone, it is certainly not desirable. The officers of the church and its members need to feel that this is their work, as well as belonging to the ministry. They are to be co-workers with them, as they are with Christ. And if co-workers, they must have something to do. It is scarcely right to find fault with the inactivity and sloth of a church, until some method has been devised for putting its energies into action. If we would have labourers work in a vineyard, we must tell them what we want done, and in what way. Until we do this, the blame of their idleness rests upon us, after that, upon them. So, doubtless, it behooves the officers of the church to devise plans and methods by which its members may act, before they bring the charge of idleness and want of interest. If this was done, we even question whether it would be necessary to find fault with want of attendance at the prayer-meeting. The interest excited by labour would be manifest in increased desire for the progress of Christ's kingdom, and in prayer for the influences of the Holy Spirit, through whom alone we hope for any permanent good. Labour leads to prayer, and prayer to labour. They are inseparable in a true Christian life. And if we would

increase the earnestness and life of prayer, we shall find no way so direct as by an increase of activity.

There are two objections to the method of action which we have here proposed, which we will in conclusion briefly notice. One is, that we have not in our churches the persons qualified or at leisure to undertake this work. There is no doubt that it will require time, labour, and self-sacrifice. And we never knew anything good or important that did not. Possibly some may be so situated as not to command the leisure. But in most cases, if any one really desires it, he can redeem portions of time for the Lord's work, even though it be but an hour or two a week. And even that amount, properly directed, would tell upon the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom. Usually, where there is the will there is a way. And all need to be reminded that they are to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; that is, they are not only to seek to enter, but also to promote the interests of that kingdom as the first and weightiest obligation binding upon every man. But the objection may be urged, we are not qualified. How can we converse with the impenitent? How can we pray with the sick? Certainly no one can till he tries. How does the ministry learn? They have to go through the same ordeal of inexperience. And the way to begin is to take first the more simple and easy steps; go as collectors for good objects, to gather children into Sabbath-schools, or older persons into the house of God, and inquire after and visit those who attend. In some way begin, and go on, praying for wisdom and strength. How do men learn to be soldiers but by submitting to the drill, and then, as they become proficients, they are advanced. The way is, to begin by entering the ranks and submitting ourselves to be guided, saying, here am I, send me. Jeremiah felt that he was but a child, and yet God qualified him to be a prophet. The apostles were only fishermen, but divine instruction and practice made them proficients in their work. In Germany they have taken to educating colporteurs, and deacons and deaconesses. If there is no other way to raise up lay-helpers, we had better do it also. But as we have been able in this country to raise up a citizen army, we know not why we may not citizen labour-

ers in Christ's vineyard. Already scattered through the churches can be found those in the humbler and less educated walks of life, who have proved themselves valuable labourers. Harlan Page was a carpenter, never having enjoyed anything but the advantages of a common-school education, and yet he became wise in winning souls. Such instances ought not to be rare. All, young and old, need to feel that in their sphere, with or without education, they are to exert all the influence they can for Christ.

Another objection is, that it will tend to increased sectarianism, instead of that unity which is so desirable in the church. We are not of those, however, that suppose that because a church is active and seeking to do good, it is necessarily bigoted, or seeking to injure the prosperity of others. But suppose a prosperous church excites the jealousy and envy of others, what is to be done? Are we to go to sleep because others sleep? Are we to let our vineyard run to waste because others fail to cultivate theirs? This would indeed be a pleasant device of the adversary. Nay, rather let them be provoked to zeal and good works. Let each denomination be zealous against the common enemy, and the others rejoice and be glad, for the sooner will the world be converted.

But it may be said, we withdraw from united common efforts to take up sectarian action. We say Yes, by all means, when we can, not because we do not love our neighbour, but because we think the work will be done more effectually, and because there will be less quarrelling about the results. If a township was to be settled in common, or divided up among the several families occupying it, we should say, by all means divide it among the families. It would promote harmony and good feeling in the end. It would do away with hard-feeling and quarrelling about the proceeds. So in churches, the proper labour of evangelization is in most cases best conducted, and harmony best secured in the end, by each attending to his own work. If there is any encroaching, agree upon a boundary line, and religiously observe it. Beyond the proper sphere of each church, there are abundant opportunities for kind and neighbourly acts and for united action in measures which can only be properly carried on in that way.

We are fully persuaded that the unity of the church is not
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best promoted by ignoring its organization. That was given, as before said, "for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying of the body of Christ, till we all come in the unity of the faith." The Apostle here declares the officers which Christ gave to the church necessary to its perfection and unity. If so, it will not do to disregard them, and place them and the organization which they represent in the back-ground, for some other method which we hope will more rapidly melt different denominations together. It will only serve to retard, instead of hastening the wished-for result. There are, however, two methods in which we may suppose the unity of the church will be advanced: 1st. By acting more against the common enemy. Minor differences will seem less important as we struggle more earnestly against the kingdom of darkness. "Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim. But they shall fly upon the shoulders of the Philistines toward the west; they shall spoil them of the east together." (Isa. xi. 13.) 2d. There will be a gradual approximation to a similarity of views—a thing which cannot be forestalled. As long as Christians do not see truth in the same light, there will be differences of opinion, causing different denominations. No force of argument has been able to break down these differences. They are doubtless wisely ordered for a time. But the time we trust is hastening when all shall see eye to eye. God will bring it about in his own way. When and how we know not. In the mean time, and as the best means of hastening that end, we are to seek to make the church fruitful, vigorous, and active; and if that end can be best secured through its own organization, then we are to seek to make that branch of it which we believe to be nearest the truth, and as, indeed, we would have all the branches to be, living, faithful representatives of Christ's living body, until we come "to a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," which stature is "the fulness of Him that filleth all in all."

It will be seen that we have attempted to present no new scheme for developing the activities of the church, but simply a return to and carrying out the plan devised by the great Head of the church, and which, if followed out, would greatly tend to promote its spiritual life and activity, and help to hasten its extension throughout the world.

ART. III.—*History of Civilization in England.* By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE. Two volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1860, 1861.

WE read this work very shortly after the appearance of its second volume, and though we cannot say that the reading of it was a waste of time, yet we confess that it did not satisfy us, and that its treatment of its subject did not appear to us to be at all adequate, just, true, or scientific. But we have since found many persons who have read it, and formed a much higher estimate of it than we had done, and this led us to a second reading of it. We have read it again with much care, and been confirmed in our first impressions of it; and therefore, even at this late day, we venture to think that a discussion of its merits may not be unprofitable to our readers.

These two volumes contain dissertations on the proper method of treating the main subject; on various physical, moral, and intellectual aids and hindrances to the process of civilization; and on the opinions, institutions, ages, countries, and authors, which have had a noteworthy part in that process. They profess to be the commencement of the Introduction to the History named in the title of the book; and, as the author is now dead, his readers are of course compelled to accept these volumes as the unfinished Introduction to a work that can never appear. No one can complain of this fact, however unusual it is for authors to write their Introduction before they have completed the main work, and ascertained its exact character, and thereby discovered what preliminary explanations are proper in order to facilitate the reading and understanding of his work. No one, we say, can complain of this, because the book bears on its face the profession that it is only an Introduction.

But a complaint may very well be made, that it is not, in any proper sense of the word, an Introduction to a History of English Civilization; but a series of essays and criticisms on a great variety of subjects, which, so far as they are connected with English civilization, ought to have been reserved for the

body of the work; and, so far as they have no such connection, ought to have been laid aside altogether, or merely used by way of illustration, so far as they were proper for that purpose, in the main work. No man can study any subject well, who starts with a contempt for it; and if our author had carefully and respectfully studied the process of English civilization, so as to discover all the active elements which entered into that process, and the various forces which they displayed at different epochs of the nation's growth, and attributed to each its proper share in the work, and shown for the result that degree of respect to which a nation's social, and moral, and intellectual struggles are entitled, he would never have thought of writing such an Introduction as this.

These volumes may be called an Introduction in the sense that they are intended to prepare the author's intelligence for the great work which he had in view. His youthful ambition had planned for itself a flight to which his breadth and strength of wing were entirely inadequate; and we might take these essays as a sort of preliminary practice, intended to assure himself of the force and skill necessary for his grand design, were it not that their boldness and even recklessness rather seem intended to convince his readers of his competence for the task, by the exhibition of his own confidence in his powers. We confess that our experience has made us cautious about trusting ourselves, our interests, or our opinions, to the guidance of boastful spirits, who either do not know, or wish to hide their own weaknesses; and that we are much more trustful of that modesty which secures careful investigation and reflection, especially when it is accompanied by proper energy. The mental energy displayed in these volumes tends to give us hope; but their boastings tend to suppress it. It is a very good saying, though it is very old: "Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off;" and we should have been saved from some prejudice against this work, if its boastings had been kept for its conclusion.

We do not object to a confident spirit; for that is essential to all brave action. Nor do we object to any one speaking or writing with all the confidence he feels on any proper subject; for this is both natural and necessary. But we do object, as

a matter of taste at least, to an author who commends his own perspicacity and genius, by a continual display of supercilious contempt for the leading opinions of the world, and of its most eminent men, by pointing to the "indolence of thought," "natural incapacity," "narrow views," "miserable deficiencies," "degrading superstition," and "contemptible subservience" of others; and to the "comprehensive views," "large generalizations," "exhaustive analyses," "great mental grasps," which he knows so well how to appreciate. Such expressions as these, and many others, showing the same spirit of undue self-esteem, and of consequent disrespect for others, abound all through the work, and of course incline us to expect a mere exposition and advocacy of the cherished opinions of the author, and not at all a scientific or philosophical investigation of the laws and principles of any great natural phenomena. He has got his leading opinions from his associations, and he studies and writes to maintain them.

Much of the vanity, pride, and censoriousness of the world arises from people taking their own opinions or systems, that is, themselves, as the standard by which the acts, opinions, and systems of others are to be measured; and, as very few can stand this test, of course the sentence of condemnation is easily arrived at. What falls short of the standard, is condemned for deficiency, and what goes beyond, is condemned for excess; and the self-satisfaction of the judge remains unimpaired. Such sentences are necessarily accurate conclusions from the premises; and it is only the assumed and subjective standard that is wrong. If each man were to take his own foot as the standard foot, there would be no end to the quarrels we should have about our lumber bills; and the more careful each would be in his measurement, the more sincere and confident would each be in their different assertions of the true quantity, and the more censorious of the other's want of accuracy or honesty, unless they should happen to discover that each had innocently assumed a different standard. This author's facility and confidence in judging others, in all past generations, convinces us that he has not discovered any other standard than this subjective one—his individual conscience—which is always ready for application. If he had any other, he ought to have told us

what it was, so that we too might have the same standard in judging his judgments, which are exceedingly numerous. He does not do so.

That he has no other standard, becomes very apparent from the manner in which he speaks of previous historians; none of them, in his opinion, have been able to "grasp their subject." Those who came near doing so are "extremely rare," not over "three or four" in Europe. According to him, "for all the high purposes of human thought, history is still miserably deficient, and presents that confused and anarchical appearance natural to a subject of which the laws are unknown, and even the foundation unsettled." He therefore condemns the standard or standards by which society has always heretofore judged of the value of historians, and gives us, instead, a standard of his own, of very imposing dimensions. His historians must be skilled in political economy, law, ecclesiastical and doctrinal history, statistics, and physics generally; so that they may "concentrate them upon history, of which they are, properly speaking, the necessary components." He afterwards includes many other sciences.

All this is new enough, and this work abounds in such novelties. Youthful thinkers and writers are very apt to make them the principal part of their stock in trade, or at least to place the highest price upon them, and to become very obtrusive and even fanatical in their advocacy of them. We should incline to imitate Horace, in saying to them, *nonumque prematur in annum*; lay your piece by nine years before you publish it, and you may, by that time, find it to be worthless, or learn to improve it. No doubt such novelties, especially when, as here, presented in a bold, earnest, and lively style, and varied and illustrated at every step by historical narratives, and confident criticisms, are very interesting to hasty readers, who have not time to stop and question the book upon each of its principles, and on the relevancy of their illustrations, or upon the sources of all the express and implied premises upon which the argument of it is founded. They are constrained to read some books as a means of saving them the labour of thought, and they do often get new and valuable thoughts in this way. If any suppose they have got such thoughts in this way from this

book, we advise to try those thoughts in their fundamental principles, and by their fitness for society, before they allow them to germinate and grow in their own minds: there are very few of them that can produce any thing else than mere weeds.

When a man takes his own opinions of any kind of excellence as the standard by which he judges and condemns the opinions and acts of others, he can be doing nothing else but giving us his own opinions, and asking us to adopt them as the standard by which we are to form our judgment, and to take him as authority in such matters; and this is what our author quite unconsciously does. We say unconsciously, because it is apparent that he was ignorant that that was the standard by which he was judging, and that there was any necessity to have any standard to judge by. And then he has a very great abhorrence of all respect for authority, that is, for standards; and therefore he is quite inconsistent with himself, when he expects us to accept his opinions as our guide; and that is the very purpose for which his book was written, and his whole manner shows his expectation. He would have written no such things, if he had first ascertained a true objective standard before he began his work.

We cannot suppose that our author is so reckless in his hatred of authority as to reject the authority of ordinary usage in language as the instrument of thought and expression, though this would be a legitimate consequence; and therefore we must regard his frequent departures from the ordinary usage of literary men in the use of terms as proceeding from ignorance of well-settled distinctions. What we have quoted above shows, that he confounds history either with the philosophy of history or with social science, and his book throughout involves the same confusion. The functions of the historian are, like those of an observer in any other department of knowledge, to record as well and truly as he can all the material facts relating to the object of his study, and thus lay up a store of materials for the use of philosophy, when the time for philosophizing comes. In so far as he goes beyond this, and develops the causes and principles of social phenomena, he becomes himself a philosopher, and most historians now-a-days

very properly do this to some extent. If the author had recognized this distinction, existing in the very nature of knowledge and clearly inscribed in language, he would not have called biographers, genealogists, and chroniclers "those babblers of vain things, who lie in wait at every corner, and infest this the public highway of our national literature." If he had ever recognized his own process, he could not have spoken so contemptuously of them; for, in his attempt at philosophizing, he is continually calling upon them for his evidence and his facts.

This makes it apparent that the author has a theory of his own, by which he is continually measuring the performances of others. He is not content that science and philosophy shall grow out of evidence and observation, but these must be moulded by them; we must become philosophers before we become observers. It is under the influence of the same prejudice that he declares it to be "the business of the historian" to show "that the movements of nations are perfectly regular, and that, like all other movements, they are solely determined by their antecedents." Yet this is not the business of anybody. It is the business of the historian to record the facts; and then the philosopher, naturally presuming that there must be some fundamental order in those facts, and that they grow out of some causes, sets himself to discover this order and these causes.

But the philosophical inaccuracies scattered through this work are so numerous, that it would weary the patience of our readers if we should attempt to correct them all. The author's industry and unreflecting spontaneity is so great that he has produced them so abundantly that we find even the notes we have taken of them in the course of our reading are very embarrassing to ourselves. We must therefore lay aside our notes, and refer only to such errors as will naturally find a place in our discussion of his leading errors.

We concede to our author an extraordinary industry in his search for historical illustrations of his theories; and we have often thought that it was these illustrations, rather than the truth of his theories, that have rendered his book so attractive to many minds; and no doubt its attractiveness is increased by the fact that these theories serve as hooks in the memory, to

hang his illustrations upon in some sort of order, though it may not be the true order; just as the Ptolemaic system of astronomy answered this purpose until we found a better one. We have even doubted whether he has not displayed such a superabundance of instances, and detailed them with so much minuteness, as to embarrass the thought of his readers in applying them, and to dim his conclusions in the very splendour of the learning that surrounds them. He thinks the civilization of the Brazilians was prevented by the very fertility of their soil, and by the gorgeous magnificence of the vegetable and animal nature around them, by which the ground was obstructed and the very heavens obscured, and their efforts of cultivation embarrassed and foiled; and we incline to the opinion that his own views of truth have been darkened, and his inquiries embarrassed, by the abundance of the materials which he has accumulated, and which he has not taken time to digest and assimilate.

We freely concede also the earnestness which he displays throughout his work, and have no right or disposition to doubt his honesty; but earnestness, and even honesty, are quite compatible with the absence of caution, and with very hasty conclusions; especially if we have not learned that honesty demands caution in all investigations wherein the interests and rights of others depend upon our actions or conclusions. Minds impartially and however earnestly inquiring after truth, and not merely seeking props and buttresses for ricketty structures or foregone conclusions, or to display striking theories, are usually calm and quiet observers and reasoners, and we are apt to suspect their scientific competence when they are not so. A very thoughtful writer has recently said, very truly, that "the heroes of science are those who, though capable of the most elevated views, have suppressed in themselves all anticipated generalities, and confined themselves to the part of humble labourers."

We cannot, therefore, concede that the author's earnestness, however confident, is any evidence to experienced thinkers that his theories or his criticisms are right. We must have taken the measure of his abilities, and found them entirely adequate to the task, and unprejudiced in the performance of

it, before we can commit our faith to his keeping. He would consider us superstitious if we should act otherwise, and we think we have some grounds to complain that he seems to have intended to gain this sort of control over our minds; for the confident, boasting, censorious, and rather arrogant manner of the charlatan is not uncommon in his mode of treating his subject and the opinions of others. This may be merely an unfortunate manner, into which really scientific men sometimes fall; but we confess an inclination to defend ourselves against theories and arguments thus presented.

We spare our readers from a discussion of the scraps of history which the author has gathered together, and are willing that it shall be taken for granted that they are all truly stated, so far as they go; because, to our mind, they are all of little consequence. They relate in general to various phases of, what the author would call, the political and religious superstitions of past times in many countries, and do not help us much in understanding the history or philosophy of civilization. In the language of legal practice, we demur to the pleading, as not entitling the author to the judgment which he claims; and to the evidence, as not sustaining his pleading, even if we admit its truth. Our business is with his law, not with his facts; with his philosophy, and not with his history. Though he seems to think that he has drawn all his philosophy from his history, we do not think so.

He evidently sets out in his investigations with many foregone conclusions or prejudices, with many likes and dislikes of a very decided character; and hence he is continually tempted out of the straight line of philosophical investigation, in order to display these feelings. Human nature has to confess a little liking for finding fault, because it furnishes to each individual some relief from his own sense of weakness, and may occasionally divert the mind from a line of thought which is not easily followed out to the end. But a philosopher, in the process of philosophizing, ought to have no likes or dislikes; or at least they ought to stand aside until he has finished his investigation, and come to his conclusions on the exact character of his phenomena, and of their causes and effects. Then his feelings will flow from his knowledge, and not direct or pervert it.

Our author has a great dislike for mental and moral philosophy and theology; and hence, of course, he has never studied them, except to discover their deficiencies; and knows very little about them, and thinks them of very little importance in civilization. On the other hand, he has a great reverence for physical science, and has given it a favourable hearing; and attributes to physical laws the main influence in civilizing human society. He does not, therefore, investigate the phenomena of human nature, to find in man the social elements which fit him for society, and which, by their gradual development, constitute his civilization.

He is very fierce and pertinacious in his assault on the clergy; but as he does not judge them by their accepted standard, and does not offer to show that they have adopted a wrong standard, of course his condemnation amounts only to an expression of his own opinions, which he ought not to have expected the public entirely to adopt. He does not even take a standard admitted by himself, as universal and objective, when he says: "Every institution, whether political or religious, represents the actual working, the form and pressure of the age." And when he says again, of the acts of the clergy: "The real cause was the spirit of their age, and the peculiarities of their position. None of us can be sure that, if we were placed exactly as they were placed, we should have acted differently."

He is almost equally condemnatory of statesmen and publicists, except of Adam Smith, whom he considers "greater than all statesmen and legislators put together," and whose "*Wealth of Nations*" he regards as "the most important book" ever published: but here again he appeals to no standard of merit, and gives us only his own opinions. It is very easy to see that these opinions constitute a peculiar doctrine of political economy, favoured by the school to which he belongs. No doubt he intends to take natural law as the standard in all cases; though he seldom, in any given case, either ascertains or applies it carefully, or seems to know what it is as a general notion. So far as he has any objective standard, it is natural law, and we cannot fairly test the skill of his performance, except by comparing it with his own standard.

We join him, therefore, in his appeal to the standard of natural law, as the sole standard of judgment for the case; and we join him, likewise, in his appeal to the Inductive Method, as the means of ascertaining what that law is in each case. But then we must know what natural law is, before we can know what we are seeking for, and this is a mere question of definition. He does not define it, and does not even appear very clearly to know what it is; for he sometimes seems to regard it as some kind of force or power outside of things controlling their movements; yet it is not a force at all, but is expressive of the mode in which a force acts. Natural law is the general term for all particular natural laws; and a natural law is the expression of the usual order of events in any given circumstances, or of the natural relation of events to each other; and the cause which produces this order is the natural force existing in the things, and producing their movements or events. We would go further, to Creative Cause; but we do not, because we desire to meet our author on his own ground, so far as he seems to have any that is true, even though it be not the Highest Cause.

Of such an inquiry, the method must, of course, be inductive, for the order of nature is a question of fact to be decided on the evidence derived from observation. If, therefore, observation proves, as the author says, that civilization depends upon knowledge, and knowledge upon leisure, and leisure upon wealth, and wealth upon a superabundance given by the earth's fertility, and "solely regulated by the physical peculiarities of the country," or depending "entirely on soil and climate," then, of course, we must accept the conclusion, though it seems to make all the energies of humanity useless, and to run us into a very unpalatable materialism, and though it contradicts our mother-wit, which has always told us that practice gives skill, that "want is the spur of wit," and that "necessity," and not leisure, "is the mother of invention." But the proverbs of our forefathers were often wrong, because founded on insufficient observation; and it may be true, as our author insists, that wit is founded on wealth, or the most abundant product of each country, and that, therefore, civilization in India grows from rice, in Lower Egypt from dates, in Upper

Egypt from the grain called dhourra, in Mexico and Peru from maize and bananas, and in Ireland from potatoes. We prefer, however, our mother-wit to our author's science or philosophy, and do not think that our readers will require us to refer to the evidence to prove that leisure and laziness, ease and idleness, are very apt to be found together in the early stages of life and civilization, and that new inventions and discoveries come in to supply the wants which industry feels in the course of its practice. This may be taken as a sample, by the way, of the author's skill, "bold generalizations," and "comprehensive views" in political economy; a science for which, and especially for the free trade doctrine, of which our author seems to have had a superstitious reverence, which might possibly have been dispelled had he lived long enough to make its full acquaintance.

But still we admit that the true method of arriving at a knowledge of the natural order of events is by observation and generalization of facts, and we are willing to try our hand at this with the author before we are done, if we find occasion for it. We do not expect to have much need to do so after we shall have corrected some of the violations of method into which he has fallen. He sometimes forgets the law of his method by postulating premises, without any proof, because demanded by the necessities of his argument; as when he says that, "in the first formation of society, wealth *must* accumulate before knowledge can begin;" and again, "there *must* be an intimate connection between human actions and physical laws," (he means, the order of physical nature.) We do not refer to these propositions for the purpose of disputing them, but only as samples of the author's resort to supposed aprioral principles when his method fails him. He does not prove them by history and observation, and from their nature they cannot be so proved.

We do not expect him to prove the fundamental principle of all reasoning, which our mind naturally assumes, and which the method of analogy confirms, that like causes produce like effects, like grounds give like consequences, or like things in like relations being given, like movements ensue; for without this we could neither attain nor attempt any science. But we cannot concede that this principle, even deductively, and much

less inductively, employed, can lead to the materialism and fatalism expressed by the author, when he says, that physical laws "invariably kept the vast majority of the fairest portion of the globe in a condition of constant and inextricable poverty;" that the general aspects of nature are the causes "of these innumerable superstitions, which are the great obstacles of advancing knowledge;" "men, being determined solely by their antecedents, must under precisely the same circumstances, always issue in precisely the same results:" in India, "abject, eternal slavery was the natural state of the great body of the people; it was the state to which they were doomed by physical laws utterly impossible to resist:" in Brazil, man is "reduced to insignificance by the majesty (of nature), with which he is surrounded:" in Asia, the general aspects of nature "excite the imagination;" in Europe, they "address the understanding:" "in the moral, as in the physical world, nothing is anomalous, nothing is unnatural, nothing is strange; all is order, symmetry, and law."

The author would have been saved from this extreme of materialism and fatalism, if he had sufficiently recognized that effects always proceed from at least two factors, and can be accounted for only by their combined influence. If he had properly appreciated this principle, he would not have despised metaphysics, by which he means mental science, and resorted so exclusively to soil and climate, and the general aspects of nature, in the study of civilization. He would hardly so despise vegetable physiology and animal instincts, and resort only to soil, climate, and aspects of nature, in the study of agriculture and animal economy. The cosmical force of gravitation is very simple; but we do not study that of the sun alone, but that of the planet-star, in order to understand the motions of a planet. And when we are studying the normal motion of the earth in its orbit, we take into consideration the several attractions of the sun, moon, and earth. Soil and climate would be nothing in vegetation, were it not for the vegetating principles in the seed or plant; nothing in animal life, were it not for the vital principles of the animal; and nothing in spiritual, and therefore nothing in social life, were it not for the mental, moral, and social principles that belong to the nature of man.

The author comes very near catching this principle, when he says, that the normal and more permanent condition of our body ought to be studied before the abnormal and variable, in order to learn the nature of disease; and thus is obtained a standard of easy application; for, though the normal state continually changes with age, and differs according to climate, yet an adequate approximation to the knowledge of it is easily obtained. This view involves the admission that both the factors of the disease must have some notice. And he applies this as an analogy to the study of society; we must study its normal, in order to know its abnormal state. It was, indeed, inconsistent with this, that he had said before that there is nothing abnormal or anomalous; but this is to be expected of a writer who begins to publish before he has completed his study. He was also inconsistent with it, when he says that a growing civilization must depend upon a growing cause; that is, upon increasing intelligence, and overlooks all the natural energies of the mind itself; besides the inaccuracy of making intelligence a cause, instead of element, of civilization. If he had defined the object of his work, civilization, before he began to write, he would have known better what he was writing about, and might have done it more to the satisfaction and edification of his readers. Definition is not easy work; but he might have got aid from Guizot. It is not a disturbed movement, but only the disturbance itself, that demands an unsteady cause.

No reflecting person needed to be told that soil, climate, and the aspects of nature have an influence on individual character and social progress; but this influence would be nothing without the reaction of the mind, and the energies that fit it to react. The mind and the external world are, therefore, in mere natural law, the two factors of all social effects, and both demand to be studied. And studying thus, there is no inductive process that can lead the author to his doctrine of human necessity. We speak not of the deductive process, for the author rejects that altogether. One factor, the mind, is always changing in its desires, purposes, course of thought, and amount of knowledge; and therefore, even in the same external circumstances, or with the other factor the same, the effects change; the relation changes as each factor changes,

and no amount of observation can furnish the evidence to induction of the fatality of individual or of social actions. And back of this again lies the fact, that the mind is continually changing itself, by its own reflections on the materials which it has acquired by observation, and is thereby continually presenting itself in new relations and aspects, and new energies, motives and intelligence, to the influences that come from without, and thus giving to those influences new directions, and always changing the diagonal of their forces. This saves us from materialistic fatalism, and yet does not forbid a reasonable induction of social laws, founded on fundamental principles of human nature, and on the conduct which flows from them.

But, notwithstanding what we have quoted from the author relative to the power of physical laws over the process of civilization, he does often speak of mental laws and faculties and feelings; and yet we are not sure that he does not thereby mean merely the effect produced on the mind by physical influences, without admitting any natural tendencies in the mind itself. Thus in India, Spain, Italy, Mexico, and Peru, earthquakes, volcanoes, and great pestilences excite the imagination, suggest the supernatural, and breed superstition, and this breeds the "contemptible subservience" of the ignorant, which subjects them to slavery. And this slavery means any degree of submission to authority that is incompatible with his notions of political economy, whether it relate to government, commerce, religion, literature, or any other matter. All comes from physical law, and he says "nothing is anomalous, nothing is unnatural," which is true, of course, if we are merely studying the natural laws of physical causes. Induction, in such a study, accepts the physical facts in order to find the law of them, and of course such a law can have no condemnation or approbation of the facts out of which it grows. It is merely the generalization of them. On his ground, therefore, he has no right to find fault with society for its vices and "diseased appetites."

He has, however, a very extensive discussion on "mental laws" and "moral laws," which is worth our notice. His purpose is to show that civilization advances by the growth of our

knowledge, and not of our morality, and he states his proposition thus: "If the advance of civilization, and the general happiness of mankind, depend more on their moral feelings than on their intellectual knowledge, we must, of course, measure the progress of society by those feelings; while if, on the other hand, it depends principally on their knowledge, we must take as our standard the amount and success of their intellectual activity." Now, if he had known a little of mental science, he would have known that all our sentiments depend on our knowledge—that we have no love or hatred, joy or sorrow, without some object perceived by the mind. Our sentiments depend on the manner in which we understand persons, things, and events, and our moral conduct, therefore, depends upon our intelligence, by the very nature of our mental constitution, and are of course subordinate to it. It follows also that our morality must improve in proportion as our intelligence of our relations with our fellow-men increases. We admit therefore that our moral feelings depend upon our knowledge, as an end depends upon its means; but not that no perceptible advance has been made in morality for the last two thousand years, which our author asserts, and not that the means are more important than the end. It is very easy to see that it is the strong dislike of moralists and theologians, entertained by his school of political economists, and imbibed by himself, that is the main argument of the conclusion in his own mind. His whole discussion on this point is totally useless to any scholar in mental science.

We know not how the author can possibly, in political economy and the philosophy of history, confine this "intellectual knowledge" to the knowledge of mere physical laws, and yet it has already appeared that such is his purpose, and he maintains it to the end. Thus he very rightly says that "the only remedy for superstition is knowledge." And considering that he admits that it naturally and inevitably accompanies ignorance, he seems to be wasting indignation in calling it "that plague-spot of the human mind." It would have been much more scientific in him to have regarded it as raising a problem of natural law for his investigation and definition. He says ignorance is the cause of superstition, and therefore,

if any indignation were proper, it ought to have been directed against the cause, and not against the effect. For ourselves, we should regard ignorance as a negative quality, and therefore as not a cause of anything; and we suppose the true cause is to be found in some mental tendency striving for its proper development, and groping its way towards it.

Another of his great evils is war, which he thinks is decreasing, whether because of our knowledge of "physical laws," or because of a higher appreciation of moral laws, we are not very certain. He says it is because "certain classes of society have an interest in the preservation of peace;" and this may mean either a moral or a physical interest, or both, if we may talk of a physical interest. He says again: "By an increasing love of intellectual pursuits, the military service necessarily declines;" and we do not know how to reconcile this with what he had just before said, and which we have quoted. And again he says, there are "three leading ways in which the warlike spirit has been weakened;" 1. The invention of gunpowder; 2. The discoveries of political economists; 3. The application of steam to travelling.

Gunpowder acts as a cause in the suppression or depression of the military spirit, by making "a separate military profession indispensable." And yet he thinks that it is just in this way that an undue religious spirit and an undue loyal spirit has been maintained, and that political economy has grown to be a science, and that, by the division of labour, all the arts of life have been advanced. His reason does not seem to us conclusive.

Political economy has depressed the warlike spirit, he says, by teaching us that money is "of no possible use, except to measure and circulate riches," and that wealth consists "solely of the value which skill and labour can add to the raw material," and that commerce must be allowed to be free; and, by reason of this intelligence, "the commercial spirit, which formerly was often warlike, is now invariably pacific." If this be so, the military spirit of commerce has become pacific for a very ignorant reason, and will not last long. But it is not so; merchants are much wiser in their business than such political economists, though they may not have learned the philosophy

of it. They know well enough that gold and silver have real value, and that they could not be measures of value without it. The author would seem to be a physical utilitarian, and to pronounce money of no use but as a measure of riches, because we cannot eat or drink it. But thereby he repudiates both the notion and the fact expressed by the words *value* and *wealth*. Both are fixed by the common estimate of the world. The world has a right to its ambition for the ornaments of life, because it is natural, and its demand for gold and silver for this purpose, if no other, necessarily gives it value; for value means the relation which articles of commerce bear to each other in the market of the world; and it depends on the common estimate of society, and political economists are bound so to accept it as an element of their science.

The application of steam to the purposes of travelling has weakened the love of war, by facilitating the intercourse between different countries, and thus aiding "in destroying that ignorant contempt which one nation is too apt to feel for another." Perhaps this is more of a moral than of a physical cause; but we make no question about it. In the discussion of it he makes some very fine remarks, two of which we quote, because they show how unconscious he is of any vain, contemptuous, or denunciatory spirit. "The greatest observer and the most profound thinker is invariably the most lenient judge. It is the solitary misanthrope, brooding over his fancied wrongs, who is most prone to depreciate the good qualities of our nature, and exaggerate its bad ones; or else it is some foolish and ignorant monk, who, dreaming away his existence in an idle solitude, flatters his own vanity by denouncing the vices of others."

The author introduces his views on the subject of the social protective spirit, by referring to the civil wars of England and of France, in the seventeenth century. In England they were settled by a spirit of liberal concession, which was followed by a restoration of harmony, liberty, and progress; while in France they were settled by a centralized despotism, and the suppression of all dissent and freedom, which generated a social disease which festered for more than a century, and then broke out into the anarchy of opinions and institutions, and the despotism and

cruelty and popular excitement of the French Revolution. He says the history of these two events, and their consequences, will show that, "in politics, no certain (we should rather say, fixed, like physical and mathematical, and not vital and social) principles having yet been discovered, the conditions of success are compromise, barter, expediency, and concession. It will show the utter helplessness, even of the ablest rulers, when they try to meet new emergencies by old maxims. It will show the intimate connection between knowledge and liberty; between an increasing civilization and an advancing democracy. It will show that, for a progressive nation, there is required a progressive polity; that, within certain limits, innovation is the sole ground of security; that no institution can withstand the flux and movements of society, unless it not only repairs its structure, but widens its entrance; and that, even in a material point of view, no country can long remain either prosperous or safe, in which the people are not gradually extending their power, enlarging their privileges, and, so to say, incorporating themselves with the functions of the state."

These views very well express the idea that vital principles must have vital forms; that the natural growth of society cannot be set back by state formalism or officialism, or prevented by it; that, however the meddling of arbitrary men, despots, or agitators, may disturb this natural growth, they cannot suppress or permanently divert it. He illustrates it further by the intermeddling conduct of James I. of Scotland, endeavouring to force his theories upon the people: "Like nearly all politicians, he exaggerated the value of political remedies. The legislator and the magistrate may, for a moment, palliate an evil; they can never work a cure. General mischiefs depend upon general causes, and these are beyond their art." A chronic disorder, "having worked into the general habit, might be removed by time; it could never be diminished by violence. Over-action on one side produces reaction on the other, and the balance of the fabric is disturbed. By the shock of conflicting interests, the scheme of life is made insecure. New animosities are kindled, old ones are embittered; and the natural jar and discordance are aggravated, simply because the rulers of mankind cannot be brought to understand, that, in dealing with a

great country, they have to do with an organization so subtle, so extremely complex, and withal so obscure, as to make it highly probable that, whatever they alter in it, they will alter wrongly; and that, while their efforts to protect or strengthen its particular parts are extremely hazardous, it does undoubtedly possess within itself a capacity of repairing its injuries; and that, to bring such capacity into play, there is merely required that time and freedom, which the interference of powerful men too often prevents it from enjoying."

The general spirit of these remarks we most heartily adopt; but it does not seem to us that this was the guiding spirit of the author's mind. His impatience at the tardiness with which society receives what he calls truth, and at the tenacity with which it adheres to old customs and old leaders, seems to us to grow out of a very opposite spirit. He approves of the firm and well-guarded walls within which society shelters itself against invasions; but frets that the men of his school of political economy may not pass the sentinels without giving the watchword. Every society must have its sentinels, and they would be good for nothing without their formalism. If they did not watch and suspect, and cry "Halt; who comes there? advance and give the countersign," they would be unfit for their place, and would soon be shot down, either by those whom they have weakly betrayed or endangered, or by those whom they have foolishly trusted.

Discipline is an essential element of the process of civilization. It is not knowledge or mental growth, and therefore impatient spirits fret at the delays which it requires; but it is the regulation and consolidation of the knowledge and growth already attained, and the fixing of the foundations of a further growth. It does not furnish either knowledge or energy to the mind; but it gives skill and accuracy in the direction of them. In war it is the law that gives organic unity to the army, saves it from disorders within and dangers without, and enables it to move with one mind against the enemy. Soldiers are apt to grow weary of the labour of learning it, and others of the time spent in teaching it; but it is sure in its rewards to those who with patience cultivate it. It may never be as good as it ought to be; but it can hardly ever be as bad as none at

all. In the state it is the constitution and laws by which all the social interests are organized, regulated, and protected; and usually it is as good as society knows how to adopt or practice; and without it there can be no social unity and harmony, no common standard of social action, rights, and duties; not even a common language to make the preservation and propagation of thought possible.

No doubt, disciplines, laws, constitutions, habits and customs are often very defective; but we have never known any systems of them that would be as bad as none at all. They are the forms of systematic unity, and they may become so rigid as to embarrass, but never so as totally to prevent social growth. A tree is sure to crack the bark that does not adequately share in its growth. If it bind too hard, it is better to encourage its growth than to strip it off.

And it is hardly wise to complain of "the interference of powerful men;" for generally their power consists of the trust which society has in them, and we become competent to criticise their measures only by their consequences revealed to their successors, and not to them, and the process of civilization demands such men. All life consists of a variety of functions, each performing its part in the vital unity. Civil society abounds in such functions, each becoming more distinctly marked as intelligence increases, and becoming represented by the different trades, occupations, professions, and classes of which society consists. This branching of thought and division of labour is an essential element of all social growth. And yet it naturally tends to produce confusion; for each function naturally organizes itself to maintain its integrity and force, and naturally tends to encroach on other functions, and the highest science and skill of the statesman and publicist are never able to preserve entire order and adequate freedom among these functions, so as to maintain complete harmony in the social unity which they compose; for all his wisdom must be derived from observing how they do actually operate together. We must have discovered, by the experience of ourselves or of others, that any given form, or institution, or class interest, works badly in society, before we can know how to correct it or supply it by another.

Now it is this very tendency of society to organize its several interests into several departments, and consequently itself into many different classes, that the author calls the protective spirit—"that mischievous spirit which weakens whatever it touches." He proclaims it the great enemy of intellectual movement, "and therefore the great enemy of civilization," and defines that he means by it, "the notion that society cannot prosper unless the affairs of life are watched over and protected at nearly every turn by the state and the church; the state teaching men what they are to do, and the church teaching them what they are to believe." Whenever commerce, or arts, or religion, or science, or literature, or politics is regulated or watched over by kings, nobles, or clergy, by state or church, that is *protection*. And it is easy to see that if the author were an advocate of free love, or concubinage, or polygamy, or free liquor, or free gambling, free forestalling, and free cheating, he would likewise have denounced all state laws and church teaching that should interfere with such liberty, as *protection*. Nearly the whole of these two volumes is occupied, directly or indirectly, with this subject; and the author thinks he has constructed a conclusive inductive argument in favour of his theory.

Now, if the author had really studied history in order to discover the general facts of our social nature, and to generalize its tendencies and their modes of operation and development, instead of studying it in order to produce evidence of his own theories, he would easily have found that what he calls *protection* is one of the most natural, as well as one of the most essential, modes of social action. All the social interests naturally and spontaneously organize themselves for self-defence against conflicting interests, and for propagating and perpetuating the life that is in them; and religion and politics, being the earliest developed of all these interests, and being fundamental to all the others, have always been the first to organize themselves, and have always been the most decidedly organized. That they are imperfect in principle and form may be admitted, because man is imperfect; but how the author, proceeding on strictly inductive grounds, and therefore having no possible standard of comparison but the generalized facts of

each society, how he can condemn them, we are unable to understand.

The more society advances in civilization, the more its moral, intellectual, and physical wants increase, and the more its functions and occupations are divided, and the more these become organized, every class having its own laws, customs, and usages appropriate to its business, and these are its protection. The organizations of the state and of the church are the strongest of all, because they involve the permanent interest of all, and therefore yield not so readily as the other interests, which are weaker, because fractional and dependent on social wants, and therefore sometimes transient, and because they can never be so entirely separated that many of them may not encroach on each other.

No doubt such organizations are embarrassing to hasty and impatient innovators; but philosophers know how to bide their time. It is the organic form, the political, religious, moral, scientific, or practical system that stands in their way; and yet their own favourite principle, if admitted, would demand only a change in the system; for without its proper place in some organic unity, it could have no life nor force. Every principle is worthless while it is out of its proper relations. All the principles admitted by society naturally systemize themselves in the social mind, and then the system must yield more or less before it can admit a new principle. To complain of this, is to complain of that very nature to which the author appeals. The aspiring sprout might as well complain that its growth is obstructed by the overshadowing forest.

There is no natural organism without its correlated parts. In all organisms, except the mind of man and society, nature regulates these correlations; but in these, the will and reason of man have much to do, and they must direct as wisely as they know how to do it. Nature assigns no invariable rule for the forms of individual or of social life. All have their permanent fundamental character, and all have their circumstantial varieties, which no aprioral principles can indicate or control. Every organism must spontaneously or by calculation hold its parts in proper relations. It must maintain its individuality, save itself from encroachment from without, and from anarchy

within. How it shall do so, depends upon inner and outer circumstances, and can be decided by no aprioral law, and by no rule not deduced from those circumstances, and from its own nature. Fences are very costly and inconvenient; but so long as some people may let their swine and cattle run at large, all must keep their fields enclosed. Walls were an obstruction to the light and air, and to the free ingress and egress of the old towns of Europe; but in those disorderly times, they were necessary to the interests and freedom of the people; now the lines of fortification must be set further out. Walls are not to be condemned for being proofs of social disorder.

But the author did not see how far-reaching would be his anti-protection principle, if carried out to its legitimate consequences. It would not only suppress the power and influence of the state and of the church, both of which he regarded with strong prejudice and even hatred; but it would forbid the organization and regulation of any of the great interests of society. War is often a chronic condition of society, and yet his principle would forbid the social readiness for it to be organized and regulated, lest the work of organization should fall into the hands of a military class, who would become protective. Disease is always present in society, and needs to be attended to, and yet his principle would forbid the organization of this social interest, lest the medical faculty should usurp the social thinking on this subject, and thus become protective. And, inconsistent though it is, he is an advocate of "the authority of the intellectual classes," without perceiving that he, everywhere and in every form, attacks the very principle of authority itself and all its foundations; and that no authority can exist in any society without becoming organized and regulated; and that, therefore, the authority of even "the intellectual classes" could not avoid becoming protective, if it is to be any authority at all.

The authority which the state and the church exert is very offensive to the author, because it interferes with "the authority of the intellectual classes," by which he very evidently means the materialistic philosophers, and especially the school or party of physico-political economists to which he belongs; and hence his earnest and rather blind hatred of them. Con-

sidering the great deficiency of his knowledge of them, and of their necessary relations with all the social interests, we think this hatred very natural. There is a necessary antagonism between his system and them, which can be removed only by an increase of intelligence, changing one or the other of them. His certainly cannot maintain its place, for it is easy to see that it is opposed to both state and church; that is, to the organization of the civil and religious interests of the country; and he would, no doubt, have no other organization of society, except the free and transient contracts of socialism, or something analogous thereto. He had not come to the proper place in his work for explaining his system; but this is the character of the system of the political sect to which he belonged.

The author deals largely in antithesis; he is a lover of striking contrasts, and, as is usual with writers who get into this vein, he is continually running them into an extreme that violates truth. Thus he contrasts the intellectual and the military classes, and says that the antagonism between them is evident, and he seems to think it a necessary antagonism. "It is the antagonism between thought and action, between the internal and the external, between argument and violence, between persuasion and force; or, to sum up the whole, between men who live by the pursuits of peace, and those who live by the practice of war. Whatever, therefore, is favourable to one class is manifestly unfavourable to the other." This is false throughout; for force is just as natural to man as intelligence, and therefore, though different, they are not necessarily nor evidently antagonistic. On the contrary, thought is necessary to action; the external is the expression of the internal; argument and persuasion are often used to produce violence and force; and war is often founded on and guided by very high intelligence.

The antagonism between prejudice and impartiality, or between two opposing prejudices, in dealing with facts, is much more evident, and this the author seems not at all to have appreciated. His mission was evidently not to seek for truth, but to propagate the truth which he was sure he had. Hence, though not a military man, he became a warrior when he first took up his pen. His whole work is a war of invasion declared

against the enemies of his system, and is conducted with all the arts of war, and not at all with the ingenuousness and gentleness of philosophy seeking to win its triumphs by the persuasive eloquence of truth. Eloquent he often is, and therefore very attractive, when you concede his premises, by looking at events only from his standpoint; and no doubt his eloquence is honest, so far as it is honest to allow a half look to dictate to his passion. This is a superficial honesty that may suffice in the ordinary affairs of life, but a philosopher ought to be more profound. The common beliefs of mankind have a real foundation in human nature, even where untrue in form, and no seeker of truth is entitled to spurn them from him. When the author frowns upon them or distorts them by his ridicule, he is guilty of using the very force which he everywhere condemns as productive of superstition. This is the spirit of war, and not of teaching.

As leader of a war on existing institutions, he must practice the arts of war, and expect to be met by the same arts; and therefore his passion, his boastful confidence, his censoriousness, and denunciations, are not out of place. He must drum up recruits, and for this he must excite and maintain indignation against the hostile array. But as an investigator and teacher of truth, if he understood his function, and the state of mind that is receptive of truth, he would regard all excitement as standing in his way, and would himself endeavour to rise to the higher mediating principles of truth, where schools and factions find no foothold, or would suffer and invite their excitements to cool, by presenting other views of truth, which have not yet been coated over by their prejudices. When he becomes himself a partisan, even for truth, he only exaggerates excitement and divisions, by shutting the ears of the opposite party; though he is sure of the support of the party that already agrees with him.

There is a natural and legitimate excitement, that accompanies and sustains every earnest effort of mind or body, and makes such efforts pleasant. Let that have its course; to suppress it, we must abandon all effort and all earnestness; without it the mind is dull and inert. Let the teacher be full of it. Our author has this; but it is sadly tainted by an excitement that is

the spirit of party, and which continually prevents him from a careful and candid examination of the position and merits of those whom he regards as obstructing his purposes. He treats them as foolish, ignorant, superstitious, and tyrannical, and is indignant at their crimes, even while apologizing for them, that they could not be otherwise in the circumstances in which they were placed. Such intellectual rudeness may subdue the minds of some, but it can convince no one.

Even truth thus received has no secure support, for it has no inner vitality. It is a law of the occasion, and becomes obsolete when the excitement passes off. Any system thus assailed is sure to arm itself for defence, and perhaps to make reprisals. In times of quietness and of intellectual progress, every system and every interest has its law as well as its philosophy; its law for its general supporters, and its philosophy for the few who investigate its principles, and thus seek its improvement. But when a war of systems and interests arises, their safety consists in unity, and all must stand by the law, and the voice of philosophy is unheard; progress must give way to self-preservation, until the controversy is hushed. And the several interests within each state, not being organized for attack and defence, because relying on the protection of the state, when they are driven to rely on themselves for defeating hostility, spontaneously fall back on the law of necessity which the occasion dictates, and make it, for the time, a law of the organism. It is the law of war, with all its violence and strategy, its watchfulness, suspicion, and rage. It is only the highest wisdom that can combine moderation and vigour in such cases, and thus ensure success, or, at least, avoid defeat.

The great enemies of the author's favourite system, at least as he regards them, are the state and the church; and his war against them is passionate, and sometimes adroit, and even unscrupulous, as it seems to us. According to him, they are the cause of all the wars, persecutions, oppressions, and despots, with which the world has been afflicted. Loyalty and superstition are the sentiments on which they are founded, and therefore these are to be suppressed, as the enemies of our race. PROLETARIAN is their hated name, though, in the estimate of society, it is not yet considered a very hard name. And

yet he admits that these sentiments are natural to men, and that they have been prevalent in all places and all times. As an inductive philosopher, therefore, it was his duty to accept them as elements of our social nature, and to seek, not to suppress them, but to correct their operation. But loyalty is the bond of the state, and an essential element of government; and superstition, by which he means religion, is the vital principle of the church; and therefore these are the special objects of his enmity. He hates both state and church, and therefore he hates the very principles of nature on which they depend.

The author has a strange mode of scientific elimination, which we have not discovered in any other writer. He throws out all those facts and elements of our nature, of society, and of history, which he dislikes, or which complicate his investigation, or interfere with his desired conclusions; and thus he obtains what he calls simplicity in the phenomena, and can more easily arrive at what he regards as the normal conditions of events. This certainly facilitates his calculations; but it does not solve the problem of which all these complications naturally form a part. Instead of the problem which nature presents, the author substitutes one which he likes better; but we confess that, in an investigation of the natural laws of society, we prefer to study social facts as we find them, rather than the hypothetic facts or the residuary facts of our author's elimination.

Loyalty to the social organism, its laws, constitution, and leaders, is a constant element of our social nature; and even the socialistic school of political philosophers must respect it, if they wish to develope it into accordance with their system. It is the natural gravitation of the individual towards the centre of its system, which saves it from mere chaotic or anarchical confusion or meteoric wandering. To reject it as an element of every social problem, is to deny man's social nature, and to declare that men associate only because they find it their interest to do so, and according to the interest which they find in society. And even this does not deny our social nature; but makes it depend on the natural requirements of our wit, rather than on any direct social tendency.

Liberty is the favourite idea of the author, and we prize it

as highly as he does, but perhaps not so passionately. Eager innovators are always passionate advocates of liberty; but history has always found them somewhat tyrannical when the time came for organizing their system. Then no one is right, and every one is wrong who does not adopt their system. Then faith in them is an essential element of a worthy character; all others are condemned, and no liberty is allowed to them that is supposed to interfere with the system. This phenomena is so constant that we must take it as natural, and make the best of it we can. Our author does not understand this.

According to our view, liberty is always a social question and depends on social circumstances. The social principle demands social organization, and therefore individual liberty must be such as is compatible with the functions of the social organism, when this is itself formed in reasonable accordance with its necessities. Liberty is therefore always regulated, controlled by rules, so that it shall not interfere with the liberty of society. When it is regulated by the arbitrary will of rulers, it may be unduly restrained. But when it is regulated by social customs, it is more naturally restrained; very much in the same way that individual liberty is restrained by individual habits; and in both cases we must rather endeavour to correct the customs and habits, than complain of the restraints which they bring with them.

There can be no liberty that is not responsible to society for its social offences; that is, for its acts which society feels to be offences. But an *ex post facto* or punitive responsibility is very far from being sufficient for the order of society; and therefore there must also be a preventive responsibility; and either of these may be unnecessarily exacting and oppressive. The former is in general under the superintendence of the judiciary, while the latter is committed to parents, tutors, guardians, and masters. He that does not pass well through the latter, is seldom fit for the liberty that belongs to the former. Even nations must usually pass through this process in their march from barbarism to civilization, a fact not noticed by the author; though it was an element in every civilization traced

by him, that the nation was brought to social order by centuries of subjection to another nation.

Liberty is the harmonious interaction of the individual and society, by these being so adapted to each other that the interests of each are properly respected by the other. The liberty of the individual must respect the order of society, which is its liberty; and the liberty of society must respect the growth of the individual; and therefore neither of them is absolute, and both of them vary according to intelligence, morality, and surrounding relations. These are fundamental principles of man's social nature which the author has not duly considered. If he had defined liberty according to its actual social nature, by the inductive method, and not followed a loose and unregulated idea of it, formed according to individual wishes, he would have been saved from very many of the errors into which he has fallen; and especially he would not have condemned loyalty as one of the greatest vices of our nature. Like all our other natural tendencies, it needs education, correction, and training, not suppression.

But the author resolves both loyalty and superstition into the sentiment of reverence or veneration, and therefore requires that this be suppressed, though he admits it to be a natural tendency. At one time he traces it to the nervous system, which he thinks he discovers to be affected by volcanoes, earthquakes, and other frightful events, until it falls into a bad habit of timidity, of wild imagination, and tame submission. We rather wonder that he did not think that this might also be the cause of the tame submission of domestic animals to the rule of man; for they too have a nervous system. And he might have examined why the brute creation in India had not become so superstitious as to worship Siva, Vishnu, and Brahma; for they have a nervous system, and are not destitute of imagination. And being in the way of suppressing natural causes, it seems to us it would have been quite as well to have advocated the suppression of the nervous system and of the earthquakes, for if this were done, he would have no trouble with their effects, loyalty, superstition, and reverence.

At another time he traces reverence to ignorance, which, being the absence of knowledge, and therefore a mere nega-

tion, can hardly be admitted by science as a cause of anything. But we admit it as not an improper form of common parlance, and we can hardly expect greater accuracy from so loose a thinker as the author. The meaning is, that our natural tendencies are the causes of all our actions, and that they act differently according to their training, their circumstances, and their degree of energy. A horse is very ignorant, but is not remarkable for reverence; and we are not sure that he has any tendency to it. Of course, where the tendency exists, it may be modified, restrained, developed and trained, for this is the very purpose of mental cultivation. It suppresses no mental tendency, but regulates all of them.

At another time it is good soil and climate that produce reverence, thus: good soil answers labour with abundance, and this produces inequality of wealth, and this gives social and political power, and this produces "tame submission" of the many to the few, and hence habits of reverence. The logical consequence would seem to be that, for the curse of reverence which it inflicts, a rich soil ought to be abhorred, as a sort of moral malarious marsh, breeding moral agues, and even moral death, slavery.

Reverence or veneration for the past is a great disturber of the author's equanimity; but we are sure that, with a little more philosophy, he would have saved his temper. He regards it as "repugnant to every maxim of reason;" though he has not given us even one of these maxims; and he fondly anticipates the time when "veneration for the past will be succeeded by hope for the future." Yet we have never considered these two sentiments as incompatible. With the author it is hatred of the past that has succeeded to reverence for the past, and these are incompatible sentiments. And since the future is ever built upon the past, we do not see how his hopes for the future could be very high. He acknowledges that the English hatred of the French was a mere superstition, founded on ignorance; and his hatred of this reverence may be no less so. He admits that "it is impossible for any man to escape the pressure of surrounding opinions;" and certainly those of his school have pressed him to many very groundless conclusions.

Regard for the past no doubt has its extremes of superstition

and contempt, and we do not admire either of them. But we cannot learn the philosophy of our social history without a respect for the past; and an inductive method that treats it with contempt is fundamentally unphilosophical. To scorn what he calls "the miserable details" of kings, courts, nobles, and wars, is to demand perfection in the first efforts at writing history; and this does not seem wrong if the past is to be despised in the study of the present and of the nature of man. But we must have enough of it to lead us to sympathize with the struggles of by-gone generations so far as to comprehend them and learn from them.

Reverence for the past is always overstated by those who allow themselves to be fretted by the reluctance with which society receives their new, or supposed new theories. It is much more fanciful than real. Society, like individuals, has no reverence for that of which it knows nothing. We know no difference, in respect of reverence, between remoteness in time and remoteness in space. "Distance lends enchantment to the view." Names that come to us from afar, in time or space, are presumed to be connected with great qualities, and we incline to receive all that favours this presumption. Like the rumour of a great event, the fame of them *crescit eundo*; our credulity, which is our natural faith not sufficiently watchful against excited witnesses, prepares us to admit all that is told us, and the very distance from which it comes is apt to shut out all evidence to the contrary. A favourite story continually grows, by the fancies of some narrators and the mistakes of others, in which common events are dropped, and strange ones exaggerated and easily remembered; and as all this is very natural, the author ought not to complain of it.

But it is not reverence for the past, but an inevitable respect for existing opinions and customs, that stands in the way of the schemes of innovators, and requires them to make clear proof of their superior merits, before existing things can give place to them. The usage stands for *prima facie* evidence on one side, and the burden of proof that is to set it aside is cast upon the innovating party. This is the natural law of evidence, and it cannot properly be complained of. Even the opinions imbibed by mere association or respect for associates, and without any

sort of investigation, or study of their tendencies or effects, and especially if they have become habitual, cannot give way before the highest and most respected authority in such matters, until, in some way, the buttresses of affection and habit, by which they are upheld, are thrown down.

And this appears to be a necessary element of social and individual stability of character. Without it, we know not how there could be any social system, or any system of any kind for growing men. No doubt it does interfere with all mere radicalism; and it will save the world from its anarchical principles, except in sudden gusts of popular excitement. It does also interfere with new systems, however sound they may be, just as a beech forest interferes with the growth of oaks on the same ground. New systems must prove their right before they can be received, and that may be a long process; for the jury is very numerous, and not always attentive, and the ladder of the judicial hierarchy consists of many rounds. If they can get their turn in the witness-stand, or a place at the bar, they are sure of a hearing in time. Let theorists allow time for the former growth to complete itself, and then to consolidate its results; then it will be ready for a new growth, and they may present their claim for a share in it. They can gain nothing by tearing down the old, and starting anew. This would only multiply the systematic wants of men, and thereby increase the number of speculators for the supply of them, and leave but little chance to the anarchist, who expected to make his fortune out of the ruins he had caused.

For the benefit of such authors, we quote a passage from Mr. George Field's *Analogical Philosophy*: "Authors have been more assiduous to controvert error than to promulgate truth, and have regarded it as no less essential to subvert the doctrines of others, than to establish their own; as if the object of philosophy were conquest, and not alliance. Yet, is the wisdom of such a course greater than would be his, who, in attempting to clear a fluid, should disturb its feculence? or his, who would endeavour to drive out darkness from an apartment, in order to admit the light? For truth, like light, shines by its own effulgence, and need but be shown to be acknowledged; and error is but the feculence of philosophy, which

will subside spontaneously, if left undisturbed, or if gently agitated only. This light and clearness of truth, all profess to be the great aim of philosophy; and truth in philosophy is naught but conformity to nature; add to which, that the philosopher need in general give himself little concern about erroneous opinions, since he may often discover truth in its purity with less labour than he can detach it from falsehood and error."

But it is not reverence for the past only, but in all its forms, that the author hates. And this seems to us very unreasonable, since he admits it to be a natural and almost universal tendency of the mind. He may hate the past, because it was there that germinated the seeds from which sprang all existing things; because there are the causes of existing institutions, there the struggles of our fathers for the liberty which we enjoy, and there originated the language that we speak, and the thoughts and principles with which we set out in life; and because he hates all these results. But how, with hopes for the future, he can abhor that reverence with which we look upward towards the infinite and the unknown, and admire and aspire after high intelligence, goodness, and excellence, and thereby make progress in spiritual life; this we are quite unable to comprehend. Even the boys at school must honour the heroes of the campus, or the playground, or the head of their class, if they are to come to anything. If their reverence does not rise so high, it will be apt to find its object in the courage of the leading rowdy of the school. The objects of our reverence change as we advance in intellectual and moral progress, always excepting that Highest Object which must ever be above our comprehension.

In this war waged by the author against loyalty, reverence, superstition, and religion, of course the clergy do not escape. He has devoted a very large portion of these volumes to them, and has discovered many offences committed by them against public order, individual liberty, morality, and science. And he often, or rather generally, makes these offences appear the more striking, by leaving out the main circumstances under which they took place. In a witness on the stand before a court and jury, this would be considered disingenuous; but the

author professes to simplify history by eliminating all complicating circumstances, and we accept that as an apology for the present.

We offer no apology for the clergy, except by suggesting some facts and principles, which he, as a philosophical investigator, ought not to have overlooked. It is especially against the bigotry and disorders of the Scotch clergy, during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and more particularly the seventeenth century, that he shows the greatest spite. But he omits to notice that, during all that period, the church was really part of the state, and that it shared in state functions; that offences against the order of the church were really civil offences, and punishable by law as such; and that the clergy, in being parties to religious persecutions, were truly obeying the law of the land as then understood, and acting according to the spirit of the age, which the author admits could not be resisted. He omits, moreover, the fact that during nearly the whole of the seventeenth century, the Scotch church, though still a part of the state, was the object of a most distressing and nearly destructive persecution by the kings of the house of Stuart, and thus its militant became much more prominent than its mere teaching character. The principles which he omits are, that it is the natural order of human affairs that, when any interest of society finds itself assailed by any other, and without any adequate guaranty or protection, it spontaneously organizes itself in reaction, and even in a militant form, to save itself from harm; that in proportion as the danger is great, this organization becomes more strict, suspicious, and ungenerous, and requires all to submit to great restraints upon their liberty; and that an organism which in this way becomes consolidated by the alarms and persecutions of almost a century, cannot at once relax itself without producing great social disorders.

He omits also to notice that in that day people were much less controlled by law than by the will of leaders; that their attachment was to their feudal and spiritual leaders rather than to any law or constitution; that when war was made on their religion, it was natural that their clergy should be recognized as leaders in the contest, and their advice as law; and

that thus the functions of strategy and politics became very naturally and almost inevitably united to the functions of religious instruction. If these facts and principles had been properly dealt with by the author, he would have written about the Scotch clergy in an entirely different spirit. When the civil department of the state became partisan, by assailing another large and essential interest of the people, or one which they felt to be essential, then a collision became inevitable, and under such circumstances even the church naturally becomes military and imperious, and of course falls into many acts of severity and oppression.

Our readers perceive, that according to the author, the great enemies of mankind are loyalty, superstition, protection, religion, and reverence, and their great supporters are the powerful classes, and particularly the clergy. These are the maladies—or rather reverence, which underlies them all, or ignorance, which underlies it, is the great social malady which he proposes to cure. And, strange as it may appear, scepticism, "the great principle of scepticism," "the necessary precursor of all inquiry," is the remedy which he proposes. "Till doubt begins, progress is impossible." "No other single fact has so extensively affected the different nations." "To it we owe the spirit of inquiry."

Strange that our natural spirit of inquiry should depend for its existence upon the doubts which its own errors suggest; that our natural faith in our intellectual power should be of less use to us than disbelief has been, and that we must begin to doubt before we have made any such progress as to have anything to doubt about! What vicious extremes a spirit of spite is sure to lead men into! With what contemptuous boastings it proclaims the victories it is about to achieve! With what blind and indiscriminating confidence and recklessness it attacks equally the strong and the weak points of its enemies! To have respect enough for enemies to make sure of understanding them, is as valuable in polemics as in war.

We have noticed that authors of much more caution and reflection than Mr. Buckle have spoken favourably of the scientific value of scepticism; but we cannot see that it can possibly be of any value. In its nature, it is a mere withhold-

ing of belief in any given opinion or system. It contributes not even hay or stubble to any of our scientific structures; and when it is studied and perverse, it treats with equal contempt the frail wigwams or clay huts of our savage life, and the more artistic and substantial mansions of the highest civilization; its delight is in weakening and destroying all human systems, and it has no constructive power. In one form it is a pitiable timidity and pusillanimity, that is ever hesitating to act, because it can come to no decided opinions; in another, it is an impudent effrontery, that rails continually at all the common opinions of society, and especially at all those which society regards as sacred, and has no opinions of its own, except that whatever others admit, it must doubt or deny. It is not philosophical or scientific caution, but the two vicious extremes of this; one fearful and the other reckless, both rejecting sufficient evidence, but one timidly rejecting it as insufficient for its own mind, and the other boldly rejecting it as insufficient for any mind; the former cowardly, hesitating, and unconstructive, and the latter impudent, dogmatizing, and destructive.

A watchful experience very early teaches us that our judgments are very liable to be erroneous, and that we ought to be cautious in investigating the evidence from which they arise; but this is rather faith than scepticism, for it admits we must form opinions. No one ever thinks of doubting until after his faith has given him a large stock of opinions, and he has discovered that some of them are erroneous, or in conflict with the opinions of other persons. But suppose that one should adopt scepticism as a principle of thought; how will he apply it? He cannot possibly reject all the opinions he has heretofore acquired or accepted, for they have become a part of the mind itself, and it must be rejected with them. He cannot arbitrarily choose to reject any one of the classes or systems that constitute his stock of knowledge or belief, for they, too, are parts of the mind. He may profess a rejection of them, but nature will assert their power when any necessity seems to call for them. He must discriminate before he can reject, and this requires evidence, and faith in evidence, before it can act, and is therefore not scepticism.

All natural doubting results simply from faith producing a

higher knowledge; we doubt, because evidence has produced another and incompatible belief; and therefore natural doubt is a mere accident of a growing faith, and is not itself a principle of the mind, though it may be cherished and cultivated until it becomes a chronic and diseased habit of mental action. We may suppose that our system of opinions on any given subject is complete, and yet a further advance in knowledge may reveal to us some hiatus in the system, or some incompatibility between it and our new acquisitions, and then it is faith that urges us to a higher knowledge, by which this incompatibility can be removed or corrected. The doubts thus raised are not scepticism, but the perception of logical contradictions, which the very nature of the mind cannot allow to stand together. Scepticism is naturally blind and indiscriminating, not knowing truth or error, and is a mere negation of knowledge; it is not it therefore that raises doubts or corrects errors. Faith alone is adequate to receive evidence, and present it to the understanding for its judgment, and the truth thus obtained is the sole power by which erroneous opinions and systems are to be expelled or modified.

But the space which we have already occupied warns us that we must bring our remarks to a speedy close. We had intended to notice with some detail the author's numerous blunders in relation to the inductive and deductive methods of philosophizing; but we must be brief; he does not understand either of them. He did not need to tell us that he intended to follow the inductive method in writing a history of civilization; for in such an undertaking he could use no other. But he not only does tell his purpose, but boasts of it as something peculiar. He is continually making an ostentation of his method as if he had some peculiar skill in the management of it, though he often unconsciously turns it upside down. He brandishes his instrument with a display that must be truly imposing to inexperienced workmen, and yet with an awkwardness that is quite ludicrous to those who have read the *Novum Organum*, or the *Novum Organum Renovatum*. As he calls the methods of mental philosophy and of history "the direct opposite" of each other, because one studies one, and the other

many minds, it would seem very proper to call them by new names—singular and plural methods.

The obtrusive ostentation and confidence with which he pronounces Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Hume, Reid, Ferguson, Leslie, Hutton, and other Scottish authors, to be deductive in their method, when, so far as we recollect, not one of them is so, is really amusing. In treating the subjects which they had in hand, it was impossible for them to be so, and if our author had understood either method he would have known this to be so. He endeavours to prove that Hutcheson's method is deductive from his own language in his complaint against those who "would reduce all our perceptive powers to a very small number, by one artful refinement or another," though this proves nothing of the sort; and if he continued Hutcheson's sentence, which adds, that such persons "depart exceedingly from nature in their accounts of those determinations about honour and shame, which are acknowledged to appear universally among men;" others would have seen, if he could not, that Hutcheson was using no other than the inductive method. We quote from *Moral Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 79, 1st ed.

Though he acknowledges that Reid professed the inductive method, and thought he was following it in all his investigations; yet he pronounces Reid's method deductive throughout, and he attempts to prove it by several extracts, all of like tenor, one sample of which will suffice: "All knowledge got by reasoning must be built upon first principles." But the extracts themselves show that Reid is speaking of knowledge got by deductive or syllogistic reasoning, as distinguished from that got by observation and generalization according to the inductive method, and any person may see this more clearly by referring to his *Essay* vii., p. 671, 1st ed.

But with an apology to our readers for this long discussion we must stop. Can any one wonder at the abounding and gross errors of an author who so badly comprehends the very method which he professes to pursue, and which is the true method of historical philosophy, and especially of a young author who treats with a patronizing air nearly all his celebrated predecessors in the same fields of inquiry?

ART. IV.—*The War and National Wealth.*

THE opposite extremes of financial opinion in regard to the war, and the vast importance of the subject in every point of view, call for a discussion of it in the light of first principles. This will show whether the war is running us into the vortex of national bankruptcy, as some maintain, or whether it is productive of unequalled national prosperity, and warrants an unprecedented profusion of private expenditure, as others appear, both by words and actions, to believe. We think it easy to show the fallacy of both these extremes of opinion, and that the nation is able to furnish the means to carry on the war, and discharge all the obligations incurred by it, both interest and principal; while, at the same time, it cannot afford an unusual extravagance, or even its ordinary freedom of expenditure in living. Quite the contrary. The only condition on which the people can sustain themselves, or the government, together with the great institutions of religion, education, and charity, through the war, if long continued, is by a stringent and thorough economy, quite beyond any standard which has of late years been necessary. Thus they can, and, when they see its necessity, undoubtedly will do.

It is undeniable, that all war, in proportion to its magnitude and continuance, consumes the treasure and resources of the nation waging it. And, besides the cost of sustaining it, it works incalculable havoc and devastation on the territory occupied by the contending armies. From both these causes, the South has been utterly impoverished by the present war. It has given every sign of financial exhaustion. The country is stripped of all but the barest necessities of life, and these in such stinted supply, that a large part of the people are on short allowance. The energy with which they protract the contest, is simply the energy of desperation, which, urging them to the sacrifice of the last man and the last dollar, cannot replenish their armies and military stores, after the complete exhaustion now apparently impending.

It is equally certain, that the war, by its magnitude and duration, has been an immense drain on the resources of the United States, though as yet quite within our ability to bear. At the same time, the draught upon our industrial agents and products has been, and still is, and, while the war continues on such a gigantic scale, must be prodigious. For three years an average of probably six hundred thousand men have been in the military service of the government. Including losses in battle and by sickness, it is probable that not less than ten or twelve hundred thousand men have been called from the productive occupations of industry to serve in the army, or in the various civil offices arising out of the war. These have been withdrawn from the population of the loyal states, which amounts in round numbers to twenty millions. Making due consideration of losses in battle, by camp and other diseases incident to military life, by wounds which permanently maim or disable, as compared with the losses which would have occurred in times of peace, and it cannot be questioned that a virtual yearly average of seven hundred thousand able-bodied men has been withdrawn from peaceful occupations to the war. They are at the period of life most robust and capable of efficient labour. We cannot compute, with accuracy, the precise proportion which such a number bears to the entire productive force, or number of labourers in all the spheres of industry—agricultural, mechanical, mercantile, and professional—with reference to statistical tables beyond our reach. But taking into view the number of women, children, aged, and infirm, who must be counted out, and it will probably be a liberal estimate, if we reckon the whole amount of productive labour in the loyal states, as equal to that which could be performed by five millions of able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty-five. Each one can satisfy himself in regard to the justness of this estimate, by looking over the sphere of his own acquaintance. If the foregoing estimates are approximately correct, the army absorbs one-seventh of our productive force. We say nothing as to its being provided with food and raiment by the residue; for the same men would require to be fed and clothed out of the products of the industry of the country in time of peace. So far as, from various causes, their support costs more at the seat of

war than at home, this is so much further drain upon the resources of the country.

But, besides the men who constitute the *personel* of our armies, and the increased outlay for their support, a very large proportion of the productive force remaining behind is occupied in preparing the arms, equipments, and munitions of war, or in building and furnishing our great iron navy. If we take into view the immense amount of coal, iron, lead, lumber, horses, forage, required for these purposes, the vast numbers engaged in manufacturing and adapting them for use, we shall find another large draught upon our industry and its products, together with an explanation of the scarcity and dearness of many of these commodities. It is of necessity a conjecture, but far from an extravagant one, we think, that all this, added to the one-seventh of our able-bodied productive force in the army, would increase it to one-fourth—*i. e.*, in round numbers, the war is consuming one-fourth of the annual production of the loyal states. This estimate, if not rigidly accurate, is sufficiently so for practical purposes.

Another process conducted on the footing of figures which we have at hand, leads to results surprisingly similar, *i. e.*, by comparing the value of the annual produce of the country, in all the branches of industry, with the national debt, added to the taxes, caused by the war. We give below the national debt, semi-officially published as we are penning this page.* It appears thus, that the public debt of the United States, contracted during the war, is, in round numbers, \$1,700,000,000. If we add to this what is now maturing, and matured, but not

* The following is a statement of the amount of the public debt of the United States on the 10th of May, 1864:

Debt bearing interest in coin.	Principal.	Interest.
4 per cent. Temporary Loan,	\$4,450 00	\$178 00
5½ per cent. Old Public Debt,	66,429,812 55	3,664,689 69
5 per cent.—5 per cent. 10-40 Bonds,	44,608,100 00	2,230,305 00
6 per cent.—6 per cent. 5-20 Bonds	510,780,450 00	30,646,827 00
6 per cent. 20-year Loan of 1861,	50,000,000 00	3,000,000 00
6 per cent. 20-year Bonds exchanged,	8,857,500 00	231,450 00
6 per cent. Oregon War Debt,	1,016,000 00	60,960 00
7 3-10 per cent.—3 years 7.30,	136,141,850 00	9,638,355 05
Total,	\$812,836,162 55	\$49,472,714 74

officially ascertained and certified, it will be safe to estimate our public debt on the 1st of July, 1864, due in fact, if not in form, at \$2,000,000,000. And it will be safe to assume that, as our expenditures are now on a scale vaster than heretofore, something like \$800,000,000 of this has accrued during the present fiscal year. If we add to this the means furnished by the United States tax and excise laws; the debts incurred by states, counties, towns, and cities, in enlisting, equipping, and sustaining soldiers; the donations and contributions of every sort from private liberality, and through the Sanitary and Christian Commissions, the cost of the war for the present year can scarcely be less than \$1,000,000,000. How close an approximation to this the outlay of each of the two previous years was, cannot be precisely known; but we doubt whether the war can be maintained on its present scale at a less average annual cost than this. Now we find the total product of the free states for the year 1859 estimated at \$4,150,000,000. Our authority is that distinguished statist and financier, the Hon. Robert J. Walker. His computations are founded on the census tables, and appear in the *Continental Monthly* for May,

Debt bearing interest in lawful money.	Principal.	Interest.
4 per cent.—4 per cent. Temporary Loan,	\$724,292 22	\$43,457 53
5 per cent.—5 per cent. Temporary Loan,	33,813,755 61	1,655,687 71
5 per cent.—1 year Treasury Notes,	48,000,000 00	2,580,000 00
5 per cent.—2 years' Treasury Notes,	180,894,887 40	9,044,744 37
6 per cent. Certificates of Indebtedness,	146,259,000 00	8,775,540 00
Total,	\$404,191,935 13	\$22,109,429 67
Debt bearing no interest.		
United States Notes,	\$441,254,290 12	
Fractional Currency,	20,547,173 85	
Treasury Notes, part due,	77,850 00	
Requisitions,	47,341,000 00	
Total,	\$509,220,313 97	

RECAPITULATION.

Debt bearing interest in coin,	Principal.	Interest.
Debt bearing interest in lawful money,	\$812,836,162 55	\$49,472,714 74
Debt bearing no interest,	404,191,935 13	22,109,429 67
Total,	\$1,726,248,411 75	\$71,582,144 41

Washington, Friday, May 13, 1864.

1864. Supposing the war then to cost the nation about \$1,000,000,000 annually, and we arrive at the result that it consumes one-quarter of the annual product of our industry. It is true that the loyal slave states add some three hundred million to this annual produce; but the ravages of war on their territory have more than balanced the account, and caused, either by arresting industrial pursuits, or destroying and pillaging their fruits, a diminution of at least one-fourth their annual product—probably much more.

These estimates are confirmed by another class of facts—we mean the comparative scarcity and dearness of all the products of industry. The inflation of the currency accounts only in part for the vast increase of the price of the necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of life. Our opulent classes, and those who have profited largely by the war, including fortunate contractors and speculators, have not generally curtailed their expenditures or their luxuries. Many who have become suddenly rich, have outrun all precedent in voluptuous self-indulgence, vulgar extravagance, and ostentatious expenditure. But the great mass of the people are obliged to procure and consume fewer articles of comfort and luxury, to spend less in constructing and repairing buildings, improvements upon their houses and furniture, their means of culture, refinement, social enjoyment, and harmful self-indulgence, than formerly. The most numerous class of our own or any people, consists of labourers, skilled and unskilled. Now, greatly as their wages have been increased, they have not been advanced at all in proportion to the increased cost of the articles which this class have been accustomed to consume, whether articles of necessity or comfort. If we pass to the farmer, the advanced price of his products is little beyond the increased price he pays for labour and the increase of his direct and indirect taxes. It does not at all approach the increased cost of tea, coffee, and sugar, of imported fabrics, cotton goods—nearly everything he desires to purchase. The result is, that large numbers who once used them freely, now stint their use of some, and have altogether dropped the use of others—of these so recently ranked among the universal necessities, or at least necessary comforts of life. All have now, without stint, whatever is absolutely necessary to

support life. But the use of these comforts, (tea, coffee, sugar, &c.,) hitherto ranked among the ordinary necessaries of life, is greatly abridged. The great body of the people are earnestly inquiring, not as formerly, what they can have, but what they can do without. But they can bear to task their ingenuity still further in this direction without injury. A vast margin of imaginary wants will yet bear to be pared down, and this without cutting to the quick. But of this, more hereafter. Our present object is to show the inroad which the war makes upon the wealth of the nation, or the products of its industry.

But we are told that the country never exhibited so many evidences of the rapid increase of wealth; that bankers, merchants, manufacturers—the great centres of exchange, trade, and finance—have never grown rich so fast as within the past two years. To which we reply, that temporary phenomena of this sort may arise as well from the impoverishment as from the augmentation of the wealth of the country. This is easily evinced. Suppose that a scarcity of the articles of subsistence, comfort, or luxury in a country be induced by any cause—earthquake, tornado, pestilence, failure of crops, the devastation of war—what is the necessary effect? Prices inevitably rise in consequence of this very destruction or diminution of property. Consequently all dealers in such articles, who have any quantity of them in possession, receive the large profits arising from the rapid rise of the commodities in their possession, and of trading in a rising market. This benefit will accrue to all of every class of producers and dealers, in proportion to the amounts of goods they have on hand, and the period and extent of the business they can do, at rising prices. The impoverishment of the country then may for a time increase the profits of merchants and manufacturers enormously, by enabling them to exact prodigious profits from their customers; in other words, to levy large contributions upon all consumers, for their own aggrandizement. The few are enriched by taxing the many. Extraordinary prosperity, therefore, *for a time*, among traders or manufacturers, so far from proving an increase of national wealth, *may* flow from its diminution. The secret is, *rise of prices*, which always favours sellers of the articles so advanced in price. Whatever causes prices to rise, there-

fore, stimulates for a time speculative and commercial prosperity.

This result often arises from other causes than actual scarcity—especially of domestic productions. In time of war or civil convulsion, several of these causes are apt to concur. Thus prices may be advanced by an increase of duties and imposts. If this be confined to imported goods, it affects only them and such domestic products as enter into competition with them. But none the less it enriches those dealers who bought the goods at the prices ruling before the duties were laid. But, as in the former instance, they are enriched by contributions or increased prices paid by all consumers of the articles. The same principle applies also to excise duties on domestic manufactures. Those who owned the kind of articles so taxed, at such a time that, without being burthened with the tax, they experienced the benefit of the advance in price occasioned by it, of course, profit to that extent. But, after the prices become adjusted to the increased imposts laid upon products, whether foreign or domestic, then the advance is simply a contribution by all consumers to the government. All duties, imposts, taxes, or domestic loans, are simply contributions to that amount of the substance, the earnings, the products, the wealth of the people, to the government and the support of the war. They draw so much upon the resources of the nation.

Another obvious cause of the enhancement of prices, and its consequent effects, for the time, in stimulating trade and speculation to a preternatural activity and prosperity, is found in the expansion and dilution of the currency. The substitution of paper for the precious metals, as a legal tender, of course renders money abundant and cheap, in proportion to its excess beyond what would be in use, if it were kept to a specie basis. So far as it is thus diluted, it falls below the standard of gold-value, and the prices of all things sooner or later rise proportionably. Other subtle and mighty effects of this substitution of paper for gold, as a legal tender, we shall have occasion soon to trace. We are now looking at it as a means of enhancing prices, and consequently, of promoting mercantile and speculative prosperity, while confessedly it adds nothing whatever to the real wealth of the country. Mere engraved bits of paper

are certainly not in themselves any addition to the national resources. But, by enhancing prices, they may enable merchants, and all having stocks of goods on hand, to thrive, by levying a contribution upon all consumers. Of course, when the inflation has reached its maximum, and become stable, then the enhancement of prices from this cause is arrested. The speculative prosperity consequent upon it is also arrested. If merchants sell at high rates, they are obliged to purchase at high rates, and so the account is balanced.

In reality, however, it is impossible to measure the whole effect of the substitution of an irredeemable for a redeemable paper currency, by the mere amount of what is in circulation as money, or by its excess above what would be in circulation, were it redeemable. As we have shown in a former article, on "Money, and Credit as its Substitute,"* bills of circulation, whether of banks or the government, are but a form of credit used as a substitute for money; and they are but one form of credit so used. Checks, bills of exchange, inland and foreign, and all forms of indebtedness, within certain limits, are substitutes for money, and, so far as they possess and exert purchasing power, have the same effect as an increased plentifullness of money, exerting the same purchasing power, would have in inflating prices. Now it cannot be denied, that it is easier to expand credit as a substitute for money in its various forms, on the basis of an irredeemable than a redeemable paper currency, in which the whole is constantly subjected to the strain of contraction to the gold standard. That this has operated so, in our present circumstances, with regard to easing and enlarging credits for stock speculation and gambling, cannot be denied. That it has also given an unprecedented harvest to stock speculators and gamblers, is also past all doubt. But while it has thus inflated stocks, and lifted up the most reckless speculators, it may be questioned whether its influence in other spheres is not less than in normal times. The payments for which no form of checks or other sorts of credit, nothing short of what is legal money will serve, are vastly more numerous than in ordinary times. Of this sort are all the payments to soldiers.

* See number for April, 1862, Art. VI.

Since, too, we have a national currency, it is now often used for travelling, and distant remittances, where drafts were formerly employed. But still further, the ordinary business of the country, which was formerly done on long credits, is now done exclusively for cash, or on short credits, virtually equivalent to money. There is no doubt, however, that the substitution of an irredeemable for a redeemable currency, and the facilities it affords for the expansion of credit, have had a principal agency in enhancing prices, and, during the rise, the prosperity of sound traders and speculators, without in itself adding a dollar to the real wealth of the country.* Other bearings of our present paper-money system on the economics of the war, will soon be considered.

A fourth cause of the unexampled prosperity of certain producing or mercantile interests, is the immense consumption by the government, in the war, of the articles they are engaged in producing. This applies to the whole round of government and army contracts, on which such numbers have suddenly grown rich. Of course, this immense demand for the army has put prices and profits very much under the control of those able to supply it. It has proportionably advanced the cost to all consumers of like articles in the country. This applies with especial force to whatever articles are more largely consumed or wasted by the army, than would be if its soldiers were occupied with peaceful pursuits; and, therefore, in its degree, to nearly all the articles used in our army. But it applies particularly to coal and iron, of both which, in naval and land operations—in iron ships, the munitions of war, in the movement of our navy and the army by steam—the consumption is immense. One great steamship will consume as much coal in a year as a considerable town. The effect is

* It is impossible, however, to determine how far this cause alone is responsible for advanced prices, when viewed aside of other causes, and the influence of speculation in intensifying them. In one sense, the premium on gold is the measure of the excess of the currency; but it must be remembered that gold, and all articles of import and export, and of immediate consumption, are matters of commercial speculation, and have their prices affected by it. If we take lands, buildings, and improved real estate, which is outside of commerce, prices have not sensibly advanced through the country as a whole, beyond the standard of 1859.

to advance prices prodigiously, on the ground of a substantial scarcity, because the vast amount consumed by government reduces the proportion left for the use of the people to the neighbourhood of actual scarcity. All this is known and felt to the quick by the great mass of the people, in regard to those articles of prime necessity, iron and fuel, which are types of a numerous class of things. Of course iron and coal companies thrive on what stints supplies to the people, beyond all former example. But it can hardly be pretended that the nation is enriched in this way, however individuals or corporations may be, at the nation's expense. Many railroads have been made temporarily more profitable by the immense amount of government business done upon them; but the nation pays it, thus reducing its own resources to that extent. In regard to many objects, the whole or a number of the foregoing causes act in combination to enhance prices, and produce the consequent effects.

We will, before leaving this branch of our subject, briefly advert to two other causes of an advance in prices, and the consequent stimulus to trading and commercial prosperity, at the expense of the people generally. The first of these is the blight upon the crop of Indian corn in the West, through the untimely frosts of last year, together with the great injury done to the crop of cereals and hay, by the excessive rains which prevailed through the harvest. This has not operated to raise the price of wheat, as it would in ordinary years, on account of the bountiful grain crops of Europe, which diminished the export demand. This apparent advantage, however, has more than a counterpoise in the fact, that the diminution of exports of the produce of the country leaves so much more of our foreign indebtedness to be liquidated in gold; this increases the demand for gold, and raises its price, and with it, the price of everything imported, and, sooner or later, of every domestic commodity. But the comparative failure of the maize crop not only serves to increase the scarcity and thus the price of the article itself, but the price of whatever is produced from it or substituted for it, such as animals, meats, alcohol, oats, hay, &c., *i. e.*, all these articles become scarcer,

but it will hardly be claimed that the country thereby is made richer. Quite the reverse.

The other cause of enhanced prices to which we refer, is a general rise in the markets of the world in the price of many, if not most, of our chief imports. This we are assured by eminent importers is the case. Indeed, no other hypothesis would be consistent with facts. The premium on gold and the increase of duties will explain the doubling of prices; but it will not account for their being threefold and fourfold what they were, as in the case of coffee and cotton goods. Now this rise in prices may enrich merchants who had large stocks of such articles purchased before the rise, but it is at the expense of consumers. It will hardly be claimed that an advance in what we pay foreigners for goods purchased of them, enriches the country. How far this addition to the prices of foreign commodities and fabrics extends precisely, we are unable to say; and we cannot tell how far it may be due directly and indirectly to our war; but in some cases the connection is very obvious and direct. The destruction of the cotton crop in this country of course advances the price of this article, and all fabrics made of it, or that are substituted for it, and in greater demand, in consequence of its scarcity, in all the markets of the world. It thus directly and indirectly advances the prices of nearly every species of dry-goods. Not only so, but, by greatly increasing the profits of cotton-planting, it may tempt planters in warm and tropical climates to abandon the culture of coffee, fruits, sugar, &c., in order to reap these profits. Analogous effects, in their measure, may proceed from the loss of the export crop of tobacco, rice, and sugar from the South. It is not improbable, moreover, that the increased production of the precious metals in the world may have some influence in rendering money plenty and cheap, and other things proportionally dear. This is, of course, independent of the war. It implies no decrease of the actual wealth of the world, and as our own is a gold-producing country, yields us its share not only of advanced prices, but of compensatory means to meet them. So far, however, as the stock of bullion or coin, which we were wont to employ as money, has been displaced by legal-tenders, and sent to swell

the accumulation of gold, and increase its abundance in the markets of the world, so far it has promoted expansion of prices. This is due to the war; but the effect is slight, probably too much so to be sensibly appreciated.

We have thus far shown that the war is an immense drain upon the industrial resources and products of the nation—consuming at least one-fourth of its annual product. Probably we have estimated rather under than over the reality. We have shown that the temporary prosperity of commercial and financial centres is entirely consistent with this view. We now proceed to show the sources from whence the nation has been able to provide means, to be consumed in the war, equal to one-fourth or one-third of the annual produce of its industry.

1. It has the normal profits of its industry, or the average annual excess of its gains over its expenditures, as a perennial fund upon which to draw. The amount of this cannot be reached with exactness. But the prodigiously rapid increase of the national wealth, coupled with the lavish habits of expenditure among the people, show that the ratio of annual profits beyond these expenses must be very great. Now whatever the ordinary annual increase of wealth is, might be consumed in the war, and still leave the nation as rich as before. The Hon. Robert J. Walker, in the article before alluded to, estimates "the total value of all the property, real and personal, in the free states, in 1860, at \$10,852,081,081, and the annual gross profits of capital thirty-nine per cent. This gives, in round numbers, over \$4,000,000,000 as the annual gross profit." We suppose that by "gross profit," must be meant the value of the products of the nation before the expenses of living, including all outlays of the people which enter into the consumption of that year, and leave no valuable product behind them, are deducted. This would make the gross annual product equal to about \$200 for each man, woman, and child, from which their support is to come first, and their savings next. It is to be considered, that the dollars here in question are gold dollars. Now it is undoubtedly true that great numbers spend on a vastly larger scale than this. But if we look at the cost of living to labourers and artisans, and their families, who constitute the great majority of our people, it will, of course,

fall far below this sum. How, striking the balance, the average cost of living for our people would turn out to be, we have no data for determining. But that a wide margin is thus afforded for the increase of national wealth, and for sparing the surplus in an emergency, without diminishing our previous stock, or our style of living, is undeniable. And if we look at the amount of the gross annual earnings or profits of the nation, is there the shadow of a doubt of its perfect ability to pay with ease the interest, and accumulate a sufficient sinking fund for a few thousand millions of national debt?

2. The previously accumulated wealth of the nation constitutes a vast fund on which it can draw, and has drawn for the support of the war. One obvious item of this is the coin, which being the only legal money of the country, was stored and hoarded to the amount of two or three hundred millions. By the substitution of legal-tender United States notes in its place, this amount is liberated to add to our other means of purchasing what the army or the people need, in the markets of the world. Another item is found in the articles and commodities ready for use, whether agricultural or manufactured, foreign or domestic, in the possession of the country, when the war commenced. This was immense, and has been undergoing a constant reduction until now. Compare the stocks of sugars, teas, coffee, the whole range of groceries, fruits, drugs, dry goods, and other articles of use, comfort, or luxury, imported from abroad, and then in the country, with the amounts of similar articles now on hand, and the truth of what we say will be evident. Compare, too, the amount of domestic produce in the form of food and provisions, or the amount of manufactured goods, whether for clothing, furniture, ornament, implements of utility and convenience, instruments of labour for rendering industry effective, and we shall find the stock of these things greatly reduced. We have been sustaining the war in part by an incessant drain upon these accumulations. The difference is, that their production was ahead of consumption and stocks accumulated. Now production scarcely keeps pace with consumption, and useful commodities are needed and procured by the consumer before they have a chance to accumulate.

Besides this circulative wealth, or capital, which is directly

available for use, and the support of labour, in our own country, and, if in excess, by exchanging it for needful foreign commodities, there is, thirdly, what may be called the fixed capital of the country, which has been made largely tributary to the war. By fixed capital we mean products of labour which, whether in legal technicality ranked as real estate or not, are substantially fixed to the soil, and incapable of transportation, or of being made articles of commerce without partial or complete destruction of value. Of this sort are all buildings, and machinery or instruments of production virtually inseparable from such buildings, manufactories, stores, roads, canals, and railways, mines, all outlays and improvements in farms fitted to increase or preserve their products, or to facilitate their transportation to the points of consumption or distribution. Now this sort of wealth is of two kinds, one of which aids the nation in sustaining itself and sustaining the army; the other belongs to the department of luxury, elegance, refinement, but no way helps the nation to sustain itself or the war: *e. g.* all that immense amount of fixed improvements which consists in magnificent mansions and palaces, elegant grounds, &c. This sort of wealth cannot be drawn upon to support the war or the nation. It is rather a tax on the industry of the people to preserve it from decay or deterioration. More or less of the circulative personal property of the country is of this description, such as splendid ornaments, equipage, furniture, &c. But there is this difference between such luxurious circulative and fixed capital. The former is moveable, and, if new, may be made an article of commerce in exchange for really necessary goods. Or in extremity, many of them may be made to do service in supporting life, health, and strength, or the war instead of luxury; *e. g.*, many horses which were a while ago kept for luxurious riding, are now employed in the army, or other needful service. In the South, even the carpets have been turned into blankets for the soldiers. Now this fixed capital which helps to support the nation, consists either of houses for the shelter, comfort, and health of the people, or of *means of production*, in the shape of agricultural improvements, factories, storehouses, fixed machinery, &c., as above enumerated.

It consists not in products finished and ready for the support of the nation or army, but in the instruments and potentialities for making and multiplying such products. All the buildings and machinery for manufacture, for mining, the railways, the accumulated fertility of the soil, the fences, buildings, and other improvements for turning that fertility to account, constitute a large part of the accumulated national wealth which has been drawn upon during the war. The amount of contribution from this source is, in its very nature, impossible to be estimated; it can be even guessed only approximately. On the one side, we have to look at the extent to which this sort of property has been suffered to decay, wear out, or otherwise become exhausted without renovation; on the other, the amount of improvements and additions to such capital, factories, railways, farm culture and fixtures, which would have been made in three years of peace by the vast body of men now occupied by the war. We can only thus suggest this fund of accumulated wealth which has contributed, and still contributes, to support the war and the nation.

A third source of means to sustain the war is economy, or diminished private expenditure. We are aware that it is said that prosperity was never so great, and extravagance of expenditure never so rife as now. But as we have shown in regard to prosperity, so in regard to extravagance, the remark is true only in certain quarters, and to a limited extent. If meant to be of wide and general application, it is founded on a narrow and superficial view of things. The unwonted extravagance prevails in quarters where the unwonted prosperity prevails, which stimulates it. But the great mass of the people find themselves under the absolute necessity of curtailing their expenditures, of lessening the comforts and luxuries they have been accustomed to enjoy. This, with vast numbers, extends to the quality of food and raiment. But it reaches still more widely to furniture and equipage—especially of an expensive kind. The quantity of these and like things procured for use during the last three years, is immensely less than in any previous three years among the great mass of the people. These strain a point to make their existing supplies of such things answer for the present, and

inquire, not so much what they can have, as what they can do without. This is seen preëminently in the few costly edifices built during the last three years, as compared with any preceding three of the last decade.

All this is entirely consistent with another fact, *i. e.*, that the latter portion of the second and the first part of the third years of the war were characterized by great activity and prosperity in these branches of trade. But the secret is, that to a considerable extent, in these things, the purchases for three years were largely made in one. During the first year of the war, financial timidity and uncertainty prevailed, thus producing an entire stagnation of trade in costly furniture, equipage, and ornaments. After this state of suspense, and the abundance of money following the substitution of paper for specie, the harvest for jewellers, cabinet-makers, etc., came. But now that two dollars will purchase little more of these things than could formerly be procured with one, the tide must ebb again, and the great body of the people will postpone purchases of what is not absolutely indispensable, to a more convenient season. There is a wide margin yet for such economy and retrenchment; and every dollar so saved is so much really added to the ability of the country to maintain the war with continued and unabated vigour; and every dollar that can be so saved is needed for the purpose.

A fourth resource for meeting the unparalleled drain upon our resources, has been the increased efficiency of industry, through improved implements, machinery, and more skilful management and organization. It is impossible even to conjecture the probable extent of this. The present state of things, with its extraordinary demand for the products of industry, stimulates that industry, and the fertility of inventions to render it effective. It would probably be impossible to cultivate and harvest the great crops of the country now, without those machines and utensils which enable animals so largely, rapidly, and economically, to do the work of man.* In manufactures, the unconscious forces of nature are har-

* The public journals state, that if an average crop is harvested the present year in the West, it must be done largely by the labour of females.

nessed on an ever-widening scale, and with continually increasing ingenuity and efficiency, to do the work of man. The extent to which the use of labour-saving inventions has increased during the last few years, we have no means of ascertaining; but it may be added, that there are fewer drones and idlers than ever before. All who can labour are utilized—stimulated to exertion by high prices and dire necessity—and it is, economically considered, some offset for the great drain of men to the war, that it has drawn into itself not only the industrious, but many of the indolent and vicious, who burdened society more than they helped it.

Having pointed out the sources of national wealth which have hitherto sustained the war, we will now inquire how the government has been able to command it.

The first and most obvious resource is taxes and imposts. These have hitherto defrayed but a small part of the expense of the war. They have covered the ordinary expenses of government, the interest on the public debt, and somewhat—we know not how much—of the cost of the war. They are now about to be laid on a scale that will, it is hoped, yield some \$400,000,000 annually, and discharge not only ordinary governmental expenses, but the interest on the public debt, and a large fraction of current war expenditures. If continued on the return of peace, they would form a sinking fund which would rapidly discharge the public debt. We have only one criticism to make upon the mode of taxation. It is so framed as to bear with prodigious severity on all salaried and other men of fixed money incomes, not in gold, but in legal-tender. Taxes in all other forms, on articles of consumption, take hold of this class in their full force. The three per cent. income tax upon all annual incomes above \$600, added to all this, was sufficiently severe, at the outset, upon all whose salaries and incomes were not above \$3000, since, within this figure, they are pretty severely adjusted to the necessary expenses of the position of those who receive them. But now, when \$1000 is worth scarcely more than \$600 was when the tax was originally laid, and when all other taxes are largely increased, it is to be increased to five per cent. This must cut severely, and often to the quick, into the means of support of a multitude of

families, of widows, orphans, professors, and ministers of the gospel.

The second principal resource of the government for commanding the means of the people, is loans—temporary and permanent, direct and indirect. Of this, \$460,000,000 is in the form of circulating notes and fractional currency, which are lawful money, bearing no interest, and the legal substitute for coin in discharging all debts, and redeeming whatever other issues or credits may pass current as money. Something over \$200,000,000, in addition, are legal-tender notes, running one and two years, and bearing five per cent. interest in currency. These in reality serve to swell the volume of government paper money. For although holders will incline to keep, instead of circulating them, if convenient, on account of the interest, yet they go to form that reserve fund of ready money so indispensable to banks and individuals. If they require to be paid out, they are good as money at all times for the face of their principal; and if they can be kept for six months, they draw their semi-annual interest. They naturally, therefore, fall into the reserved funds before spoken of, and thus liberate from this predicament, for current circulation, an equal amount of the other species of legal-tenders. We have thus between six and seven hundred millions of government paper money, which is an indirect loan from the people, most of it without interest, and the residue at a very low rate of interest. As this has far more to do with the financial phenomena of the country, and the ability of the government to command the resources of the people, than the simple amount itself involved, we will endeavour to trace its operation somewhat more in detail.

1. It is hardly necessary to reiterate, that mere engraved pieces of paper are not in themselves wealth, and cannot make any addition to the resources of a nation. They may fill the place of money, and pass as money, but they are not money proper. But, inasmuch as they may take the place, and discharge functions of money as a circulating medium and legal tender, as between ourselves, though not as between us and foreign nations, they may and do produce prodigious effects on the production and distribution of wealth, and in rendering it accessible to the government. These effects vary with circum-

stances. They are far different in the incipient stages, and with the moderate expansion of an exclusive paper-currency, from what they are in its later stages, and under its reckless dilution.

2. In the present case, the emission of paper money by the government, when it began, obviously raised the credit of the government, by giving assurance of payment to its creditors. Thus it stimulated activity in producing the supplies needed for the government, and so infused confidence and activity into every branch of industry. The rise of prices, too, due to this and other causes, by which, for a time, the increase of the market value of products was more rapid than the increase of the cost of their production, likewise greatly stimulated production, turning the North into a vast work-shop and laboratory, and bringing its vast accumulation of materials and means of production into active and profitable requisition. It is well known, that prior to the issue of this paper-money, the suspension of specie payments, and the gloomy war prospects, had seriously embarrassed the government, impaired its credit, and rendered it impossible to negotiate loans. The finances of the government were in a dead-lock. This threatened to arrest the production of supplies to the government. If capitalists feared to trust money to the government, others feared to trust commodities. Thus these industries, and others implicated with them, or dependent upon them, were in danger of coming to a pause.

3. Not only did it warm productive industry into fresh life; it also liquefied the capital of the country, so that it would flow freely into the national treasury. The abundance of money rendered it easy to convert all kinds of property into money, to sell other securities at high rates, and invest in government stocks. It has also led to the extensive discharge of mortgages and other forms of private indebtedness, leaving the lenders no resource for investment but United States securities. Another result of the plentifullness of money, aided by the uncertainty and distrust induced by the national convulsions, is, that very little credit is given in sound, ordinary mercantile business. Business is done mostly for cash. Borrowing is resorted to largely for speculation, especially stock-gambling. Hence the

banks, and other lenders, have been perplexed to find any sound borrower but the government. A large part of the capital of banks, insurance, savings, and other like companies, and indeed of the productive funds of most public institutions, has been invested in United States securities. Men are putting their savings, accumulations, and unproductive funds in these securities, as the only sound ones to be had at less than exorbitant prices. Thus, while private debts are so largely cancelled, government becomes the great debtor. The nation is indebted to its own members—the whole people to such individuals as have lent them their savings, secured by a lien on all the property and future earnings of the whole. Amid all the evils incident to a great national debt, there is one, indeed there are many, compensating benefits. But that to which we especially refer, is the wide-spread interest which it must beget, to preserve the integrity and stability of the government. We have heard gentlemen of Southern origin and proclivities say, that had there been a large national debt, extensively owned among the people of the South, the present rebellion would not have been organized. We believe this to be true. The immense national debt of Great Britain, onerous as it is, yet being due chiefly to her own citizens, is a mighty bond of national stability and perpetuity. Another advantage is, that it is a great stimulus to public economy, and a check to corrupt expenditure on the part of the national legislature and executive.

4. The effects of paper money on the distribution of property are curious. What under a normal currency is deemed the most secure and solid form of productive property, bond and mortgage, becomes not only largely liquefied, but evaporated, under this magic influence. The income is shrunk to the full extent of the premium on gold. But this is not the worst. They are sure to be paid unless put at a low rate of interest. The only alternative is either government stocks, or other securities at an enormous price. On the other hand, fancy stocks of mere nominal, fluctuating, speculative, capricious value, become suddenly elevated to the very summit—and often bear enormous premiums. A vast quantity of railroad securities have gone through this metamorphosis, and raised their holders to sudden and unexpected wealth. So universally, the rise in

prices of all commodities, as we have before remarked, goes to make the owners of them richer, and the buyers so far forth poorer. It also obviously favours debtors whose obligations were contracted when money was at its normal value, at the expense of their creditors, who are compelled to accept payment in a depreciated currency. Thus vast amounts of indebtedness have been liquidated.

Closely connected with this facility of raising money and paying debts, is the remarkable fact that church-debts have been liquidated during the last two years to an unprecedented extent. Indeed, there are comparatively few churches in debt that have not been relieved of these depressing, often crushing and fatal burthens. In connection also with the spirit of self-sacrificing beneficence, which has been developed, on a scale the most stupendous and unparalleled, during the war, more has been done for the endowment of literary, religious, and charitable institutions, than during any equal period in the nation's history. This is explained by the fact that some of these institutions were so shaken by the war, in their finances, that their friends were thoroughly convinced of the imperious and overbearing necessity of coming to their rescue, and straining a point to ensure their safety; by the habit of giving, which has so grown upon the people during the war; and by the large prosperity of individuals, from causes already mentioned, who have been led to discern the blessedness of doing good, and devote large sums to the noble purpose of endowing the great institutions of Christian charity and high education. This development of Christian liberality to relieve soldiers and others suffering from the war, has been immense. These calls were indeed too imperious to admit of refusal. Yet they have never been so met, or begun to be so met, in any previous wars. And, so far from drying up the streams of beneficence to other objects, they have only given these a larger volume and swifter current. It is to be hoped that one of the national virtues which will be permanently invigorated by the war, and long survive it, will be this free and large Christian liberality.

An obvious consequence of the substitution of paper money for gold, is the premium at which gold is held over currency

in the market—a premium variously fluctuating, but, on the whole, continually rising with the progress of the war, until it has now reached a serious and appalling magnitude—as we now write, oscillating from 190 to 200. This premium represents the redundancy of paper money, or various credit substitutes for money, above the specie standard, that is, above the amount that would be current if all paper money were convertible into coin. That is to say, if the amount of paper currency that would be in circulation, if redeemable in coin, be represented by unity, then the relative amount of irredeemable paper money now current, is represented by the fraction $\frac{19}{10}$. This, however, cannot be taken absolutely; it is qualified by certain conditions. Sometimes trade is inactive; very little property is exchanged—a diminished amount of money is sufficient for all transactions. Then, again, when it is brisk, sometimes it is done very much by money; sometimes by checks in place of money; sometimes by notes of hand, or other forms of credit. Thus, even at the specie standard, the same amount of money may at one time amount to a scarcity; at another, to a glut in the market. The same phenomena, of course, are possible under a currency exclusively metallic. Our impression is, that at present, and thus far through the war, real estate has been inactive, taking the whole country over, and a small amount of money has sufficed for all transactions in it. On the other hand, business was never so much done for cash. Payments to the army require to be made in cash; and speculation in stocks and commodities, never so rife, absorbs large amounts of money—all the larger, let it be observed, as it succeeds in inflating prices. How far these and other elements may mutually balance each other, and leave the present premium on specie a true exponent of the excess of our present irredeemable currency over the normal amount, is uncertain. There is a single disturbing element, however, of prodigious power to produce a temporary interference with this relation between the market premium on gold and the excess of irredeemable currency. We refer to speculation and gambling in gold. It is enough to call attention to the fact, that the premium on gold fluctuates ten or fifteen per cent. every few days, through the reckless and gambling manœuvres of specu-

lators, through fictitious sales, long and short, "cornering" operations, and false rumours in regard to the war, and everything else that can further their nefarious schemes, by producing public distrust. Still further, very much depends upon the habitual feeling of the public mind in regard to the speedy termination of the war, and the probable future expansion or curtailment of the government issues of paper money. Thus, last summer, after the battle of Gettysburg and the capture of Vicksburg, the premium on gold, having been at seventy per cent., worked rapidly down to the neighbourhood of twenty per cent., whence it has been steadily ascending to its present height. All this shows that the premium on gold is not the sure barometer it is supposed to be of the dilution of the currency at any given time. Yet it is, as a whole, and taking any considerable periods together; for the prices of all imports, all imported and all exportable articles, are made up of their cost in gold, with its premium added. Now if this premium be permanently larger than the intrinsic difference in value between gold and paper, then there will be a profit in sending gold from foreign countries, or mining it here, to realize this excessive premium, until the equilibrium is restored. In other words, if gold is unduly dear, or will purchase more commodities here than elsewhere, it will flow here until this condition ceases, and there is no longer a profit on its importation. It is impossible for speculators permanently to impart a fictitious price to gold, any more than to butter or beef; but they may and do work the greatest mischief, by causing groundless fluctuations in the price, subjecting all business to the dominion of a ruinous caprice, which subverts all rational calculation, and making the interests of the community the sport of their own greed.

But as we have said, speculation in gold, as in other things, would soon collapse, unless supported by other and deeper causes. One dollar of gold commands nearly two dollars of currency, because it is wanted at these rates to do what nothing else will do—pay for our imports not paid for by our exports, and discharge custom-house duties; and because, in addition to articles of prime necessity, which the people and government must have at whatever price, there are innumerable articles of another sort, which people will have at this cost, rather than

go without them. As we have indicated, the plentiful supply of government legal-tenders, and of other paper money, checks, and credits, founded upon it, has made our currency cheap, and, along with other causes, other commodities high. The vast consumption and diminution of production caused by the war, creates a need and a demand for the productions of foreign countries, to the utmost extent of our ability to pay for them, while the diminished harvest here, and bountiful harvest of Europe for the last year, have thrown us back more especially on our gold reserves to pay for them. The high price of gold and other commodities, with the small purchasing power of our money, or the reduced amount of goods we can procure with it, are all so many diverse manifestations or symptoms of the comparative scarcity induced by the war, and the consequent necessity, on the part of the people, to use a plain phrase, of getting along with less than they have been wont.

Nor would it be otherwise for the better, if money had been kept rigorously to the specie standard. It would rather have been worse, although the privations and retrenchments might have been differently distributed. We do not mean by this to intimate that in peace or any normal state of things, we are advocates of a currency not on a strict specie basis. Quite the reverse. But in this matter preëminently war reverses the natural order of things, and *inter arma leges silent*. We wish it to be further understood, that even when it is necessary to suspend specie payments, every interest requires that the currency be kept at the closest approximation to the specie standard practicable; and that all divergence from this standard should be regarded as an evil, to be submitted to only for the prevention of greater evils, and to be restricted within the narrowest possible limits and the shortest possible time.

But the effect of adhering to specie payments through the war, would have been a constant panic or series of panics, which would have been fatal to public confidence. The drain of specie to pay for imports, would have obliged the banks to take in all their circulation, to refuse their wonted accommodations, in order to protect themselves. Thus government would have been unable to borrow, as it came to be, immediately before the first issue of legal tenders. Distrust and

alarm, would have destroyed business, paralyzed industry, and checked production; thus vastly aggravating the diminution and scarcity of products, which is the real cause of our present straits, in whatever form it may show itself—whether in the form of an increase of paper money and a still greater increase of prices; or in the form of diminished prices, and a still greater scarcity of money to pay them. This will be apparent if we examine the matter more closely.

How is it that the price of gold, and with it of all things else, at least all exportable commodities (and in due time of all others) are now forced up? It arises from the amount of our foreign imports, which must be paid for in coin or in exported goods, in either or both, and so far as either falls short, in the other. Now if the exported goods are insufficient, specie must be had for the balance, whatever it costs. In proportion then to the deficiency to be supplied, the price of gold must be forced up. But suppose it be too scarce to meet the whole deficit, what then? The price of gold goes up until other home products are so raised in price that only a smaller number of people can afford to use them, while still the price of them, if reduced to the gold standard, is no more than in foreign countries, and so renders them exportable. For example, if butter is selling at 25 cents in currency per pound, on the basis of the domestic supply and demand, and if it will command that price in gold across the seas, and expense of transportation, then if gold is stiffened to 160, butter will rise to 40 cents per pound here, being in demand at this rate for export. This actually occurred this last season, and on this basis speculators for a time forced the price up to 50 and 60 cents per pound, which widely arrested consumption, and suddenly precipitated them to a righteous destruction.

What now would have been the course of things on a specie currency? As has been shown, in this state of things the circulating medium would have experienced the most stringent contraction. Distrust, alarms and panics, would have greatly checked production, and aggravated the existing scarcity. The necessity for large importations would have been still more urgent. This would have caused the exportation of specie to pay for it, until the banks, to prevent its efflux, refused to

renew their loans, and thus still further increased the scarcity of money, and of credit as its substitute. This would have gone on until the prices of commodities sunk to the point at which they could be profitably exported. This would reduce prices, but it would be because the amount of money wherewith to purchase was much more reduced than the prices, so that far fewer persons would have the means of purchasing, since there would in fact be fewer commodities to purchase, than in the present state of things. But there would be a still greater difference in the distribution of the losses and privations. They would fall on another class of persons entirely. Those who had money would gain, while those who had commodities would lose. Those who owed money would suffer. Those to whom it was payable and paid would have had the vantage—the reverse of the existing condition of things. It must not be understood, however, that creditors gain by circumstances which bear with crushing severity upon their debtors. If it goes so far that debtors are unable to pay, then debtors and creditors alike are whelmed in a common ruin. This often happens in commercial panics, and would be constant in such a chronic panic as would arise from the attempt to enforce specie payments through a war of such unparalleled magnitude and continuance as the present.

We wish, however, to say very explicitly, that while we think the country can bear the strain of war, and stimulate production, and command its resources, better with than without an irredeemable paper currency, yet every consideration requires that this currency be kept as close to the normal specie standard as possible. Every effort should be made to accomplish this. The cost of interest-bearing loans, even to the government, is as nothing, compared with that of an excessive dilution of the currency. Such a currency may pay debts, but it loses its purchasing power. When this is gone, the sinews of war are gone. Financial confusion and disaster reign among the people. Let us beware of battering out our money to the thinness of Confederate currency.

In carrying this discussion out to its practical conclusions, we observe,

1. It inspires the fullest confidence in the ability of the

nation to pay punctually the interest, and ultimately extinguish the principal of whatever national debt may be incurred by the necessary outlays of the war. This is evident in various ways. The amount of taxes imposed by the proposed law of Congress would discharge the present debt, interest and principal, in a dozen years. Yet they will be borne—nay, they are demanded by the people, however severely they may press. Those classes who complain that they are loaded with an undue proportion of the tax, nevertheless, not only bear it, but, notwithstanding any injustice to themselves, greatly prefer the tax as it is, to any weakening of the faith and credit of the government. But, if this be so now, what will be the state of things when our great armies are returned to productive occupations? when those now employed in fabricating instruments of destruction are occupied in producing means of subsistence, comfort, and luxury, adding to the national wealth, developing the immense agricultural and mineral resources of the country, which only await the hand of enterprise and industry to bring them forth? And, if we add to this the future inevitable rapid growth of the country, by natural increase and foreign immigration, as measured by the past, a growth all the more free and rapid when no longer hampered by the fetters of slavery, including also the prodigious productiveness of the South, as reclaimed and placed under the quickening regimen of free labour, it will have the amplest ability to carry the national debt without staggering. And if it can, it will. Every instinct of national pride and honour, every aspiration for national glory, every pulsation of the public conscience, every dictate of self-interest, will prompt and ensure the ready payment of the interest on this debt. Moreover, as we have already seen, the debt is so widely diffused, directly and indirectly, the property of the people so largely consists in it, that its repudiation would involve a catastrophe and a ruin at which the nation would stand aghast, and which it will never suffer to come.

A similar result is reached on the basis of figures already presented. The gross property of the free states in 1859 amounted to \$10,852,081,081. The product of the same year from agriculture, manufactories, mines, and fisheries, was

\$4,150,000,000, or thirty-nine per cent. on the capital. Now one-seventh of this annual income, in round numbers, paid in the form of taxes direct and indirect, would yield about \$600,000,000. This sum would discharge the interest of \$10,000,000,000, at six per cent., and \$12,000,000,000, at five per cent, at which, and even lower rates, loans can readily be obtained, when the permanent stability and solvency of the government are indisputably established. Now the proportion of the annual product of Britain paid in taxes, is three shillings on a pound sterling, or more than one-seventh. Of course, most of these taxes are indirect and unobserved; but the same is true of our own. Are we less willing and able to pay for the cost of the benefits and privileges of our own government, than the British for theirs? Besides, the income of the labour of the country will, in all probability, be immensely increased; but, whether this be so or not, we find a demonstrated ability to discharge the interest and principal, not only of our present national debt, but of triple that amount. The same view has constrained the assent of British economists, that have shown the most groundless and exuberant prejudices against our cause.*

* Not having within reach the *London Economist* and the *Saturday Review*, we quote an abstract of their views on this subject, as presented in the *New York Times* of May 31.

"The *London Economist* and the *Saturday Review*—neither of them at all partial to this country—have taken occasion lately to call attention to an important economical fact, developed by this war—the immense wealth of the population of the free states. The *Economist*, in a recent able article on the subject of our "ability to bear taxation," demonstrates, as if against the popular opinion of England, our capacity to bear easily \$600,000,000 annual taxation. The writer states that the great peculiarity of American society has not been understood in Europe—that is, the large number of people with an income say of \$500. There are not, he admits, a body of men representing, for instance, such an amount of property as is represented by the British Parliament, but there are a far larger number of small property-holders with taxable incomes than in England. Reckoning the average wages of the American labourers and small farmers at \$1.50 per day, which he believes to be a low estimate, and the number of families in the Union at five and a half millions, he thinks the wage-income of America would be equal to the property-income of Great Britain. The income of our middle class he estimates as equal to that of the British middle class, though the former possesses less accumulated property. Supposing a tax laid corresponding to the English, of three shillings on the pound, he concludes that £120,000,000 could be raised here from direct taxes, without counting the indirect taxes on

2. The real difficulty is, to obtain the means now needed to prosecute the war to a successful issue. The extent to which this has been, thus far, accomplished, almost entirely from the resources of our own people, and without spreading among them any serious privation, is one of the marvels of history. No instance can be found of such immense armies so long maintained in the field, so well fed, clothed, paid, and supplied, such a vast simultaneous increase of the navy, all without any appreciable aid from foreign loans, without faltering in the credit of the government, and with the prevalence of general plenty and comfort amongst the people. As we have seen, this plenty, and the surplus on which we have been drawing, begin to be seriously impaired. We are approaching that point in which retrenchment of superfluities, and a general economy among all classes, constitute the condition of a continued supply of the means for the prosecution of the war on its present vast scale, without oppressive stinting of the subsistence of the people. If the requisite means can be furnished to the government now, we feel little concern about the ability to pay hereafter. How shall these means be obtained? It can easily be done by the practice of an economy, it may be in some cases severe, but in very many simply salutary. In this way, the means could be furnished to sustain our present immense war expenditure, without in the least interfering with the supply of the substantial wants of the people. If tobacco and intoxicating drinks were given up by all to whom they are worse than useless, would not enough be saved to defray a

Luxuries. With respect to the willingness of our people to pay, he entertains little doubt that where a debt is so universally held, and where a population is so well off, the tax would be paid with but little grumbling. He does not see why an American "farmer" or artisan should not be willing to pay for the American nationality, or dignity, or safety, or whatever we consider it, as much as the British banker's clerk for the British—namely, three shillings on the pound. Grumblings there would be, but there are grumblings also from English rate-payers, and yet the poorest pay with little opposition. There might be many difficulties in collecting, but experience and ingenuity would gradually perfect modes of raising the taxes which would be the most effective and the least annoying. And, as he justly argues, it is hard to fix a limit to the amount of indirect taxes on luxuries which might be raised from so rich a people. His final candid conclusion is, that the European public have not at all estimated correctly the American ability to bear taxation."

very considerable part of the expenses of the war, and generally with great advantage—certainly without injury to the people in their highest interests? But if those who indulge in the use or abuse of these, feel under an iron necessity of using them, what shall be said of theatres, operas, luxurious living, and extravagant outlays innumerable? What shall be said of those enormous expenditures for ostentatious dress, equipage, ornaments, which cost enough to support an immense army in the field, or to relieve the sufferings from poverty among the people? It has been said that an unexampled extravagance in these things has been prevalent of late. We think this has been very much confined to localities and parties where the war has concentrated sudden wealth; but all this flashy and dazzling display is the price of blood. It is a contribution towards disabling and dispiriting our own armies, and to “aid and comfort” the enemy in the most decisive way. It detracts so much of our means from the support of the people, or the uses of the government, thus embarrassing it with all those perplexities which are involved in the growing scarcity of useful commodities, and the rise in the price of gold. If it is thus unchristian and unpatriotic, it is none the less unseemly, and at war with all good taste and proper sensibility. Nero fiddled while Rome was burning, and all history signalizes this act as the climax of imperial brutality; but is not ostentatious extravagance, pompous gayety and frivolity, dazzling brilliancy of dress and equipage, among us, at this awful juncture, quite as monstrous? Is it not like dancing, frolicking, and parading brilliants at a funeral?

When the flower of our nation are mowed down, mangled, maimed, by thousands and tens of thousands, week after week, desolating so many households, filling the land with widows and orphans, and spreading over it a funereal gloom; when the nation is making such stupendous sacrifices, pouring out its best blood, in this dire struggle for existence, can sane persons luxuriate in a vain display, in ministering to the lust of the eye and the pride of life, thus aggravating the perils of the nation as really as the traitors in arms against it? Whoever occupies what is equivalent to the labour of a man in useless extravagance, virtually withdraws one soldier from the field,

or the services of one man in producing or forwarding supplies for the defence of the country. And this effect is inevitable, whether first seen in the increased premium on gold, or the enormous price of provisions.

This view is, we are glad to say, beginning to touch and sway the female heart of the country, always alive to high motives, when properly presented. We have no doubt that the same patriotic and Christian spirit, which has led them to so many errands and ministries in behalf of our imperilled country, and the soldiers who are bleeding for it, will lead them to the further easy self-denial which foregoes all expensive or avoidable display and ornamentation at such a time as this. We are sure that when they come to understand the bearings and effects of it, their Christian principles and kindly impulses, will combine with elevated patriotism to overpower the pride of life in the premises. This is of fundamental importance. The standard of fashion and style, which involve so much of the expenses of living to which we are constrained, is mainly determined by ladies. And, inasmuch as these things derive their highest fascination, as much from being regarded as symbols of rank and social position, as from the love of beauty, so potent in the female mind, it follows that no movement in this direction can be successful, unless led by ladies uppermost in wealth and social position. So far as this whole matter is concerned, they are largely "masters of the situation," and on them devolves proportionate responsibility. What they treat as respectable, all classes will regard as respectable. We cannot doubt that, by example as well as precept, they will effectually promote the movement which has been inaugurated.

We have a single suggestion to offer in the hope of guarding against misdirection and failure. The movement thus far has been prominently, if not exclusively, against the use of imported finery and luxuries, prompted by the very natural impression that these add enormously to that foreign balance against us, which enhances the demand for gold to meet it, and therefore its price; and with it the price of all imported and exportable commodities. Hence, it is inferred with great confidence, that, if this class of importations were greatly re-

duced, there would be a corresponding reduction in our foreign indebtedness, the price of gold, with all its beneficial consequences. This reasoning is just on one simple condition: viz., that we do not undertake to replace foreign finery and luxuries with equivalent extravagance in articles of domestic manufacture. In order to afford real financial relief to the country, *the extravagance must be discarded altogether*. To continue it, simply by substituting the products of domestic industry for foreign importations, so far from mitigating, will only aggravate the evil. For why are they now imported from abroad, instead of being made here? Simply because they can thus be procured more cheaply, because our industry is more efficient and lucrative when employed in producing other things, and sending them abroad to pay for these fabrics, than in making them here. This is because of the greater facilities of every kind for producing them in other countries. Now if we undertake to fabricate them or their equivalents here, we divert so much industry from other useful products for the people or the army, in which it is now employed. This aggravates the present scarcity of those articles, and forces up prices in proportion—the very evil we are trying to lessen. A probable result would be importations of these articles from abroad to fill the void created by this diversion of our domestic industry from them. This would simply leave us where we were before, with only this difference, that we have the disadvantage of turning our labour out of channels of greater, to those of less efficiency—*i. e.*, so as to produce less for us, or leave us poorer than before. And indeed something like this would be inevitable, because the greater scarcity of useful products of our own industry would lift up prices so as to render it profitable to import them. The true remedy then, is not in any crusade exclusively against foreign luxuries and finery, but against all expensive display, and “shabby splendour,” and luxurious indulgence in products of whatever origin. Nothing less than **GENERAL RETRENCHMENT** of both sexes and of all classes will meet the crisis—such retrenchment as may easily be borne, and leave us still a people more largely supplied with all needful things than any nation on the globe. Can we hesitate to do this, which, at the worst, is but a tithe of what is borne by

our brothers who yield up not only every comfort of life, but life itself on the battle-field? If we refuse, do we deserve success? And have our people, as a whole, begun to suffer, or to feel the pressure of the war in their own comforts and privileges as yet? Is it not wonderful how little they have been obliged as yet to give up the substantial blessings of life? If we would know what war means, or what sacrifices it involves, let us go over the territory, and look at the homes and firesides of the rebellious states! Indeed, what could be so beneficial to our nation as to rid it of that profuse, luxurious indulgence, which so enervates and corrupts it?*

Another obvious remark is, that the financial calamities and losses so often and so lugubriously predicted from the return of peace, are groundless. Of course, we do not know what unforeseen events are in the womb of the future to baffle all human calculations. We only refer to causes now visible, or in prospect, from the operation of which such a catastrophe is predicted. What will be the effect of peace? Surely to release most of the productive force now in the field, and occupied at home in providing supplies for the army and navy, for the production of national wealth—for the subsistence, comfort, elevation, and refinement of the people. Is not this labour, and are not its products, now needed, and would they not diffuse among the people vastly more to use, enjoy, and accumulate against future want?

But it is said that prices would be brought down, money would be scarcer, and many traders would lose. What then? Even if some suffer, are not the great mass of the people enriched thereby? The reverse of the present course of things which enriches the few at the expense of the many. Besides, who are

* The following from Edward Everett is quite to the point. No person could say it better, and there could be no fitter person to say it:

"A reform is needed, on the part of both sexes, and in many things besides foreign luxury. Extravagance in the general style of living, in building, furniture, equipage, entertainment, amusements, hotels, watering-places,—*extravagance often as tasteless as it is otherwise reprehensible*,—is growing upon us, and consuming, worse than unproductively, the substance of the country. The waste at a fashionable private entertainment would support three or four men in the ranks of the army for a twelvemonth, and provide for the relief and comfort of a hundred wounded soldiers in a hospital."

to lose? Honest and prudent merchants, in an unsettled state of the market, and with strong prospects of a decline in prices, are careful to avoid accumulating large stocks. They merely provide for present wants. Their course is the opposite when they anticipate a rise in prices. They therefore will lose little. And this little they can generally well afford to lose, after the rich harvests they have reaped from the rising markets of the last three years. Reckless speculators, who have blown up fortunes, consisting in fictitiously inflated stocks, which they have purchased with borrowed money for a larger inflation; who are striving to force up gold, and profit by depreciating the credit and strength of the government; who try to add to the distress of the people and difficulties of the government by forcing beyond their natural to a fictitious height the unavoidable cost of the necessities of life, may totter to ruin and come to grief. And would not this be an unspeakable benefit to the country? The sooner the whole army of "operators" is broken up, the better for the nation. If they should be conscripted into the national armies, the national industry and resources would suffer no loss—but would be relieved of a foul parasitic growth which is consuming and withering them. It is a fair question for our national lawgivers, whether they can do a better or more righteous thing than to make the penalty of gambling speculations, particularly in gold and necessities, immediate conscription into the national army. One of the conditions which always underlies every widespread commercial panic and collapse, is now wanting—viz., a wide-spread commercial and personal indebtedness among the people. Whatever speculators may owe, the great mass of the people, beyond all former example, have been paying their debts, although often at the expense of mortgagees. Sound business is done mainly for cash. The great mass of indebtedness in the country is in the form of public securities, national, state, municipal, and corporate. Other debts and investments have flowed mostly into this channel. While the war, therefore, has largely consumed the national resources, yet the very uncertainty engendered by it has led to that general prudence and caution among the people, which guard against the exposures arising from large liabilities. Inasmuch as government is the great borrower, and so much of the property

of the people lies in its securities; the return of peace would certainly enhance the value of those securities, and with it general financial soundness and confidence. The conditions, therefore, aside from unforeseen contingencies, of an all-pervasive financial collapse, on the return of peace, seem to us to be wanting. This we deem important. For while we sustain the war, to all lengths and at whatever cost requisite to destroy the rebellion, we think it one of the worst of fallacies to suppose its continuance a source of national wealth, or condition of abiding prosperity. It may be so to speculators and those who thrive on government contracts. To the body of the people, peace cannot be otherwise than a blessing—unless purchased at the sacrifice of the national life, integrity, and honour, which would be the climax of evils.

We add, that since the foregoing went to press, the public statement of Senator Wilson, that one million eight hundred thousand men have been raised for the national armies—six hundred thousand within the past year—more than sustains the leading positions we have taken. We also see statements which give to our estimate of the cost of the war to the nation, for this current year, the look of extravagance. But it must be understood, that the present is the culminating year of the war, in regard to the vastness of its operations and expenditure; that it is conducted on the basis of prices nearly doubled; and that we estimate not only the outlays from the national treasury, but from states, counties, towns, cities, corporations, and all forms of public and private contributions to the cause—all which have been vast during the current year. This is but partially represented by the increase of the national debt.

ART. V.—*Christian Baptism spiritual not ritual.* By ROBERT MACNAIR, M. A. Eph. iv. 5, 1 Pet. iii. 21. Edinburgh: 1858. 16mo., pp. xi. 202.

THE design of Macnair's treatise is to establish the position, that the baptism spoken of in Christ's commission to the apostles,—“Go, disciple all nations, baptizing them;”—was not water baptism but that of the Holy Spirit,—that baptism with water is without divine warrant under the gospel dispensation, and that its administration is a pledge of ignorance and corruption in the Christian Church. The book, we understand to have acquired considerable reputation among the Society of Friends; and it has, within our knowledge, been the means of great perplexity in the minds of young inquirers on the subject. We propose, therefore, to present, with some particularity, the teachings of the Scriptures in contrast with those of the author.

Here, however, in the outset, we would guard against the mistake of any who may suppose the question at issue to involve, in any measure, a competition between water baptism and that of the Holy Spirit,—any sanction to the unscriptural pretence of baptismal regeneration,—or any, the least, dispraise of the baptism of the Spirit. Of the latter, it is impossible to describe the importance, in exaggerated terms. Without it, salvation is impossible. Possessed of it, salvation cannot fail. The question is not, therefore, whether water baptism is to be accepted as a substitute for the other, or, as inseparably identified with and imparting it, in any sense, or to any degree. All such ideas, whether veiled under the name of baptismal regeneration, or in whatever guise, we repudiate with horror; as derogatory to the high and incomunicable prerogatives of the Spirit of Christ.

But the question is, whether the Lord Jesus,—having promised the baptism of the Spirit to all his people,—has appointed the baptism of water to be an ordinance of perpetual obligation in the church, as a sign and symbol to the world, and seal to believers, of the blessings conferred by the spiritual baptism. That such is the clear and unequivocal testimony

of the Scriptures, will appear before we close. In fact, we shall see that Macnair himself distinctly recognizes that such was the doctrine of the apostles, as deduced both from their teachings and example. And he only succeeds in reaching the conclusions at which he aims, by taking the ground that they were in error on the subject.

The questions, therefore, at issue in the pages of this writer, involve the very foundations of our eternal hopes. To the apostles was the commission given by the Saviour, to organize the gospel church and establish its ordinances,—to preach the gospel and baptize all nations. To them the promise was given of the Comforter, to guide them into all truth, to bring all the instructions of the Master to their remembrance, and take the things of Christ, even all that the Father hath, and show them unto them, for their guidance in this office. Their names are written on the foundations of the New Jerusalem; and they, with the prophets of the Old Testament, resting on Christ the chief corner-stone, are its foundations. If they, then, could be mistaken, in a matter so plain yet so important as the meaning of the very commission by which they were sent forth to preach and baptize, we must be compelled to admit that the whole gospel of the Son of God, as proclaimed and recorded by them, may be a tissue of errors, and the great and precious promises, upon which we have been caused to hope, may all be delusive and vain.

In the present argument, we shall, in most cases, refer without reciting them, to the Scriptures relied upon; partly for the sake of brevity, and partly that they may be sought out by the reader, in the "more sure word," and studied in the light of their connection there.

Macnair admits that the meaning of the word *baptism* must be realized more or less distinctly alike in the application of water and of the Spirit. *Macnair*, p. 11. He further states that it appears from such places as Isa. xliv. 3, 4, Ezek. xxxvi. 25—27, and Mal. iii. 1—3, that the essential idea is the bestowal of life-giving, refreshing, and cleansing influences. According to this view, then, the baptism of the Holy Ghost signifies his outpouring from on high, (Isa. xxxii. 15,) for the renewal and cleansing of the soul; and by the baptism of water

is meant the application of water to the person, so as to bring into view the other. This statement is true, so far as it has respect to the ordinary renewing gift of the Holy Spirit. But there is another baptism of the Spirit,—the baptism of power, which is to be broadly distinguished, although by Macnair, under the necessities of his position, insidiously confounded with the other.

We will first examine into the nature of these baptisms of the Spirit.

In all baptisms there are four things of essential importance. These are, the administrator; the matter of the baptism, or substance poured out; the subject of it; and the end or design of the administration.

1. In the baptism of the Holy Ghost, the substance poured out is the Spirit itself, the third person of the Godhead; who is personally imparted to dwell in the subject of it. Isa. xxxii. 15; Joel ii. 28—32; John xiv. 16, 17; Acts ii. 17.

2. The only administrator of this baptism is the Son of God. The power of shedding forth the Spirit of God from on high, can, manifestly, in the very nature of the case, be in none but God; and hence, in no man but Him who is also the Son of God. To argue, as does Macnair, that, as John was not the only one who baptized with water, therefore, others as well as Jesus may baptize with the Holy Ghost,—is to trifle with the subject. If it is possible for language to express a peculiar prerogative, John does it, with respect to Jesus's power of baptizing with the Spirit. “I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance: [which is no extraordinary display of power,] but he that cometh after me is mightier than I; whose shoes I am not worthy to bear; He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire.” Matthew iii. 11. (Compare this and the twelfth verse, with Mal. iii. 1—3.) Again, “I knew him not; but he that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining on him, the same is he which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost. And I saw, and bare record that this is the Son of God.” John i. 33, 34. Thus John distinctly contrasts his own power, as a baptizer with water, with that mightier power which was displayed in the baptism of the Holy Ghost; and attributes the

latter to the omnipotence of Christ, recognizing it as a distinguishing attribute of the Son of God. As soon as, ὁ βαπτιζων ἐν Πνεύματι ἀγίῳ, “the Baptizer with the Holy Ghost,” is pointed out to him, John at once recognizes him, although veiled in flesh, as the eternal Son of God. Not only so, but although the gracious influences of the Spirit did unquestionably accompany his own ministry, and the extraordinary baptism of the Spirit which Jesus received, took place under it—a baptism more abundant and remarkable than any other—yet does John deny to himself and attribute to Jesus the prerogative of baptizing with the Spirit. In so doing he equally denies it to the apostles, whose relation to the outpouring of the Spirit, in regenerating grace, upon the hearers of the gospel, was of precisely the same nature as was that of John.

Macnair asks, “Whether would his [Christ’s] glory most conspicuously appear, in making an immediate gift of the Spirit to each follower; or, in causing that one disciple should be the channel through which his influence should flow to another;—in giving to each such a measure of his influences as would serve his own needs; or in imparting the Spirit so copiously as that they who had freely received, might freely give?”—*Macnair*, p. 65. Thus, if the doctrine of this writer be true, we are to expect the baptism of the Spirit—his renewing and sanctifying influences—not from the ascended Son of God, but from some fellow worm, who possesses a superfluity of the Spirit beyond “his own needs,” with power to impart it to others at pleasure! Here have we the worst form of priestly usurpation and mediation between God and the sinner. That is the very spirit of antichrist itself, which would interpose a human medium between the one Mediator and the soul; or point lost men to any second-hand fountain of grace. And, to attribute to a mere man the power of pouring out the Spirit upon men, is little short of blasphemy. Where is the living man who will venture to arrogate to himself such a power? And how will he go about to exercise it? Yet is the command, “Go, baptize all nations.”

3. There are two several baptisms of the Spirit spoken of in the Scriptures, which are discriminated from each other, alike,

as to the subjects of them, the effects produced, and the end had in view.

The baptism of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, is common to all the elect of God, and was enjoyed under the Old Dispensation as well as under the New. See Psalm li. 2, 7; Isa. vi. 6, 7. In fact, salvation is impossible to any man of any age without it. John iii. 5, 6. Its immediate effect is to unite the subject of it to the Lord Jesus Christ, and its design and end is the renewal and sanctification of those to whom it is given,—their imbuement with the Spirit of Christ, and formation after his image. It is given, ordinarily, in connection with the preaching of the word, without any visible sign, or outward manifestation, other than the transformation which marks the subsequent lives and characters of the renewed. See Tit. iii. 5; Rom. viii. 9; 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13; Gal. iii. 27, 28; John iii. 8.

The baptism of power was peculiar to the apostolic age, and bestowed upon none but the apostles and certain of the converts of their personal ministry. Its immediate effect was to confer upon the subjects of it the gifts of miracles and tongues. Its design and end was the miraculous attestation of the gospel proclaimed by the apostles. In the beginning of the gospel it was imparted to the apostles on the day of Pentecost, by the immediate agency of the Son of God, accompanied with visible tongues of flame, thus confirming the gospel which then began to be preached. Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 4, 5, 8; ii. 1—4, 16—18, 43; Heb. ii. 4. In like manner it was imparted to the house of Cornelius, to attest the opening of the door of the gospel to the Gentiles. Acts x. 44—47; xi. 15—18. In other cases, it was conferred through the laying on of the apostles' hands; thus identifying it with that testimony of which they were the chosen witnesses. Acts viii. 14—18, 25; xix. 6.

We repeat, that the baptism of power is not, and was never designed to be, administered to all the people of Christ. This, the experience of the church testifies. Since the apostolic age it has entirely ceased, and at the present day there is no trace of it in the church, even where the most abundant evidence of the presence of the Spirit is given. Even in the times of the apostles, it was not given to all believers. All had the Spirit, in his renewing and sanctifying graces, but all were not

endowed with tongues nor power. See 1 Cor. xii. 4—11, 28—30. Nor was its general bestowment necessary to the ends for which this baptism was given. Heb. ii. 3, 4.

Another point, to be distinctly marked is, that whereas faith is a fruit of the Spirit—a consequence of the baptism of regeneration—(see Gal. v. 22; John i. 12, 13,) the baptism of power was given to believers, subsequent to their faith, and to the fruits of regeneration working in their lives. Compare John vi. 68—70; Matthew xvi. 16, 17, and Acts ii. 1—4; viii. 12, 14—17. xix. 2—6.

We have said, that the baptism of regeneration was common to all ages of the church, administered by the Son of God alone, and by him bestowed upon all his people. The question is here raised by Macnair—Wherein then consisted the peculiarity of the baptism which John announced, when he declared that Christ should baptize with the Holy Ghost? It consisted in several things. 1. The baptizer thus announced, did not exercise a new prerogative; but himself assumed a new form in its exercise. The Son of God was now clothed in flesh, and it was by the Son of Mary, the Son of Man that the baptism of the Spirit was thenceforth to be administered. Compare Luke iii. 15—17; John i. 29—34; xv. 26; xvi. 7; Acts ii. 33. 2. It was no longer to be limited to the nation of Israel, but to be bestowed upon all flesh. Acts ii. 17, 39; x. 44; xi. 15—18. 3. It is now given in more abundant measure than ever before. 2 Cor. iii. 7—18. 4. In testimony of this, and assertion of the exaltation, glory and power of the incarnate Son, it was to be introduced by the miraculous scenes of the day of Pentecost, and the baptism of power, promised by Christ before his ascension, and dispensed after it. 5. It was to be followed by a baptism of fire, an outpouring of wrath, consuming his enemies; a baptism fulfilled in the desolation of Jerusalem, and the ultimate destruction of all the rejectors of Christ. Mat. iii. 10—12. Compare Psalm lxxix. 6, xi. 6.

Macnair urges that the Spirit was imparted by the laying on of the apostles' hands, and hence concludes that it was their privilege to baptize with the Spirit, and that this was what was commanded them in their commission to baptize all nations. But in the first place, as we have seen, the laying on of the

apostles' hands was for conferring, not renewing and sanctifying grace,—but miraculous powers, to those who were already possessors of grace; it was not given to all believers; and, we may add, was not administered by any but the apostles alone. Acts viii. 18. It could not then be that baptism which is to be dispensed by the hands of Christ's servants, in all ages, even to the end of the world; and to be administered to all who receive the gospel. Second. On the day of Pentecost, the apostles and disciples themselves were the subjects of the baptism, and declared it to have been dispensed by Jesus. Acts ii. 32, 33. The baptism of Cornelius and his house with the Spirit, was in like manner independent of all human agency, and attributed to the same Divine power. Acts xi. 15—17. The gifts conferred upon the saints of Samaria were conferred, it is true, through the laying on of hands, but in answer to special prayer; in which, the apostles not only sought the gifts for the disciples, but recognized their own incompetence to confer them. When Simon the sorcerer thought this to be a "power" belonging to the apostles, and sought to purchase it, he is rebuked by Peter, for conceiving such an idea respecting "the gift of God." Acts viii. 14—20. And Paul declares these gifts of the Holy Ghost to have been God's own witness to the testimony of the apostles concerning the great salvation. Heb. ii. 3, 4.

We will now examine the testimony of the Scriptures as to water baptism. Of this two kinds are traceable in Macnair's own admissions; the first is the baptism of preparation, in the name of ὁ ἐρχόμενος, "the coming One;" and was administered not only by John, but also by the apostles, under the direction of Jesus. John iii. 22, iv. 2, Matt. iv. 17, Mark i. 14, vi. 12. On ὁ ἐρχόμενος, compare Matt. xi. 3, Acts xix. 4. In this baptism there was no specific mention of the Persons of the Godhead. The distinct manifestation of these was yet to take place through Jesus Christ. See John i. 9, 18, xvii. 6, 1 Tim. iii. 16. Hence some who were baptized of John did not know that there was a Holy Ghost—a fact which assured Paul that they had not received Christian baptism. Acts xix. 2—5.

The burden of this baptism was; "Prepare ye the way of the Lord." "Repent, for the kingdom is at hand." Its message

proclaimed "the coming One." Hence, its administration by the disciples, after Christ's ascension to heaven, would have been a denial that he was the Christ; as it would have taught the people to expect a Christ yet to come.

Besides this baptism, which he acknowledges to have been with water, it is admitted by Macnair, that there were unquestionable instances of water baptism, by the apostles and disciples, after the day of Pentecost. With respect to it, the evidence will appear in what follows. Its burden is that the King Messiah has come, and that Jesus is the Christ. Its administration is in the name of the blessed Three, of whom the Lord Jesus was the messenger, revealer, and mediator. Matt. xxviii. 19, Acts x. 48, xix. 2—5. Its testimony is, that the kingdom of heaven has come,—that Jesus now occupies the throne. Acts v. 31.

Let us now look at the history of facts, as bearing on the present inquiry;—and first, for the present purpose, we will accept Macnair's own answer to the question: How is it that until the ascension of Christ the word *baptism*, standing alone, designates that with water? *Answer*—The writers are speaking of baptism as an existing institution. The baptism heralded by John was yet future; and water baptism alone was then in being. "Till the time when the Spirit is given, they were safe in using the word *baptism*, even without an adjunct, as equivalent to water baptism." *Macnair*, pp. 19, 20. Such, then, is the fact, and the reason of it; our author being witness. Now, no rule is more imperative, nor manifestly reasonable and necessary, than that which forbids the historian or writer to depart from his own established usage, as to the application of words, without notice to the reader. We have found that, by admission, the Evangelists used the word, baptism, by itself, in all their narrations of the ministry of John, and the former part of the life of Jesus, to designate water baptism, whilst adjuncts or explanatory phrases are used with it, to indicate spiritual influences. Unless, therefore, we have notice of a change in this mode of expression, or find something in the context forbidding us, we are bound to regard the word as unchanged in its significance,—as meaning water baptism, —wherever we find it.

As bearing upon the present question, one of the most signal testimonies occurs in the early ministry of our Lord. John and Jesus, and their disciples, were employed in preaching that the kingdom of heaven was at hand; and administering the baptism of repentance, in preparation for its coming. Whilst engaged in these labours, Jesus was visited by a man of the Pharisees, Nicodemus, who indicates the object of his coming by his salutation, "Rabbi, we know that thou art a *teacher* come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him. Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see" (he cannot apprehend in its true spiritual nature) "the kingdom of God," which is at hand,—which I come to establish. "Nicodemus saith unto him, How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born? Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." John iii. 2—5.

Here, we accept the designation of Macnair as to "the kingdom of God." "It is hardly necessary to make the remark that the expression [Mat. xi. 11—15, Luke vii. 28—30,] cannot mean the kingdom of grace, for that would be to exclude the father of the faithful, and the man after God's own heart, from a participation in its citizenship. It must point to the gospel dispensation,—the form which the kingdom of grace assumed when the day of shadows passed away, and Jesus Christ assumed the government as king over His own house." *Macnair*, p. 23. In short it is the gospel church, imperfect and of mixed elements, here; but to be perfect, hereafter. Compare Matt. xxi. 43, xxiv. 30, xiii. 47—50, Luke ix. 27. Of this kingdom, Jesus declares, that no man can truly apprehend it, except he be born of the Spirit, (compare Luke xvii. 20, 21;) and that, in order to entrance into it, the birth of water must be superadded to the other. What was meant by this allusion to water, the employment of Jesus and his disciples, shortly after indicates, with abundant evidence. John iii. 22. That the spiritual baptism was the principal thing, the whole tenor of the discourse shows. That the water baptism is of imperative obligation as a symbol and seal of the other, Jesus testifies,

here; as, with equal emphasis, in the final commission given to the apostles.

When the preaching of the coming of the kingdom had been finished, and the King was about to assume the throne of grace, he gives the new and great commission to his disciples. You have heretofore proclaimed the kingdom at hand; but now it is set up. "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Matt. xxviii. 19. Here notice:

1. Jesus had already taught his disciples to baptize with water.

2. He had declared that the birth of water was necessary to entrance into the kingdom now to be set up, the visible gospel church.

3. He never hints that his apostles and disciples shall baptize with the Spirit. On the contrary, he and John had both taught them to recognize that as the prerogative, and demonstration of the power, of Jesus himself; and he promises that they, instead of baptizing, shall be baptized, with the Spirit.

4. Their powers were adequate to water baptism, but not to that of the Spirit.

5. No other than water baptism had yet been given, and the usage still held, which Macnair admits, of designating water baptism by the single word, *baptism*. They could not, therefore, have understood the words in any other sense than as enjoining them to baptize with water. How in fact they did understand them, we will presently see.

Here, however, it is necessary to notice the nature and significance of water baptism.

1. Its design is twofold;—to seal to the subjects of it the blessings of the covenant of grace; and, to testify to the witnessing world of the manner in which the blessings of grace and salvation are bestowed,—to wit, by the outpouring of the Spirit. Both of these designs appear in John's baptism; as well as in that of the Christian church.

2. Hence none are entitled to it except those who are embraced in the covenant, that is, believers and their households;

and it is to be administered to none who do not give scriptural evidence that they are heirs of the promises of the covenant. See Matt. iii. 7, 8. Hence, to hearers of the word, the conditions of the covenant are repentance and faith. Mark xvi. 16, Acts ii. 38, (comp. 41), xvi. 31—34.

3. These graces are fruits of the renewing of the Holy Spirit, and being made antecedent conditions of baptism, it is hence evident that the baptism which is enjoined as subsequent to faith, is not the baptism of the Spirit; since the latter precedes faith, and is its cause. It must, therefore, mean baptism with water, the seal of the blessings of the covenant. But to return:

“Tarry at Jerusalem,” said Jesus, “until ye be endued with power from on high.” The day of Pentecost comes, and the baptism of power descends. The multitude are gathered, and, under the preaching of Peter, cry, “What shall we do?” Peter replies, “Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the Holy Ghost, for the promise [of Joel] is to you and to your children, &c.” Acts ii. 38. Thus Peter utters the very testimony which he and the other apostles and John had been accustomed to deliver when they baptized with water, and preached “the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins.” Mark i. 4. Compare Mark i. 15, John iii. 22, iv. 2. The only change in the language is, that instead of ὁ ἐρχόμενος, the coming One, Peter now proclaims the name and kingdom of the Lord Jesus, as already come. Acts ii. 33—36.

Thus, we have still no hint of a change in the use of the word *baptism*. On the contrary, the phraseology, identical with that of John’s preaching, must have suggested to the hearers a similar baptism,—a washing with water.

Further, the baptism and the gift of the Holy Ghost are broadly distinguished from each other. The one is urged as a duty, conjoined with repentance. The other is announced as a promised gift from God,—that gift of which Joel spake, as conveying miraculous powers. The baptism enjoined, and the promise given, cannot, therefore, be the same thing. The one is antecedently conditional to the other.

Macnair’s interpretation presents Peter absurdly saying, Acquire the Holy Ghost, and thereupon ye shall receive it!

Upon condition that ye become sanctified, ye shall then receive sanctifying grace!

In short, the fact that the gift of the Spirit, here spoken of, is that extraordinary outpouring promised by Joel, (compare vs. 17—20, and 38, 39,) shows this not to be the baptism which is to be administered to all believers.

Thus far, we have no hint of a change of usage, as to the word which formerly designated water baptism; of the Saviour commissioning his followers to administer any other; or, of their pretending to baptize with the Spirit.

We will now notice the cases in which it is acknowledged by Macnair, that water baptism was used by the disciples, after the ascension of our Lord.

First is the case of the Samaritans who were baptized by Philip,—Acts viii. 12—17,—with which is properly to be associated that of the Ethiopian eunuch,—vs. 26—39. Upon these cases the following points are to be observed:

1. Macnair insinuates a doubt whether Philip was especially endowed with the Holy Ghost. Nothing could be more conclusive evidence of unwillingness to receive the truth, contrary to his own opinions. When the apostles directed the multitude of disciples to select “seven men full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom,” to superintend the ministration to the widows, Philip was the second man chosen by the multitude, and approved by the apostles, at a time when the whole body of disciples was realizing the full baptism of the day of Pentecost. Compare Acts iv. 31, v. 32, vi. 3. Upon the persecution following Stephen’s martyrdom, Philip was driven from Jerusalem; and at Samaria preached Christ, the Spirit attesting his ministry with signs and wonders wrought by him. An angel of the Lord commanded him to go to the place where he met the eunuch; the Spirit directed him to join with the Ethiopian; and, immediately after the baptism, the Spirit caught him up and bore him away, so that the rejoicing eunuch saw him no more. And yet Macnair questions whether he was a man taught of the Holy Ghost!

2. Peter and John were sent by the apostles at Jerusalem, to Samaria, to confer upon the believing Samaritans the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost. They found that they were all

baptized; and laying their hands upon them, the Holy Ghost was given. If the water baptism had been wrong, surely it would have been condemned by Peter and John. Certainly, they had the Holy Spirit, in the fullest measure. Compare Acts ii. 14—40; iii. 1—26; iv. 8, 31; v. 1—10, 15, &c. Yet, upon the visit of the apostles to Samaria, we have not a hint of the mistake of Philip being corrected by them. On the contrary, immediately after, Philip baptizes the eunuch in the same mode; and, in like manner, Peter baptizes Cornelius.

3. Here, then, we have the concurrent testimony of Peter, John, and Philip, in favour of water baptism. In the case of the eunuch, the Holy Spirit adds his authority, as a party to the baptism. He brings Philip to the eunuch, awaits his preaching of the gospel and administration of the baptismal seal, and then immediately bears him away; thus exhibiting to the eunuch a miraculous pledge of the Divine authority of the ministration of Philip. And yet we are told that the evangelist blundered in a cardinal point, and this in founding the gospel in Ethiopia. For the question between water and Spirit baptism must be fundamental. The assertion is an impeachment of the Holy Spirit, by whom Philip's ministry was so emphatically endorsed.

4. "The place of the Scripture" which the eunuch was reading, was in Isaiah liii. 7, 8. The section of Isaiah's prophecy in which this occurs, begins with chap. lii. 13, and includes that declaration, "So shall he sprinkle many nations," (chap. lii. 15)—language which points to baptism, and accounts for the request coming from the eunuch.

5. The testimony is express, that the Samaritans "had (*ἐπῆρχον*, upon their first believing*) been baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus," although the Holy Ghost was not fallen upon any of them. The command, therefore, to baptize into that name was fulfilled in the water baptism, and not in that of the Holy Ghost.

6. Macnair's argument from the case of Simon the sorcerer is futile. That there is a dead faith—a mere rational conviction, which is not saving—we are abundantly assured: Matt.

* Compare Phil. ii. 6: "Who, *ὑπάρχων*, being, at first,—originally,—in the form of God."

iii. 7, 8; James ii. 14—26; John xii. 42, 43. This kind of belief, however, is never called faith. Upon Macnair's own theory, he must admit that Simon's belief was not true faith; and the declaration of Jesus is emphatic: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." Mark xvi. 16. Thus he teaches us—upon failure of salvation—to look, not to a defective baptism, but to a failure of faith in the heart. And in the case of Simon, this is precisely where the defect was, Peter being witness: "Thy *heart* is not right in the sight of God."

7. In the history of Philip's ministry, we find the word *baptize* still employed, always to signify water baptism, as it was before the Spirit was given.

The next case of water baptism admitted by our author, is that of Cornelius and his house, by Peter. Macnair objects to Philip, that he was not an apostle; but he has as little respect for the authority of Peter as of Philip. He insists that the very vision which Peter had, in connection with his call to the house of Cornelius, shows him to have been steeped in a ceremonial spirit. Let us look at the facts.

1. Early in the ministry of our Saviour, upon occasion of Peter's profession of faith—"Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"—Jesus had said to him, "On this rock I will build my church; and [inasmuch as thou art first to recognize and profess this faith] I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven," &c. Matt. xvi. 16—20. This promise was fulfilled, with respect to Israel, by the preaching of Peter on the day of Pentecost; and, with respect to the Gentiles, by the baptism of Cornelius. See Acts xv. 7. The transactions, therefore, connected with the case of Cornelius, have respect, not to him merely, or chiefly, but to the whole Gentile world. The door which the keys in Peter's hand opened to Cornelius, must be entered by all who desire a part with Cornelius in the son of David.

2. Proportionate to the importance of the occasion was the preparation for it,—the vision seen by Peter, giving him divine instruction as to what he should do; and the vision of Cornelius, directing him to send for Peter, and hear from him "what he ought to do." Acts x. 6.

3. Whilst Peter preached, the Holy Ghost fell upon his hearers; yet he is so far from recognizing that, as the baptism which he was commanded to administer, that he exclaims,—“Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we.” Acts xi. 47. The baptism of the Holy Ghost was not, then, that which the apostles were appointed to administer.

4. This case,—as well as those by Philip, which we have seen to have been acquiesced in by Peter and John,—shows the view taken of the subject by the apostles; especially by the pentecostal preacher; and consequently confirms our understanding of the baptism then administered, to those who believed at the preaching of Peter.

5. In the case of the Centurion we find every circumstance which should preclude a possibility of mistake as to the will of God. In answer to his continual prayers, Cornelius is directed by an angel to send for Peter, who should tell him what he ought to do, “whereby he and his house should be saved.” Peter receives special Divine instruction in preparation for his mission to Cornelius. The Spirit, already resting in fulness on him, is poured out upon the Centurion and his house. In the midst of such a scene, Peter commands the baptism of water to be administered. And yet we are told that, in so doing, he showed his ignorance of the meaning of the commission to baptize, given him on Olivet, by the ascending Saviour,—that he was controlled by a carnal and Judaizing spirit! If this be so, the Centurion was instructed by the Spirit of God to lean on a broken reed,—to receive and obey, as the voice of God, the mistaken requirements of an erring man!

Our next example occurs in the ministry of Paul, an authority of the highest importance, as his apostleship and his doctrine were derived immediately from the ascended Saviour, independent of any intercourse with the other apostles, and free from liability to have imbibed from them any errors which they may be supposed to have fallen into. See Gal. i. 1, 11—24, ii. 1—10. This apostle rejoices that he had baptized but few of the Corinthians, for, says he, “Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel.” 1 Cor. i. 17. Here Macnair thinks Paul asserts water baptism to be an ordinance of

man, and not of Christ, and that he yet admits himself to have sometimes administered it. But,

1. Whatever the word *baptize* properly means, that it is of which, if we suppose him to have understood his own words, Paul speaks. Our author admits that he did mean water baptism.

2. Paul rejoiced, not that the Corinthians were unbaptized;—to admit that some were, and yet deny it to have been administered to all, were preposterous;—but his joy was, that he, personally, had not administered the ordinance, but had left it to the hand of others.

3. The apostles had it as their distinctive office to bear witness to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, as a demonstration of his Messiahship. Whilst, in common with all ministers of the gospel, they were commanded to baptize,—they had special commission to proclaim the gospel of the risen Saviour; to testify as eye-witnesses to the fact of his resurrection, and confirm that testimony by miracles. See Acts i. 3, 8, 21, 22, ii. 32, x. 39—41, 1 Cor. ix. 1, 2 Cor. xii. 12, Heb. ii. 3, 4.

4. Hence, it would seem to have been common with the apostles to commit the baptizing of their converts to the hands of any other authorized persons, who might be present; thus recognizing the fellowship of the ministry. See Acts x. 48.

5. In thus doing, the apostles as fully complied with the terms of their commission, as though each one had, with his own hands, baptized all who were converted under his ministry.

6. This, further, restrained the tendency of carnal disciples to attach some importance to the person by whom they had been baptized.

7. Macnair attempts to find support in the language of Paul, (1 Cor. i. 22,) “For the Jews require a sign,” which he would interpret, “The Jews require baptism,—a ritual symbol or sign.” But such is not the meaning of the word *σημεῖον*, which signifies a demonstrative proof. See Matt. xvi. 1, xxiv. 3, 30, xxvi. 48, &c. Paul, therefore, has no reference, in that word, to baptism; but to that trait in the Jewish character, of which Jesus says, “Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.” John iv. 48.

The conclusion, therefore, is, that Paul, the great opponent of Judaizing ritual and ceremonial observances, did baptize with his own hands some of the Corinthians with water,—an observance to which he could not have been led, but by the express authority of Christ. Gal. i. 1, 11, 12, ii. 6. This, too, in perfect consistency with the fact that he rejoiced in having cultivated the fellowship of the gospel, by committing the ordinance, in most cases, to the hands of other ministers; thus providentially cutting the Corinthians off from that ground of boasting of his name.

Further, we have thus an unquestionable exposition of the language of Acts xviii. 8, respecting the baptism of those who believed at Corinth. If Paul understood what the word *baptize* meant,—if Luke, the writer of the Acts, truly records the facts,—the baptism of the Corinthians was water baptism. And when, in the very next chapter, we find it stated of certain believers at Ephesus, that they were baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus, (Acts xix. 5,)—when this baptism is expressly contradistinguished from the baptism of power by the Holy Ghost, and brought into immediate connection with the baptism of John, both being expressed by the same word, *baptize*, the conclusion is inevitable, that the Ephesians were baptized as were the Corinthians, with water.

In this connection are to be included two additional places, in which it is admitted that the words *baptism* and *baptize* signify the application of water, viz., 1 Cor. x. 1, 2, and Heb. ix. 10.

And now let us glance at the leading points of the conclusions to which we have, thus far, come.

1. We have seen that baptism with water is a type and seal of that with the Holy Ghost.

2. That whilst the latter is essential in order to true conceptions respecting the kingdom of God, the baptism with water, our Saviour being witness, (John iii. 5), is essential to admittance into the visible organization of that kingdom.

3. That throughout the ministry of John and Christ, until the coming of the Spirit, the words, *baptize* and *baptism*, when used without adjuncts, designate baptism with water.

4. That at a time when this usage confessedly still existed, the Saviour commanded his disciples to baptize all nations.

5. That the baptism of power, promised by Christ to his disciples and realized by them on the day of Pentecost, and by others subsequently through the laying on of their hands, was an extraordinary influence, not to be confounded with "the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost," which is common to all the elect, whilst the other was peculiar to the apostolic age, and to certain chosen persons.

6. That this extraordinary, miraculous, and occasional baptism of the Holy Spirit, which disappeared from the church with the death of the apostles, is the only spiritual baptism of which the Scriptures speak, as attendant upon the laying on of hands.

7. That on the day of Pentecost, the reception of baptism was urged as a duty correlative with repentance; whilst the miraculous gift of the Spirit was announced as a promise, to be realized subsequent to repentance and baptism.

8. That Peter, John, Philip, and Paul, did confessedly baptize with water; and that, too, when under the extraordinary influence and guidance of the Spirit, who gave evidence of his approval, by miracles wrought in immediate and marked connection with the baptisms.

9. That especially was this the case in connection with the baptism of Cornelius; which was the opening of the doors of the kingdom to the whole Gentile world.

10. That by Peter, Philip, the Eunuch, and Paul, the word *baptize* is recognized as significant of water baptism,—is familiarly employed to express it, and, when so employed, is never accompanied with an explanatory adjunct, as though it might mean, of itself, something else.

11. That Luke, both in his Gospel and in the Acts, uses the same mode of expression wherever water baptism is alluded to.

12. That in one place (Acts xviii. 8,) in which no express mention is made of water in the history given by Luke, Paul himself testifies, as Macnair acknowledges, that water baptism was administered.

13. That the usage in respect to the words *baptize* and *bap-*

tism, as expressive of water baptism, is acknowledged by Macnair to prevail throughout the Gospels;—that no notice of a change in this usage occurs anywhere;—and that it in fact prevails throughout the Acts, in every instance of water baptism admitted by Macnair, and is still retained even in the Epistles. See 1 Cor. x. 1, 2, Heb. ix. 10.

Baptism is spoken of about eighty times in the New Testament. Of these about forty-one occur in the Gospels, where it is admitted that the word, by itself, signifies water baptism; some twenty-six are in the Acts, where in two instances an adjunct is used, to express spiritual baptism; in sixteen, it is admitted by Macnair that the circumstances render it unquestionable that water baptism is meant; in the other cases no adjunct is used; and yet Macnair asserts that they all mean spiritual baptism, although there is nothing in any one of the places to imply such a deviation from the universal usage as to the phraseology; and one of them is the case of the Corinthians, of whom we have Paul's testimony that they were baptized with water,—a testimony the more significant, as the apostle does not in terms name water at all, but Macnair is compelled from the nature of the apostle's argument to admit that he speaks of water baptism. The remaining instances in which the words occur, are in the epistles. In some of them, water baptism is unquestionably meant, and in others the adjuncts employed and the statements made show that the baptism of the Spirit is intended.

In short, in about sixty-six instances in which the words occur in the history of the beginning of the gospel, as given in the Evangelists and Acts, we have inspired interpretations which are admitted by Macnair to be conclusive in fifty-seven cases. Among these, a solitary case does not occur, in which the word baptism or baptize is used alone to express spiritual baptism. In no case is either word accompanied with an adjunct, when water baptism is meant; except where the design is to emphasize the distinction, where it is brought into immediate contrast with that of the Spirit. In the remaining places in which the word occurs, in the history of the apostolic age, there is nothing to forbid the word to be interpreted as in all the other places. Further, our Saviour,—speaking at a time

when the word, used without adjunct, is admitted by Macnair to have meant water baptism and nothing else,—uses it alone in the commission, “Go, baptize all nations;” the apostles go forth in fulfilment of this commission, and baptize all who received their testimony. In repeated instances, we have incidental proof that, by baptism, they understood that with water to be meant, and did in fact administer it; and, in no case, is there anything inconsistent with this interpretation.

THE CONCLUSION IS INEVITABLE, to those who take the Scriptures as their guide, that in the church which is built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone, there are two baptisms,—the baptism of the Holy Ghost, and that with water; the one, promised by the Son of God, and administered by him alone; the other, commanded by him, and administered in his name, and as a testimony to his saving grace, by his apostles and other ministers; and to be administered by his servants, until his second coming;—the one, in its own nature, essential to salvation; the other, a duty commanded by Christ, neglect of which is a sin, which, if wilful, implies destitution of renewing grace, and consequently loss of the soul;—the one, constituting a bestowal of eternal life upon the soul; the other, a public testimony to the source of that life, the manner of its bestowment, and the effects thence resulting.

Macnair appeals to the “one baptism,” of Eph. iv. 5, as excluding that with water. The apostle, as Macnair states, is insisting upon the unity of believers, as an argument of mutual love. “I beseech you that ye walk worthy of the vocation wherewith ye are called, with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love; endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. There is one body, and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.” Eph. iv. 1—6. The question present to the apostle’s mind brings up such points as attest the unity of believers, and, in respect to baptism determines nothing more than that they are not separated by diverse kinds of baptism, one being baptized into one thing and another into something different; but “by one

Spirit are we all," (with one baptism) "baptized into one body." 1 Cor. xii. 13. To assert, as does our author, that this language is inconsistent with the supposition that there is a typical baptism, with water, as well as the essential baptism of the Spirit, is to ignore and contradict the fact that, Macnair himself being witness, Paul did himself unquestionably administer baptism with water, as did the other apostles; and that he designates that ministration by the bare word, baptism. If, indeed, we were to admit as Macnair pretends, that some of the early converts were baptized with water, and others were not, we should then have a diversity of baptisms, contrary to the apostle's statement, and inconsistent with the unity of the church; which is the point of his appeal. The phrase "one baptism," as used by the apostle probably comprehends both that of water and that with the Spirit. "One Lord, one faith, a baptism one in the Spirit given, and the graces conferred, and one in the visible sign and seal." The argument of Macnair is puerile, in which he asserts that "baptism with water is not one, but manifold, administered sometimes in infancy, sometimes in manhood, sometimes by sprinkling, sometimes by immersion, sometimes with other ceremonies, and sometimes without," &c. He might have added the difference of sex to that of age. But are all cases of spiritual baptism at the same age? Then, in the first place, the assumption is altogether unwarranted, that it ever was administered, in the apostolic age, otherwise than by affusion; and, in the second, if water baptism be, as our writer himself represents it,—such an application of water as shows forth the renewing influences of the Spirit upon the soul,—the distinctions mentioned above are merely circumstantial,—the baptism is one.

In short, by the direct admission of this writer, the baptism which is spoken of in the last command of the ascending Saviour is to be administered to all believers, and dispensed to them by the hands of Christ's disciples. From the ministry is the baptism to be received; and to them, therefore, must men come to enjoy it. The alternative is, that lost sinners are to look,—not to the Son of God, himself, for the Spirit of renewing, cleansing, and sanctifying grace,—but to men like themselves, upon whose faithfulness, and superabundant investiture

with the Spirit, their salvation is made to depend;—or, that the baptism which the ministry is to dispense is that of water; whilst, as at first, so still, the Son of God himself is the baptizer with the Holy Ghost, to whom men must come for salvation, and from whom alone is to be obtained “the Spirit of life.” The one theory invites men to trust in an arm of flesh; the other, in the love of Christ. The former system is antichrist. The latter is the gospel of the Son of God.

Faithfulness to the truth of Christ forbids us to close, without distinctly marking the sceptical spirit which inspires Macnair's entire book. Whilst professing to accept the word of God as the infallible guide, he does not hesitate to reject the testimony of those very apostles to whom Jesus expressly says, “Whoso heareth you, heareth me.” He quibbles about the vision and misrepresents Peter, as though he was hard to persuade to call no man common or unclean. Whereas, the simple fact is, that the vision and expostulation of Peter was respecting the eating of all manner of wild beasts and reptiles. The meaning of this vision was not at first revealed to Peter, (Acts x. 17,) and was only imparted to him, upon the coming of the messenger of Cornelius, with whose summons Peter, without a moment's hesitation, complied. But what must be the writer's estimate of the wisdom, faithfulness, and power of God, whom he admits to have used such special care, in preparing Peter for his mission to Cornelius, and inducing in Cornelius an implicit trust in Peter, as one who would “tell him what he ought to do;” and yet permit Peter to commit a signal blunder, which implies utter mistake as to the meaning of the very commission under which he went forth to preach, given him by the ascending Saviour, on Mount Olivet! In one word, either were the apostles protected from all error in their official instructions and actions, or the Bible is to be rejected as a rule of faith; since we have no criterion of truth, if there be error there. Either are they infallible guides, or they are nothing, and the Bible a fable. It is said that they did sometimes err, as Peter at Antioch, (Gal. ii. 11;) but, in the first place, the case was of private, and not of official conduct. As an apostle, he had the pledge of guidance into all truth. As an individual, he was not yet perfect. And, in the second

place, we should never have known of that error, but for the inspired record condemning it. Thus we are assured, that had the apostles erred in more important matters, the mistakes would have been distinctly pointed out, and not left on the sacred page, to ensnare and mislead the people of God.

In one word, by the distinct admission of our author himself, he and the apostles differ on the subject of baptism. They administered it with water, in the name of the blessed Three, as commanded by Jesus. He thinks they ought not so to have done. The authority of Christ and the apostles is on one side. On the other is our author. The reader will choose between them.

ART. VI.—*The General Assembly.*

THE General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States met agreeably to appointment in Newark, New Jersey, May 19th, 1864; and, in absence of Dr. Morrison, the Moderator of the last Assembly, was opened by a sermon by William L. Breckinridge, D. D., on 2 Cor. viii. 9. After the usual preliminary services, James Wood, D. D., of Indiana, was chosen Moderator and Ravaud K. Rodgers, D. D., of New Jersey, Temporary Clerk.

Report on Psalmody.

J. Trumbull Backus, D. D., chairman of the committee on this subject, made a report included in the following resolutions, which, after protracted and desultory debate, were adopted.

Resolved, 1. That a selection of psalms and hymns be made from our present book, and from other sources, and published with suitable tunes; and that all the new hymns in this new selection, which are not in our present book, be published as a *supplement*, for the use of those who prefer it; and that the hymns in the new selection, in addition to their own numbers, shall

retain the numbers in the old book, so that both may be used in the same congregation without embarrassment.

Resolved, 2. That in accordance with the recommendation of previous Assemblies, and responsive to the wish of many in the church, there shall be made a careful selection from the Bible, of passages to be arranged for chanting; and that this shall be fitted to be bound both with the selection of hymns and tunes, and with the supplement, at the option of the churches.

Resolved, 3. That the volumes thus provided for, shall be furnished with ample indices, after the style of the best improvements in this respect.

Resolved, 4. That a committee of five be appointed by this Assembly, who shall have power to employ all needful talent and means, at the expense of the Board of Publication, for the accomplishment of these ends, as perfectly and speedily as possible, and report the result to some future Assembly.

Resolved 5. That the Board of Publication be instructed to defray the personal expenses of the present Committee, incurred in performing this service.

Dr. Krebs, J. T. Backus, R. Davidson, W. Lord, and J. E. Rockwell, were appointed the committee to prepare a new Hymn Book.

Increase of Salaries.

Judge Ryerson introduced at an early period the following preamble and resolutions, which were unanimously adopted, viz.

Whereas, By reason of the greatly enhanced prices of every article of family consumption, averaging fully fifty per cent. more than two years ago, the salaries of the great majority of our ministers have become entirely inadequate to the comfortable support of their families—causing in many cases much of destitution and suffering; therefore,

Resolved, That a committee of five ruling elders be appointed, to consider what steps it may be proper for this General Assembly to take, to remedy this crying evil.

The Judge said that he thought no remarks were necessary to enforce the importance of this proposal, as the facts were

obvious. He had proposed that the committee be composed entirely of laymen, in view of the delicacy that ministers might feel in acting upon a subject of that nature; and he hoped the proposal would meet with the favour of the Assembly.

The committee appointed in virtue of the foregoing resolution, prepared a letter to be addressed to the churches, by the General Assembly. This letter was adopted, and is as follows:

Letter of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, to the Ruling Elders, Deacons and Trustees of the churches under the care of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church.

Beloved Brethren—We have, on various occasions, addressed our churches on the subject of providing an adequate support for the ministers of the gospel, and are happy to know that this obligation has been generally recognized in our communion.

Under ordinary circumstances, it might have been superfluous to advert to the subject again. But the calamitous war, which has been so recklessly and causelessly forced upon our country by unscrupulous and wicked men, bringing with it so many new duties, trials, and sorrows, and affecting in various ways the vital interests of the church, is telling with extreme severity upon the comfort and usefulness of the Christian ministry. Many, very many, worthy, faithful, and devoted pastors, while they and their families have been suffering for want of the comforts, and often the necessities of life, have most sensibly been caused to realize some of the consequences of the great sin of rebellion.

It would be but a waste of time to dwell upon the greatly increased expenses of living; you have but too many proofs of it already. The inevitable consequence has been a corresponding advance in wages and salaries, and a corresponding loss to all dependent upon fixed incomes. Families have increased the wages of their domestics; farmers and mechanics, of their workmen; merchants, commercial institutions, corporations of every kind, and public offices—municipal, state, and national—of their clerks and agents. A movement so general and comprehensive must have had an adequate cause; the necessity which compelled it must be one reaching all classes of society—all,

at least, dependent upon fixed salaries for a livelihood—and none should be denied a participation in these measures of relief.

We have, however, reason to fear that up to this period, with some rare and honourable exceptions, the claims of the ministry have been overlooked. The salaries of pastors, always small, always much less than they could have earned in secular pursuits, and too often insufficient for even a meagre support, remain in a large majority of cases stationary, while the price of living has advanced fully fifty per cent. We believe this is the result, not of design, but of inadvertence. Pastors shrink from asking an increase, and it is not the way of the world to enlarge salaries where there is neither demand nor complaint. But we are sure that our people would not willingly subject their ministers to the mortification of *supplicating* an increase of their stipends. We cannot doubt their readiness to act in the premises, whenever it shall be properly brought before them. To believe otherwise would be a reproach to their intelligence, their sense of justice, their appreciation of Christian ordinances, and their fidelity to the Saviour. They are not yet prepared to condemn His wise and equitable decree, "that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel." What our congregations need, is that some competent authority should bring the subject to their notice.

It is with this view, beloved brethren, that we address this letter to you, the respected ruling elders and trustees of our churches. We ask you to bring the subject before your respective congregations *with the least possible delay*. We beg you to have it candidly and prayerfully considered. Deal justly, nay, generously, by your pastors. Your liberality to them will not be a lost investment, but will yield a rich return to you and your families; for in this, as in other relations, "he which soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully." You will begin to reap at once, for a congregation always finds its own present advantage in relieving its pastor of all perplexity about his support, and placing him in a position where he can work with comfort, his mind free from anxious and harassing cares about his temporal support. And then, if other motive still be needed, you have it in those touching and wonderful words of our Lord and Saviour, "Inasmuch as ye have done it

unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." If the Saviour were here, is there a church bearing his name that would not covet the privilege of ministering to his wants?

We are deeply impressed with the importance of this subject. It is not at all in the light of a personal favour to the ministers of the gospel that we bring it before you. It is vital to the church, and vital to our afflicted country. Our most precious interests, secular and spiritual, ecclesiastical and national, demand that the hands of the evangelical ministry be strengthened in every practicable way, and the ordinances of the sanctuary clothed with the highest degree of efficiency. We are now being punished most grievously for the past wickedness of the nation, and it cannot be too often, nor too strongly, impressed upon the minds and hearts of our people that there cannot be any rational hope of maintaining our free institutions except by the all-pervading influence of the gospel. "Righteousness exalteth a nation: but sin is a reproach to any people." "If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." All history abundantly confirms these clear teachings of the Bible, and we must heed them if we desire to escape the fate of the many great and powerful nations that have perished from the earth. How is it possible to produce these blessed results, so dear to the heart of every Christian, of every true patriot, unless we maintain the Christian ministry, and the ordinances of the gospel, in a condition of the highest practicable efficiency? And how can that be done without an adequate support of the ministry?

We leave the matter in your hands, dear brethren, satisfied that you will deal with it in a spirit of Christian kindness to your pastors, and of unfeigned love to our common Lord and Master.

P. S. This letter relates to pastors. But the policy it recommends pertains, with equal reason, to ministers who are faithfully serving the church in her Colleges, Seminaries, and Boards, and in this view we invite attention to it on the part of all concerned in the management of these institutions.

JAMES WOOD, *Moderator.*

A. T. MCGILL, *Stated Clerk,*

W. E. SCHENCK, *Permanent Clerk.*

The ground taken in the above letter is self-evidently just and proper. The increased price of the necessaries of life has forced upon all employers a corresponding increase in the rate of compensation. As ministers are salaried officers, though not exactly hired servants, they are very apt to be overlooked in the application of the rule which is recognized not only as just, but indispensable, in other cases. We hope great good may result from the Assembly's kind appeal. That good can, however, at best, be only temporary. The evil lies much deeper than any passing condition of our monetary affairs. It is rooted in our system, which is radically wrong in principle, contrary to all Divine appointments, and to the usage of the church in all ages except our own. Our whole theory of ministerial support is founded on the denial of the unity of the church. It resolves itself into Congregationalism. The minister is the servant of a congregation, and they only are bound to support him. Against this system we have written and protested for years; and some of the best men of our church have argued and laboured to subvert it; but to no purpose. In this, as in so many other points, Presbyterianism has been congregationalized (*i. e.*, adulterated and weakened by the introduction of the principles of Independency) in this country to such a degree, that the public mind has become fixed. The people are set in their present way of thinking. They will acknowledge that they are bound to support their own minister; but what have they to do with supporting the ministers of other congregations, in Iowa, or Kansas? We are glad of every opportunity of bringing up this subject. The truth will at last prevail. *Gutta cavat lapidem.* Let the brethren, clerical and lay, think of these things, viz., 1. The obligation to support the ministry, so far as it rests on the law of Christ, that "those who preach the gospel shall live by the gospel;" or, on the general principles of moral and religious duty, binds the whole church, and the church as a whole. We are bound to sustain and comfort the soldiers fighting on the Chickahominy or the Chatahoochie, as well as those who garrison the forts in our city harbours. 2. Under the old dispensation, the obligation to sustain the temple, its services, and the priesthood, rested on the whole people. It was a lien on the property of

the whole land. 3. The same principle has been the general law of Christendom. 4. Throwing the support of the clergy on the particular congregations to which they minister, is very much an Americanism. It is one of the new principles which have sprung up among us, some of which principles are good, and some evil. 5. It works great injustice to the people. It imposes on the few and the poor the same burden which in other places rests on the many and the rich. 6. It works grievous injustice to the ministry. Hundreds of them are labouring on a salary which does not afford them even the necessaries of life, to say nothing of its comforts. Nearly twenty years ago, Mr. James Lenox, of New York, caused to be reprinted and widely circulated, a pamphlet on Christian Economics, by the late Dr. Chalmers, of Edinburgh, in which the Free Church plan for an equitable, and, within certain limits, an equitable ministerial support, was ably advocated. It would be well if the facts and arguments therein presented could once more be brought before the mind of the church.

Vacant Churches.

The Rev. Dr. Krebs, from the Committee appointed by the last General Assembly, to report upon the subject of vacant churches and unemployed ministers, and bringing them to a union, made a report, reciting the difficulties that environ the subject, and making some suggestions. The report was accepted, and placed on the docket. It was a lucid and interesting report.

Prayer for the Country.

At an early period of the sessions, the Rev. S. Miller introduced a resolution contemplating the appointment of a day for fasting and prayer, in relation to the state of the country. After some debate, a substitute was offered by Dr. Nevin, recommending that the Assembly devote the afternoon of the next Wednesday, to special thanksgiving and prayer in reference to our national affairs. It was also resolved, that notice should be sent to the General Assembly in session at Dayton, Ohio, apprising them of this action of our Assembly, and requesting them to unite with us in the appointed services. To this a cordial assent was signified; and the two assemblies united

their prayers in behalf of our beloved and suffering country. The Rev. Dr. McMaster introduced a paper which was read and made the order of the day for the evening of the fifth day of the sessions of the Assembly. In this paper he recounted the national sins for which we are now suffering, especially our sins in connection with slavery, and urged the appointment of a general fast. The adoption of this paper was urged by its author in an earnest speech, occupying most of the evening in its delivery. On motion of Dr. Musgrave, the paper and its proposals were referred to the Committee of Bills and Overtures. On their recommendation, the first day of September next was designated as a day for fasting and prayer, in case the President of the United States should not previously appoint another day.

Revised Book of Discipline.

The Rev. Dr. Beatty moved that the Assembly take up the consideration of the Revised Book of Discipline, commenced in the last Assembly, and by it referred to this body. He proposed the adoption of the eighth chapter of the New Book, with a view to its being sent down to the Presbyteries. The Rev. Dr. Rice moved that the consideration of the subject be referred to the next Assembly. This motion was warmly seconded by Dr. Musgrave, and sustained by Drs. Elliott, Junkin, Nevin, and Messrs. Haskell, Kempshall, Miller, and others. It was opposed by Dr. Beatty, who urged that as the work had already been seven years on hand, it ought to be finally disposed of. Drs. Krebs, Lowrie, and Backus took the same view, but Dr. Rice's motion to postpone was adopted by a large majority. We do not know that any surprise need be felt at this decision. In the first place, the General Assembly is a large body. Its *vis inertiae* is great. It requires a great and continued force to set it in motion. In the second place, in every such body, and in every community, there is a party opposed to all change. They are wedded to old ways, and cannot be persuaded that anything new is good. The old naval officers of England and America opposed the introduction of steam into the navy. It is not surprising, therefore, when a man has trod the quarter deck as long as Dr. Musgrave has

done, that he is disposed to pitch any new sailing orders into the sea without even looking at them. He has sailed in all weathers, and always got into port; he is therefore satisfied with things as they are. This class of men are very respectable, very strong, and very confident. With *them*, seeing is believing. It is no use to tell them that steam is surer and better than wind as a motive power. They have sailed too long to believe that a ship can go ahead against wind or tide, no matter how large "a tea kettle," (as an English Admiral called a steam-engine,) she may have on board. These good men can be moved only by a *vis à tergo*. But move they must. Still for the time being they keep things steady. In the third place, not one in ten of the General Assembly knew anything of the New Book. They had, therefore, no ground for judging of its merits. More effective than any other consideration was no doubt the desire to get rid of business. There is so much more to be done by every Assembly than can be done deliberately, that every item is stricken from the docket which can with any show of propriety be got rid of. There is also a latent consciousness that the General Assembly is not a fit body to frame a book of discipline, or to discuss its several provisions. Its members change year by year. Every question comes up new to every mind. It must decide on the first impression, or not at all. Congress might as well be expected, in the midst of the pressure of all other business, to frame a constitution, as the General Assembly wisely to frame a new Book of Discipline. There are only two ways, as it seems to us, that this work can be well done. The one is, to have a convention called for the purpose, to sit two or three weeks; and when they have settled everything to their satisfaction, send it down to the Presbyteries to be ratified or rejected. Thus our national constitution was framed. The other method is, for the Presbyteries to take the Revised Book and carefully consider, amend, or reject it; and then for the Assembly to act definitively under their guidance. The work of deliberation must be done either in a convention, or in the Presbyteries. It cannot be done in the Assembly; and the plan of having it done by a committee of eight or ten, experience shows will not answer. The reasons for the alterations are presented to too

few minds. The mass of those who are called to judge and decide have not considered the several points to be determined, and they cannot be expected to act blindly. That something must be done, we are fully persuaded. Our present Book is confused, contradictory, and impracticable. It cannot be acted upon without a consumption of time that is intolerable. In every Assembly where judicial business is to be transacted, there are confusion, and disorder,—decisions which shock and offend, first one party and then another, all because the Book itself is what it is. It is no answer to this to say that our present Book was framed by great and good men. So was the constitution of England the work of great men. But it must be altered or overthrown to suit the change in men and things. And our old Book, we are persuaded, must be altered, or our whole system will utterly break down. That a church of three thousand ministers shall be occupied, as it may be for days, or even weeks, in its General Assembly, in determining the merits of a petty slander case, in any village in the Union, is a solecism not to be longer endured.

Board of Church Extension.

The Committee on the Board of Church Extension report to the General Assembly, that they have examined the Annual Report and the Minutes of the Board, and find them worthy of approval; and in relation to the important work of this Board, they recommend the adoption by the Assembly of the following resolutions, viz.

Resolved, That the Assembly, with devout gratitude, acknowledge the good measure of prosperity which God has bestowed on this Board during the past year, in inclining a number of churches larger by one hundred and forty-seven than last year, to contribute to this cause, from this and other sources raising its receipts to \$24,847, a sum greater by \$5622 than last year received, enabling it thus to increase both the number and the amount of its appropriations; and yet to report an encouraging balance.

Resolved, 2. That the Assembly cherish and express entire confidence in the wisdom, zeal, and prudence with which its operations have been conducted during the past year, and that

in these respects the Board be commended to the prayerful affection and support of all the churches.

Resolved, 3. That the increase of one hundred per cent. in the cost of building, together with the diminished pecuniary resources of many of our new and frontier churches, and the dismantling and destruction of many church edifices by the presence and ravages of war, combine to enhance, to a great degree, the importance of this cause, and give it a claim more powerful than ever upon the interest of Christians.

Resolved, 4. That the Assembly regret to contemplate the large number of churches under its care which as yet have failed to make any contribution to this cause, and that it earnestly asks from all a support for the coming year, which shall be proportioned to the exigencies of the present crisis.

Resolved, 5. That the Board be directed to appropriate its resources during the coming year, with the utmost liberality which is consistent with prudence, trusting to that goodness of God, and that liberality of his people, which have characterized so largely the year past.

The following is an abstract of the Report of the Board of Church Extension:

We must open our Ninth Annual Report with a record of death. On the 31st of January, 1864, Hamilton R. Gamble, Governor of Missouri, and one of the original members of the Board, entered into his rest. By his removal, the country has lost one of its wisest and purest statesmen, the church one of its brightest ornaments, and the Board one of its most liberal and judicious friends. Saddened as we are by this great calamity, we yet find abundant cause for thankfulness in the favour of God shown towards the work entrusted to us. He has increased the receipts of the Board \$5622.27 over those of last year, and inclined 713, instead of 566 churches, to remember the cause of Church Extension.

Applications.—The number of applications for aid filed from April 1, 1863, to April 1, 1864, was seventy. These applications were from churches in the bounds of twenty Synods, thirty-six Presbyteries, and fifteen states and terri-

tories. These seventy churches ask for aid amounting in the aggregate to \$31,054.02, averaging \$442.91 each.

Besides these new applications, there were thirty-two previous applications, calling for \$12,750, undisposed of April 1, 1863. The Board therefore had before it during the period covered by this Report, one hundred and two applications, calling for nearly \$44,000.

During the year, seven applications, calling for \$7100, were stricken from the file because they had not furnished the requisite information in the two years allowed for that purpose.

There remained on file, undisposed of, April 1, 1864, applications from forty-two churches, requesting aid to the amount of \$22,210.

Appropriations.—During the year under review, appropriations amounting to \$11,557.27 were made to forty-seven churches, in the bounds of seventeen Synods, thirty-one Presbyteries, and fourteen states and territories.

Cost of Church Edifices.—Since the organization of the Board, July, 1855, appropriations have been made to five hundred and seventeen different churches. Of these, seventy-one churches were aided by special appropriations, for which the Board took no responsibility. As nearly as we can ascertain, the remaining four hundred and forty-six churches cost \$874,847, or \$1961 each.

Receipts and Expenditures.—The balance on hand April 1, 1863, was \$20,506.58. The receipts from all sources during the year were \$24,847.49, of which sum \$14,936.52 was from churches. The available means of the year therefore were \$45,354.09.

The expenditures of the year, as shown by the Treasurer's statement in the appendix, were \$12,302.81. The balance in the treasury April 1, 1864, was consequently \$33,051.26. There were, however, unpaid at that time liabilities amounting to \$15,552.71, leaving as the unpledged balance at the close of the fiscal year, \$17,498.55.

Rev. H. I. Coe, Secretary of the Board, advocated its claims, and explained its operations, and was followed by Drs. Musgrave, Tustin, and Candee.

Board of Education.

The Committee on the Board of Education respectfully report that they have examined the Annual Report, with an abstract of the Treasurer's accounts, and the several record books of the Board and the Executive Committee, and finding in them evidences of correctness, fidelity, progress, and success, cordially recommend approval, and the adoption of the following resolutions:

Resolved, 1. That the continued success of the operations of the Board of Education during the past year furnishes occasion for the reiteration of fervent thanksgiving to God for his approving smiles; that amidst the grievous desolations of an unprecedented civil war, which has filled our Zion and our land with sorrow, the Board of Education has been enabled to meet all the authorized demands upon their treasury, and retain a balance sufficient to enter upon the new fiscal year with an encouraging promise of efficiency.

Resolved, 2. That the General Assembly rejoice to know that progress has been made during the last year towards a higher standard of ministerial qualifications, and that so much evidence is afforded of the good which has resulted from the greater caution exhibited on the part of the Presbyteries in receiving and watching over the candidates under their care.

Resolved, 3. That the General Assembly learn with gratitude and commendation of the evidence of increasing interest manifested by the courts of our church, in the schools, academies, and colleges under their supervision, in connection with the Board; especially the growing confidence of the church in the Ashmun Institute, the only institution of our church in our country, whose sole object is the education of coloured students for the Christian ministry, and other important positions.

Resolved, 4. That whereas a large number of the African race in our country, known as the Freedmen, are in great need of both moral and intellectual culture, the General Assembly do hereby instruct the Board of Education to endeavour to supply these wants for them at all such points as are now or may in the future become accessible, and the funds which are now or may hereafter be in the department of schools may authorize,

and that the necessary and long-established rule for the organization of parochial schools be considered as no hinderance to this important and pressing work.

Resolved, 5. That although the number of candidates received during the last year is larger than it was the year previous, yet this General Assembly cannot fail to notice with deep concern the alarming disproportion existing between the increase of candidates for the gospel ministry and the increase of the membership of our churches, which fact prompts them again to urge most affectionately this vital subject upon the prayerful attention of the ministers, elders, and membership of our entire Zion.

Resolved, 6. That the General Assembly most cheerfully concur in the recommendation of the Board, and do hereby ordain that the maximum of the scholarships, for the present, be increased from \$80 to \$100 to academical students, and from \$100 to \$120 for college students, and from \$120 to \$150 for theological students, and that the Board be requested to make it \$175, if in their judgment the funds will warrant it.

Resolved, 7. That this Assembly renew with increased earnestness the recommendation of previous General Assemblies, that the last Thursday of February may be designated as a day of special prayer for the children of the covenant, and the youth of the world—especially those gathered in our various educational institutions; and that it also be recommended to all the churches to take up collections on that occasion for the fund devoted to the aid of parochial schools, academies, and colleges.

Resolved, 8. That the securities which came under the name and control of the Board of Education by the acts of the Agent or Standing Committee of the Presbytery of Chicago, the proceeds of which are to be devoted to the cause of Education among the French-speaking Canadians of St. Anne and Kankakee in Illinois, be returned by the Trustees of the Board of Education to the Presbytery of Chicago, to be applied by them as intended by the original donors of said funds.

Dr. Chester, Secretary of the Board, made the following remarks in setting forth its plans and operations:

The courtesy of the Assembly puts restraint upon a Secretary in regard to complaints, or he would deplore the fact that

the number of candidates for the ministry has greatly diminished. That was the most discouraging fact to which the Report called the attention of the Assembly. They had also to complain of deficient means, at least in one department of the operations of the Board—that of fostering schools, academies, and colleges. The method which was relied upon—the scheme of systematic benevolence—for replenishing the Boards of the church, had measurably failed. It was a scheme which might be well adapted to the *millennium*, and to a more perfect state of the church; but as things are, and as men are, and ministers, it was not likely that the voluntary offering of the people would suffice, unless greater efforts were made to call it forth. He was perfectly satisfied that this system will not accomplish what the church and the cause need, until there is created a public sentiment that will rebuke, as derelict in duty, the minister and the church that fails to make regular collections for the several Boards of the church. Owing to the diminution of the number of candidates, the Board had not a deficiency of means for ministerial education; but in the school and college enterprise, the means were far in the rear of the calls upon the Board. There is a tendency, however, in a direction that he hoped would relieve this ground of discouragement. One of the evils of our educational appliances was that of too many small and ill-sustained colleges. There now was a disposition to concentrate into one large and well-appointed institution the means and efforts of many colleges. He thought it likely that five states of the Northwest would unite in the endowment of one great collegiate institution.

In regard to the diminution in the number of candidates, the chief cause, he thought, were the public troubles. Seventeen youth from a single institution had taken their muskets and gone forth to battle, and are now numbered with the dead. In another, the whole senior class had gone to the war, and that year there were no graduates. This is the point upon which the war has struck us—not so much the lack of funds as the decrease of candidates. Something must be done, or the church will suffer for labourers. It is a divine revelation and command, “Pray ye the Lord of the harvest that he will send

forth labourers into his harvest," and that prayer should be regarded as incomplete that does not embrace this request.

Dr. Chester wished to bear testimony to the happy effects of the increased care which the Presbyteries bestowed upon the examination of candidates. The best effects had followed this increased diligence. The standard of qualification had been lifted up; if fewer candidates were received, they were better qualified, and less likely to prove failures. The injunction of the Assembly upon the Presbyteries to exercise greater vigilance and care, works well. He was aware that prejudices had arisen against the cause of this Board on account of the fact that from time to time some failures had occurred. It is true that when the enterprise was new, and the Board, and the church, and the Presbyteries inexperienced, some candidates had not turned out well; but the per centage was annually diminished, until under the care of the Board and the faithfulness of the Presbyteries, it is a rare thing for a candidate of improper character to be taken on our funds. Of one hundred and thirty recently passing through the care of the Board to the ministry, not one had been a failure.

Dr. Chester spoke of a wide and interesting field of education lately opened before the Board, in the vast numbers of freedmen that had been and were being delivered from slavery, and whom the church ought to meet with proffers of education. He thanked the General Assembly and Committee for commanding them to the notice of the Board, and proposing to authorize the Board to make efforts to send teachers to them. He mentioned the case of the Ashmun Institute, Chester county, Pennsylvania, which had been established for the purpose of educating coloured men for teachers and ministers. The Board assisted in the support of the president, and gave to students in it five hundred dollars last year. The beloved Van Rensselaer had taken a lively interest in this institution, so long as he lived; and the Board desired, as they could get the means, still to cherish it. It had lately sent forth three coloured ministers, with the Hebrew Bible under one arm, and the Greek Testament under the other, to occupy three important positions of usefulness. Scores of individuals, male and female, were ready to go and teach the freedmen, if protection

and bread were furnished. He spoke in feeling and earnest terms of the condition of the coloured population, and plead for their education.

The recommendation to increase the allowance to the beneficiaries of the Board, on account of the great increase of the cost of living, was cheerfully complied with by the Assembly. The resolution respecting the instruction of freedmen gave rise to some discussion, in which Dr. Musgrave, Dr. Nevin, Mr. Logan, Mr. Dubois, and others, took part. The importance of the work, and the obligation of the church in the matter, were fully recognized; but some doubts were expressed whether it fell properly within the province of the Board of Education. On motion of Mr. Logan, sustained by Dr. McMaster, a resolution and a memorial in the hands of Dr. McMaster, on the same subject, were referred to a special committee, who subsequently reported that schools for freedmen were too great a burden to be added to the duties of the Board of Education, and recommended that special committees be appointed to take charge of this business. Agreeably, Messrs. W. P. Breed and Samuel F. Colt, ministers, and Morris Patterson, John McArthur, and Wilfred Hall, ruling elders, were appointed as such committee in Philadelphia; and Messrs. J. H. Nixon and S. C. Logan, ministers, and James M. Ray, C. W. Todd, and Jesse L. Williams, ruling elders, the committee in Indianapolis.

Board of Publication.

The first order of the day was taken up, and Dr. Backus, from the Standing Committee on the Board of Publication, presented a report. After discussion, the report was unanimously adopted, as follows:

After careful examination of the books of minutes of the Board of Publication and of its Executive Committee, and their balance-sheet exhibited to us, it is recommended that these records be approved.

The Committee with pleasure report that they discover abundant evidence of fidelity and success in the prosecution of this important work of our church. Particular attention is invited to the fact that the Board promptly and cordially conformed

to the directions of the last Assembly, and that they are enabled to say in their Report that they find themselves, "at the end of the first year after, in a condition of comfort and prosperity," hoping that "the future progress" of the Board may be marked by an experience of "generous confidence from all sides." The Board were, unfortunately, not able to effect the purpose of the Assembly in respect to the annuity for the family of whatever Secretary might die in office, the company with whom the deposit was made declining to permit the withdrawal of the funds, on the ground that it is a permanent investment.

But the hopeful view of the Report appears to be fully authorized by the facts, so far as your Committee have discovered, and the following action is recommended to the Assembly in relation to this subject.

Resolved, 1. That the growing importance of this work is recognized by the Assembly, and urged upon the churches, as a means of supplying our people, and especially our youth, in this day of prevalent pernicious literature, the facilities afforded by our Board of Publication for healthful efforts in the direction of congregational and Sabbath-school libraries, and for those forms of parish colportage now becoming more and more manifestly the essential auxiliary of our ministry in their work, are commended to our pastors and churches. That the Assembly approve of and highly appreciate the successful efforts of the Board to enlarge its list of Sabbath-school books, affording (as we believe) an invaluable supply for the church, in their excellent character and superior attractions. And that the recommendations of previous Assemblies be earnestly reiterated in regard to the circulation of the *Home and Foreign Record* in our families, and of the *Sabbath-school Visitor* in our church schools. At the same time the Assembly say to the Board, that in these respects, and preëminently in regard to reading matter for Sabbath-schools, their motto more than ever should be "Excelsior;" that here, under the Divine blessing, is the hope of our church in the efficiency of this Board for developing our peculiar resource and power as a denomination.

Resolved, 2. That the liberal outlay of the Board on behalf

of our young men in the army and in the navy, and of our sick and wounded in the hospitals, and the gratuities to our military prisoners, and to the freedmen, are warmly approved; and that the duty and privilege of a zealous coöperation in this work of love and mercy, so greatly owned and blessed of God, is urged upon all our churches. Especially is it advised, that the efforts of our people, through that noble and well-named enterprise, the Christian Commission, recognize the preëminent suitableness of our own publications for the religious purposes of the camp and the hospital.

Resolved, 3. That the Assembly direct the Synods and Presbyteries, at their next regular meeting hereafter, to take order upon these suggestions, and consider the expediency of appointing a committee to secure regular and proper coöperation from the churches with the Board.

Resolved, 4. That the Assembly approve of the temporary increase of salaries allowed by the Board in consequence of the times, and regard it as not inconsistent with the directions of the last Assembly upon the subject of remunerations. And they also recommend, for the same reason, a fair addition to the pay of our colporteurs.

Dr. Schenck addressed the Assembly on the operations of the Board, giving a very encouraging view of its history during the past year. He was followed by Mr. Hayes, Dr. Junkin, Mr. Colt, Dr. Musgrave, Dr. Beatty, Mr. C. O. Waters, Rev. Mr. De Lancey, and Rev. Mr. Cleland; and the report of the Committee was unanimously adopted.

Board of Foreign Missions.

The first order of the day was taken up, and Dr. Candee presented a report from the Standing Committee on the Board of Foreign Missions, which was adopted, and is as follows:

The Committee to whom was referred the Report of the Board of Foreign Missions, beg leave respectfully to present to the Assembly the following suggestions and resolutions:

They have examined with care both the Report of the Board and the Minutes of the Executive Committee; from the latter deriving the strong conviction of the care and caution with

which, in these times of unusual pecuniary derangement, they have managed the funds committed to their trust.

The duty of the church in the spread of truth, is not bounded by her own families or firesides, nor is it limited to her own churches and neighbourhoods. The wide world is her field; and in carrying out her plans of evangelization, her agents must traverse every land, and become inured to every clime.

The Report encourages us to go forward in the great work of furnishing to the whole world the means of salvation. It is not needful that your Committee should review, in this report, the whole field of the Board's operations, nor would time permit. But we are glad to say that in nearly all the fields occupied by our missions, there are strong encouragements to go forward.

Among these encouragements we may mention

The missions to those of the Indian tribes which the rebellion has left within our reach, among whom a great work is being done, at very small expense.

In South America, especially in Bogota, in consequence of certain governmental action, a collision has arisen between the clergy and state authorities, which has tended to turn the attention of the people toward the truth.

We may mention here, also, the encouragement which our missionaries receive from the authorities in India; and also the protection extended to them in China—a mission having been established, and a missionary actually residing in Pekin, the capital of that vast empire.

We are happy to state, also, that there has been, during the past year, an increase, both in the amount of contributions from the churches, and in the number of churches that have contributed. Of the twenty-six Synods whose churches have sent up their offerings, all but four have very considerably increased their donations. The income of the Board during the year now closed, has been larger than that of the previous year, by a large amount. This fact is encouraging, as showing the deeper hold this cause is taking upon the hearts of the people.

Thus the greatly increased expense of transmitting funds to our foreign missionaries, has been met by a corresponding

increase in the contributions to the cause. But we must not forget that probably even a greater increase of cost in this direction is to be met another year, and that no provision has been made to meet it. We would say to the churches, whose servants we are for Jesus' sake, *let not these interests languish.*

The increase in the number of native helpers, and the growth of the native churches, is an encouraging and animating feature of this work. In every field the work is progressing. There are, of necessity, loud calls for men to occupy these opening harvest-fields. Are there not in all our tens of thousands of families, and in our hundreds of thousands of purses, men and money enough to answer all these calls? The silver and the gold are the Lord's, and the cattle upon a thousand hills.

In view of these facts, the Committee recommend to the Assembly the adoption of the resolutions following, viz.

Resolved, 1. That our earnest thanks are due to the great Head of the church—1st. For the raising up of so many efficient native helpers in the foreign field. 2d. That the work is progressing in every field now occupied by the missions of our church. In this we recognize the tokens of the Divine blessing on this cause.

Resolved, 2. That our felt dependence on the Spirit of God, for carrying on this work, and giving success to our efforts, does not lessen our obligation to pray and give of our substance to this end, but rather increases our obligation thereto.

Regarding the means and agencies bearing on our work,

Resolved, 3. That the periodicals issued by the Board of Foreign Missions be commended to our church-members and Sunday-school pupils, as well adapted to stir up a spirit of prayer, and excite increased efforts for the promotion of the cause.

Resolved, 4. That as the way opens, and the fields expand, we do earnestly encourage the Board to enter in and occupy.

New missions are needed. Shall they be established? Is it inquired, Where are the means? We answer, They are in the hands of Christians, who are God's stewards. Let a proper demand be made; let this Assembly call on the churches in the

name of the Lord, and that call will be answered. The response will come to us in the spirit of that consecration in which all God's people have laid themselves and their all upon his altar.

Resolved, 5. That this Assembly say to the Board of Foreign Missions—*Go forward* in the great work to which God and this church have called you.

Resolved, 6. That, in the opinion of this General Assembly, the Presbyterian church under its care should, during the ensuing year, increase the amount of funds put under the command of the Board of Foreign Missions, for the spread of the gospel among the heathen, to not less than *three hundred thousand dollars*.

The Rev. J. C. Lowrie, D. D., Corresponding Secretary, referred to the severe bereavement which the Board had experienced during the past year, in the death of valued missionaries; to the peculiar difficulty arising from the high rate of foreign exchange; to the encouragements which, in the midst of these trials, God had given them in their labours. Messrs. Platt, Haskell, Walsh, W. Rankin, Hughes, Rodgers, Spears, Dr. Junkin, Dr. Nevin, and Robert Carter, Esq., spoke, more or less at length, words of encouragement and counsel.

Board of Domestic Missions.

The Committee to whom was referred the Annual Report of the Board of Domestic Missions, and also certain papers relating to the Board, from the Presbyteries of New Lisbon and Louisville, respectfully state: That they have examined the Report of the Board with care, and find in it matter of deep and sacred interest. It furnishes evidences of substantial progress during the year, both as it respects the resources of the Board, and the extent and efficiency of its operations. It also furnishes evidence that our people, as well as the Board, are gaining a truer and more influential conception of the vast home-work committed to the church, to attempt and to do. That work is no less than the subjection of our whole country to the evangelical truth, and to Christ.

* The Committee have also given due attention to the additional papers referred to them.

That from the Presbytery of New Lisbon contemplates prompt and vigorous missionary efforts in the South, as the progress of our arms may open the way; and especially the religious care and instruction of that large and constantly increasing class, once slaves, but now freedmen. This matter seems to the Committee one of great moment, and they would commend it to the favourable consideration and action of this General Assembly.

The paper from the Presbytery of Louisville is of a different character. It complains of the Board for obtaining from the War Department certain facilities for the prosecution of its missionary work, in various portions of the country, now in military possession and under military rule; and calls upon the General Assembly "at once to disavow this action of the Board, and so save the church from the sin, reproach, and ruin which this thing is calculated to bring upon her." The Committee regard this paper as a misconception and misstatement of the real facts in the case. In their judgment, the course of the Board, in the matter referred to, was eminently proper, and indeed indispensable, if in those portions of the country they would carry forward their great and holy work.

In view then of the Report of the Board, and of the papers referred with it, the Committee recommend for adoption, by this General Assembly, the following resolutions, viz.

Resolved, 1. That the Sixty-second Annual Report of the Board of Domestic Missions be accepted and published; and that an abstract of the Report be inserted in the Appendix to the Minutes of this Assembly.

Resolved, 2. That the Assembly recognizes with devout gratitude the goodness of God, in the enlarged means placed by his people at the disposal of the Board, and also in the increased favourable results of its sacred labours during the year. Let the praise be given to His adorable name.

Resolved, 3. That in view of the greatly increased cost of living, and the consequent embarrassment and even suffering of many of our missionaries, the Board be instructed to increase its appropriations to such extent as its means will permit, in all cases of real need; and also, while exercising a just liberality towards churches truly feeble and dependent, to

consider whether there are not some now receiving aid, which have the ability, and therefore ought to be self-sustaining.

Resolved, 4. That the Assembly regards with favour the plan of the Board touching the appointment of District Missionaries, to act in connection with Synods and Presbyteries, as detailed on pages 13 and 14 of the Annual Report; but would also direct the Board, while carrying out this plan with all due vigour, to remember that it is an experiment, and to be ready for such changes or modifications of it as actual trial may show to be necessary or expedient.

Resolved, 5. That in the wonderful providence of God, spreading out before us so immense a work; in the increase of our home-born population; in the swelling tide of emigrants from the old world; in the desolations resulting from the present stupendous rebellion; and in the condition and wants of the long-oppressed children of Africa—this Assembly has a most imperative and a Divine call to redoubled zeal, labour, and sacrifice; and it hereby enjoins upon the Board, and upon the churches under its care, to put themselves, by Divine grace, in a posture of thought, feeling, and effort, corresponding to the greatness and urgency of the work.

Resolved, 6. That the Assembly commend to the careful attention of the Board, all those claims on its sympathy and its active efforts, which arise in connection with the progress and the results of this gigantic war with rebellion; and especially to coöperate, so far as practicable, with the other Boards of the church, in carrying the light, and all the various blessings of religion, to the multitudes emancipated from slavery; that so their sufferings may be alleviated, their ignorance dispelled, their character transformed, and they be fitted for the duties and privileges of American citizenship, and made heirs of the kingdom of God.

T. L. Janeway, D. D., dwelt on the extent of the field and on the difficulty of procuring suitable men. Mr. B. J. Low, of California, Judge Ryerson, Mr. Hay, Dr. Musgrave, and Mr. Fraser, of California, discussed the various points included in the Report.

Disabled Ministers' Fund.

The Rev. Dr. Beatty, Chairman of the Committee on Disabled Ministers' Fund, reported thereon, and asked the Assembly to hear their Secretary.

The Rev. Dr. J. H. Jones, the Secretary, then read the Report of the Board, which would furnish the members with more information than any speech he could make. The Report says: The first Report of the Board was made in 1856. At that time there were eight ministers, eleven widows and orphans, to about the number of sixty persons. The amount expended was \$1580. When this is compared with the present, it will show the great increase in the operations and usefulness of the Board. For the year ending May 1st, 1863, the increase was nearly fourfold. There were forty-eight widows, thirty-seven ministers, and a number of orphans—amounting in all to one hundred and eighty persons who have received appropriations from the Board. The sum of \$13,160 had been distributed. The contributions have never been as large as during the present year. Dr. Jones read a number of letters from persons who had received aid, thanking the Board for their timely support.

There are \$8000 in the treasury. The treasurer has given his services gratuitously, and the expenses of the Secretary are paid by private contributions. The results of the last year show a cheerful advancement of the usefulness of the Board.

The following is the report of the Committee:

The Committee on the Report of the Trustees of the Assembly in relation to Disabled Ministers, have carefully considered this Report, and learn from it, with great satisfaction, that the contributors to this good cause have been increased, and that its affairs have been managed with wisdom and efficiency.

The Committee would submit the following resolutions to the consideration of the Assembly.

Resolved, 1. That the Assembly has listened, with deep interest, to the Report of the Trustees of the Fund for Disabled Ministers in need, and the destitute widows and orphans of deceased ministers.

Resolved, 2. That the Assembly rejoices to learn that this

important cause is gaining a stronger hold on the churches, and that the contributions to it during the past year have been greatly increased.

Resolved, 3. That while, in the judgment of this Assembly, a fund, accruing from legacies and other sources, may in some respects be desirable, the chief dependence of this scheme of benevolence should be placed—as it is in the case of the several Boards of the Assembly—on the annual contributions made by the churches in this behalf.

Resolved, 4. That the Report be appended to the Minutes of this Assembly, and be printed by the Board of Publication; and that a copy of the same be sent to each pastor and stated supply, and the session of each vacant church, with a request that this important subject be laid before their several congregations.

Resolved, 5. That this Assembly earnestly calls upon the churches in its connection to consider their responsibility and duty to contribute to this cause; and in view of the extreme reluctance on the part of the most needy and deserving to make application for aid, urges upon the several Presbyteries the duty of searching out those within their bounds who are proper subjects of relief, and of making the requisite application to the Trustees in their behalf.

Resolved, 6. That in consideration of the urgent wants of those needing relief, and of the increased expenses of living, the Assembly recommends that the yearly appropriations to the recipients of this Fund be, if possible, largely increased.

Resolved, 7. That the Assembly acknowledges with gratitude the kindness of those friends of the cause by whose liberality a large proportion of the expenses of this important agency is provided for.

Remarks were made by Dr. Jones, the Secretary, Judge Linn, Messrs. Foster, C. Henry, Robert Carter, Osborn, and other ruling elders; Dr. Junkin, Dr. Burtis, Rev. Mr. Miller, &c. The principal point of discussion was the propriety of the establishment of a fund for this benevolent object. Judge Linn advocated with earnestness the establishment of such a fund. After a few amendments, the report of the Committee was unanimously adopted.

Parsonages.

Overture No. 2 was taken up and adopted, which is as follows:

A memorial from J. M. Wilson, of Philadelphia, Pa., in behalf of Parsonages, or comfortable homes, for Presbyterian ministers.

Whereas, the importance of providing parsonages for the comfortable accommodation of Presbyterian ministers and their families, is a duty, the performance of which cannot be much longer delayed, but the magnitude of the operation demands a careful scrutiny of the state of the church, and a thorough knowledge of her condition, therefore

Resolved, That the churches under the care of the General Assembly be requested to reply to the following questions:

1st. Please give the name of your church, with the year of its organization.

2d. What has been (about) the annual rent paid by your minister for a house to live in? or

3d. Have you a parsonage for your minister, thereby securing him a comfortable home?

4th. If you have a parsonage, how long has it been finished, and (about) what amount in rent does your minister annually save by living in the parsonage?

5th. What was the plan you adopted to awaken the interest of the people, and thus secured the means to build your parsonage? You will please let your answer to this question be as full as possible, (as these replies will be published,) and you thereby aid your brethren who have not yet erected a parsonage, but who will do so as soon as they may see how it can be done, by showing them how it has been done.

6th. Have you a glebe attached to your parsonage? If so, what is saved to a minister's family by tilling a few acres?

7th. Please give a description of your parsonage, its size, and accommodations, with specifications of its cost, as far as possible, with diagrams of the arrangement of the rooms, the attention paid to ventilation, the capacity of its library or study, together with such other suggestions as may tend to increase the value of these returns.

Resolved, That the ministers, ruling elders, deacons, trustees, or members of the churches under the care of this General Assembly, be earnestly requested to make early and full replies to these questions, adding any information or making any suggestions that may awaken an interest in behalf of parsonages, or comfortable homes for Presbyterian ministers.

Resolved, That said replies, suggestions, and information, be sent to Joseph M. Wilson, Philadelphia, Pa., to be by him arranged and classified in time to be presented to the next General Assembly of the Presbyterian church.

Resolved, That Joseph M. Wilson be authorized to supply the Stated Clerks of the Presbyteries in connection with this General Assembly, with a sufficient number of copies of this overture as there are churches within the bounds of said Presbyteries, with the understanding that the Stated Clerks will attend to their distribution among the churches.

Resolved, That in order to the fulfilment of the objects contemplated, the Presbyteries be enjoined to make inquiries from time to time, testing the diligence of the churches in replying to the questions contained in this overture.

Theological Seminaries.

Dr. Junkin then read the report of the Committee on Theological Seminaries.

The Princeton Seminary reports that since the last report, 65 new students have been received, and the whole number connected with the institution during the last year is 186, five more than last year. The Directors report improved regularity in attendance, also good attention to study, devotion and other duties, and also very satisfactory examinations—42 members of the Senior class received certificates of having finished the whole course of three years. Three others received specific certificates. Of the whole number nearly one-half are at work as pastors or ministers.

The number of volumes in the library is 19,684.

The report of the Treasurer exhibits a balance of \$7,999.12.

The Trustees during the past year received from Mrs. Isabella Brown, of Baltimore, the magnificent gift of \$30,000, to

erect an edifice to be called "Brown Hall," which is in process of erection.

Allegheny Seminary reports 34 students admitted within the year, the whole number on the roll 114, the number in attendance 100; 23 received diplomas, having completed the prescribed course. The report speaks in terms of high commendation of the piety, Christian earnestness, and general good deportment of the students. Two of the Senior class have offered themselves to the work of Foreign Missions.

The Board of Directors ask the General Assembly to fill the vacancy in the chair of Theology. *

The Treasurer's report exhibits a balance of \$1,104.74, and the Librarian acknowledges some valuable donations to the library.

The report of the Seminary of the Northwest, at Chicago, acknowledges the gift of 25 acres of land, and also of a \$2000 scholarship, and of handsome gifts from others. The library numbers 7,000 volumes. The financial report shows a balance of \$1,479.37.

At the Danville Seminary six new students were admitted. Whole number 14; two have received certificates, having finished the full course of the college. 120 new volumes have been added by gift from the Board of Publication.

The exhibit of its financial account shows a balance of \$1,416.05.

After reading the report, the Rev. Dr. Elliott moved that nominations be made for a Professor of Theology in the Western Theological Seminary. Rev. Dr. Krebs nominated Rev. Dr. A. A. Hodge, of Wilkesbarre, and spoke in favour of his merit as a scholar and a fit person to occupy that important position. Dr. Nevin nominated Rev. Dr. John M. Lowrie, of Fort Wayne, and also spoke of his merits.

Rev. Dr. Burt nominated the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, D.D., of Philadelphia. The Rev. Dr. Candee nominated Dr. E. D. McMaster, of Indiana, and spoke of his nominee's ability as a theologian and a scholar, in every way fitted to fill this important chair in the Seminary. The Moderator requested Rev. Dr. Elliott to offer prayer for Divine guidance in the selection. Dr. McMaster's name, at the request of his brother, was with-

drawn from nomination; and subsequently Dr. Lowrie withdrew his name. When the election was made, it appeared that A. A. Hodge, D. D., had received 154 votes, and Jonathan Edwards, D. D., 29. Dr. Hodge was then declared elected, and a committee appointed to inform him of the fact.

Reunion of the Old and New-school.

A communication was received from the General Assembly now sitting in Dayton, Ohio, in regard to the action of that Assembly upon memorials from the Presbytery of St. Lawrence, on the subject of the union of the two bodies represented by these Assemblies; and is as follows:

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, in session at Dayton, Ohio, May 25, 1864.

The Committee on the Polity of the Church, to which was referred the overture of the St. Lawrence Presbytery, upon the reunion of two General Assemblies of the Presbyterian church in the United States of America, propose the following declaration, viz.

1st. That this Assembly cordially welcome all signs of increased love and union among those who hold to the same facts and doctrines of the gospel, and bears its solemn testimony, with self-humiliation, against whatever fosters alienation and genders strife among the disciples of our Lord.

2d. That the tendencies of modern society, the condition of Protestant Christianity, the increase of infidelity, the progress of Romanism, and the present and prospective state of our country, afford powerful arguments against further subdivisions, and in favour of that union and unity of the church, into which it is to grow, and which is to be its consummation; and that we record with unfeigned gratitude our profound conviction that the spirit of disunion and of sectarianism is waning, and that the spirit of brotherly kindness and mutual confidence is largely on the increase.

3d. That in an especial manner are those churches bound to foster this spirit, which adopt the same standards of faith and order, and whose divisions are local, personal, and incidental, and for whose reunion there is only needed a wise deference to each other's rights, and a higher measure of Christian charity.

Adopting the same formulas of faith and Form of Government, all that is needed is to receive them in the same spirit.

4th. That as the churches represented by this Assembly did not inaugurate the separation, so, too, they hold to no principles and views, and would impose no terms inconsistent with a full and cordial reunion, whenever and wherever the will of the Great Head of the Church, as indicated by Divine Providence, may open the way for us all to meet together again on the same basis on which of old our fathers stood; and that we should rejoice in such reunion as a pledge of the future prosperity, and an augury of the accelerated growth of the kingdom of Christ through the length and breadth of our land; and that it is our united and fervent prayer to our common Master, that he would so remove all hinderances as to make a plain path for our feet whereon we may walk together, being of one heart and mind, in the ways of the Lord.

5th. That while we do not deem it expedient now to appoint such a committee as that asked for in the memorial of the St. Lawrence Presbytery, yet, that this expression of our principles and convictions, with our heartfelt Christian salutations, be transmitted to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church now in session in Newark, New Jersey.

The report and recommendation were unanimously adopted.

A true extract.

EDWIN F. HATFIELD, *Stated Clerk.*

In our own Assembly the following action was taken.

The Committee to whom was referred an overture from the Presbytery of Miami, and certain resolutions of the Presbyteries of Ogdensburg and Buffalo City, in relation to a union of the two great branches of the Presbyterian church, submit to the Assembly the following resolutions for their consideration and adoption, viz.

Resolved, 1. That this Assembly have witnessed, with unalloyed satisfaction, the happy influence of the correspondence initiated by a former Assembly between the two bodies, in promoting fraternal and Christian affection, and thus preparing the way for a still closer union at some future day, (if such should be judged best for the promotion of the glory of God, and of the spiritual interests of the whole church.)

Resolved, 2. That in view of the pleasing results which have already been developed from the plan of correspondence now in successful operation, the Assembly do not deem it expedient at present to propose any additional measure towards the consummation of the object contemplated by the Presbyteries whose action has been submitted to their consideration.

Resolved, 3. That with a view still further to attain and strengthen that "unity of the spirit" which is so essential to organic unity, the Assembly express their concurrence with the suggestions and counsels of the Assembly of 1863, as contained in the third resolution adopted by that body, (page 39 of their *Minutes*,) and recommend them to the prayerful consideration of the parties concerned.

The Rev. Dr. D. Elliott proposed an additional resolution, referring the Assembly at Dayton, in answer to their proposal of union, to the foregoing resolutions, *viz.*

That while this Assembly receive in the spirit of fraternal kindness the "Declaration" transmitted to them, and thank their brethren for the courtesy thus promptly extended to them, yet, having so fully expressed their views on the same general subject in the foregoing resolutions, they deem it unnecessary to add anything further, and recommend that those resolutions, together with this minute, be transmitted by the Stated Clerk to the Moderator of the General Assembly in session at Dayton, Ohio, and reciprocate the feelings manifested.

We rejoice that this subject was left as it was. On the principles which should regulate the reunion of the two branches of the Presbyterian church in this country, there can be little diversity of opinion. All must admit that the gospel requires that the church should be one, not only in faith and love, but in fellowship and organization. If the inward unity of believers were perfect, their external union would be complete. But as the church, in this world, always has been, and probably will ever continue to be, imperfect in other respects, its normal or ideal state of union cannot be perfectly realized.

In the second place, it must also be conceded that error has been, and still is, committed, on the one hand, in requiring too

much, and on the other, of requiring too little, as the condition of Christian and ministerial fellowship.

Thirdly, the Scriptures clearly teach, that in order to Christian fellowship and church communion, nothing but agreement in essentials should be required. In other words, we are bound to receive and treat as Christians, all whom Christ receives. The conditions of Christian fellowship can be neither more nor less than the conditions of salvation. With regard to ministerial communion, the case is different. There are two aspects of this subject. First, Whom are we to recognize as ministers of Christ? and, secondly, Whom are we to admit to the office of the ministry among ourselves? All that can be said on this point on this occasion, is, that it is evident that much more should be required of those who are admitted as authorized teachers in Christ's church, than of those who are simply recognized as his disciples.

Fourthly, that in order to justify or demand the union of believers in the same organized body, there should be such agreement in doctrine, worship, and discipline, (or order,) as will admit of their acting together in harmony, and effectively.

Fifthly, that where this agreement does exist, organized union should take place, so far as geographical considerations admit of united action. The mere size, or number of the members of the church, does not seem to be a legitimate consideration in the determination of this matter.

Sixthly, as to the question of fact, whether the two branches of the Presbyterians in this country are sufficiently agreed in opinion and spirit as to order, doctrine, and worship, as to render their reunion desirable, we have no doubt that some would answer the question confidently in the affirmative, and others as confidently in the negative. We suppose that the truth is, that in some parts of the country they are thus agreed, while in others they are not. This being the case, all efforts for an immediate general union would probably produce much more evil than good.

Report against Slavery.

In the Presbyterian General Assembly, on Tuesday, the Hon. Stanley Matthews, from the Committee on Bills and

Overtures, presented the following report, founded on an overture from the Presbytery of Newton. It was read, and made the order for Wednesday evening.

The Committee on Bills and Overtures report

Overture No. 12, from the Presbytery of Newton, reciting the former deliverances of the General Assembly upon the subject of slavery in this country, and the duty of emancipation, and asking this General Assembly to take such action as in their wisdom seems proper to meet the present aspects of human bondage in our country, and recommend the adoption of the following:

In the opinion of the General Assembly, the solemn and momentous circumstances of our times, the state of our country, and the condition of our church, demand a plain declaration of its sentiments upon the question of slavery, in view of its present aspects in this country.

From the earliest period of our church the General Assembly delivered unequivocal testimonies upon this subject, which it will be profitable now to reaffirm.

In the year 1787, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, in view of movements then on foot looking to the abolition of slavery, and highly approving of them, declared that "inasmuch as men introduced from a servile state to a participation of all the privileges of civil society, without a proper education, and without previous habits of industry, may be, in many respects, dangerous to the community, therefore they earnestly recommend to all the members belonging to their communion to give these persons who are at present held in servitude, such good education as to prepare them for the better enjoyment of freedom." * * * "And, finally, they recommend it to all their people to use the most prudent measures consistent with the interest and the state of civil society in the countries where they live, to procure eventually the final abolition of slavery in America."

In 1795, the General Assembly "assured all the churches under their care, that they view with the deepest concern any vestiges of slavery which may exist in our country."

In 1815 the following record was made: "The General Assembly have repeatedly declared their cordial approbation

of those principles of civil liberty which appear to be recognized by the federal and state governments in these United States. They have expressed their regret that the slavery of the Africans and of their descendants still continues in so many places, and even among those within the pale of the church, and have urged the Presbyteries under their care to adopt such measures as will secure, at least to the rising generation of slaves within the bounds of the church, a religious education, that they may be prepared for the exercise and enjoyment of liberty, when God in his providence may open a door for their emancipation."

The action of the General Assembly upon the subject of slavery, in the year 1818, is unequivocal, and so well known that it need not be recited at length. The following extracts, however, we regard as applicable to our present circumstances, and proper now to be reiterated:

"We consider the voluntary enslaving of one portion of the human race by another as a gross violation of the most precious and sacred rights of human nature, as utterly inconsistent with the law of God, which requires us to love our neighbour as ourselves, and as totally irreconcilable with the spirit and principles of the gospel of Christ, which enjoins 'that all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.' Slavery creates a paradox in the moral system. It exhibits rational, moral, and accountable beings in such circumstances as scarcely to leave them the power of moral action. It exhibits them as dependent on the will of others, whether they shall receive religious instruction; whether they shall know and worship the true God; whether they shall enjoy the ordinances of the gospel; whether they shall perform the duties and cherish the endearments of husbands and wives, parents and children, neighbours and friends; whether they shall preserve their chastity and purity, or regard the dictates of justice and humanity. Such are some of the consequences of slavery—consequences not imaginary, but which connect themselves with its very existence." * * *

"From this view of the consequences resulting from the practice, into which Christian people have most inconsistently fallen, of enslaving a portion of their brethren of mankind, . . .

. . . it is manifestly the duty of all Christians, who enjoy the light of the present day, when the inconsistency of slavery, both with the dictates of humanity and of religion, has been demonstrated, and is generally seen and acknowledged, to use their honest, earnest, and unwearied endeavours to correct the errors of former times, and as speedily as possible to efface this blot on our holy religion, and to obtain the complete abolition of slavery throughout Christendom, and if possible, throughout the world."

They earnestly exhorted those portions of the church where the evil of slavery had been entailed upon them, "to continue, and, if possible, to increase their exertions to effect a total abolition of slavery, and to suffer no greater delay to take place in this most interesting concern than a regard to public welfare truly and indispensably demands;" and declare "that our country ought to be governed in this matter by no other consideration than an honest and impartial regard to the happiness of the injured party, uninfluenced by the expense or inconvenience which such a regard may involve;" warning "all who belong to our denomination of Christians against unduly extending this plea of necessity; against making it a cover for the love and practice of slavery, or a pretence for not using efforts that are lawful and practicable to extinguish this evil."

Such were the early and unequivocal instructions of our church. It is not necessary too minutely to inquire how faithful and obedient to these lessons and warnings those to whom they were addressed have been. It ought to be acknowledged that we have all much to confess and lament as to our shortcomings in this respect. Whether a strict and careful application of this advice would have rescued the country from the evil of its condition, and the dangers which have since threatened it, is known to the Omniscient alone. Whilst we do not believe that the present judgments of our Heavenly Father, and Almighty and Righteous Governor, have been inflicted solely in punishment for our continuance in this sin; yet it is our judgment that the recent events of our history, and the present condition of our church and country, furnish manifest tokens that *the time has at length come, in the providence of God, when it is His will that every vestige of human slavery among us*

should be effaced, and that every Christian man should address himself with industry and earnestness to his appropriate part in the performance of this great duty.

Whatever excuses for its postponement may heretofore have existed, no longer avail. When the country was at peace within itself, and the church was unbroken, many consciences were perplexed in the presence of this great evil, for the want of an adequate remedy. Slavery was so formidably intrenched behind the ramparts of personal interests and prejudices, that to attack it with a view to its speedy overthrow appeared to be attacking the very existence of the social order itself, and was characterized as the inevitable introduction of an anarchy, worse in its consequences than the evil for which it seemed to be the only cure. But the folly and weakness of men have been the illustrations of God's wisdom and power. Under the influence of the most incomprehensible infatuation of wickedness, those who were most deeply interested in the perpetuation of slavery *have taken away every motive for its further toleration.* The spirit of American slavery, not content with its defences to be found in the laws of the States, the provisions of the Federal Constitution, the prejudices in favour of existing institutions, and the fear of change, has taken arms against law, organized a bloody rebellion against the national authority, made formidable war upon the Federal Union, and in order to found an empire upon the corner-stone of slavery, threatens not only our existence as a people, but the annihilation of the principles of free Christian government; and thus has rendered the continuance of negro slavery incompatible with the preservation of our own liberty and independence.

In the struggle of the nation for existence against this powerful and wicked treason, the highest executive authorities have proclaimed the abolition of slavery within most of the rebel states, and decreed its extinction by military force. They have enlisted those formerly held as slaves to be soldiers in the national armies. They have taken measures to organize the labour of the freedmen, and instituted measures for their support and government in their new condition. It is the President's declared policy not to consent to the reorganization of civil government within the seceded states upon any other

basis than that of emancipation. In the loyal states where slavery has not been abolished, measures of emancipation, in different stages of progress, have been set on foot, and are near their consummation; and propositions for an amendment to the Federal Constitution, prohibiting slavery in all the states and territories, are now pending in the national Congress. So that, in our present situation, the interests of peace and of social order are identified with the success of the cause of emancipation. The difficulties which formerly seemed insurmountable, in the providence of God, appear now to be almost removed. The most formidable remaining obstacle, we think, will be found to be the unwillingness of the human heart to see and accept the truth against the prejudices of habit and of interest; and to act towards those who have heretofore been degraded as slaves, with the charity of Christian principle in the necessary efforts to improve and elevate them.

In view, therefore, of its former testimonies upon the subject, the General Assembly does hereby devoutly express its gratitude to Almighty God for having overruled the wickedness and calamities of the rebellion, so as to work out the deliverance of our country from the evil and guilt of slavery; its earnest desire for the extirpation of slavery, as the root of bitterness from which has sprung rebellion, war, and bloodshed, and the long list of horrors that follow in their train: its earnest trust that the thorough removal of this prolific source of evil and harm will be speedily followed by the blessings of our Heavenly Father, the return of peace, union and fraternity, and abounding prosperity to the whole land; and recommend to all in our communion to labour honestly, earnestly, and unweariedly in their respective spheres for this glorious consummation, to which human justice, Christian love, national peace and prosperity, every earthly and every religious interest, combine to pledge them.

Judge Matthews argued to show that the time had come, when the Assembly was called upon to pronounce clearly its judgment on slavery and its relation to the war in which the country is involved. He said that the objection that this was a political question, was no valid ground against the action of the church. The same question was often moral as well as

political. It was only in its moral aspects that the church presumed to utter her judgment in relation to it. In answer to the objection, that the adoption of the paper would commit the Assembly to the approbation of the President's proclamations, and other acts of the government, about which good and loyal men differed, he said this was not a fair construction of the paper. It gave simply a narrative of the facts, which did not imply approbation of them. The adoption of this paper does not involve an expression of opinion on the part of the Assembly. "It does not bind the opinion of the church-member—it does not bind his conscience." This is very true, and very important. But the Judge further said, that every man is "bound to presume that the laws and the measures of the government are right, and binding." "They may be otherwise," he adds, "but the private citizen is not the judge." This is very loosely stated, and would justify the whole doctrine of passive submission to the authorities of the church and state, against which Puritans and Presbyterians have ever, and ever will contend, to the death. The private citizen *is* the judge as to what binds his conscience; and he renounces his allegiance to God, and his right to the name of Christian, whenever he renounces this right of private judgment. If the government should make a law that we should blaspheme Christ, or turn Papists, would that bind our conscience? Must the private citizen presume and assume that such a law is right, and binding? This was doubtless only a *lapsus* on the part of the worthy Judge; but the principle is too important to be allowed to pass without a protest.

This paper was further sustained, at length, by Judge Ryerson, Dr. Nevin, and other leading members of the Assembly. Drs. Rice, Maclean, and Junkin, succeeded in obtaining certain modifications in the language used, which secured an almost unanimous vote in favour of its adoption. The best spirit was manifested, as we are informed, not only by Judge Matthews, but by all the more immediate friends of the measure; and every concession was freely made, in order to meet reasonable objections.

Dr. Rice delivered a very effective speech in the course of the debate on this subject, of which we have seen only a very

meagre outline. The first thing which will impress the public mind, in this action of the Assembly, is the remarkable unanimity with which this important manifesto was adopted. The Assembly is a representative body; not only technically, in that it is composed of delegates freely chosen by the Presbyteries in every part of the country, but because it really reveals and expresses the opinions and feelings of our whole church. There cannot be a doubt that the sentiments of this paper are the sentiments of the Presbyterian church in these United States. And as that church does not now, and never has, belonged to any one political party—as its members represent all the prevalent phases of public opinion, on every subject of general interest—we think it may safely be assumed, that the report unanimously adopted by the Assembly expresses the opinions and feelings of the vast majority of the people in the Northern, Western, and Middle States. In this view of the matter, we regard the adoption of such a paper a matter of great public importance. It is the revelation of a spirit of loyalty, and of devotion to the great cause for which the nation is now contending as for its life. In this view, it is matter for gratitude and encouragement.

In the second place, although the spirit of this paper may be new; although its animus, so to speak, may be more distinctly pronounced than that of previous declarations on the same subject, its sentiments are not new. It teaches nothing which the General Assembly has not heretofore openly avowed and distinctly taught. It asserts indeed slavery to be “an evil and guilt,” a moral wrong, which ought to be abated and abandoned. But this was the language of our fathers in the church and in the state. It was the form of expression constantly used by the founders of our national Constitution, and by the early and venerated members of every body of Christians in the country. By slavery, however, they meant that concrete system with which the people of this country are familiar; a system which is designed and adapted to keep a certain class of our fellow-men in a state of degradation in order to retain them in the condition of slaves. It is the system which declares, with the force of law, that a slave cannot marry; which forbids his

being taught to read and write; which allows of the forcible separation of husbands and wives, (that is, of those who in the sight of God are husbands and wives, although the law denies them to be such); which separates parents and their minor children; and which denies to the slave a just compensation for his labour. With regard to this system it is undeniable—
1. That it has prevailed in our country. 2. That it is known and designated as slavery, or the slave system. 3. That it is essentially and inherently unjust and wicked. 4. That these slave laws ought to be at once and universally abrogated. 5. That those who enacted, and those who sustained those laws must have contracted great guilt in so doing. 6. That such guilt rests, in a measure, on all who acquiesced in the system thus established, or who failed to protest against it, and to use all lawful efforts to secure its abolition.

It is only by taking the word slavery in this sense, that the former and present deliverances of our church on this subject can be reconciled either with truth or with the word of God. It is however greatly to be lamented that the word was ever used in this wide sense. 1. Because it is not the proper meaning of the term. Slavery is nothing more nor less than involuntary bondage—that state in which one man is bound without his own consent to labour for another. 2. Because what is true of slavery in the wide and improper sense of the word, is not true of it in its true and proper meaning. There is the same impropriety in confounding slavery with any particular system of slave laws, as there is in confounding despotism in the state with the despotic laws and acts of a Nero, Peter the Great, or Louis XIV. To say that despotism is in itself and under all circumstances sinful, because certain despotisms have been cruel and oppressive, would be absurd. The family government is of necessity a despotism. The possession and exercise of despotic power is therefore a thing right or wrong according to circumstances. 3. Confusion, error, and contradiction inevitably result from using the same word in such diverse senses. It is not true that slavery, in the sense of involuntary bondage, is morally and universally wrong. It is not true that it should be always, everywhere, and immediately abolished. It is not true that all slaveholding is sinful, or that slaveholders as such

should be denounced as wicked men and excluded from the fellowship of the Christian church.

Two enormous evils have long afflicted our church and country in connection with this subject. On the one hand, because all slaveholding is not sinful, a large class of men have maintained that the slave-laws, or that concrete system of slavery which has existed at the South, is not sinful. They have been thus led to defend that system; and to insist on its continuance and extension; and have denounced all those who condemned it as "infidel abolitionists." On the other hand, because the existing form of slavery in this country, (or the slave-laws of the South,) is unjust and antichristian, another large class of men have declared all slavery, or involuntary bondage, to be sinful; they have denounced all slaveholders as wicked men, and demanded universal and immediate abolition of slavery in all its forms as an imperative duty. These are "the abolitionists," technically so called. Their doctrine, as palpably in opposition to the teachings of the Scriptures, both in the Old and New Testament, cannot be maintained in consistency with due subjection to the authority of God's word. The fact is undeniable, that slaveholders were received into communion with the Christian church, and that the apostles did not enjoin the immediate manumission of all slaves as a Christian duty. For any man therefore to assume the ground that slaveholders should not be received into the church, or that all slavery is sinful, is to place himself above the Bible. It matters not from what motive this is done. It is as much the expression of an unbelieving spirit as the rejection of the doctrine of the incarnation, because we cannot understand it; or the denial of the doctrine of endless future punishment of the finally impenitent, because we cannot reconcile it with infinite benevolence. We are Christians, and as Christians we must submit our faith and practice to the supreme authority of the word of God. It is specially important in times of great public excitement, that good men should be upon their guard, and not allow themselves to adopt principles or to use expressions which bring them in conflict with the holy Scriptures, the only infallible standard of moral and religious truth. While, therefore, we can adopt the language of this

paper in the sense in which we doubt not it was intended to be used, and in which similar language has been before used by our General Assembly, we must protest against the assumption that in so doing we adopt the doctrine of the abolitionists, technically so called, viz., that all slaveholding is sinful, or that immediate emancipation is everywhere and always a Christian duty. Those only are entitled to freedom who are able to use it to their own advantage, and with safety to others. Paul tells us that a child, so long as he is a minor, (*νήπιος,*) differs in nothing from a slave, (*δοῦλος.*) It is morally right that he should be restricted in the use of his liberty, so long as he is unfit to use it aright. So it may be morally right to restrict a class or tribe of men who are in the condition of children intellectually and morally, in the use of their liberty, so long as they continue in that state. But as it would be atrociously unjust to keep a child in the imbecile condition of an infant, in order that others might enjoy his labour or his property, so it is equally unjust to prevent any class of men from elevating themselves into the condition in which they can be safely made free. One of the saddest proofs of the injustice of Southern laws, is, that after more than a century, the vast body of the slaves of the extreme Southern states are in a condition of the greatest degradation. That this is not to be attributed to their inferiority as a race, but to the systematic effort to prevent their improvement, is clear, because it is only the "field hands" who are thus degraded. Household servants, and those living in cities, where they have the opportunity of learning mechanic arts, are as much improved, as intelligent and moral, as any other class of men of no higher advantages. This, however, is not the time to enter anew on questions which have been repeatedly discussed in this journal. We wish, however, to have it distinctly understood, that we have not changed our ground on the subject of slavery. We hold now precisely what we held in 1836, when the subject was first argued in these pages. What is far more important, it should be known that the Old-school Presbyterian church has not changed her doctrinal teaching by the recent action of the General Assembly. God and truth are immutable; and a church vacillates in doctrine only when deserted by God. The General Assem-

bly has not declared all slaveholding to be sinful; it has not contradicted, retracted, or modified its formal and explicit teachings of 1845; it simply declares that slavery, as it exists in this country, (that is, the slave-laws of the Southern states,) is an unjust and antichristian institution. This it has ever taught, and this is self-evidently true.

Thirdly, the Assembly clearly pronounces in favour of the entire abolition of slavery within the limits of the states and territories of this Union. Is this a declaration in favour of abolitionism? Does this justify the assertion that the Assembly has joined hands with the abolitionists? Nothing is more important, and nothing is more necessary to truth and righteousness than the use of words according to their established meaning. Usage, not etymology, determines that meaning. The signification of a word is one thing, its meaning another thing. The word *Jacobin* *signifies* a member or frequenter of the convent of St. James. It *means* a man who adopts the principles and sentiments of the atheistical and anarchical faction so denominated during the French revolution. The word *Jesuit* *signifies* "a follower of Jesus." It *means*, either a member of the society founded by Ignatius Loyola, or one who adopts the principles and practices of that society. An abolitionist, according to the signification of the word, is one who is in favour of the abolition of slavery. In this sense nine-tenths of the good men on the face of the earth are abolitionists. In this sense the late Dr. Thornwell was an abolitionist. It is not many years since he said to us that slavery was a low state of civilization, and must of necessity come to an end. But for the last thirty years there has been a party, of which Garrison, Wendell Philips, and others, are the acknowledged representatives, who call themselves, and are called by others, abolitionists. So that by abolitionist is now meant one who belongs to that party. The meaning of words thus fixed by usage cannot be arbitrarily altered. It would be obviously untrue and slanderous to call a Christian, law-abiding man, a Jacobin, because he lived in a convent of St. James; or to call him a Jesuit, because he professed to be a follower of Jesus. It is no less untrue and slanderous to call a man an abolitionist, in the sense in which modern and American usage has attached to

that word, simply because he favours the abolition of slavery. We deny, therefore, that our venerable Assembly has enacted abolitionism, because it has unanimously declared that, in their judgment, the time has come when every vestige of slavery should be effaced from this country. The reason assigned for this declaration is not the characteristic and essential idea of abolition, viz., that all slavery is sinful, and therefore should be immediately abolished; but the conviction that the continuance of the system of slavery among us is "incompatible with the preservation of our own liberty and independence," as a nation. This reason we hold to be valid and sufficient.

We fully believe that the leaders of the present rebellion, years ago, determined on the overthrow of the Constitution, and the erection of a southern confederacy, in order to perpetuate and extend the system of African slavery as it now exists; that for this purpose they not only systematically misrepresented the opinions and purposes of northern men, in order to prejudice and inflame the southern mind; but that they made extensive military preparations, by fraudulently amassing public arms in southern arsenals; and by leaving the national forts in the slave states without adequate protection. We believe that without any just, or even plausible provocation, and against the advice and warning of the wisest and best of the slaveholders themselves, they threw off their allegiance to the United States government and to the Constitution which they had sworn to support, seized the public forts and arsenals, fired on the flag of their country, and inaugurated a civil war, which has already cost hundreds of thousands of lives and many thousands of millions of money. During the three years which this war has continued, the President and Congress have repeatedly and authoritatively proclaimed that if those in revolt against the Constitution and Union would lay down their arms, return to their allegiance, and submit to the laws of the land, the war should cease, and the states be restored with the right to determine their own institutions, each for itself within its own limits. These overtures have been contemptuously rejected, and the war has been carried on, and, in many cases, with savage barbarity. The issue has thus been fairly presented. Either our national life or slavery must be extinguished. This issue

our General Assembly has met, by declaring unanimously that the time has come when slavery should be at once and for ever abolished in the states and territories of this Union. In this declaration our understanding, heart, and conscience, fully concur.

Although thus in favour of the abolition of slavery, we do not wish to see it abolished by servile insurrections, by violence, or by the arbitrary exercise of power, but by the alteration of the Constitution, legally effected.

Fourthly, the only other remark which we feel called upon to make in reference to this subject, is that the declaration of the Assembly is patriotic and not partisan. It takes sides with neither of the great parties into which the country is divided. It would be a sad thing for the Church of England, or for the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to declare itself either Whig or Tory; but a very just and proper thing for either of those bodies to declare in favour of the constitution of Great Britain, and to denounce all measures designed for its overthrow. So it would be a sad thing for our General Assembly to declare itself either Democratic or Republican, or to take sides with any particular party. It has done no such thing. It has taken part with the country. The paper which it adopted can be received as cordially by an opponent, as by a supporter of the present administration. It is only upon the assumption that patriotism is not a moral virtue, that the patriotic declarations of the Assembly can be condemned as unbecoming a religious body. If the law of God requires us to love and honour our parents, on whom we are dependent and by whom we are protected, it requires us to love our country, on which we are still more dependent, and whose protection we enjoy from the cradle to the grave. And therefore, if a church court can enjoin its people to honour their parents, it may enjoin them to love and stand up for their country.

Complaint of the Rev. Dr. McPheevers.

The papers in the case were read, viz., a memorial from certain members of the Pine Street Church, St. Louis; the action of the Presbytery upon that memorial. The complaint of W. W. Green and others; the complaint of Samuel B.

McPheeters, D.D., against the Presbytery of St. Louis, in relation to himself and the Pine Street Church. This complaint embodied a certain military order of Major-General Rosecrans, requiring a particular oath to be taken by members of ecclesiastical bodies, before being permitted to sit and deliberate, with other correspondence bearing upon the same subject.

This case was in form perfectly simple. It was merely a complaint against the Presbytery of St. Louis, for prohibiting Dr. McPheeters from preaching in the Pine Street Church. It would seem therefore to present only two possible questions. First: Had the Presbytery the right to pass the act complained of? And was the act itself wise and just? But although thus simple in form, it was, in reality, one of the most comprehensive cases in facts and principles, and one of the most important in its bearings that ever claimed the attention of the General Assembly.

It appears from the several papers submitted to the Assembly, and from the arguments before that body, that the Rev. Dr. McPheeters, pastor of the Pine Street Church, St. Louis, was, at the breaking out of the war, residing in New Mexico on account of his health. Hearing of the outbreak of hostilities, he determined to return home; and knowing that the people of Missouri and those of his own charge were likely to be greatly excited and divided on the momentous question at issue, he addressed to his church and congregation a pastoral letter, in which he exhorted them to mutual forbearance and kind feeling, and announced his own purpose, while he faithfully performed all his duties as a citizen, to abstain from taking any part in the controversies and conflicts by which the whole country was distracted. On his arrival in St. Louis, he resumed his pastoral functions, and the church continued in a quiet and prosperous state until the spring of 1862. In May of that year, Dr. McPheeters attended, as a delegate from his Presbytery, the General Assembly which met in Columbus, Ohio. While there, he spoke and voted against the adoption of a paper on the state of the country, presented by the Rev. R. J. Breckinridge, D.D., on the ground that it was inconsistent with the nature of the church and the proper functions of its judicatories to express any judgment on political questions

and that such expression would tend to increase the distractions under which many of our churches were suffering. His course in this matter seems to have given offence to some of his own people, and to have increased the misgivings which more or less prevailed as to his loyalty to the Government and Union. One of his elders, George H. Strong, Esq., and one or two others, addressed to him a letter requesting him to express clearly his opinions and feelings in relation to the great struggle in which the country is engaged. This he refused to do, not only because he denied their right to interrogate him as to his political opinions, but specially, because he had always opposed "the introduction of civil, secular, and political questions into the house of God. As a pastor," he said, "and because I was a pastor, I have stood aloof from these things, even in my private relations." The unpleasant feeling awakened by these circumstances continued to increase, and on December 19th, 1862, by a military order issued by Major-General Curtis, he was banished from the state, forbidden to exercise any ministerial functions within its borders, and the church with all its records given over to a commission. This act was promptly disavowed and corrected by the authorities at Washington, but, from some misunderstanding, it remained in force, except so far as the sentence of banishment was concerned, from December 19, 1862, to March 4, 1863. A *pro re nata* meeting of the Presbytery of St. Louis, called at the request of three ministers (two of whom had no pastoral charge,) and four elders, was held on the 15th of May, 1863, "to take measures to remove the grievances under which the Pine Street Church has been labouring for some months past, and to dissolve the pastoral relation between that church and Samuel B. McPheeeters, D. D., and in general to take such action as the interests of that church may seem to require." When the Presbytery met, Dr. McPheeeters placed his resignation of his pastoral charge into its hands. Whereupon the Pine Street Church and congregation were cited to appear on June 3d, by their commissioners, "to respond to the resignation of their pastor," and to this end they were directed to meet on the 27th of May, to take action in the premises. The congregation met agree-

ably to this direction, and by a vote of ninety-one to fifty-six adopted the following resolution, viz.,

"Resolved, That this meeting do not agree to, and protest against, the dissolution of the existing relation with the Rev. Dr. Samuel B. McPheeters, as pastor of Pine Street Church, and that we request him to withdraw his resignation offered to St. Louis Presbytery."

After this resolution, a majority of the meeting left the house, and near midnight Mr. George P. Strong, the leader of the minority, was appointed the commissioner to represent the church in Presbytery, and instructed to urge the dissolution of the pastoral relation. The Presbytery met on the 3d of June, and on some technical difficulty, adjourned to meet on the 23d of that month. On the 22d, the Pine Street Church met on the call of the session, and on motion of the Hon. W. T. Wood, ruling elder, the following preamble and resolution were adopted by a large majority:

"Whereas, at a meeting on the 27th of May, 1863, at a late hour of the night, after a vote had been taken in full meeting of ninety-one (91) to fifty-six (56) against the resignation of Dr. S. B. McPheeters, pastor of the church, and against the dissolution of the pastoral relation, and after a majority of the members had left, and gone home; as it appears by the proceedings of the persons who remained, it was resolved, that this meeting now appoint a commissioner to represent this church in Presbytery, and that he be instructed to urge Presbytery to accept Dr. McPheeters's resignation, and to dissolve the pastoral relation between him and Pine Street Church; and whereas, the resolution was offered and passed, without even a motion to reconsider the vote that had been taken and entered on the subject, in violation of all rule and order, and against the known voice of the church and congregation; therefore,

"Resolved, That said resolution does not express the voice and wishes of Pine Street Church and congregation; and further, *resolved,* that the true voice of the church and congregation was expressed in the resolution adopted at that meeting on motion of Captain Greene; and unless George P. Strong, as the Commissioner from this congregation, can, and will, in

good faith present and urge upon Presbytery the voice and wishes of the congregation, as expressed in the resolution adopted on the motion of Captain Greene, on a fair vote of 91 to 56, he be requested to resign his trust as Commissioner."

The Presbytery met, Mr. Strong was received as the Commissioner of the congregation, and strenuously urged the dissolution of the pastoral relation between Dr. McPheeters and his church. "After Mr. Strong had concluded, it was moved that *the request of the Pine Street Church be granted*, and the pastoral relation dissolved." Pending the motion, the Rev. J. H. Brookes presented a paper from Dr. McPheeters, in which "he asked leave to withdraw his resignation." This paper was returned to him without being put on the minutes. The motion to dissolve the pastoral relation recurring, it was put to vote and carried, *ayes* eleven, *noes* ten. This motion was carried by the votes of eight ministers and three elders, "out of about sixty in a full Presbytery." The absence of Dr. McPheeters, and of many other ministers, was owing to conscientious scruples. General Rosecrans had issued a general order requiring a stringent oath of allegiance to be taken by all members of any ecclesiastical body. The objection was not to the oath, for they, or many of them (and Dr. McPheeters among the number) had voluntarily taken oaths equally stringent. But they believed that it was incompatible with their allegiance to Christ, as King of his church, to recognise the right of any civil or military authority to prescribe the terms on which they should attend the meetings of courts of his appointment. In this belief some of the members of the Assembly, as, for example, the venerable and zealously loyal President Maclean of Princeton College, concurred. When the vote dissolving the pastoral relation between Dr. McPheeters and the Pine Street Church was adopted, Mr. W. W. Green, the elder from that church in attendance on the Presbytery, and a member of that body, entered an appeal from the decision to the Synod of Missouri. The Synod received the appeal, declared it in order, and entered it upon their docket for trial.

During all this time, it had, on all hands, been assumed that the military order of December 19th, 1862, forbidding Dr.

McPheeters to exercise any ministerial function in the state of Missouri, was still in force. This turned out to be a mistake. The President of the United States had revoked or annulled the order from the beginning, and intended so to do, although his intention seems to have been misapprehended by his subordinates at St. Louis. At last, however, this misapprehension was corrected, and all legal or military disabilities were removed from the Doctor, as appears from the following extract of a letter addressed to him by Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General at Washington.

"The President, in substance answered, that it was always his wish and purpose to hold individuals responsible for their own acts, without any reference to the fact that they happened to be members or officers of particular churches; that the fact of being a member or pastor of a church was no excuse for personal misdemeanour; but that he never intended to assume, or to permit his subordinate officers to assume, any power to govern or control the churches; or in any manner to determine who may, or who may not preach or minister in them. You say that you are in full function of your civil rights; the President considers you in the full enjoyment of your ecclesiastical rights. I write this with the express permission of the President; and I presume to advise, that you quietly resume the exercise of all the rights, duties, and functions of your office, as if no interruption had occurred."

All pretence being thus removed, that Dr. McPheeters was not sufficiently loyal to preach the gospel, even in the disturbed state of Missouri; as the Pine Street Church was without preaching, as six out of seven elders composing the session and the great majority of the people desired him to preach there; as he was invited to do so by the committee of supplies; as he considered the act of Presbytery dissolving his pastoral relation to that church suspended by the appeal of its elder, Mr. W. W. Green; and as, whether that act was suspended or not, he had the right of every other minister in good standing, to preach wherever, in the providence of God, he might be called to do so, he complied with the invitation of his former people, and commenced preaching in the pulpit of the Pine Street Church. At the meeting of the Presbytery, April 6th, 1864,

"which was attended by only eighteen out of about sixty ministers and ruling elders, because of the military order touching ecclesiastical assemblies," a memorial was presented, signed by nine members of the Pine Street Church, asking "that such action may be taken in the premises as to compel Dr McPheeeters to respect the decision of Presbytery, and retire from Pine Street Church, and that such other relief may be afforded, as to your body may seem meet and proper." Mr. George P. Strong, being present, was invited to address the Presbytery on the subject, after which the following minute was adopted.

"1. By action of Presbytery of June, 1863, the pastoral relation between Dr. McPheeeters and Pine Street Church was dissolved, and Dr. McPheeeters ceased to be the pastor of that church, and ceased to have the right to exercise discipline or perform the functions of the pastoral office in that church.

"2. *That, inasmuch as this action was taken by Presbytery, in the exercise of its power to ordain whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under their care,* and is its solemn judgment that the interests of Pine Street Church require that Dr. McPheeeters shall cease to exercise the functions of ministry to that church; therefore, resolved," that Dr. McPheeeters be required to cease preaching in the Pine Street Church,* of this act Dr. McPheeeters complained to the General Assembly.

One of the great difficulties of this case, and one of the great sources of the injustice, as we regard it, which Dr. McPheeeters has experienced at the hands, both of the military authorities and of the ecclesiastical courts, is the confusion of mind prevailing on this subject of loyalty. The word has two very distinct meanings, which men commonly fail to distinguish, and yet the distinction is essential to the administration of justice, and to the intelligent and proper decision of what is due to our fellow-citizens and to our ministerial and Christian brethren. Loyalty is properly fidelity to law. A man is loyal who complies with every legal obligation resting upon him; who recognizes the constitutional authority of the magistrates, who obeys their

* The precise words of this last resolution are not given in the document before us. But it appears from the complaint of the whole discussion, that the substance was as above stated.

lawful commands; who pays his taxes, and who, not only abstains from giving aid or comfort to the enemies of his country, but is ready at all times to defend and support it. In this sense of the word, Dr. McPheeters is, and was, thoroughly loyal, his opponents being witnesses. He had taken a stringent oath to do all that a loyal citizen could be required to do. No man pretended that he had violated that oath. But in another sense of the word, loyalty is a feeling. It is love and zeal for a person, for a cause, or a country. A man may, therefore, be loyal in one sense and disloyal in another. He may faithfully perform all legal duties to his sovereign or to country without love and zeal for either. It is perfectly apparent that, so far as all courts, military, civil, or ecclesiastical are concerned, they can take cognizance only of what is outward—of the acts and of the words of men. They cannot hold him responsible for his feelings. The grand difficulty in Dr. McPheeters's case was, that the military authorities and the church court undertook to punish him for his feelings. No one charged him with disloyal acts. General Curtis, when he wished to test his loyalty, did not ask him what he did, but, how he felt. The absurdity and injustice of such a course, President Lincoln, with his usual sagacity, detected in a moment, and ordered his subordinates, in substance, to let the man alone; so long as he acted properly, it was no concern of theirs how he felt. There are hundreds, and we doubt not thousands, of men in the rebel army doing the work of good soldiers, who, if you asked them about their feelings, would say, they hated the whole affair, disapproved of the war, and heartily desired the restoration of the Union. It would surely be preposterous for the rebel authorities to summon these men before a court martial, dismiss them from the army, and banish them from the country because they did not feel right.

While we say this, we can easily see and readily admit that a man who is strictly loyal, in the proper and legal sense of the word, and who did nothing that any court, military or ecclesiastical, could properly take hold of, might simply on the ground of what he did not do, be so unacceptable to a zealously loyal people, as to justify a Presbytery for separating him from his charge. But then the ground of such action must be not his

disloyalty, but the dissatisfaction of the people. The people might be dissatisfied with a pastor because he was a dull preacher, or a disagreeable man. These are not grounds for Presbyterial action. A minister cannot be tried for poor preaching, or for not being agreeable. But he may be dismissed because the people dislike him and desire his removal. We do not know how Dr. McPheeters feels, or what are his sympathies in our national controversies, but we do know—1. That he is free from all charge or suspicion of disloyal conduct in word or deed. 2. That the highest national authorities declared that there was no reason, so far as they were concerned, why he should be interfered with, either in his rights as a citizen or in the exercise of his ministerial functions. 3. That he so conducted himself as to secure, not only the respect and affection of the whole community, but the full confidence of the great body of his people, embracing, as is certified by the majority of the ministers and elders of his Presbytery, many of the most devoted Union men of St. Louis. Under these circumstances, we expected fully that his complaint would be sustained and his rights vindicated. In this, we were disappointed. The great majority of the Assembly took a different view of the matter, although his cause was advocated by many of the wisest, ablest, and best men of the House. Arguments of great clearness and power in support of the complaints were made by Hon. Judge Wood, Rev. Drs. Rice, Maclean, W. L. Breckinridge, and Craven, by Judge Ryerson, H. Murray Graden, Esq., Rev. Messrs. Samuel Miller, Thomas Cleland, and others. When the roll was called, the vote stood 46 to sustain, 2 to sustain in part, and 117 not to sustain. The views of the majority are summed up in the minute reported by a committee, consisting of Drs. Beatty, Musgrave, Elliott, Tustin, Craven, and Judge Linn, and adopted by the House, which is as follows:

“The Assembly does not sustain the complainants, because the proceedings of the Presbytery of St. Louis in this case appear constitutional and regular, and, so far as we can perceive, were judicious, equitable, and for the edification of the church.

“These complaints, both in their language and the necessity

of the case, brought the whole proceedings under our review. The question of a dissolution of the pastoral relation between Dr. McPheeters and the Pine Street Church was originally brought in an orderly manner before the Presbytery, by petition from a minority of said church, and a personal tender of resignation by the pastor; and after all the constitutional steps were taken with care and deliberation, was decided by the Presbytery, acting for the peace and welfare of that church. That which was called an appeal and complaint to Synod against that action could not so suspend all further proceedings as to prevent the Presbytery from considering and acting upon the continued disturbed state of that congregation; and when, at a subsequent stated meeting of that body, this subject came before them, they did, almost unanimously, deem it unadvisable that the late pastor should continue ministerial labours in that congregation. Against this decision of the Presbytery, Dr. McPheeters and others have uttered these complaints, which we do not sustain.

"The Assembly has patiently listened to the history of this case from the opposite points of view taken, but in their decision have strictly confined themselves to the facts on record. The resignation of the pastoral relation, and the distracted state of the church, seemed plainly to call for the action of the Presbytery; and being upon the ground, and conversant with all the circumstances and demands of the case, they seem most competent to understand and decide what that action should be. The question of the pastor's loyalty to his national government, which seemed to be so largely a disturbing element in the church, has not been properly before the Assembly, as it was not pronounced upon in any Presbyterial action. They judged it best for the peace and prosperity of that particular church that the late pastor should retire altogether, and cease from his public ministrations to them; and this Assembly cannot decide otherwise. And though many of the members of the Presbytery were absent from that meeting which so decided, this could not invalidate their proceedings, as it was a regular and lawful meeting of that body.

"The right and duty of the Presbytery 'to order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under their

care,' and especially to heal dissensions, by seeking to remove the occasions of them, is a distinctive and important feature in our Presbyterian polity. And when the pastor himself so far recognized the propriety of his withdrawal as to tender to the Presbytery his resignation, it was clearly competent for that body not only to grant his request, but to order, if necessary, that he cease his ministrations to that people, if they believed that by longer continuing to serve them the dissensions would be fomented, the strife become embittered, and the spiritual interests of the church endangered. And when the Presbytery did, at length, so interfere and direct, without pronouncing upon the rumours and side issues which were the occasions of the strife and unhappy condition of the church, they simply undertook to control the relations of pastor and people for the welfare of the church, without impeaching, by any expression, the moral character and ministerial standing of that pastor. They only ordered, as a prudential measure, that the resignation which he had himself voluntarily tendered to them, should properly and entirely be carried out, by his ceasing in any way to keep up this unhappy state of things, and by ceasing to minister to them as their pastor."

We do not dissent from any of the principles stated in the above minute, but as we are so unfortunate as to differ from the Assembly as to the justice and wisdom of their decision, we claim the privilege of presenting in few words the view which we have been constrained to take of this important case. Before doing this, there are some preliminary points which demand consideration.

We think Dr. McPheeters committed some very grave mistakes, which were the source of all his difficulties. In the first place, he adopted the new, exaggerated doctrine as to the spirituality of the church and the limited range of her prerogative as a teacher. He says he had always resisted the introduction of what he calls "politics" into the house of God, and on this ground opposed all deliverances on the part of church courts touching the present rebellion, and the introduction into the services of the sanctuary of anything which implied a decided opinion as to the controversy which now rends the

country. In the year 1859, Dr. Thornwell opposed the recommendation of the Colonization Society, on the principle above stated. In private, if not in public, he took the ground that the division of the country was a certain event. He, however, wished to prevent the division of the church as consequent on the disruption of our national Union. To secure that end, he said, it was necessary to adopt the principle that the only duty of the church as a teacher, was to preach the gospel, to labour for the salvation of men. He said in his public speech that if the Government chose to re-open the slave-trade, the church would have no right to open her lips against it. This new doctrine excited great attention and feeling. When the Assembly met in 1860, the subject was again brought up, and caused for a time great anxiety. A resolution was prepared and presented by the Committee on Bills and Overtures, affirming the directly opposite doctrine, and asserting that the church as God's witness on earth is authorized and bound to reprove all sin and to support all truth and righteousness. This resolution was adopted by a unanimous vote of the Assembly.

There is indeed a sense of the words in which the church has nothing to do with politics. She has no right to pronounce judgment on purely secular matters, or upon such questions which ordinarily divide men into political parties. But politics, in the wide sense of the word, include the science of government, the policy of states, and the duties of citizens. The plain principle which determines the legitimate sphere of the action of the church, is, that it is limited to teaching and enforcing moral and religious truth; and to such truths as revealed and determined by the sacred Scriptures. The Bible gives us no rule for deciding the litigated questions about public improvements, a national bank, or a protective tariff, or state-rights. But it does give us rules for pronouncing about slave-laws, the slave-trade, obedience to magistrates, treason, rebellion, and revolution. To shut her mouth on these questions, is to make her unfaithful to her high vocation. The authors of this new theory soon repudiated it; and while those who agreed with them at the North were protesting against church courts saying a word against the rebellion, the pulpits, conventions, synods, and assemblies at the South, were resounding with

exciting appeals to inflame the spirit of rebellion.* We think that a great part of Dr. McPheeters's difficulties have arisen from his adopting a principle which prevented him from uniting with his brethren in church courts in condemning the rebellion.

A second error, as it seems to us, into which he fell, relates to the independence of the church. His zeal for the authority of Christ and for his rights as the King of the church, led him to regard certain military orders as entrenching on Christ's prerogatives. He does not appear to have joined in the clamour against arbitrary arrests, or to deny the authority of the Government in times of rebellion and invasion, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, or to proclaim martial law where necessity calls for it. On all these points his views appear to be just and reasonable. But his conscience would not allow him to recognize the right of the military authorities to interfere with his ministerial duties, or to prescribe any condition for attendance on church courts. On this principle he and his friends declined to attend certain meetings of the Presbytery, because General Rosecrans had issued a general order requiring all the members of any religious convention to take an oath of allegiance to the Government. It was not the oath he objected to, for he had voluntarily taken a similar oath before. But it was the making that oath a condition of membership in a church court. This he said was inconsistent with the independence of the church. Had it not been for scruples of this kind, preventing a full attendance of the members of Presbytery, the

* The Rev. Dr. Rice, in his speech on the floor of the Assembly, seemed to intimate that Dr. Hodge in the Assembly of 1861, and Dr. R. J. Breckinridge in the Synod of Kentucky, had placed themselves on the same ground as to the prerogative of the church, as that occupied by Dr. McPheeters. This is a great mistake. Dr. Hodge in his review of the Assembly of 1859, argued strenuously against the new doctrine. In the Assembly of 1860, being a member of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, he drafted the resolution condemning that doctrine, which resolution was adopted unanimously. In the Assembly of 1861, he stated publicly that his objection to Dr. Spring's resolution was not founded on the assumption that the church had nothing "to do with politics," and that if those resolutions were presented to the Synod of New Jersey, he would cordially support them. And accordingly he has repeatedly voted for similar resolutions in Presbytery and Synod. The real grounds of his objection to the Spring resolution were stated in the protest in which he joined with other members of the Assembly of 1861.

pastoral relation between Dr. McPheeters and his church would not have been dissolved in June, 1863, nor he forbidden to preach in the pulpit of that church in April, 1864; and this complaint would never have troubled the Assembly or the church. To us it seems that these unfortunate scruples are founded in error. There was no just ground of complaint against General Rosecrans's order. There was nothing therein inconsistent with the independence of the church or true allegiance to Christ. Suppose the small-pox had been prevalent in that region, and the authorities of the city had issued an order that no one should attend any public meeting, ecclesiastical or secular, who did not produce evidence that he had been vaccinated. Would this be an interference with the liberty of the church? Not at all—because the object sought, (viz., the public health), was a lawful object; and because the thing demanded (vaccination), was something the authorities had a right to demand. So in General Rosecrans's order, the object sought, the public safety, was a legitimate object; and the thing demanded, allegiance to the Government, was admitted to be obligatory. In our view, therefore, the order in question presented no lawful or reasonable objection to a free attendance on the Presbytery.

A third and still more serious error committed by Dr. McPheeters, was his adoption of the principle of neutrality. He avowed his purpose in his letter to his people, written before his return from New Mexico, to have nothing to do with the great conflict in which the nation was engaged. When called upon, in writing, by one of his elders and certain other persons, to say on which side were his own personal sympathies, he refused on principle to answer. And again, when General Curtis requested him to say whether he *wished* the rebellion to be suppressed, he declined to give the desired information. He constantly declared that "as a pastor, and because he was a pastor," he felt bound to be neutral, to abstain from all expression of his feelings or wishes in regard to our national difficulties. This was a very serious mistake, and arose from the same false theory to which the errors before mentioned are to be referred. There are occasions in which neutrality is improper and impracticable; occasions on which our Lord's

declaration, "He that is not for me, is against me," has its full application. And there are occasions on which neutrality is more offensive and irritating than open hostility, as our Lord in another place says, "I would thou wert either cold or hot." Such occasions are these—1. In which great questions of right and wrong are concerned. 2. In which great interests are involved, and 3. Those in which strong and right feelings are implicated. Our present national conflict involves all these elements. The attempt to destroy this Union, and to overthrow the Constitution for the purpose of establishing a great slave empire, is a stupendous wrong. In such a cause no man can be neutral. He might as well be neutral between God and Mammon, Christ and Belial. That such is the object of the present rebellion, the great body of the Northern people fully believe. It has been avowed over and over by the Southern leaders. The Richmond papers not long since told the slave-holders that as the war was made for them, they were bound to bear its burden. But whether on this point Northern sentiment and conviction be correct or incorrect, the fact that it is the conviction of the people makes neutrality in the matter an impossibility. In the second place, vital interests, personal and national, for this and for future generations, for America and for the world, are confessedly involved in the issue of this great struggle. And thirdly, it calls forth our strongest and best affections. The love of country is a virtue. We are bound to seek its honour and its welfare. It is our common parent, and we are under the strongest obligations to live, labour, and suffer, in its behalf. We cannot be neutral in a conflict which involves our national existence.

It is no wonder that Dr. McPheeters, adopting, as he did for his guidance, the three false principles above mentioned, should have trouble. In such times as the present, these false principles would bring a saint to grief; and it is due to Dr. McPheeters's uncommon excellence as a minister and as a man, and to the remarkable amiability of his temper and loveliness of character, that his troubles did not come sooner. It is a question of conscience how we ought to act towards those who do not sympathize with us in our national struggle, or who try to maintain a neutral ground. In answer to this important ques-

tion it may be remarked—1. That it is undeniable that good men do differ in their sympathies on this subject. We must take human nature as it is. A good, and even pious, mother may be blinded to the character of a wicked son; she may take his side in her heart even when he is wrong. A man, therefore, either from the adoption of wrong theories, or from having been born at the South, or from the associations of friendship and kindred, may be led into the great moral error, as we regard it, of taking sides in his feelings and wishes with the Southern revolutionists, and yet be a good man. We are not, therefore, to withdraw our confidence in such men as Christians, because they do not think and feel as we do in these times of trial. 2. If such a man is in a private station, and abstains from any thing in word or deed, that is hostile to the government, or designed to aid the rebellion, he is entitled to remain unmolested in the enjoyment of all his rights, civil and ecclesiastical. 3. If he occupies any public position which renders the avowal of his feelings and wishes unavoidable or necessary, he has a right to make such avowal, as is freely done by so many of our public men on the floor of Congress. 4. If such a man, however, be a pastor, his situation is peculiarly difficult. He is the organ of the people in presenting their prayers and thanksgiving to God. They have the right to have their hearts' desires for their country brought before his throne. If the pastor's principles or feelings prevent his doing this; if he cannot pray for the success of our arms, and for the suppression of the rebellion; if he cannot heartily thank God for the victories he may grant our armies, he cannot satisfy the just demands of the people. The want of agreement or congeniality may be such as to demand a separation. If those who are dissatisfied be the minority, they should withdraw; if the majority, the pastor should withdraw. What, in such a case, should be done, is a question fairly within the province of the Presbytery to decide. These principles appear to us plain and reasonable. How far they apply to the case of Dr. McPheeters will be seen from what follows.

In relation to his case, we have to remark, in the first place, that, in our judgment, the whole course of the Assembly was singularly unfair. The Presbytery of St. Louis had three

courses open to them when the memorial was presented to them in June, 1863. They might have proceeded judicially to try Dr. McPheeters on the charges included in that memorial, if they were such as admitted of a judicial investigation; or they might dissolve the pastoral relation between him and this church at his request, or on application of the people; or they might decree that dissolution on the ground that the interests of the congregation required it. They declined to adopt the first of these courses, and took the second, in June 1863, and the third, in April, 1864. Now, as the Presbytery did not give the case a judicial character, it was not competent for the Assembly to do so; and yet this is what they virtually did. In the first place, they admitted Mr. Strong to appear before them as "one of the original parties." But, if he were one party, Dr. McPheeters must have been the other—one the accuser, the other the accused—and then there must have been charges, testimony, and judicial decision. But in fact there was nothing of the kind. We agree, therefore, with Dr. Rice, who pronounced the admission of Mr. Strong as a party, and allowing him all the privileges without any of the responsibilities of an accuser, was something unheard of in the history of our church. In the second place, Mr. Strong, in his able seven-hour speech, acted not only as accuser but as witness. The greater part of his speech was of the nature of testimony, a statement of fact designed to prove that Dr. McPheeters is disloyal. Here was testimony not before the lower court, not on record, given without the sanction of an oath, without the opportunity of cross-examination or contradiction. When Dr. McPheeters denied one of the statements of a member of the Presbytery, he was told by the Moderator, that he had not then the right to deny anything. He had a right to deny every assertion which he believed to be unfounded, but he had no opportunity to rebut all this testimony thus irregularly adduced. H. Murray Graydon, Esq., had good reason for saying, "Accustomed as he had been to the pleadings of civil courts, where nothing was admitted that might affect the decision, except sworn testimony or official records, he was amazed, as he listened, to hear all the forms of law disregarded, and persons admitted here to make long and rambling statements of fact,

and of rumour and hearsay,—all of which, it is evident, are looked upon as testimony, and have produced their effect upon the minds of the judges of this court of Christ. . . . Why, Sir, if professional counsel should attempt, in a civil court, to argue before Judge Linn as parties have done here, he would silence them, he would turn them out of court; and he was surprised to hear the judge and others seem to vindicate and justify the strange irregularities of this case.” It was this irregular testimony, we doubt not, that decided the judgment of the house. The form which the matter evidently took was—Here is a disloyal minister and a loyal Presbytery, whose side will you take? There could, of course, be but one answer to that question. In allowing the case to take that form, we think the Assembly did Dr. McPheeters great injustice.

In the second place, it may be said however, admitting the mode of procedure to be liable to objection, substantial justice was, after all, done by the vote of the Assembly. To this we cannot agree.. We think grave injustice was done, not only to Dr. McPheeters, but to the whole Presbyterian church; and that the sanction of the Assembly has been given to principles and acts deserving universal reprobation.

The complaint of Dr. McPheeters and of his session, is technically against the action of the Presbytery in April, 1864, forbidding him to preach in the Pine Street Church. But that act cannot be separated from the act of the Presbytery in June, 1863. The two are related as effect and cause; and the Presbytery assign their action in June, 1863, as the ground of their action in April, 1864. The two were united in the judgment of the Assembly. We do not dissent from that judgment, 1. On the ground, taken by some distinguished members of the house, that the Presbytery was not a free body; that the military order then in force put its members under duress, and therefore its acts are invalid. We have already said that we cannot agree with that view of the matter. We believe the members who absented themselves on account of that order, acted under a mistaken view of duty; and consequently that the integrity or validity of the Presbytery was not thereby impaired. 2. Nor do we agree with Judge Ryerson, Mr. Graydon and others, that the Presbytery were bound, if they acted

at all, to proceed judicially on the charges presented in the memorial of Mr. Strong and others. Judge Ryerson and others voted to sustain the complaint, because Dr. McPheeters had been virtually silenced without a trial. The dissolution of the relation, however, between a pastor and his church, or the forbidding a minister to preach in a particular church, is not an act of discipline. It involves no censure. It leaves the minister perfectly *rectus in ecclesia*. The Presbytery could legally do all they did without a trial. They were not bound to take up the vague charges against Dr. McPheeters's loyalty, which, it is probable, they saw to be mere complaints that he did not feel properly, presenting no grounds for a judicial investigation.

3. Nor do we place our objection on the assumption that Mr. Green's appeal from the decision of the Presbytery, dissolving the pastoral relation, was valid; or that it suspended the operation of that decision, leaving Dr. McPheeters in the possession of all his rights as pastor. This is one of the grounds taken by Dr. McPheeters himself. He argued that he had a right to preach in the Pine Street Church, because Mr. Green's appeal, being valid, he was still its pastor. Mr. Strong made it one of the main points of his argument, that Dr. McPheeters had no right to preach in that church, because that appeal being invalid, he was no longer its pastor. We cannot see that this argument has any force on either side. Dr. McPheeters's right to preach in the Pine Street Church did not depend on the validity of Mr. Green's appeal. He preached there because he was regularly invited to do so. He had the right to preach in any church in the land. It was not because he was the pastor of the church, but because he was a minister in good standing, free from all disabilities, military, or ecclesiastical, that he accepted the invitation to occupy that pulpit.

4. Nor do we think the ground taken by the Rev. Samuel Miller valid. He says, the question is, "Were the Presbytery right in prohibiting a minister of the gospel, in good standing, and a member of their body, from preaching in a certain church? 1. Had they the power? 2. Was it expedient to exercise it?" The former of these questions, he answers in the negative. The Presbytery, he says, had no right to prohibit Dr. McPheeters from preaching, (of course he means in that

church,) without trying him. But why not? If, as he properly admits, they had the power for cause to dissolve the pastoral relation without the request or consent of either pastor or people, why should they not have the power to prohibit his preaching? If they could do the greater, they could do the less. The principle is the same in both cases. If the Presbytery believe that the interests of religion demand that a pastor leave his church, they may decree the separation. If they believe that a minister's preaching in a particular church would distract, and divide it, or be otherwise hurtful, they may prohibit such preaching. For the exercise of these discretionary powers, they are responsible to the higher courts. But the power clearly belongs to every Presbytery.

The reasons why we should have voted to sustain the complaint of Dr. McPheeters, are—1. That he is a good man and a faithful minister of Christ. Had he been a factious, ill-tempered, contentious man, our sympathies would not be so much enlisted on his behalf. But it is acknowledged that he is a remarkably amiable, faithful, spiritual, and devoted man and minister. It is a duty and privilege to stand by and support such a man, as far as a good conscience will permit. This is specially incumbent when such a man is persecuted and unjustly abused. That Dr. McPheeters has been the object of persecution and ill-usage is undeniable. The military order by which he was banished from the state, forbidden to preach within its borders, and the charge of his church taken from its trustees and session, was an unjust and tyrannical proceeding. We say this, not because we deny the right of summary arrest and of martial law. We admit the right. We are surprised that the exercise of that right has been so sparingly made. But it is not a matter of surprise, that, while in many cases its exercise has been just and useful, in others it has been uncalled for and impolitic; and in others, grossly unjust and oppressive. That it was unjust in the case of Dr. McPheeters is plain. 1. Because the order itself gives no adequate and even plausible reasons for this extreme exercise of power. Dr. McPheeters was one the best men in St. Louis; he had by word or deed broken no law of the land; he had failed in no social or civil duty; he had taken and kept a stringent oath of

allegiance to the provisional government of Missouri and to the Government of the United States. There are hundreds and thousands, and, we fear, hundreds of thousands of men in the land more deserving of arrest and banishment than he.

2. We are authorized to speak of this order as we have done, because the authorities at Washington immediately annulled it. Either General Curtis was wrong in issuing it, or Mr. Lincoln was wrong in annulling it. We only agree with the President and the Attorney-General in condemning the order in question. Notwithstanding the action of the national authorities, however, this oppressive mandate remained in force against Dr. McPheeeters, except as to banishment from the state, for a whole year. It weighed him down. It declared him to be so disloyal that it was not safe to allow him to preach, and this in a community so excited that Governor Gamble, General Curtis, and President Lincoln himself were denounced as traitors. Dr. McPheeeters submitted to all this quietly. He made no opposition or complaint. Such a man is entitled to the sympathy and support of all good men.

3. But the consideration just mentioned, although in our judgment of no slight importance, justifies only sympathy and support so far as higher obligations permit. We are not authorized to justify even a good and persecuted man in doing wrong, or to condemn those who censure his wrong-doing. We should have sustained the complaint of Dr. McPheeeters, because we regard the acts of which he complains as deserving of universal condemnation. The committee of the Assembly who framed the judgment adopted by the House, say that they refused to sustain the complaints against the Presbytery of St. Louis: 1. Because the dissolution of the pastoral relation between Dr. McPheeeters and his church, and forbidding him to preach in that pulpit, were acts of the Presbytery in the regular exercise of its authority; and 2. Because the members of that Presbytery, being on the ground, were the best judges of what the spiritual interests of the Pine Street Church required. Were these facts true, we should have nothing to say. Had we been a member of the Assembly, we should have been very slow to put up our private opinion against that of the Presbytery on a matter concerning which they were the best judges.

But we deny, that in the true and proper sense of the words, the Presbytery of St. Louis did separate Dr. McPheeters from his church, or did forbid him to preach. On the contrary, they condemned both these acts and protested against them. And yet the General Assembly, in opposition to their protest and to their better judgment, sanction and endorse the action which the Presbytery condemn. The Presbytery of St. Louis is a permanent body, consisting of over sixty members. Who separated Dr. McPheeters from his church? eight ministers and three elders. Are they the Presbytery? In a technical, legal, constitutional sense, they are entitled to be so regarded; but in a fair, honourable, moral, and righteous sense, they are not. Suppose a Presbytery should be called to meet, and by a storm, railroad accident, or other providential event, only three out of sixty members should come together. Suppose those three should perform an act, (depose a minister or divide a church), which they knew to be contrary to the judgment and wishes of the absent members; and suppose further, that those absentees, nineteen-twentieths of the body, should memorialize the Assembly, stating that they condemn the act of the technical Presbytery, and protested against it; and suppose the Assembly should refuse to hear that memorial, and should sanction the act because it was the act of the Presbytery, and because the Presbytery was the best judge. We do not hesitate to say that every honest man on earth would condemn such a judgment. The Assembly might say they thought the three right, and the fifty-seven wrong; but to say they sustained the three because they were the Presbytery, (that is the sixty), and because they, being on the ground, they were the best judges, is something hardly conceivable. And yet it is into such a judgment as this, our good, wise, and we add with all sincerity, venerated Assembly, have allowed themselves to be bewildered and cajoled. They rest their decision on the wishes and judgment of the Presbytery of St. Louis. One-fifth of that Presbytery wish one thing, four-fifths another. Why should one-fifth be preferred to the four-fifths, simply because they voted? They were not wiser, better, more fully informed, or more impartial. It is to sacrifice substance to form, justice to technicality; to take the act

of the small minority of a body against which the majority protest, as the act of the body itself.

3. This fraction of the Presbytery came together June 3d, "to dissolve the pastoral relation between the Pine Street Church and the Rev. Samuel B. McPheeters, D. D.," without being requested to do so, either by the pastor or the church, and against the known wishes and judgment of the great majority of the Presbytery. They knew the majority would not attend. It matters not whether that absence arose from an epidemic, from stress of weather, from the disturbed state of the country, or from conscientious scruples. The minority knew the majority would not be there; and they announced their purpose to do, what they could not do, had their brethren, who had equal rights with themselves, been able to attend. As Dr. McPheeters placed his resignation into their hands, their mode of proceeding was changed. Instead of dissolving the pastoral relation of their own motion, they proceeded to cite the church to appear by their commissioners to signify their wishes in the case. The pastoral relation involves a contract to which there are two parties, pastor and people. Neither can dissolve it at his, or their, option. There must be a mutual agreement, unless the Presbytery see cause to act contrary to the wishes of either or of both the parties. The church met, and by a large majority protested against the resignation of their pastor being accepted. When near midnight, a great part of the meeting having withdrawn, Mr. Strong, the only elder who favoured the dissolution of the pastoral relation between Dr. McPheeters and his church, was, by the minority that remained, appointed commissioner to the Presbytery. When this was known, the church again met, at the call of the session, and protested against Mr. Strong's acting as the representative of the church, unless he would in good faith carry out their wishes and oppose the separation between them and their pastor. The Presbytery met. Mr. Strong was recognized as the commissioner representing the church; was heard at length in favour of the dissolution; and the Presbytery resolved, that "at the request of the Pine Street Church,"* the connection between it and

* This statement was made on the floor of the Assembly, and is contained in the memorial addressed to the Assembly by the majority of the Presbytery.

Dr. McPheeters as its pastor should be dissolved. Nothing need be said in reference to this record. If it is not condemned by the instinctive moral sense of every honest man, there is no help for it. Mr. Strong was legally, to be sure, the commissioner of the church; in justice, morality, and honour, he was not. It was in violation of all moral right that he was so received and recognized. This action of the Presbytery was one of the grounds of Dr. McPheeters's complaint, and this action the Assembly is made to endorse.

4. We have already admitted that a man may be legally loyal, one who so discharges all his obligations to his country, that no court, civil, military, or ecclesiastical, can have just ground of action against him, and, nevertheless, may be so hostile in feeling as to render him an unsuitable and even an intolerable pastor of a loyal congregation. With regard to Dr. McPheeters, however, the undeniable facts are these—
1. He was a man universally respected and beloved. 2. He had taken, and faithfully kept, a stringent oath of allegiance to the Government. 3. The highest authorities in the land, the President and Attorney-General, pronounced themselves so satisfied with his loyalty that they forbade his being interfered with on the part of the authorities, either as a citizen or as a minister. 4. Whatever were his private feelings, he so conducted himself, and so performed his ministerial duties, as to retain the affection and confidence of the community, of six out of seven of the elders of his church, of the vast majority of its members and attendants; and of four-fifths of the members of his Presbytery. That such a man should be dismissed from his church and forbidden to preach in its pulpit, by a mere fragment of the Presbytery to which he belongs, who knew him and all the circumstances of the case, seems to us an injustice which has few, if any, parallels in the history of our church.

It seems, however, incredible that any body of men should say that the church requested, what they knew it not only did not request, but formally protested against. If any correction of this statement, as a clerical error, was made before the Assembly, it has escaped our notice. If the record be correct, it is a millstone about the neck of that technical Presbytery.

S H O R T N O T I C E S .

The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, &c. Collected and edited by James Spedding, M. A., Robert Leslie Ellis, M. A., Douglas Denon Heath, Barrister at Law. Vol. X. Being translations of the Philosophical Works. Vol. III. Boston: Taggart & Thompson. 1864.

This is the concluding volume of fifteen, which constitute this edition of the works of one of the most illustrious writers England has ever produced. The advantages of this edition are: 1. That it is conducted under the supervision of competent and scholarly men. 2. It is comprehensive. 3. It is in a most convenient form. 4. It is published in the finest style, as to paper, printing, &c. 5. It is cheap, not only in view of the present cost of material and labour, but also relatively to the price of the English edition.

Theological and Homiletical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, from the German of G. V. Lechler, D. D., and R. Gerok. Edited by J. B. Lange, D. D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Bonn. Translated by the Rev. Paton J. Gloag. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson & Co. 1864.

This is another of the numerous and valuable volumes of Clark's Foreign Theological Library, of which such frequent mention has been made in these pages. This Commentary on Acts is part of Lange's Bibel-Werk, or popular commentary on the Bible, which has for some years been in the process of publication in Germany, and which has attained a very high reputation. Professor Philip Schaff has undertaken the translation of the whole work, aided by numerous literary associates in this country. This elegant edition of the part relating to the Acts, (including the first twelve chapters,) will of course be specially acceptable to those who have other parts of the Foreign Theological Library.

The Life of the Lord Jesus Christ: Being a complete critical examination of the Origin, Contents, and Connection of the Gospels. Translated from the German of J. P. Lange, D. D. In six Volumes. Vols. I. II. III. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, and the same publishers in London and Dublin as the work above noticed.

The Life of Christ by Lange, is the most complete and thorough work which the infidel book of Strauss has called forth. To those who have not access to German books, this,

and other books of this series, are of inestimable value. They open to the theological student a new field, and supply ministers with materials of thought and knowledge which they cannot elsewhere obtain.

Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament. By C. F. Keil, D. D., and F. Delitzsch, D. D., Professors of Theology. Translated from the German by the Rev. James Martin, B. A. Vol. I. The Pentateuch. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton & Adams. Dublin: John Robertson & Co. 1864.

Keil and Delitzsch are already extensively known in this country as among the most distinguished modern German theologians of the evangelical school. This work will be a great storehouse of useful matter for students of the Bible. The present volume includes Genesis and a few chapters of Exodus.

The Golden Censer: Thoughts on the Lord's Prayer. By John S. Hart, LL.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 144.

The late highly gifted and lamented missionary, Löewenthal, when a student in the Theological Seminary in Princeton, delivered in the Oratory, a discourse on the word "Our," in the preface to the Lord's Prayer. It filled all who heard him with surprise and delight. Surprise, that one word could contain so much, and delight, that the truths involved in that one word were so precious. Numerous works have been written on this wondrous compend of petitions. The volume before us, as might be expected from the ability and elegant culture of its author, is replete with excellent thoughts felicitously expressed.

Memorial of the Rev. John N. Campbell, D.D. Late Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in the city of Albany. Compiled by a Member of the Congregation, and published by order of the Trustees. Albany: 1864. Pp. 70.

Dr. Campbell was a remarkable man. With a physical constitution unusually delicate and refined, he had an extraordinary firmness of will and force of character. The writer of this notice was a companion of his early childhood in Philadelphia. He had then the appearance of a delicate little girl. As he grew to manhood, the general impression was that he would be effeminate and feeble through life. He soon, however, put an end to such forebodings. He showed himself to be a man of marked ability, of indomitable perseverance, of unflinching courage, of extraordinary efficiency. Very few of our ministers have accomplished more, or attained to greater influence in the sphere in which he moved. This affectionate tribute to his memory on the part of his people contains a brief memoir of his life; the excellent address by the Rev. Dr. Sprague, delivered

at the funeral of his friend, and numerous notices and testimonials of respect gathered from the public journals.

The Blennerhassett Papers; embodying the private journal of Haram Blennerhassett, and the correspondence, hitherto unpublished, of Burr, Tyler, Devereaux, Dayton, Adair, Emmet, Theodosia Burr Alston, &c., &c., developing the aim of the attempted Wilkinson and Burr Revolution, &c. &c. By William H. Safford. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, and Baldwin, 26 West Fourth St. 1864. 8vo., pp. 665.

This fine large volume (received as our last sheets are going to the press), relates to one of the most interesting and least understood portions of our national history. Consisting of authentic documents, most of them hitherto inaccessible to the public, it must command general attention among all students of history, and those fond of romantic adventures.

The Book of Common Prayer, &c., as amended by the Westminster Divines in Royal Commission, 1661, and in agreement with the Directory for Public Worship of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Philadelphia: William S. and Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut Street. 1864. Pp. 637. To which is added, *Liturgia Expurgata; or the Prayer-Book amended according to the Presbyterian Revision of 1661*, and historically and critically reviewed. By Charles W. Shields, D. D. Philadelphia: Wm. S. and Alfred Martien.

As this volume has come into our hands at the last hour, we have not had time even to note its contents. The public has been aware that Dr. Shields has been long devoting his attention to the history of the liturgical services of the Reformed churches. Many among us have so associated Episcopacy and Liturgies, that the two can hardly be separated. This arises from very limited historical knowledge. Most of the non-episcopal churches of the Reformation, the Scotch among the number, used liturgies more or less extended, and most Protestant churches on the continent of Europe do so to the present day. The labours of Dr. Shields will, we trust, awaken interest in this subject, and direct attention to a most important part of public worship.

The Charge and Inaugural Address delivered on the occasion of the Induction of the Rev. W. G. T. Shedd, D. D., as Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, January 11, 1864. Published by request of the Board of Directors. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864.

The charge delivered on this interesting occasion was by the Rev. William Adams, D. D. This is a sufficient guarantee of its character. It displays in a high degree the learning, culture, taste and piety, which have won for its author so honourable a rank among our metropolitan pastors. The following is a true index of its spirit and tone:

“When we have emphasized the pre-requisite of a sound

judgment, familiarly known as common sense, in distinction from all mystic and mythical methods, let us remember that there is a spiritual discernment which is more than erudition, and which God has promised even unto babes. The true interpretation of Scripture must be that which the Author of Scripture puts upon his own words, and which he communicates to him who seeks it with filial prayer. This 'quick understanding' is a temper, rather than a faculty. It is like *antennæ* to the mind, a sensitive power by which it feels its way easily and promptly through passages manifold and labyrinthine, when pride and self-confidence grope and stumble." P. 16.

Dr. Shedd's address is also quite worthy of himself and the occasion. He treats of the influence of biblical exegesis upon the theologian and the preacher. He shows with his wonted depth and richness of thought, and in his classic, vigorous, clean-cut style, that the thorough Exegesis of the Scriptures tends to impart to the mind of the expositor, whether preacher or theologian, the truest originality and authority, those great sources of convictive and persuasive power.

Letters to a Theological Student. By Leverett Griggs, Pastor of the Congregational Church, Bristol, Connecticut. Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston.

These letters, by an earnest, judicious, and successful pastor, to his son in Lane Theological Seminary, are brief, plain, pithy, and every way to the purpose. They can be read in one hour. It would be difficult for a theological student to spend an hour more profitably than in reading them.

Annual of Scientific Discovery; or, Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art, for 1864. Exhibiting the most important discoveries and improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, Zoölogy, Botany, Mineralogy, Meteorology, Geography, Antiquities, etc., together with notes on the Progress of Science during the year 1863. A list of recent Scientific Publications, Obituaries of Eminent Scientific Men, etc. Edited by David A. Wells, A. M., M. D., author of Principles of Natural Philosophy, Principles of Chemistry, First Principles of Geology, etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1864.

It is difficult to give a better account of this valuable work than is furnished by the above title-page. The value of such a book, if well executed, must be obvious. Scientific men can hardly afford to do without it. To all educated and inquiring persons, it is a thesaurus of information to which they need access, and which they cannot easily find elsewhere. So far as we have been able to examine, the volume is made up with great labour, care, and judgment. Its materials are very abun-

dant, from the highest sources, judiciously selected, and well arranged.

The Freedom of the Will, as a Basis of Human Responsibility and a Divine Government; Elucidated and Maintained in its issue with the Necessitarian Theories of Hobbes, Edwards, the Princeton Essayists, and other leading advocates. By D. D. Whedon, D. D. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter. 1864.

Notwithstanding the elaborate assaults upon Edwards's great Treatise on the Will, which almost every decade brings forth, it still remains to be assaulted: like the storm-smitten rock which serenely and sublimely awaits all the tempests that may vainly dash against it, to the end of time. Dr. Whedon's book has unquestionable acuteness and dexterity, along with great zeal and assurance, and an amazing fecundity of huge and unusual words. But it will require more than all this to demolish Edwards; however an occasional fallacy may be detected in his reasonings. It will be seen from the title-page, that Dr. Whedon honours us with special consideration. We wait an opportunity for a closer examination of his volume, before concluding whether there is any occasion for us to reciprocate the compliment.

The Influence of the Bible in improving the Understanding and Moral Character. By John Matthews, D. D., Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary of Hanover and New Albany, Indiana; Author of "Letters on the Divine Purpose," etc., with a Memoir of the Author, by James Wood, D. D., President of Hanover College, Indiana. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This work bears the impress of the author's force and originality as a thinker. The topic speaks its own importance, and the ability with which it is treated will be its passport to public acceptance and usefulness. The Memoir prefixed is well done, and will add to the value and interest of the book, as a memorial of one of the lights of our church.

The Memorial Hour; or, the Lord's Supper, in its relation to Doctrine and Life. By Jeremiah Chaplin, D. D., author of "The Evening of Life," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1864.

This book consists of a series of chapters on the Lord's Supper, as to its meaning and intent, its proper observance and due improvement. It is both didactic and devotional. For the most part, the several chapters are enriched with choice selections of evangelical poetry, and some of them are illustrated by the examples of eminent saints. We welcome whatever is suited to promote the earnest and fit observance of this sacrament among evangelical Christians, many of whom fail duly to appreciate it, and fall below the standard of scriptural and edifying observance.

A Memorial of Bird Wilson, D. D., LL. D., late Professor of Systematic Divinity of the General Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America. By W. White Bronson, A. M. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1864.

Dr. Wilson is shown here to have been a wise and good, but quiet and unobtrusive man. As the son of one of our most eminent revolutionary statesmen, and the first principal professor in the oldest Episcopal Theological Seminary of our country, who filled his station with credit and success, he was an historical character, who deserves some fit memorial. He was the bosom friend of the venerable Bishop White. His biographer, from time to time, lets his light, as a high-church exclusive, shine. He attributes Dr. Wilson's warmth in vindicating the validity of lay-baptism "to the fact that he had himself received lay-baptism, and therefore felt a deep personal interest in its thorough vindication. A supposition not entirely destitute of weight, inasmuch as he was, in all probability, baptized by one of the rigid Scotch school, then presiding over a congregation in Philadelphia." Pp. 73—4. The English of this is, that baptism by Presbyterian ministers is lay-baptism, and that circumlocution must be employed to avoid calling them ministers or pastors. They may well defend the validity of Presbyterian baptism, call it lay, or what they will, unless they would class a large part of their bishops and ministers as unbaptized; and so, if we are to accept their dogma of baptismal regeneration, as unregenerate. We will add another suggestion. It is quite fortunate for our Episcopal brethren that they have such sources of supply and replenishment as the great Presbyterian communion. Were it otherwise, were they deprived of all their clergy and laity who had a Presbyterian training, whence would the void be filled? And is not that a perennial fountain of life and strength, which not only supplies the losses and provides for the rapid increase of the Presbyterian body, but so largely replenishes other communions?

Light in Darkness; or Christ discovered in his true character. By a Unitarian. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Blakeman. 1864.

The struggles of minds emerging from destructive error into the truth are usually profoundly instructive and interesting. The present is no exception. As the writer, a clergyman, unfolds the progress of his recovery from the sceptical negations of Socinianism to the positive, soul-sustaining verities of the everlasting gospel, we feel more deeply than ever the folly of

all human wisdom, and the incomparable excellence of that wisdom of God which is foolishness with men.

Helen Maurice; or the Daughter at Home. Published by the American Tract Society.

The Weed with an Ill Name. By the author of "The Story of a Pocket-Bible," "Mackerel Will," etc. Published by the American Tract Society.

These are additions to the excellent story books for children and youth, illustrating and enforcing some point of truth and duty, of which the Tract Society has been so prolific.

Grace-Culture, or Thoughts on Grace, Growth, and Glory. By Ezra M. Hunt, M. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

It is altogether delightful when those whose vocation it is to medicate bodily distempers, address themselves to spiritual maladies, and look after the health and vigour of the soul. It has been observed that, contrary to a very prevalent opinion, there is a mutual congeniality between the study of medicine and psychology, and that the habits of observation and reflection, of seizing and analyzing subtle and tenuous phenomena, which are requisite in the physician, are also essential in the metaphysician. High authority has attributed Locke's success as an analyst of the mind to his medical training. And we have often observed that truly Christian physicians are among the most skilful in treating certain departments of experimental and casuistical divinity, especially those implicated in the connection of the mind with the body. All this is illustrated, in this copious, well-packed volume, by one of the promising young physicians of our church. It abounds in doctrinal and practical insight, and is well adapted to promote that growth in grace which it so happily elucidates.

The Old Parsonage, or Recollections of a Minister's Daughter. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 18mo. pp. 236.

"From the storehouse of early recollections, I have endeavoured to depict a few of the scenes which have taught me many a salutary lesson, and I trust they will not be to others utterly useless. If there be any charm in the plain narrative of truth, they will not be wholly devoid of attractive interest."—*Preface.* They are delightful, and deserve a circulation far beyond the Sabbath-School Library.

Several books have been received too late for notice in this number.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

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GERMANY.

Keil and Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament, 4th Part. The Book of Job, by Dr. F. Delitzsch. 8vo. pp. 543.

F. Hitzig, The Psalms, translated and explained. Vol. II. Part 1. 8vo. pp. 240.

A. Brechei, The Psalms metrically translated. 8vo. pp. 312.

J. Gärtner, Explanation of the Prophet Daniel and the Revelation of John, as well as Ezekiel's Prophecy of Gog. Chaps. 37—39. 8vo. pp. 576.

The 24 Books of the Bible in the Hebrew Text, with a German translation, continuous exposition, and homiletic remarks, by Rab. S. Herxheimer. Vol. I. The Pentateuch. 8vo.

J. E. Löwy, Critical Talmudic Lexicon. In Hebrew. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 494.

The Hagada, illustrated and translated by A. V. Morpurgo. Hebrew and Italian. 4vo. pp. 66.

A. Nager, The Religious Philosophy of the Talmud. 8vo. pp. 44.

M. Duschak, The Mosaic and Talmudic Law of Marriage. 8vo. pp. 750.

E. Bernhardt, Critical Investigations respecting the Gothic version of the Scriptures. A contribution to German literary history and to the criticism of the New Testament. 8vo. pp. 31.

P. de Lagarde, The Four Gospels in Arabic, from a Vienna Manuscript. 8vo. pp. xxxii and 143.

M. A. Levy, Phenician Studies, No. 3. 8vo. pp. 80. Phenician Lexicon. 8vo. pp. 51.

T. Nöldeke, On the Amalekites, and some other nations neighbours of the Israelites. 8vo. pp. 42.

E. Riehm, On the Nature and Symbolic Conception of the Cherubim. In Latin. 4vo. pp. 26.

J. Pietraszewski, German Improved Translation of the Books of Zoroaster. Part 1. 8vo. pp. 248.

The Creation of the World, a Cornish Mystery, edited with a translation and notes, by Whitley Stokes. 8vo. pp. 208.

Monachi Anonymi Scotti Chronicon Anglo-Scoticum. E codice Durlancensi primum integrum edidit C. W. Bouterwek. 8vo. pp. 48.

H. Pabst, De Ariberto II. Mediolansensi, primisque mediiævi motibus popularibus. 8vo. pp. 46.

L. Morgenstern, The Life of Galileo Galilei. 8vo. pp. 40.

P. Pressel, John Calvin. 8vo. pp. 264.

Corpus Reformatorum. Vol. XXX. 4to. Vol. II. of the complete works of John Calvin. Pp. 1118.

C. A. Brandis, History of the Developement of Greek Philosophy and its subsequent effects in the Roman Empire. 8vo. pp. 430.

E. Alberti, The Question concerning the spirit and order of the Writings of Plato, illustrated from Aristotle. 8vo. pp. 115.

H. Steinthal, Philosophy, History and Psychology, in their reciprocal relations. 8vo. pp. 76.

T. Vanderhausen, Ideas toward a new system of Historiography. 8vo. pp. 46.

Shakespeareiana, List of Writings of and about Shakespeare. 8vo. pp. 16.

W. Peters, Scientific Journey to Mozambique, at the command of his Majesty, King Frederick IV. in 1842—1848. Botany. 4vo. pp. 584.

H. Barth, Travels through the Interior of European Turkey, from Rustchuck, by Philippopol, Rilo, Bitolia, and the Thessalian Olympus, to Saloniki, in the autumn of 1862. 8vo. pp. 232.

FRANCE.

The Holy Bible, New Translation from the Hebrew and Greek, by a union of Pastors and Ministers of the two National Protestant Churches of France. No. 1. To be completed in ten numbers.

E. de Pressensé, the Church and the French Revolution, a History of the Revolutions of Church and State from 1789 to 1802. 8vo.

F. Monnier, Alcuin and Charlemagne, with fragments of an unpublished Commentary by Alcuin on St. Matthew, and other pieces published for the first time. 32mo.

H. Guys, The Nation of the Druses, their History, Religion, Manners, and Political Condition. 8vo.

History and Description of Lower Cochinchina. Translated for the first time from the original Chinese by G. Aubaret. 8vo.

The Spouse from beyond the Tomb. The Chinese Text with a French Translation by L. de Rosny, followed by a Bibliographical notice of the principal Chinese Romances. 12mo.

S. Julien, San-Tsen-King, composed by Wang-Pe-Heou,

toward the end of the 13th Century. Chinese Text, a table of 214 keys, and a Latin Translation. 8vo.

Mansala Parva, the 16th book of the Mahabharata, Translated and Annotated by E. Wattier. 8vo.

P. E. Foucaux, Buddhism in Thibet. 8vo.

F. Baudry, The Science of Language and its actual Condition. 8vo.

F. Baudry, The Brothers Grimm, their Life and Labours. 8vo.

Christopher Columbus, Complete Collection of his Writings, to illustrate the Discovery of America, in Italian, corrected with notes, and an introduction by G. B. Torre. 8vo.

Note to the article on The War and National Wealth.

Since this article went to press, the publication of the Secretary of the Treasury more than confirms our estimate of the cost of the war for the present year. The rise in gold to the neighbourhood of \$2.50, also shows that the excess of our consumption above production is represented by foreign fabrics which we have not gold enough to pay for, consequently the price of gold is forced up until it raises the price of other things, so as to constrain a diminished consumption. This goes on, until enough is in this way liberated for export, to pay our foreign debt. The enormous income tax to be paid the current year, also lessens, like other taxes, the amount of commodities which the people can pay for and consume. All this is enforcing what we have insisted on, the absolute necessity of strict economy, and that equilibrium between consumption and production, without which, in the absence of foreign loans, the war cannot continue, on its present scale; and towards which equilibrium, however disturbed, there is always an inevitable *nexus* in the very nature of things.

THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1864.

No. IV.

ART. I.—*Francis Bacon, of Verulam. Realistic Philosophy, and its Age.* By KUNO FISCHER. Translated from the German, by John Oxenford. London, 1857.

WE know of no better exposition of the merits and defects of the Baconian philosophy than this, and it is translated in a free, luminous, and philosophical style. We have no intention to criticise it, or even to sketch a summary of its contents; those who have a taste for the subject, and have not entirely mastered it, ought to read the book. The merits of the Inductive method are proved by the immense additions it has made to the physical sciences since it has been brought into distinct practice. Its defects, as it was limited by Bacon and understood by his followers, may be seen in its influence on the mental sciences as developed or degraded by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Bayle, Voltaire, Condillac, Holbach, Helvétius, and others of the materialist school.

The natural order of the acquisition of knowledge is, first, that of the phenomena of physical nature around us, and afterwards that of our mental nature; and Bacon fell so far into this order that he unduly fastened the intellect to the leading-strings of physical nature, and restricted all human knowledge to our external experience, and allowed to the mind no inhe-

rent character, and no natural laws, tendencies, faculties, or capacities. This was an unnatural and arbitrary limitation of the sphere of inductive philosophy, for it confined all philosophical investigation to the objective aspect of knowledge, rejecting the subjective; and logical thinkers, accepting this limitation as a principle, found its sphere of operation continually growing by their deductions, until it culminated in the blank scepticism of Hume. Our author traces the history of this with great skill and thoroughness.

Of course, the natural and untrained logic of mankind saved us from accepting the results of such one-sided investigations; and the moral and intellectual world still moved on, sustained by its faith in its God-given capacities to learn, and instinctively set aside, or simply ignored the demonstration, which it could not then answer, that there existed neither mind nor matter—beings to learn, nor things to be learned. Now, however, we have no difficulty in seeing that all knowledge must result from—or we should rather say that it *is*—the relation of mind with things and facts, and other minds, and from their mutual adaptation to the production of knowledge; and that the mind is no empty tablet, or clean-swept threshing-floor, passively receiving the things and facts, or the impressions and inscriptions of them, which the world may chance to bring before it.

But, defective as this theory was, it admitted the mind's receptivity, and therefore, that thus far, at least, it had inherent character and capacity; and inductive science, instead of arbitrarily limiting the mind to this, ought to have taken the hint which the admission gave, and applied itself to a more thorough investigation. We might as well expect the empty tablet to perform the work of the type-founder and the compositor, and the threshing-floor to execute the functions of the mill and the bakery, as to expect the merely receptive capacity of the mind to transform its sensuous individual impressions into will, sentiment, language, conceptions, ideas, and scientific systems. Even the passivity of the cannon-ball before the exploding powder, is not so entire as to dispense with the form, weight, and texture of the metal that fit it for its purpose; a cotton ball would not answer there.

Our author does not attempt to show us the way out of the difficulties caused by this undue limitation put upon inductive philosophy by the followers of Bacon; but he promises to do so in a future work, that is to be devoted to Kant and his followers. We shall await its appearance with much hope; yet not without some misgivings, derived from what he has already written, that his admiration of Kant may prevent him from perceiving the fundamental errors of his system. Meantime we venture on some suggestions, which some of our readers may receive as indicating the way in which the mind naturally sets aside the arbitrary limitations imposed by materialistic philosophers, without falling into the equally arbitrary absoluteness of idealism.

We have nothing new to offer; but we may present old, and really very common thoughts, in a new aspect, and with more calculated purpose and distinctness than have been devoted to them heretofore. Our appeal is to the natural spontaneities of the human mind, and we shall call to our aid other natural spontaneities, animal, vegetable, and merely material; and in doing so we shall not distinguish between the methods of induction and analogy, because Bacon has not distinguished them, though many philosophers regard them as fundamentally different.

These natural spontaneities are everywhere observed, and thus they become elements of inductive philosophy in every branch of real science. In every department of nature we discover that there are certain well-defined tendencies or spontaneous activities, which are always in operation, producing the most minute and the most magnificent results; tendencies, and activities, of which science cannot discover the origin or cause, and which it must be content with observing as facts, recording in history, and classifying into various branches, that they may be afterwards comprehended by philosophy.

It is one of these tendencies or spontaneous activities, called attraction or gravitation, that holds the earth together, balances it in its perennial circles round the sun, and maintains the moving order of the universe. It is the basis of all mechanical science, enters as an element into all the laws of motion, and

while it is freely used and applied by man, the safety of the world requires that he should have no power to suspend it. Analogous to this tendency are the attractions of electricity and magnetism, manifesting themselves in endless variety in the world's activity, and submitting to human control and application, by means of the electrical battery, the magnetic telegraph, the compass, and the ordinary artificial magnet, and abounding, no doubt, in yet undiscovered and grander adaptations.

And at the very foundation of chemical science lies another of these spontaneous activities called elective affinity, being the tendency which particles of different kinds of matter have to combine so as to form new bodies. It manifests itself according to definite laws, very many of which have been revealed by modern science, and only under proper conditions of different bodies, and is subject to great modifications under the influence of light, heat, and electricity, and had it no existence or no variability, the world would be a barren waste, without vegetable or animal life.

Other familiar and beautiful examples of this natural spontaneity are found in crystallization, or the process by which particles of matter come together and cohere, so as to constitute bodies of a regular form, the form being infinitely various according to circumstances and conditions, but each involving in it a primary or ground form, that indicates the very nature of the body, and which is itself revealed by the cleavage or analysis of the mineralogist.

Let this suffice for indicating the spontaneities of inorganic matter resulting in mere inorganic products, countless in their magnitudes, varieties, and beauties. Rising in our observations to the systems of organized bodies, we find these natural tendencies becoming still more obvious, various, beautiful, and mysterious. We see them in the bursting seed, the descending root, the rising stem, the leaf, the flower, the fruit, and pervading all and essential to the whole, the sap. Spontaneously the seed grows, according to its kind of plant or tree, if it be placed in conditions that allow of its development, however imperfectly, according to its kind; if not, its tendency becomes a lost germ of the activities of nature, a bird without its mate,

a soul without its body, an absolute without a relative. Subject to the modifying influences of varying light, soil, position, and cultivation, the seed, in its growth, will take the peculiar form of its species, become dressed in the same foliage, adorned with the same flowers, bear the same fruit; the varieties produced by cultivation not being regarded as affecting identity of species. All this is so familiar to us from our infancy, that it presents no mystery until we begin to investigate and reason. To reason it must ever remain a mystery how the splendour and fragrance of the rose and the lily, and the beauty and lusciousness of the peach and the pear are produced; for reason can never look beyond tendencies and second causes, so as to see the Great First Cause that moves and directs all things.

Again, we see this mysterious spontaneity in the climbing plant or shrub, directing its growth towards the object that it needs for its support, putting forth its tendrils to take hold of it when it begins to climb, and twining around it, every species in its own direction, from left to right, or from right to left. We see it in the sensitive plant, shrinking from the touch of rudeness; the chickweed, folding its leaflets over the buds of its young flowers to protect them from the cold; the saracenia and Venus' fly-trap, closing upon the insects that enter their flowers, and retaining and digesting them. These are spontaneous activities that compel us to think of voluntary actions; although no one supposes that such is their character. They proceed not from their own reason, but from that of their Creator. We might enlarge the catalogue of these natural tendencies of vegetable life indefinitely; but it is unnecessary.

Rising another step in the general classification of created things, we find these natural spontaneities increased in number and variety in the animal kingdom. No insect, fish, or reptile, bird, or beast, is without them. All the process of growth, the digestion of food, the formation of every part of the body, the circulation of the blood, respiration and perspiration, and seeking after food; all are spontaneous activities, not necessarily involving one conscious act of will. A similar spontaneity is at the foundation of all their other actions, though other principles, not now to be considered, may be connected with it; their association in pairs, and flocks, and herds; their fondness

for locomotion and rest; their construction of nests and lairs; seeking dens or burrowing holes; constructing honey-combs or ant-hills, cocoons or gossamers; their care of their young, and providence for the future; all are founded on certain spontaneous or instinctive tendencies, differing in all species, and yet analogous in all; and even in the same species, presenting very wide differences according to circumstances, and which become still more wide under the influence of domestication. They have desires and aversions, love and hatred, hopes and fears, emulations, gratitude, and even love of property, of the home which they have selected, and of the stores which they have provided for the future.

All these tendencies are qualities inherent in the very nature of things; they are essential elements of the mineral, plant, or animal in which they are found, and which, without them, would not be what they are; they give to all things their place and name among the varieties, species, genera, and families that constitute the world. Whether all the germs of these natural tendencies have yet been developed, we know not; but we may be sure that science has not yet discovered them all. The influence of cultivation has developed many of them, which would, without it, have remained unknown to us. Let us briefly consider this.

Many latent tendencies of plants and animals have been developed by changing their circumstances, and many obvious tendencies have been suppressed in the same way. The tendency of the apple, pear, and plum tree to produce thorns is suppressed or reduced under the influence of cultivation, and their fruit greatly improved in beauty, richness, and variety. The wild rose and other wild flowers will scarcely bear comparison with their cultivated progeny in their variety of form and hue and fragrance. The grains that are to us the staff of life, compared with their wild state, produce a thousand fold. The esculent roots which are so common in our gardens, and constitute so large a portion of our daily food, have all been changed in flavour by cultivation, and become adapted to the tastes of man, and his domesticated animals; the turnip has increased from ounces to pounds, the beet, the parsnip, and the carrot, from roots like a pocket pencil in size, often exceed

the size of a man's arm, and all are improved in quality and multiplied in variety. And so it is with the fowls and other animals with which man surrounds his home; they change in colour, size, shape, and qualities; old tendencies are suppressed, and others before unknown are developed.

We have noticed these spontaneous tendencies with some detail; because it seems to us that the observation of them in mere inorganic or dead matter, multiplied in vegetable productions, and again largely increased in animal nature, and continuing still further to increase as we rise to the highest grades of animal life, constrain us to expect to find similar tendencies more fully and variously developed in man, who stands at the head of all known organic life. The most superficial observation shows that they do abound in our human nature, and it is of the utmost importance to admit that they constitute essential and fundamental elements of our moral and intellectual, as well as of our animal nature.

The mind can, no more than mere material nature, act at all without its antecedent tendencies to act given to it by its Creator. It has its fundamental character and functions allotted to it in the plan of creation, and these are the germs, forms, and tendencies of all its future development and activity, and it can have no others, unless derived from the same divine source. It cannot act, or think, or feel, without innate tendencies to do so, no more than the vegetable can grow, and flower, and fruit, without such tendencies. And whence these tendencies come, faith alone, and not science, can reveal to us. Science must confine itself to ascertaining and defining what they are, and how they act and grow. They may be called the instincts of our moral and intellectual nature.

We know that some have objected to have them thus denominated; but in this we are guilty of no innovation. Very few writers on mental philosophy have failed to recognize that they have this fundamental character; some, as it were, instinctively, and many others by calculation and design. The analogy between the natural tendencies which produce the actions of men and animals, is too strong to avoid giving to them the same name, instincts. They must be distinguished by their adjectives: *animal* instincts, and *rational* instincts.

Others would object to the term as applied to man, because there is a sort of necessity and infallibility about instinctive actions, which do not at all apply to man's rational and moral activities. This argument has often been used by those who deny to man his moral sense, and refuse to admit that he has any innate moral character; yet its major premise is entirely unfounded. The natural tendencies and instincts of the lower orders of creation are not invariable in their manifestations, and do not necessarily follow internal law, irrespective of external circumstances and relations.

We may call the vital principle in vegetable and animal life a blind power of nature, acting necessarily under appropriate circumstances; yet it by no means acts uniformly even in the same species. So far as we know, all vital tendencies are subject to change, improvement, degradation, adaptation to circumstances. This seems to be of the nature of life. The vital principle develops itself with a general resemblance in each species of vegetables and animals; and yet with endless special and individual varieties, so that, notwithstanding the supposed identity of nature or vital principle, we are not entitled to say that any two beings developed from it are alike in form or character.

The variety that arises from cultivation is still more worthy of notice in this connection; for if the comparatively limited natural tendencies of the vegetable and brute creation may, by cultivation, produce all the wonderful changes of character that are manifest to all who choose to observe; if they develop new and better tendencies and qualities under favourable circumstances, how much more is this to be expected of man, with his higher and more numerous tendencies. And if they become degraded and lose their good qualities from neglect of cultivation, how much more shall man; since all his voluntary acts operate directly on *his* character, and only indirectly upon theirs.

The least amount of reflection must make it very apparent that there is a logical necessity to assume the existence of these spiritual tendencies as the basis of all mental development or growth, and that we are constrained to infer them from the moral and intellectual facts of our nature; for from

nothing, nothing comes, and of nothing there can be no development. Without vital tendencies there can be no growth, and without spiritual tendencies no moral and intellectual improvement; they are the gifts of God, the divine foundations on which must be constructed all that man can, in any sense, call his own. He has no duties, functions, or capacities that are not founded on them, and dependent on their development. All his faculties are at first spiritual instincts, and act spontaneously; and it is only after they have become considerably developed that they become subject to reflection and self-control.

These instincts constitute the germs and early growth of all our affections of love, hatred, gratitude, imagination, hope, fear, emulation, curiosity, love of society, desire of property; none of which can be created by the will of man. It is only when we have learned enough about them to know how to regulate, restrain, and guide them in reasonable coördination, that we can truly be said to be rational beings.

All our reasonings, conceptions, and ideas, have our spontaneous activity for their essential basis. The mind, before perception, is like a seed before it is affected by heat and moisture; it remains dormant in all its qualities; but it *has* qualities and tendencies that are sure to be developed by perception. Perception is the first experience of the mind, as warmth and moisture are of the seed, and development follows in both cases. It is the mind's spontaneous acquisition of the materials of thought and reflection, which also are spontaneous acts of the mind, as the circulation of the blood and the sap are of animals and plants.

Spontaneously and instinctively the mind generalizes the gifts of perception, and coördinates the results of generalization; and it is by the spontaneous memory of these natural processes that it learns their nature and value, and becomes prepared to make a rational use of them. It gets its start and its first experience in this way; but it cannot go far without the conscious aid of the rational will. The strong and systematic thinker is distinguished by the degree of volition exerted in attention and reflection. All our first acts of attention and observation are perfectly spontaneous, and not at all voluntary; and it cannot be otherwise, for we cannot

will to direct our minds to anything of which our minds have had no previous possession. And all our first acts of analysis and reflection, and indeed of every character, are equally spontaneous and instinctive; for it is as impossible for the will to choose methods of mental action, without a previous knowledge of such methods, as it is to make choice of a road to be travelled, or of a trade to be learned, without knowing that there are roads and trades.

All this would seem to be plain matter of observation and experience, and therefore falls within the province of inductive science, though not much noticed by the school of Bacon, because the master had not thus applied his method. So far as we can see, these instincts seem to be a necessary part of our spiritual nature. If animal instincts are necessary for the support of animal life, and vital activity for its start, why must there not be intellectual instincts and spontaneity for the start and maintenance of intellectual life? Under circumstances giving rise to perception, intellectual spontaneity must act. It must begin before it can be conscious of beginning, and before having any knowledge of itself. It must think before it can know itself—and we might almost say, before it can have a self to be known. It must form judgments before it can know its powers, and how they act. It must have experience before it can know what experience is. It must analogize, analyze, synthetize, and hypothetize, before it can have any conception of these processes, or learn how to direct them.

There must be a spontaneous germination and growth of our spiritual nature, or an instinctive activity of it. There must be natural germs of thought, which are not created by experience, but are the conditions of it, and exist before it. Habit and education cannot give them, for they are but forms of experience, and depend upon it. When awakened into life, they are not moulded by experience, but it by them. Experience influences the essential forms of thought no more than warmth and nourishment influence the essential forms of vegetable and animal growth. Perhaps the first step in the process of mental germination is the waking up of the consciousness to attend to its sensations, and then perception comes in answer, as it were, to the interrogatories, what? when? where? whence?

how?—all suggested by, and calculated to give definiteness to experience.

It is no valid objection to the instinctive origin of a mental process, that it does not develope itself in the earliest stages of human life, or that, in many minds, it is scarcely developed at all. Every herb and tree must arrive at some degree of maturity before it can develope its fruit-bearing tendencies. And so it is with man and the lower animals; their physical instincts are not all developed at the first, but at different stages of life. As we have noticed before, different tendencies are developed or suppressed, according to circumstances of climate, nourishment, and training. It must be, therefore, that many intellectual instincts cannot become manifest until, through other avenues, the mind is furnished with the materials on which they are to act. Perhaps a man might live half a lifetime within sight and hearing of the Falls of Niagara, without having ever experienced the wonder which they are calculated to excite. But let him stand beneath that frowning cataract, and view the huge chasm which it has worn in those old rocks, and think of the ages it has rolled down its mighty flood, and uttered its thunder-voice, and of the ages it will still continue to roll and thunder, of the oceans it has emptied over, and which it will still pour down that dizzy height, of the victims who have been swallowed up in its deep abyss, and of the terrible destruction that would follow if that rock barrier above him should suddenly give way, and his hair may stand on end with awe and wonder. Not because he wills to wonder, but because he cannot help it; he may never before have experienced the sentiment; and it comes not from his will, but spontaneously from the very nature of the mental constitution which God has given him.

Take a very obvious illustration of the instinctive character of many of our most common actions, which shows that, without our instincts, we should be utterly helpless. There is no motion of our body that can be said to be entirely voluntary and rational. If we intentionally give our arm a certain motion, we will only the given motion, and not at all the special means by which it is to be effected; for it is done by nerves and muscles and bones of which we may be entirely ignorant.

We cannot be said to will that of which we have no previous conception, and most of us have no practical conception of the forces and machinery of bodily motion. If we were compelled to be still until we should obtain such a conception, we should never move at all. And we could never move effectively, if we had first to calculate the exact degree of nervous power that is to be transmitted to each muscle, and the means of doing it. How little rational and voluntary, therefore, are even the motions of our body that we call voluntary. There is the same complication in most of our judgments, as any one will see, who will attempt to analyze the process and ascertain the elements of the instinctive bound of the mind, by which they are reached. In most of the practical affairs of life the mind springs spontaneously to its conclusions, and reserves its processes of reasoning for the office of leading others to the same results. To our mind, all this is very wholesome thought; for it shows our entire dependence on our Creator for all our faculties, and for all the germs of every thought and action and sentiment.

Like to our physical organs, all our spiritual instincts are complex in their character, and various in the performance of their functions. They are clusters of spiritual fibres, and need to be more or less analyzed in order to be understood. Like our physical organs, in their healthful and normal state, they always act in clusters, and those of one kind so fully and constantly sympathize with those of another kind, that it is very difficult to distinguish them so as to ascertain the functions of each. As no bodily act can take place without requiring the exertion of a thousand bodily fibres, which no scientific skill can so thoroughly investigate as to be able to attribute to each fibre its precise function and force in the production of the result; so no thought, or wish, or judgment can arise, without being complicated by mysterious and insoluble connections.

We do not know that we can have any innate or aprioral conceptions; for, so far as we can discover, all our knowledge takes its start in our actual experience, and in our perception of concrete beings, things, and facts; but our mind naturally tends to generalize our experience, and thus to rise to concep-

tions that are more and more abstract. Being started by experience, it naturally reaches out after more experience; *seeking* is one of its essential functions: like the seed started in its growth by moisture, and pushing out its roots for further nourishment. Life, both physical and spiritual, is an abiding tendency and effort to appropriate, assimilate, and grow; and therefore it must have inherent qualities and special tendencies continually reaching after new acquisitions and new arrangements of its acquisitions. Spiritual life naturally gropes or feels after new perceptions, and having obtained them, it naturally classifies, generalizes, analyzes, and systematizes them, and therefore naturally creates for itself new experiences.

Primarily the mind receives the gifts of nature in their crude and concrete form, and then it naturally analyzes these acquisitions, and thus obtains all its abstract, general, and universal ideas and conceptions, expressive of all the actual relations of beings, things, thoughts, and facts. It is not sensation that gives it such conceptions, for such relations are only spiritually discerned, and the conceptions of them are spiritually formed. It is thus the mind forms the ideas of quantity, quality, order, goodness, justice, force, and such like. Even space and time, as conceptions or ideas, are formed in the same way. All are conceptions of actual things and facts, and therefore none of them are merely subjective.

They are not real things, but the real relations of things, or rather, the generalized conceptions of such real relations, so far as they are anything for us. Time and space are relations and conceptions of this character. Kant makes them mere subjective conditions of sensibility, and therefore only parts of the mind itself. But then they can express no truth as to external objects, if they can as to any objects; but only a quality of the mind. They are no further objective than any other mental tendency or quality, and can express only relations of parts of the mind to the whole mind. Truth being a relation of intellect to its objects, time and space, as mere conditions of sensibility, can express no relation between the mind and the external world; but only our own mental acts, and therefore no objective truth. Hence the idealism of the Kantian

school. But if we take into account the mind's natural adaptation and tendency to form such conceptions, when the appropriate facts are presented to it, then time and space become objective, and our conceptions of them are formed from real relations among objects, and are as truly suggested by or on account of experience, as any other general conceptions.

Kant supposes that the conceptions of space and time are not derived from external experience, because they are essential conditions of such experience. Yet they are no more essential than the conceptions of quantity, force, order, goodness, and such like, are in relation to other forms of knowledge. We must have such general conceptions before we can form any judgment in which they are involved; yet none of them are given apriorally; but they are all gradually developed out of our mental tendencies, under the influence of appropriate circumstances. It is not the conceptions themselves, but the tendency to form them, that are given anterior to and as conditions of experience.

Again, Kant supposes that these conceptions cannot be derived from external experience, because it can give us only general, and not necessary and universal truths, such as we have in the demonstrations of geometry. Yet the certainty of such demonstrations depends, not upon the origin, but upon the nature of the conceptions with which they deal. Time and space are the simplest of all our conceptions, and the simplest of all relations of things and events, because they have no quality but their limits; and these we can take from nature, or form them by our imagination. In pure geometry they are mere conceptions, treated of without any reference to real things; and the conceptions being perfectly definite, so must be the science that depends upon them. There is no such definiteness in real things and facts and their relations, and therefore there can be no such accuracy and certainty in the science of them. Time and space absolute are nothing in reality, and nothing in the mind, but the general terms or frames in which we set all our limited conceptions of relative time and place. As relations, they are as real as any other relations of facts and things, and therefore are proper objects of knowledge; and our minds are so constituted that they naturally receive them.

These are fundamental errors in the philosophy of Kant, and lie at the bottom of the vicious idealism or subjectivism into which his school has run. Others have adopted them, without running them out to their consequences. If Kant had applied his searching analysis to the human mind, in its progress from infancy to maturity, instead of applying it only to the matured mind, he would have been saved from such errors. He might, indeed, have insisted that space and time are involved in all *growth*, and that without them we can have no conception of growth; and therefore they are aprioral conditions of all growth and life, and aprioral elements of all growing things. We admit inherent and aprioral functions and tendencies to grow, but no aprioral products of growth, though they may be essential to its conception.

Faith is a spiritual or mental tendency which is an essential element of mind, and of our conception of mind, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated, and we desire to appropriate to it the most of what we have yet to say. Faith—not so much in its religious acceptation, as constituting our relation to a divine and personal being—as in its more general, intellectual application, and as constituting our relation to all created things, or bringing us into intellectual relation with them. This kind of faith is associated with every act of our life.

Instinctively we believe in our sensations and in the world which they reveal to us; and without this instinctive faith we could not take the first step in knowledge. Without the belief and knowledge thus instinctively acquired, we can make no attainments in reasoning; for, without them, argument could have no existence, because it would be destitute of premises. Instinctively we believe in the narrations of others; and without this there could be no history, and no society—confidence in others being an essential and fundamental element of both. It is only after our instinctive belief has been violated by mistakes or mendacity, that we feel called upon to test the evidence that is submitted to us; and even then all our tests are necessarily founded on other beliefs that are fundamentally instinctive.

Instinctively we believe in the faculties of mind and body that God has given us, and without this we could do nothing.

We do not believe because we have tried them, but we try them because we believe in them; and by this faith we grow, for by trying them we improve their capacity, and even enlarge our confidence in them, unless our trials of them are rashly adventurous, and thus unsuccessful. Failures in this way have often a most depressing effect by producing a morbid caution or timidity; as we often see the most thorough radicalism, when disappointed in its purposes, oscillate into the most rigid conservatism and formalism. A modest and duly cautious faith is always a growing one; while one that is audacious may degenerate into fickleness and pusillanimity, or into mere unreasoning obstinacy. Our faith in our capacities is naturally limited by our conscious inexperience, and by a knowledge of our weaknesses. It must be connected with our reason as well as with our impulses, and therefore with both acting together. We may yield to our impulses and subdue our reason, or to our reason and subdue our impulses; but we cannot avoid believing in one or the other, or in their combined action.

And rationalism could not take one step of progress without faith in another form; that is, faith in the regular connection of events and principles, in the law of cause and effect. Without such an instinctive belief there could be no argument; for no consequences could be affirmed as the results of any given premises. We do not choose to believe in a cause for events, for we cannot help believing in it. We did not choose such a belief the first time it came into the mind; for it arose naturally and spontaneously, and may have been called into action many thousand times before it could be revealed to our reflection that it is a law of our mental action to assume a cause for every event. Our natural curiosity involves this belief; for, without it, it could never perform its function of asking, Whence comes this? It believes in a cause first, and then seeks what it is.

It is thus that the spontaneous act of faith takes the lead of all knowledge, and of the voluntary act of reasoning. We can make no rational attempt at analysis or synthesis, at induction or deduction, without a previous hypothesis which we seek to test or prove; and a hypothesis is always a mere formula of faith; we do not create it by any voluntary act, but merely

accept it as a suggestion of faith, presented for our investigation.

We have already spoken of faith and reason as distinct portions, or rather functions, of our intellectual nature, and before we go further we may notice how they are usually distinguished. A very common acceptation of reason is, that element of the human intellect which distinguishes it from the intellect of the brute; but it requires very little effort to use this definition in order to discover that it is too defective to be of any scientific value. It is sometimes called the director of the will; but this is inaccurate, for it implies that reason itself is or has a will directing the true will of the mind; unless we understand by "director" merely the light which it furnishes to the will, and then it is equivalent to our knowing faculties generally.

Perhaps the most ordinary view is that in which reason is contradistinguished from faith; and this view is involved in the term rationalism, as it is ordinarily understood. Rationalism professes to be reason in action without faith. It is therefore different from religion, for of this faith is an essential element; and it is opposed to religion in so far as it rejects faith as incompatible with its functions. In this sense reason is a voluntary faculty of the mind; it is the human will itself gathering up for itself the light by which it acts, and the materials upon which it acts, and by its own power, as independent human will, working out, by its own logical and scientific processes, its elements and systems of belief.

Surely such a reason as this can have no existence, and the rationalism that pretends to it is ignorant of itself. If there is such a thing as a superstitious faith, as undoubtedly there is, this is just as certainly a superstitious reason. If faith is sometimes bigoted, so also is reason. We can conceive of faith without reason; but what can reason be without faith? It is like substance without attributes, matter without form, and mind without thought, or any tendency to think. For convenience of thinking about them we may treat the mind, and certain forms of mental activity, as separable, when in reality they are naturally concrete, and not susceptible of analysis. And so it is with reason; without faith it can have no exist-

ence. As the arm without the nerves, that give it power and direction, is nothing, much more is the reason nothing without faith.

Faith is the crystallizing force that attracts to a common centre all the elements of intelligence of which reason is constituted. When this force acts with all its normal and pristine purity, the progress of the intellectual formation is perfect. The more it is disturbed, the more abnormal or degraded are the results.

Faith furnishes all the materials on which reason operates, and which it classifies and arranges into scientific systems. We have already said that, without it, we can have no knowledge of the most usual things in life; it reveals to us our own existence and that of the external world, and it is only reflecting and erring reason that ever questioned these facts. Faith reveals to us the connection of cause and effect, and experience, observation, and reflection only enable us to define the various laws of this relation, to assign them their proper place in the midst of other laws. By faith we learn the language, and customs, and institutions of the family and of the country; and it is only a selfish and unsocial reason that leads us either in violating established social institutions, or in attempting, by agitation, to introduce others for which the public mind is not prepared. Agitation is a species of social force and not proper social influence, and it is not by it, but by education, that a people is to be trained to better institutions.

Reason, it may be said, proceeds by a regular and scientific process, founded on evidence and axioms. Granted; but what is light to us without the natural eye to receive it, and what is evidence without that natural faith that accepts it? Neither of these is the creation of reason. We have a natural tendency to believe in evidence, and this gives it all its value. Our faith may sometimes mislead us; but we have other faculties, which, if properly developed and used, will correct its tendency to error, just as our judgments of sight may be corrected by those of touch and taste, if we join the caution of experience to our actions.

And what are axioms but instinctive truths revealed to us by faith? No amount of reasoning can reveal them to us, for

often they are the very ground on which reason erects its structures, and never the result of its efforts. Individual reasoners sometimes undertake to deny or disprove them, but they never succeed to the satisfaction of any but themselves. The most thorough sceptic is forced to admit them as fundamental principles of his practical life, however he may attempt theoretically to reject them from his religious or philosophic creed.

Whatever may be the power of our will, it is very far from having the entire control of the mind in reasoning. We do not depend upon our will for our mental activity, however this activity may be increased and directed by it. Reasoning is one of the natural forms of the mind's activity, and it is only by observing this spontaneous activity in ourselves, or what it has grown to in others, that we know what reasoning is. And it is only by observing the degree of control that we can exert over our processes of reasoning, that we can learn what is the office of the will in this respect. That the will has duties to perform in relation to all our mental activities is plain enough; but it would require a whole volume of psychology to explain them. It is enough for our present purpose to say, that we instinctively perform all the processes of reasoning, and that by our will we may have such control over them that we may greatly improve or degrade our reasoning powers.

Man naturally believes, and naturally reasons. There must, therefore, be both a legitimate faith and a legitimate rationalism, and either may be one-sided and bigoted. Faith may shut its eyes against reason, or reason against faith. Reason may deny to faith more or less of its legitimate functions, and faith may do the same with reason. True faith and true reason exist together in the same mind when each is allowed to act its proper part. In the early period of life, all the acts of the mind are acts of faith, and necessarily so, because it must lay up a considerable stock of facts and of mental skill in the spontaneous use of its faculties, before it can apply itself to any voluntary and calculated control and direction of them. At first, perhaps, it merely notices, as a whole, the concrete scene around it; afterwards analyzes it into its several parts of things and acts; afterwards gradually generalizes these acquisitions when they have become familiar; then begins to

discover the fitness of familiar language to express these generalizations; then commences to require and to learn language for its own purposes, and thus to fix its acquisitions; and then to rise to higher and broader, and to more spiritual generalizations and their corresponding language, until the amount of its stores, and its skill in handling them, prepares it first for spontaneous, and afterwards for intentional and voluntary reflection upon them. Looking thus at the growth of mind and of mental skill, its analogy to the growth of the body and of physical skill, will very naturally suggest itself; and this may contribute to the illustration of the subject.

This, we trust, will be recognized as, at least, a rude approximation to accuracy in the expression of the actual process of mental growth; and it is to be hoped that it will not be long until its accuracy will be improved by carefully taken, recorded, analyzed, and generalized observations of the mind, beginning with its earliest infancy. We have said enough to show that there is, and must be, a very large amount of intelligence, spontaneously received and assimilated, before there can be any calculated or intentional reflection upon it, or reasoning upon or by means of it.

It is in this way, also, that the mind receives the common opinions, maxims, customs, and sentiments of the family and of society, and thus grows into fitness with the people with whom it is to associate. These are the common social atmosphere which it continually breathes, and from which it has no disposition and no power to escape, though by the aid of higher minds, communicating a higher education, it may acquire both. But it must at first accept this social atmosphere before it can reason about it and learn its fundamental principles, and how to use them in any better way. It is thus that laws, customs, and opinions become acquisitions of faith, and then a higher faith directs the mind to the investigation and discovery of the principles out of which they grow, and enables us to correct their growth by improved training and education.

And this suggests to us how ignorant and unjust are the censures which we usually pass upon the conduct of children, and upon people of other ages and places of the world. Their conduct may be the natural product of their capacity and circum-

stances, and they are not answerable to us for it, except so far as they are under a law that is binding on us and them in common. Yet this does not forbid the training of our children even so far as to compel their submission to the order of the family; for their conduct may be wrong, even though not consciously or intentionally so, and we must correct it, even though we do not understand the principle from which the wrong proceeds. And thus, according to the maxim—"ignorance of law excuses no man,"—we correct the crimes of adult persons in society, often regarding only the evil of the deed, and not of the intention; as we correct the vicious growth of a tree without understanding its principles. It is by such treatment, and by the natural consequences of wrong doing that children and grown persons are taught to reflect upon and respect the laws and order of nature, and of society, and its rights. If we understood these things, we should know how to look upon and correct most of the disorders of society without indignation and excited censures; yet, in our ignorance, this sentiment seems to be a necessary spur to the vindication of our social rights. In the conditions in which it arises, it is natural and spontaneous, as all other sentiments are, and not at all a matter of intention or volition.

We all grow up by degrees to the knowledge that we have, and of course, in the early stages of our growth, our knowledge is very defective; but this is not saying that it is wrong, for it may be exactly adapted to our age and circumstances. Our natural instinct of imitation, which is necessary to our social nature, draws us into conformity with society, without any intention of ours; and thus we share in all the erroneous customs and opinions of society, just as we do in the defects of its language. It is expected of a child or of an ignorant person that he will speak in such a way of day and night, of the action of a pump, of the falling of stones and rising of balloons, as to show that he is totally mistaken in his views of the laws that rule in these phenomena: even intelligent persons may employ the same forms of speech if the usages of language require it, though he knows that, in their form, they express a false theory. The knowledge of a child is not adequate to the higher aims of science, but it is adequate for him, and fits bet-

ter in his imperfect system than the scientific truth would do. He can use his defective knowledge as a basis on which to continue his intellectual structure, and he may some day comprehend the truth as men of science do. But if he is to do nothing and know nothing until he obtains perfect truth, he will never know nor do anything at all.

A child is not to be censured for not knowing all that is taught in the Bible, and all that the most accurate hermeneutic skill can draw out of it concerning spiritual and divine things; for it is not his time to know so much yet. If he has faith, in the sense of spiritual life or vitality, aspiring after higher and higher principles, and especially after the highest spiritual principles, he is growing towards it, and will ever grow. Our want of charity for those who, by reason of their youth or of unfavourable circumstances, are not so intelligent or so correct in their conduct as to satisfy *our* standard, is most generally chargeable to our forgetfulness of the steps by which we have ourselves risen. Perhaps the best teachers of every branch of human knowledge, and conduct, and duty, are those who best remember the inner and outer difficulties which they had themselves to overcome.

We grow by faith, and not by law. Faith is the inner principle of all spiritual life, and when it is the faith of Christ, it is the inner principle of true religious life. Law is one of the outer circumstances, in the midst of which faith produces growth, and also the expression of the general form of the actual attainments of society, or of its accomplished growth; and, to be right, the principle and the form, as received and comprehended, must be adapted to each other. If we impose on children the outer forms of life, that belong to mature age, we stint and distort their growth, and make it artificial and disingenuous. If no regimen can be admitted but the most perfect rules of conduct that can be conceived of for the holiest intelligences, then the higher our views of legal perfection, the more unfit should we be to govern those who are in the first stages of human progress; and the best trained intellects would be totally unfit to govern ignorant or barbarous people, however fit to teach them. If they are to rise to the higher degrees of human cultivation, they must pass through the lower ones. They

cannot comprehend your highest generalizations in morality and religion, any more than they can those of philosophy and mathematics, without having experienced the special facts out of which these generalizations are formed.

God, in the absoluteness of his perfections, is entirely beyond our comprehension; but we may gradually catch glimpses of those perfections by observing the finite manifestations of them, and get them still more clearly by his direct revelation of them. Yet the knowledge of the child cannot be like that of the mature man in this respect, and we must not require that it should be. Let all things be adapted to their place and functions. We do not feed swine on pearls, nor put new wine into old sacks; and let us not attempt to force a ripe and indurated hull upon a growing nut. The faith of a child is often better and more hopeful than the knowledge of the man; and it is always so when this knowledge is, by a bigoted rationalism or a bigoted faith, wrapped up in unyielding forms, which give no freedom of action to the vital principle of the soul, of which true faith is an essential element.

Faith and law, soul and body, spirit and letter, are essential to each other; the former being the substance of which the latter is the approximate natural expression. The latter cannot be produced without the former, nor the former comprehended without the latter. We must receive them together, before we can analyze and learn them; and if the former changes, so will the latter, as the human countenance changes with the growth of intelligence and virtue, or of fatuity and vice, and with all the changes of temper in our daily life. There is, therefore, a true Christian and philosophic progress, which expects a constant change of form, in consequence of a continued growth in intelligence and virtue; but this progress operates as quietly, regularly, and naturally, as the growing seed. Opposed to this, on one hand, are the disorderly radicals, or reforming rationalists, who mistake their own moral and social theories for law, and endeavour to agitate them into authority, and to amend the world by subjecting it to them, in a fixed and ungrowing uniformity. And opposed, on the other hand, are the conservative rationalists, who trust only in our present human law, for the growth and preservation of society. Both

alike mistake the true functions of law, and are ignorant of the inner social principle of growth; and have no trust in the natural law of social progress which God has ordained as an element of our humanity. The former would tear away the protecting and nourishing pod, before the seed is ripe; and the other would bind it up, to prevent the seed from scattering according to the free laws of growth, with wastefulness and disorder.

There is another form of rationalism, equally ignorant of our human spontaneities, which is very often introduced into the family training, to the great injury of the future prospects of the children, and which opposes all control of the conduct of children, until they are able to understand the reasons of the duties required of them, or to perform them freely, out of filial affection. Children very soon learn that coaxing and reasoning do not at all interfere with their having their own way, and thus this mode of training very naturally results in teaching children, among their first lessons, that the wishes of their parents are of no consequence. Indians teach their children better, when they turn them loose to attend to themselves, without this pernicious training, which teaches only disrespect. Children are much better taught by their fellows at school, who instinctively compel them to respect the rights and feelings of others, and to submit to the order and common customs of their little society.

Reason children into submission to authority! Why, they must first have submitted to authority before they can know what authority or submission is; and they must also have experience of, and much reflection upon, the blessings of submission, before you can have any argument to enforce it which they can possibly appreciate. Authority exercised, they can understand, in so far as they feel it as a power above them controlling their actions; and feeling that it is above them, they cannot suppress the sentiment of respect or reverence, more or less crude, that naturally belongs to the perception; and this is a real gain. A proper training is not at all commenced until they have felt the necessity of submitting to authority; and this step in their education is among the most important of their lives. Until it is taken, their development continues to

be purely selfish; and if parents cannot bring them to it wisely and steadily, the sooner they commit their children to the boys and girls at school the better for them.

And what parents can act on pure rational principles, or know what they are? None of us know enough about human nature, in all its stages, to know how to deal with it rationally. Parents have, therefore, their mental instincts, that are a better guide than any light furnished them by the ordinarily limited extent of their science of education. Our instincts tell us that parents know better than their children what is proper for them, and therefore mere instinct teaches the parent to insist upon and enforce his will. Let not this be laid aside because sciolists are heard to say that there ought to be no training that is not guided and accepted by reason. The training must be done, and if we have not reason enough to guide us, we must go by our mental instincts, as the next best course. If we carefully follow and observe their lead, and study the character of children, and train ourselves to moderation, and kindness, and good sense, we shall gradually learn for ourselves and our children what is the reason by which we are to be guided. Until we obtain this light of reason, we must act upon our spontaneous promptings, under the restraints of good sense and caution.

We have the life of faith and that of law well illustrated in the history of the Jewish people. It is very evident that they were much degraded by idolatry at the time of their delivery from Egyptian bondage; and their forty years of desert life, with its adventurous freedom and its miraculous teachings, seem to have been necessary to awake in them that degree of faith which they needed in order to insure their future growth, and to enable them to master all the difficulties they were to encounter in settling themselves in the promised land. Their subsequent history is the measure of their comprehension of the principles of the Mosaic institutions. We cannot doubt that those institutions were adapted to their customs, but so far modified as was necessary to give adequate expression to the divine spirituality then begun to be revived among them. The mistake is often made of supposing that, because of their divine origin, they must be *absolutely* perfect, whereas their

wisdom could be shown only by their *relative* perfection, or their adaptation. They are not fit for man in all circumstances, but only for a people with the inner principles and outer circumstances then constituting the life of the Jewish people. But the divine principles which they contained—the unity, spirituality, and perfections of God revealed in them—the high ideas that were presented of our moral, social, and religious duties, and the promises of the future; these were the objects to which their faith was directed—and by this faith they were to grow, and did grow. But when this faith died out under the indurating formalism of an irreligious priesthood, they ceased to grow, falling away first into a superstitious idolatry, and afterwards into a bigoted rationalism that excluded all faith containing any real vitality, in the sense of a growing principle. They had a life of form, analogous to the crystal's growth in size and hardness, which resists dissolution; but not the true life, of which the mustard-seed, with its growing and aspiring tendencies, is a genuine analogy. They had a legal "form of knowledge and truth," but no more than the Samaritan woman could they understand the symbol of the water, that should become in them a well of water springing up in everlasting vitality.

Pharisees and Sadducees were alike materialists in this, that they rejected that spiritual faith which is the life-principle of human progress; they admitted for man the growth of the crystal and the coral reef, by accretion; but not that of the tree, with its blossoms and fruit—and especially not of the divine in human nature, with its beautifying and elevating principles communicated by the Holy Spirit. In vain did the prophets of God warn them against their formalism, reject their sacrifices, purifications, and tithes, and call them to understand the *principles* expressed by their institutions, and to observe justice, mercy, and faith, and to a life and growth born "not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."

All forms of natural religion which are suggested by human reason, founded upon our dim and undefined faith in divine things, or wherein this is the prevailing element, seem naturally to run into this formalism, because their faith is misdirected,

and fixed on objects too gross to excite any true reverence, or too impalpable to reach the intelligence, and thus attract the affections of men. And it is only when the object of faith is a holy, all-wise, and almighty sympathizing God, revealed to us through his Son, manifest in the flesh, and dying for us, that we obtain a definite, yet living and growing faith, having an object sufficiently intelligible to attract our love. "We love him because he first loved us," and because we can perceive that he did so. This true faith requires no hierarchical magnificence, imposing rituals, solemn ceremonies, mysterious traditions, or grand legal unity, to supply its defect of principle; for its very simplicity of principle demands simplicity of form.

Now, if minerals, plants, and animals must have natural tendencies and instincts according to their several natures, in order to be what they are, then surely man must have natural tendencies that incline him to a complete fulfilment of his destiny. If the tendencies and instincts of plants and animals are susceptible of improvement, much more so must be man's. And if the infant has spiritual instincts by which it gradually appropriates to itself the common knowledge and principles which Providence casts in its way, and thus gradually enlarges the province in which its activity may exert itself, surely there must still be natural tendencies that urge it to occupy that territory. These tendencies may be almost always too weak to resist the lower tendencies of human nature, and to overcome the difficulties that lie in the way; but, with the blessing of God, they will have power enough.

Faith is the vital principle of all these tendencies, and it has a natural germ in every human heart. If we are destitute of faith and trust in any given line of action, we must fail. If we do not believe in our natural craving after food, we must die. It is because we trust to our natural desire for knowledge that we ever attain any intelligence; and it is only when we trust to our natural desire after the highest spiritual gifts that we can ever make any advance towards them. We call this a natural desire, because man, however degraded, has still some remains of it.

"Seek, and ye shall find;" but how can we seek without a previous faith that there is something to be sought after?

And God assures to us this faith, for the world is full of adaptations to man's physical, moral, and intellectual nature; and, grow as he may, their variety will never be exhausted. Naturally we look upward in search of goodness and intelligence superior to our own, and faith is our natural aspiration towards their attainment. And this faith in beings higher and holier than ourselves is always attended by a sentiment of reverence, varying in degree from the ordinary respect felt for our equals up to the profound awe with which we recognize the divine. This is worthy of special attention. Every complete impression of any act, event, thing, or being, is at least double in its nature, consisting of the intellectual act by which the object is recognized, and the sentiment that naturally follows such recognition. Thus, the sight of an object that is sublime, or beautiful, or ugly—or of an act that is cruel, ungenerous, or mean, raises a corresponding sentiment; and it is this that makes virtue attractive and vice repulsive to us. All our sentiments rise in this perfectly spontaneous way, depending on the judgments which the mind forms of its objects; and hence the great importance of careful reflection in the formation of our judgments, and of being on our guard to exclude from our mind all thoughts that excite corrupting and misleading emotions. If we recognize in another any excellence to which we have not attained, the natural sentiment of a generous heart is reverence, or at least respect, and a desire to imitate it. But it may be envy, and a desire to degrade that excellence to a level with ourselves. If we have cultivated or indulged a habit of selfishness in all our calculations and conduct, the representation or judgment that we form of an excellent man, will likely be that he stands in our way, or that we compare badly with him; and then our natural sentiment will be envy. Our judgments are the sources of our sentiments, the very springs of our inner and outer life, the cords of all the moral harmonies of the soul; and it is when we allow the tempters and the moral and political charlatans of society to play upon them at their pleasure, that we are sure to lose all proper self-control, and become the slaves of social excitements and seductions.

Faith, in its highest and most general spiritual sense, is the judgment of the mind concerning things above us—"things

unseen"—and reverence for, and desire to reach them, are its naturally attendant sentiments. And this reverence is the very blossom of the tree of life; it gives to faith its upward look and hopeful aspirations after the unseen excellencies that it feels to be above it. This reverence may be in excess or in deficiency, and thus be timid and superstitious, or rude, impudent, and audacious; but it must exist wherever there is faith enough to "look at things which are not seen." There can be no more important sentiment belonging to our spiritual nature, and we must endeavour to correct its excess or deficiency by exercising, with measured and reflecting caution, the faith out of which it flows.

But we have gone much further than we intended in elaborating these views; perhaps further than our readers care to follow us, and we must stop. We need not go back upon what we have said in order to convince our readers that the Inductive Method does not unduly bind philosophy to the leading strings of material nature, so as to exclude all the mental knowledge that is to be derived from our internal experience. It does take nature as it finds it, because that is a main object of its study; but it also studies how far nature may be improved by man. And especially does it, or may it, study human nature, and find wherein and how it may be improved. Life and growth are essential characteristics of this method. It operates by appropriation, digestion, and assimilation, like the plant or animal. From the concrete gifts of nature it rises to the highest classifications, and from its most obvious laws to the highest principles. And in the performance of this work, the mind of man, also an object of philosophy, is continually growing and developing its natural tendencies, and always urging philosophy upwards, and always forbidding it to be complete. There can be no aprioral philosophy to fix or measure the destiny of man, except in the mind of his Creator.

ART. II.—*The Russian Church.*

THE foundation of the great Russian Empire was laid by Ruric, a Varangian knight, about the year 862. He reigned first at Ladoga, and afterwards at Novgorod, which was then a large and opulent city.

To Vladimir, a descendant of Ruric, belongs the honour of establishing Christianity among the Russians; which event took place near the close of the tenth century. There had been instances of conversion at an earlier period—some even in the royal family. But Christianity was not permanently established before the year 986. The circumstances of its introduction are thus stated by Karamsin, in his learned History of Russia.*

In the year above mentioned, there came to Vladimir envoys or missionaries from the different religions of the known world. First came Bulgarian Mussulmen from the region of the Volga. “Illustrious Prince,” said they, “wise and prudent as thou art, thou knowest neither law nor religion. Believe in our religion, and honour Mohammed.”

“What is your religion?” said Vladimir. “In what does it consist?”

“We believe in God,” they replied, “and believe what the Prophet teaches:—Be circumcised; abstain from pork; drink no wine; and after death, from seventy beautiful wives select the most beautiful.”

Vladimir listened to them for the *last* reason; but he did not like circumcision, or abstinence from pork, and least of all, the prohibition of drinking: for drinking was then, as now, the great delight of the Russians.

Next came the representatives of Western or Roman Catholic Christendom. “The Pope begs us to tell you,” said they, “that though your country is like our own, your religion is not. Ours is the right. We fear God, who made the heavens and the earth, the stars and the moon, and every living creature; whilst thy gods are of wood and stone.”

* In eleven volumes, 8vo.

"What does your *law* command?" asked Vladimir.

"We fast, to the best of our power; and when any one eats or drinks, he does it in honour of God, as taught the apostle Paul."

"Go home," said Vladimir. "Our fathers did not believe in your religion, or receive it from the Pope."

Next came some Jews, who lived among the Khozars. "We have heard that the Mohammedans and Christians have tried to persuade you to adopt their religion. The Christians believe in him whom we have crucified. We believe in one God, the God of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob."

"In what does your *law* consist?" asked Vladimir?

"Our law requires circumcision; prohibits pork and hare; and enjoins the observance of Saturday."

"And where is your country?"

"At Jerusalem."

"And what is Jerusalem?"

"God was wroth with our forefathers: he dispersed us, for our sins, throughout the world; and our country has fallen into the hands of strangers."

"What!" said Vladimir; "do you wish to teach others—you, whom God has rejected and dispersed? If God had loved you and your law, he would not have scattered you abroad. You wish, perhaps, that we should suffer the same."

Another agent now appears on the scene. He is not a barbarian, as before, but a Christian philosopher from Greece. "We have heard," said he, "that the Mohammedans have sent to induce you to adopt their belief. Their religion and their practices are an abomination in the face of heaven and earth, and judgment will fall upon them, as of old upon Sodom. We have also heard that messengers have come from Rome to teach you. Their belief differs somewhat from ours. They celebrate the mass with unleavened bread; and, on this account, as well as others, have not the true religion."

Vladimir then added: "I have also had Jews here, who said that the Greeks and Germans believe on him whom we crucified. Can you tell now why he was crucified?"

"If you will listen," replied the philosopher, "I will tell you all, from the beginning." And so, commencing at the creation,

he detailed to the king the principal events of Jewish and Christian history. He described the true faith; spoke of the future reward of the righteous, and punishment of the wicked; and showed to the king a tablet on which was painted the scene of the last judgment. He showed him the righteous, who, filled with joy, were just entering into paradise; and also the sinners who were going into hell.

The king was moved, and heaving a sigh, exclaimed: "Happy are those who are on the right, but woe to the sinners on the left!"

"If you wish," said the philosopher, "to enter heaven with the just, you must repent and be baptized." But the king, on reflection, concluded to wait a little, that he might be more thoroughly instructed in religion. So he loaded the philosopher with presents, and sent him away.

The next year Vladimir sent for his nobles and elders, told them what he had heard, and asked their advice. Their reply was as follows: "No one, O Prince, talks evil of his country's religion, but each one praises his own. If you would know the exact truth—you have wise men here—send them to examine the faith of each, and the manner of their worship."

The Prince accepted their advice, and sent out his ambassadors. On their return, they reported unfavourably respecting the Mohammedan and Popish religions, but were delighted with what they saw at Constantinople among the Greeks. They happened to be present at one of the high festivals in the magnificent church of St. Sophia, and were placed in a situation to see all to the best advantage. The incense smoked, the chants resounded, the Patriarch appeared in his splendid vestments, and (what affected the envoys more than all) the deacons and sub-deacons came forward in dazzling robes, with white linen wings upon their shoulders. These, they were told, were angels, who had come down from heaven to take part in the service. "We are satisfied now," said the Russians; "we need no further proof. Send us home, that we may make report."

And they did report, in terms the most ecstatic. "We knew not whether we were in heaven or on the earth. We cannot describe to you all that we have seen. We seemed to be in the very presence of God. We shall never forget so much grandeur

and magnificence. Whoever has seen so imposing a spectacle can be pleased with nothing else."

Still Vladimir was not more than half convinced. He was besieging the city of Cherson, in the Crimea, and made a vow that, if he succeeded he would be baptized. At the same time, he sent to the Greek emperor, Basil, demanding the hand of his sister Anne in marriage. He obtained his bride, was baptized at Cherson, and gave orders for the general baptism of his people at Kieff. The great idol, Peroun, was dragged over the hills at a horse's tail; was unmercifully scourged by two thousand mounted pursuers, and then thrown into the Dnieper, where it was pushed along the stream until it went down the rapids, and finally disappeared in a spot long afterwards known as the Bay of Peroun. The whole people of Kieff were baptized in the same river, some sitting on the banks, others plunging in, and others swimming, while the priests read the prayers. "It was a sight," says Nestor, "beautiful to see, when the whole people were baptized, and each one, after baptism, returned to his house." The spot was consecrated by the first Christian temple, and Kieff became, henceforward, the Canterbury of the Russian Empire.

The Greek church, being thus established in Russia, has been the religion of the empire ever since. Like the religion of Rome, it is one of dead formalism, exhibiting little of the life and power of the gospel. Like Romanism, too, it has been an intolerant persecuting church. And yet, between the two, there are some important differences. The Greek church owes no allegiance to the Pope of Rome, but is governed by Patriarchs, much as the whole church was, after the days of Constantine. Among the Greeks, the clergy are not only permitted but required to marry previous to ordination, though they are not allowed to marry afterwards, or to be married more than once. The Greeks have no images in their churches, but are extravagantly, even fanatically, attached to pictures. They reject purgatory, and administer the communion in both kinds, giving it even to baptized infants.

There are other minor differences between these two churches, which have been the occasion, at times, of violent disputes;

such as those respecting the procession of the Spirit, and the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist. But a more important difference, practically, than any other, relates to the circulation of the Scriptures among the people, and the use of their respective liturgies in the vernacular tongue. This is permitted among the Greeks; and this rendered the conversion of the Russians more easy, and without doubt more thorough, than would otherwise have been possible.

I have spoken of the attachment of the Greeks to pictures. Among the Russians, both in the earlier and later periods of their history, this attachment is carried to an almost ridiculous extent. "It is," says Dr. Stanley, "the main support and standard of their religious faith and practice. It is like the rigid observance of Sunday to a Scotchman, or the Auto da Fé to a Spaniard, or like fasting to a Copt. Everywhere, in public and in private, the sacred picture is the consecrating element. In the corner of every room, at the corner of every street, over gateways, in offices, in steamers, in stations, in taverns, is the picture hung, with the lamp burning before it. In domestic life it plays the part of the family Bible, of the wedding gift, of the birth-day present, of the ancestral portrait. In the national life, it is the watchword, the flag, which has sustained the courage of generals, and roused the patriotism of troops. It has gone forth to meet the Tartars, the Poles, and the French. It has been carried by Demetrius, by Peter, by Suwarrow, by Kutusoff. A taste, a passion for pictures, not as works of art, but as emblems, as lessons of instruction, is thus engendered and multiplied in common life, beyond all example elsewhere."*

On this same subject, Macarius, a Syrian traveller of the 17th century, remarks: "The Muscovites are vastly in love with pictures, regarding neither the beauty of the painting, nor the skill of the painter; for with them a beautiful and an ugly painting are all one. They honour and bow to them perpetually, though the figure be only the daub of children, or a sketch upon a leaf of paper. Of a whole army, there is probably not a man but carries in his knapsack a gaudy picture,

* Lectures on the Eastern Church, pp. 411, 412.

in a simple cover, with which he never parts; and whenever he halts, he sets it up on a piece of wood and worships it.”*

Passing from common life to the church, the same peculiarity presents itself. In the churches of Moscow, for example, “from top to bottom, from side to side, walls, and roof, and screen, and columns, are a mass of gilded pictures; not one of them of any artistic value, not one put in for the sake of show or effect, but all cast in the same ancient mould, or overcast with the same venerable hue, and each one, from the smallest figure in the smallest compartment to the gigantic faces which look down, with their large open eyes, from the arched vaults above, performing its own part, and bearing a relation to the whole.”

Vladimir I., the founder of the Russian church, has been canonized, and is called a saint; but he seems not so well to deserve the title as Vladimir II., who came to the throne in 1114. His wife was Gytha, a daughter of Harold, king of England. The details of his life can be understood only through the obscure and fragmentary records of his time; but his general character may be sufficiently gathered from his dying injunctions to his sons.

“O my children, praise God, and love men. For it is not fasting, nor solitude, nor monastic life, that will secure your salvation, but only doing good. Forget not the poor, but nourish them. Remember that riches come from God, and are given you only for a short time. Do not bury your wealth in the ground; for this is against the precepts of Christianity. Be fathers to orphans. Be judges in the cause of widows, and do not let the powerful oppress the weak. . . . Never take the name of God in vain; and never break the oath you have made.”

“Be not envious at the triumph of the wicked, and the success of treachery. Fear the lot of the impious. Do not desert the sick, or fear the sight of a corpse, for we must all die. Receive with joy the blessing of the clergy, and do not keep thyself away from them. Do them good, that they may pray to God for you. Drive out of your heart all the suggestions

* Travels, vol. ii. p. 50.

of pride, remembering that we are all perishable—to-day full of hope, to-morrow in the coffin. Abhor lying, drunkenness, and debauchery. Love your wives, but do not suffer them to have power over you. Endeavour constantly to acquire knowledge. Without having quitted his palace, my father spoke five languages—a thing which wins for us the admiration of foreigners.

"In war be vigilant; be an example to your soldiers. When you travel through the provinces, do not suffer your attendants to do the least injury to the inhabitants. Entertain always, at your own expense, the master of the house in which you stop to rest. O my children, be not afraid of death, or of wild beasts. Trust in Providence; for this surpasses all human precautions."

Thus counselled a Russian prince in the 12th century. What prince or potentate, since that period, has given better advice to his children.

The monks are, and long have been, a numerous and powerful body of ecclesiastics in Russia. Some of them reside in convents, following the rule of St. Basil; but others, notwithstanding the severity of the climate, are anchorets of the wildest and most fanatical stamp. Even the Styliites, or Pillar saints, who never reached the west of Europe, are found in the heart of Russia. The following account of them is by English travellers of the 16th century: "There are certain Eremites who go stark naked, save a clout about their middle, with their hair hanging long and wildly about their shoulders, and many of them with an iron collar or chain about their necks or waists, even in the depth of winter. These the people take as prophets and men of great holiness, giving them the liberty to speak what they list, without any controlment, though it be of the very highest himself." "One of this class, whom they call Basil, took upon him to reprove the old Emperor, Ivan IV., for all his cruelty and oppression of the people. The body of this hermit lies in a sumptuous church, built on purpose to receive it, near the Emperor's house in Moscow, his iron collar and chain hanging over it, and him have they canonized for a saint."*

* Fletcher's *Russian Commonwealth*, p. 117.

Another, who lived at the same time, is thus described by Mr. Horsey. "I saw this impostor or magician—a foul creature. He went naked both in winter and summer, enduring the extremes both of heat and frost. He did many things through the magical illusions of the devil, and was much followed and praised both by prince and people." He was a means, at one time, of saving his native town of Plescow. When Ivan IV., surnamed "the Terrible," came there with the design of murdering all the inhabitants, the hermit rebuked him in the most solemn terms. At the same time he pointed to a black thunder cloud over their heads, and threatened the Emperor with instant destruction, in case he, or one of his army, touched so much as a hair on the least child's head in the city. Ivan trembled and retired, and the city was saved.

The monasteries in Russia are very numerous and strong. Standing, for instance, on the walls of the Kremlin, and looking over the city of Moscow, the eye rests at once on the towers of vast monasteries, which, at regular intervals, encircle the outskirts of the whole city, each encompassed with its embattled walls, and forming together a girdle of gigantic fortresses.

About the year 1223, commenced the onslaught of the Mogul Tartars, under the descendants of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, upon the domains of Russia. The war continued, with various success, for two hundred years; and it is of the Lord's mercies that Christianity was not entirely obliterated. It is said to have been through the influence of the clergy and the monks, that the Tartars were finally defeated and driven from the country. The most sacred of the Russian convents is that of "the Troitza," or the holy Trinity, founded in the year 1338. It is situate about sixty miles from Moscow, in the midst of one of those interminable forests which cover all the uncultivated parts of Russia. It is as much a fortress as a monastery, and is visited by pilgrims innumerable, from all parts of the empire. In this wild and uncultivated spot, near the close of the fourteenth century, lived the renowned hermit, Sergius. It was his prayers and blessing which encouraged the desponding Prince Demetrius to renew his attack upon the Tartars near the river Don. Two of his monks accompanied

Demetrius to the field. They fought in coats of mail drawn over their monastic garb, and the enemy was repulsed.

It was from this same convent, at a later period, that an influence went forth to confound the Tartars. When Ivan III. wavered, as Demetrius had done, it was by the remonstrance of Archbishop Bassian, a former prior of the Trinity convent, that the king was driven to take the field. "Dost thou fear death?" cried the aged prelate. "Thou too must die, as well as others. Death is the lot of all men; none can escape it. Give these warriors into my hand, and, old as I am, I will not spare myself, nor turn my back upon the Tartars." Aroused by this appeal, Ivan returned to the camp. The Tartars fled without a blow, and Russia was delivered.

As the invasion and expulsion of the Tartars form the first great crisis of Russian history, so the invasion and expulsion of the Poles constitute the second. "We are so much accustomed," says Dr. Stanley, "to regard the Russians as the oppressors of the Poles, that we find it difficult to conceive a time when the Poles were the oppressors of the Russians. Our minds are so preoccupied with the Russian partition of Poland, that we almost refuse to admit the fact that there was once a Polish partition of Russia. Yet so it was; and neither the civil nor the ecclesiastical history of Russia can be understood, without keeping in mind that long family quarrel between the two great Slavonic nations, to us so obscure, but to them so ingrained, so inveterate, so intelligible."*

The Poles were at the time here referred to (A. D. 1605), as they now are, Roman Catholics; and the wars between the two countries served to intensify the hatred of the Russians, not only against the Poles in particular, but against the Catholic religion everywhere.

In this struggle, as in the last, it was the church that saved the empire; and the monastery of the Trinity saved them both. When the Sovereign and the Patriarch had both disappeared before their enemies, the convent Troitza still stood erect. Its fortifications again served a noble purpose. Its warlike traditions revived in the persons of its warlike monks. As Deme-

* Lectures on the Eastern Church, p. 449.

trius had formerly received his blessing from Sergius, so the Prince Pojarsky was sent forth on his mission of blood by Dionysius, a successor of Sergius. In a little time, Moscow was retaken, and the empire was saved.

It was at this time that Demetrius, the only remaining scion of the stock of Ruric, disappeared, and the dynasty of Romanoff was established. Philaret, once a humble parish priest, but afterwards Patriarch of Moscow, was the father of Michael Romanoff, and the founder of this illustrious house.

For several hundred years, the sovereigns of Russia had borne the title of Dukes;—Dukes of Kieff, of Vladimir, and of Moscow. But in 1538, under Ivan IV., they assumed the more pretentious title of Czar; which is but a contraction for Cesar. The Czar of Russia is a sacred character. His coronation is a solemn event, preceded by fasting and seclusion, and occurring in the most sacred church in Moscow. In the form of investiture, he is not a mere passive recipient, but is himself the most active performer. On his knees, in the midst of the assembled multitude, he recites aloud the Confession of the orthodox church, and offers up a prayer of intercession for the empire. He places the crown upon his own head; and entering through the doors of the innermost sanctuary, he takes from the altar the elements of bread and wine, and communicates with the bishops, priests, and deacons.

The city of Moscow was founded in the year 1147, and is, beyond all others, the sacred city of Russia. It has a hold upon the religious mind of Christendom greater, perhaps, than that of any other city, if we except Jerusalem and Rome. Like Rome it is a city of innumerable churches, of everlasting bells, of endless processions, of tombs and thrones, of relics, treasures, invasions, and deliverances, as far back as its history extends. Then the Kremlin, with its crested towers and impregnable walls, unites within itself all the elements of the ancient religious life of Russia. Side by side stand the three cathedrals of the marriages, the coronations, and the funerals of the Czars. In the last of these, lie the coffins of the Czars, and twice every year a funeral service is performed for them all. Hard by are two convents, half palatial and half episcopal, while over all stands the double, triple palace of the Patriarch and the Czar.

I have said that the first who assumed the title of Czar was Ivan IV., surnamed "the Terrible," about the year 1538. His character was made up of strange inconsistencies, sometimes intensely religious, according to the fashion of the age; at others, intensely savage and cruel. Sometimes he would retire, for weeks together, to a monastery which he had built for himself at Moscow. He would himself ring the bell for matins at three o'clock in the morning; and during the services, which lasted seven hours, he would read, and chant, and pray, with such fervour that the marks of his prostrations would remain long after on his forehead. In the intervals he would go down to the dungeons underneath the convent, that he might see, with his own eyes, his prisoners tortured; and always returned with a face beaming with delight. On one occasion, he is said to have nailed the hat of an ambassador to his head. On another, he drove his huge iron walking-stick through the foot of a man whose attention he wished to secure. Indeed, during the last half of his reign, he was little better than a madman. Yet so venerable was his office, that he seems to have been loved by his people, as well as feared, and to have been regarded with high honour when he was no more.

Next in honour to the Czar was the Primate or Metropolitan. He was, at the first, subordinate to the Patriarch of Constantinople, but became, at length, independent; and, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, was himself constituted the Patriarch of Moscow. The Patriarchate was abolished by Peter the Great, who could not brook a rival near him; but whether Patriarch or Primate, the honours paid to the head of the Russian Church are much the same. "When he leaves the cathedral," says Dr. Stanley, "it is with difficulty that he can struggle through the crowd, who press to devour his hand with kisses, or to lay a finger on the hem of his garment. And when he drives away in his state-carriage, every one stands bareheaded as he passes, while the bells of innumerable churches and chapels join in an ever increasing river of sound."

But neither the grandeur of the office, nor the enthusiasm of the people, has ever raised the Primates of Russia to a level of political importance with some of the prelates of Europe.

There has been no Hildebrand, or Becket, or Anselm, among them. One of them (Philip) fell a martyr to the barbarity of Ivan the Terrible. For administering a merited reproof to this monster of cruelty, he was dragged away from the cathedral and put to death.

Perhaps the most remarkable of the Primates of Russia was the Patriarch Nicon, who received the mitre about the middle of the seventeenth century. He introduced some important changes into the service of the church, and well deserves to be called a reformer. He set himself with stern severity to root out some of the more flagrant abuses of the Russian hierarchy, especially the crying evil of intemperance. In his own person, he exhibited a new type of pastoral virtue and liberality. He founded hospitals and alms-houses, relieved the wants of the poor, visited prisons, and, with a promptitude of justice rare in the east, released the prisoners, if he found them innocent. Through his intervention, the seclusion of the female sex was partially broken up; so that the Empress, who had never before entered a church but in the night, now appeared there publicly by day. The baptisms of the Latin church, of which the validity is to this day denied by the Greeks, were, by his sanction, first recognized by the Russian church.

Nicon also showed himself the friend and patron of education. The printing-press was introduced, and Greek and Latin were taught in the schools. The study of the Bible was encouraged, and a new and more accurate translation was attempted. But the greatest change which he effected—one at that time without example in the east—was the revival of preaching. From his lips was first heard, after many centuries, the sound of a living, practical sermon. Archdeacon Paul has given us several examples of his discourses, which he complains of as tediously long. On one occasion, when the Czar was going forth to war, “the Patriarch blessed him, and then raised his voice in prayer for him, reading a beautiful exordium, with parables and proverbs from the ancients; such as how God granted victory to Moses over Pharaoh, and to Constantine over Maximianus and Maxentius, adding many examples of this nature, with much prolixity of discourse, moving on at his leisure like a copious stream of flowing water. When he

stammered, or made mistakes, he set himself right again with perfect composure. No one seemed to find fault with him, or to be tired of his discourse, but all were silent and attentive like a slave before his master.”*

Still, we cannot hold up the Patriarch Nicon as an object of unqualified admiration. His manners were rough, and his measures not unfrequently harsh and repulsive. “He was,” says Archdeacon Paul, “a very butcher among the clergy. His janissaries are perpetually going round the city, and when they find any priest or monk in a state of intoxication, they carry him to prison, strip him, and scourge him. His prisons are full of them, galled with heavy chains and logs of wood on their necks and legs, or they are compelled to sift flour day and night in the bake-house.” The deserts of Siberia were peopled with dissolute clergy, whom Nicon had banished there with their wives and children.

For a long time the Patriarch Nicon and the Czar Alexis lived together on terms of the most intimate friendship. “They appeared,” says Mouravieff, “as one and the same person in all acts of government, passing most of their days together, in the church, in the council-chamber, and at the friendly board. To unite themselves still closer by the bonds of spiritual relationship, the Patriarch became godfather to all the children of his sovereign, and they both made a mutual vow never to desert each other on this side the grave.”†

But at length the nobles, who were displeased with the rigor of Nicon’s government, and envious at the favour shown him by the Czar, contrived to separate the two friends, and to alienate Alexis from him. The breach, once opened, gradually increased; all intercourse between the two was broken off; and in a burst of indignation, the Patriarch resigned his place. He afterwards assayed to recall his resignation, and recover not only his office, but his place in the affections of his sovereign; but it was too late. He was formally deposed, degraded, and imprisoned; and though, after the death of Alexis, the sun of the royal favour once more shone upon him, he lived not to enjoy it. He died on his journey from the Siberian prison,

* Macarius’ Travels, vol. ii. pp. 59, 76.

† Hist. of Russia, p. 215.

and was buried in the convent of the New Jerusalem, which himself had founded.

Peter the Great was a son of Alexis by his second wife, and came to the throne of Russia in 1696. Of the perils of his early years—of his romantic journeys and residences in foreign lands, to copy their manners, acquire their learning, and make himself acquainted with their arts—of the leading events of his life generally, it is not necessary here to speak. It is chiefly as a civil and religious reformer, and in his connection with the church, that he claims our notice at the present time. While abroad in foreign lands, Peter conversed with their ecclesiastics, attended their meetings, and made himself acquainted with the different forms of Christian faith and worship. Still, he continued faithful to the church in which he had been baptized; although in several particulars he attempted a reformation.

In the year 1700, he adopted the European calendar, commencing the year in January instead of September. He abolished the office of Patriarch, as before stated, substituting in its place a Synod of Prelates, to be presided over by himself, or by his Legate. He abolished the Strelitzes or Janissaries, who had been constituted to be the sovereign's bodyguard, but who had virtually controlled the sovereigns, and been a terror to them, through long ages. In place of these, he organized a new army on the German model, entering the ranks himself, rising through every grade of office, and requiring his nobles to do the same. Finding Russia without ships, he laid the foundation of a navy, working himself in foreign shipyards, and employing Venetian and Dutch shipwrights to build his vessels. By his sword he also opened ports for his ships, both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic, and with incredible labour founded the city of Petersburg, and made it his capital.

To raise a revenue, he introduced a general taxation, taxing, among other things, the beards of his subjects, and their long-tailed Tartar coats; and as the Russians did not care to part with these appendages, they became a fruitful source of income. He encouraged and regulated the press, caused valuable translations to be made and published, and established naval and other schools. He fostered commerce, requiring his people to trade with other countries—a course which, up to

this time, had been sternly prohibited. He dug canals and built factories, established a uniformity of weights and measures, framed a new code of laws, organized tribunals, and built hospitals. He set himself sternly against all impostures and pious frauds, insisting that divine honours should be paid to God, and not to holy pictures and relics, and that no false miracles should be ascribed to them.

It is not to be supposed that these numerous innovations in the customs of a semi-barbarous people were acquiesced in without opposition. Peter encountered a strong resistance, more especially in his change of the calendar, his abolition of the Patriarchate, and his attack upon the beards and the long coats of his people. The separatists, called *Rascolniks* and *Starovers*, caused themselves and their sovereign a good deal of trouble; but Peter's intercourse with foreign nations had taught him toleration, and the great body, not only of his people but of his clergy, were prepared to follow him.

The character of Peter has been variously estimated. That he had talents, shrewdness, an indomitable perseverance, and an iron will, there can be no doubt; but then he was badly educated, and early contracted pernicious habits which could not be controlled. "I wish to reform my empire," said he on one occasion, "but I cannot reform myself." One of the darkest spots upon his character was the execution of his first-born son, on a charge of treason, but with the intent, probably, to put him out of the way.

Peter's second wife, Catharine, who succeeded him on the throne, was raised from a low and ignominious life; but she had great influence over him in his later years, and this influence, it may be hoped, was for good. He became temperate and simple in his habits, while his time was devoted to unwearied labours in the service of his country. After a very painful illness, which he endured with calmness and resignation, he died on the 28th of January, 1725.

Peter was the first of the Russian sovereigns who assumed the title of Emperor. His eleven successors, though by no means his equals in vigour and in power, have in general adopted and carried out his plans of reform; and, in so doing,

have transformed a rude and semi-barbarous people into one of the great powers of Europe and the world.

Alexander I., who died in 1825, was perhaps the best of the Russian emperors. He industriously sought the good of his people, favoured the circulation of the Scriptures among them, and is supposed to have been a truly pious man. His namesake (Alexander II.), the present Emperor, is thought to resemble him in some respects. Like him, he favours the circulation of the Scriptures; and he has commended himself to the consideration of all good men by the emancipation of millions of serfs.

One of the prelates of the Russian church is distinguishing himself, at the present time, by his untiring missionary labours. I refer to the Archbishop of Kamtschatka. Not in cars and steamers, but in rough canoes, and on reindeer sledges, he traverses the long chain of Pagan islands which unite the Asiatic and American continents, and is leading many of the besotted natives to a knowledge of Christian truth. Long may he live to pursue successfully these labours of love, and may many others be raised up to copy his example, and to call him blessed. And may this latest branch of the ancient oriental church, divesting itself of formality and superstition, and bringing forth much fruit unto holiness, yet prove itself to be a living branch of the living vine.

ART. III.—*Modern Philology. Its Discoveries, History, and Influence; with Maps, Tabular Views, and an Index.* By BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT. First Series, 8vo, pp. 360. Second Series, pp. 554. New York: Charles Scribner, 1864.

NOTHING in the nature of man is more wonderful than the harmony between his physical and spiritual constitution, and the influence exerted by the one upon the other. The soul is shut up in this material casing, excluded from all direct contact with anything external. The bodily organs are its only medium of communication with the world without; and in fact the soul

appears to come first to the consciousness of its own existence through the impressions thus received. It is most interesting to observe how these organs are contrived to accomplish not only the physical ends which they are designed to answer, but in addition, to meet the wants of the soul, promote the development of its latent powers, and give expression to its hidden workings.

The organs of speech and hearing, for example, are purely material instruments, constructed with reference to the laws of sound, as created and propagated in the subtle medium of the atmosphere. The inferior animals have similar organs for the production of sounds or the utterance of cries which accomplish ends suited to the wants of their being. But it would have been impossible to imagine, prior to experience, what extensive and varied uses they could be made to subserve on behalf of man. With a slight modification adapting them to the utterance and ready perception of articulate sound, intelligent and intelligible speech has become possible. Without this, man would have been consigned to perpetual and hopeless imbecility. His intellectual powers and capacities never could have been unfolded. His creation would have been a failure. But, by a signal instance of far-reaching spiritual consequences suspended upon a simple mechanical contrivance, possessed of this, man becomes man. The development of reason, civilization, art, and science, are the sublime sequences.

When in early infancy we began to learn the meanings and use of words, and to make our first rude attempts at their pronunciation, our education was begun, and in the most effective manner. We were learning to think, for speech implies thought. Language is not learned by rote. The process of its acquisition is not the mere retention in the memory of so many arbitrary symbols of thought put together by equally arbitrary rules. It is not as when a horse or a dog is trained by forced association to connect a given sense with particular sounds, or as when a parrot is made mechanically to imitate them. A child is taught to speak by awaking the faculty of language in his soul. The utterance of an idea or of an emotion becomes intelligible to him only as it excites the same within him. The effort to comprehend what is said to him,

exercises and strengthens his mind. Every one who approaches him, though it be but to interest or amuse him for a moment, becomes his teacher. However simple and childish the expressions used for his entertainment, they are yet the offspring of another mind. They contain the forms of thought cast in the mould of maturer powers, and they can only be understood by the exercise of thought. The very notion of language involves classification, comparison, reflection. The power of abstraction is called into exercise. It becomes necessary to refer individuals to the species to which they belong, to distinguish between acts in themselves considered, and the various circumstances of time, mode, and person, to separate qualities from substances, to conceive of the different degrees of the former and the relations of the latter, to perform all those mental operations, which are involved in a correct appreciation of whatever belongs to the derivation, inflection, and collocation of words. The most cursory review of what is implied in the acquisition of a language, and of the processes of thought necessary to accomplish it, will reveal how large a stock of ideas must be amassed, what an insight must be gained into their several relations, and what an amount of mental power and discipline must be acquired.

The use of language further demands besides the ability to understand what is spoken, the ability to speak ourselves. The former renders the mind active, by compelling it to echo and repeat to itself the thoughts of others; the latter requires it to originate and express its own. The impulse to communicate to others what is passing within us, is instinctive and strong, and this not only when required by some necessity, or by the desire to compass some particular end, but without any more definite motive than the pleasure of saying what we think or expressing what we feel. And this impulse is of incalculable advantage in the unfolding of our powers. He who never speaks, will think but little. The fountain must be allowed to flow out, or it will cease to flow altogether. A person must utter his ideas if he would come into the complete mastery and possession of them; he must put them into a form intelligible by others, if he would arrive at a full comprehension of them himself. In intellectual things the law is of rigorous application. He that scattereth

increaseth; and withholding tendeth to poverty. The mind must give off light and heat, or it can never be warmed and illumined itself. We have no clear conception even of our own inward states until we are roused to contemplate them, and put them into a definite and objective form by translating them into words. Notions which we have never sought to express in this precise and tangible manner may float vaguely and indistinctly in the mind; but they will not be relieved of this dim and misty character until they are interpreted in language either by others or ourselves. Language is the vehicle of thought as well as the medium of its expression. It is by it that we communicate with ourselves, as well as with others.

This intimate connection between language and our inward exercises discloses a fresh measure of the influence which it has upon the development of the human mind. It not only, as we have seen, gives its earliest stimulus to the power of thought, by teaching the child both to reproduce the conceptions of others and to express his own, but it supplies the permanent mould in which his thoughts are cast for ever afterwards. We came into being surrounded by those who are in the constant and familiar use of language, to whose consciousness it has not the character of arbitrary symbols, representing something different from themselves, or of formal rules determined by some external standard. It is interwoven with every operation of their minds. It is their souls' natural and spontaneous outgoing. They know no difference between the expression they utter and the thought they entertain. One is not only the precise counterpart of the other; but they are, as far as consciousness can judge, identical. Language is simply outspoken thought, the mind unfolding itself. Now, as we possess the same mental and physical organization with those by whom we are surrounded, disposing us originally to the same inward exercises and the same mode of expressing them, as we learn to think in the first instance by thinking their thoughts, and are thus supplied with a medium by which our thoughts may in turn be made intelligible to them, it is a matter of course that their language becomes ours, not merely adopted as the expression of thoughts independently conceived, but wrought into the whole texture and framework of our souls. It gives law to our mental operations,

determines the form and flow of our thoughts, becomes itself our inner nature, gives a bent to our powers which they ever inflexibly retain. Language is consequently not to be regarded as something wholly external to the soul, which it uses as a convenience. It is not even something foreign, which has been obtruded upon it, and to which it submits from sheer necessity. It is something precisely conformed to its nature, spontaneously adopted as soon as it is proposed and understood, because it offers the legitimate and only possible unfolding of the faculties originally implanted within it. It becomes thus a part of its constitution, a law of its life, a power in the soul, ever present, ever active, guiding all its motions. It is as evident and uniform in its operation upon the human mind as gravitation is upon matter. We are made sensible of one as of the other, not by a direct perception of the forces themselves, but by beholding their effects.

Every living language has its seat in the minds of those who speak it. When it has lost its present hold upon their souls, and is found only in past utterances and in written documents, it is petrified and dead. While it lives, it exercises a constraint which is felt in the fashioning of every sentence, in the choice of every word and inflection. With all the free variety in the sentiments conveyed, and an unlimited range in the mode of conveying them, there is yet a general submission to the control of this inward power. There is a constant uniformity in the phenomena, from the observation of which the grammarian deduces his rules, and the lexicographer the meanings of words. But the law of the language is anterior to all grammars and dictionaries, and independent of them. They who have seen neither, will use words and inflections with unfailing precision, even where delicate shades of difference are involved; and this, though they might be able to give no other reason for employing this word rather than that, or this form in preference to another, than that it is to satisfy an inward feeling. These distinctions are felt to exist, and they spontaneously determine the choice of words and forms, even though the philosophic student of language may find himself sorely puzzled to explain, in a complete and satisfactory manner, the grounds upon which they are based, or even to define exhaustively their

precise limits and character. It is an inward law, not deliberately submitted to, and as the result of reflection, but the impress of the language under which the mind was trained, and its habits of thought formed.

Language may be said to be the body of which thought is the soul, a body from which it can no more emancipate itself, and whose character can no more be changed by a direct volition than the human soul can either free itself from the clay tenement in which it dwells, or alter its nature. There is a limitation in both cases, no doubt, from the material form to which the spirit is bound: its actings are restricted by fixed laws and modes of operation. How far this is an evil and how far a good, it is not for us to determine. Higher orders of spiritual intelligences may not be encumbered by these restrictions, because they do not need the aid which material forms supply. It is enough that they are indispensable to us, constituted as we are; they are a necessity imposed upon us by our very nature. To attempt to rise above these limitations is but to destroy ourselves. Disembodied spirits and thought unfettered by language both undoubtedly exist; but we can form no more distinct conception of one than of the other in our present state of being. These material aids have been our helpers in all that we know of activity; and for us to refuse to use them, because something higher is possible, though beyond our reach, is to cease to act altogether.

It hence results that every language is possessed of organic unity and completeness. It is not an accretion but a growth, the product of a living spirit, the expression of an inner law. It must accordingly have that oneness which belongs to every living body and which consists in its being pervaded by its own distinctive vital force. This reaches to every part, however minute, and is everywhere the same, just as it is one vitality which animates each of our bodies. The same blood circulates through the whole down to its most insignificant portions, and every microscopic molecule of that blood has something about it by which it can be recognized as belonging to a human being. So in language there is one principle, one abiding law, which has impressed itself on every part, and binds in one all its endless ramifications from root to topmost bough. We

have not the means of demonstrating this in detail, in regard to any particular language, because it only becomes subject to our inspection as it reveals itself in the phenomena of actual speech. So viewed it may present a fragmentary appearance; for it has its spring in what is accidental and occasional. What is actually spoken, depends upon the need or the impulse of the moment. And the sum of these occasional utterances, so far as we can gather them and pass them in review, may be chargeable with chasms and seeming incoherencies because the links that unite them are missing. But this cannot be true of the language in its proper sense. For it comprises not only the sum of all that is spoken, but of all that could be thought or spoken by the people of whose intellectual life it is the permanent and necessary law. And as this is a unit and possessed of a specific character, which distinguishes it from the life and spirit of every other people on the globe, so must each language have its governing animating principle, in which its individuality consists; which is indestructible and invariable so long as the language lives and remains the same. The materials of which the body of a language is composed may have been gathered from the most diverse quarters, and when regarded in their original form may have been of the most heterogeneous description. But as they are wrought into this new organism, they are forced to undergo an assimilating and vitalizing process, which reduces them to a harmonious whole, informs them with a common life, and sets each in organic relation with the rest. Thus our common English tongue is based upon the Anglo-Saxon, and has drawn from the Celtic, the Latin, the Greek, the Norman, and other sources, and yet it is an independent language, not a repetition of any of its predecessors, nor a confused and heterogeneous mixture of them. It has as distinct a life of its own, governing every part and impressed upon its varied elements, as if all had been drawn from a single source or had been created expressly for its use. On the other hand, modern Italian is composed of almost the identical elements of the ancient Latin. The great bulk of its words are the very same, or have merely undergone slight phonetic modifications. But so diverse a spirit has been

infused into these elements, that the entire grammatical structure is changed, and the languages are totally distinct.

This view of the languages of the world suggests a basis for estimating their various worth. The ideal type of language is that which shall in the completest manner fulfil its proper end; which shall give to the human faculties, so far as this falls within its province, the development best suited to their nature, opening to them the amplest range, and laying the least constraint upon their free expansion and legitimate working; and which shall at the same time supply the most faithful and adequate representation for every diversity of spiritual states and exercises. It is, in brief, that which shall be best fitted to unfold and to express the soul of man. Approximation to this ideal standard is the test of excellence in languages. They make their approaches to it from various quarters and by every conceivable route; and one of the most curious things in their comparative study is the tracing out of the diversity of methods employed to attain a common result with their respective merits and demerits. Each language has its own stock of elemental sounds, chosen from the entire sum of those which the human organs are capable of uttering, the Oriental bringing in his harsh and difficult gutturals, the Hottentot his peculiar click, and the Chinese converting that scale of tones, which in other languages indicates the varied emotion of the speaker, into a constituent part of the signification of words. The mellow flexibility of the Sanscrit, linking its words of various length by their significant terminations expressive of nice modifications of thought, is unknown to the immovable Chinese, who speaks in rigid, uninflected monosyllables, placing, as it were, his unwrought conceptions side by side without elaboration, and unfitted together. Relations which the classic tongues subordinate and cast into the shade by making of them mere dependent syllables attached to the radical word, are in modern languages brought into greater prominence, and more variously expressed by means of auxiliaries and particles. Clearness and logical order is promoted in some languages, as in English, by a uniform sequence of words in the sentence; the freer collocation admissible in Latin allows of nicer shades of emphasis and more delicate touches of feeling. The modern Armenians

think habitually in an order the reverse of ours. This is so precisely true, that the arrangement of the words adopted in their translation of the Bible, will in many instances be yielded by reading the verses of our common translation backwards. And one of the difficulties in the way of acquiring a fluent use of that tongue is this necessity which it imposes of inverting the accustomed style of thought, by requiring the introduction of all the attendant circumstances first, and holding back the main proposition to the very last words of the sentence. The compound words and complex sentences of Indo-European tongues have no counterpart in the Semitic languages, which are more simple and intuitional, but, at the same time, less energetic and less rigorously exact. And in the necessity imposed upon all languages of adapting a limited stock of roots to the expressive unlimited number of ideas, there is endless room for the play of the imagination or of the logical powers, in suggesting the harmonies and relation of things in the same or separate spheres; so that, as has been truly said, every language embodies a particular conception of the universe.*

To this diversity in the original and fundamental character of languages may be added that arising from the various grade of their development and the truthfulness with which this has been conducted. Language, as the organ of thought, may be compared to the human body in its influence on the mind. The degree to which the body promotes or retards intellectual activity, and is the faithful exponent of the states of the soul, is dependent not only upon its original physical constitution, but also upon the measure of its growth and its healthful condition. There are capabilities in every language reaching indefinitely beyond the expansion it has actually received. The same unlimited power of progression inheres in it as in those faculties of the soul where it has its seat. It will unfold by its own law, adhering strictly to that course upon which it has set out; but even in its most imperfect state it has its points of contact with the highest forms of thought to which the soul can rise, and it may be made by a legitimate expansion

* So liegt in jeder Sprache eine eigenthümliche Weltansicht.—*Wilhelm von Humboldt.*

to take them in. The soul lifts itself from thought to thought, not by the sudden admission of ideas unconnected with any entertained before, but by climbing a ladder, so to speak; each fresh idea giving it a new position from which to step to the next. The grandest and most exalted ideas possible to the human mind are so connected by intervening steps with its feeblest and most rudimental conceptions, that it can thus proceed either by its own inherent force, or by the help of teachers from one to the other. And in like manner, if a language can convey the rudest and simplest ideas, it thereby proves itself to possess an expansibility corresponding to that of the mind itself. One of the important functions performed by great thinkers, poets, philosophers, and orators, is this unfolding of their native tongue, bringing forth to the popular consciousness its hidden stores of wealth, revealing elements of power and beauty which were not previously known to have existed in it. By making it the vehicle of thought never so well expressed before, by conducting speculations into realms yet unexplored, by touching the springs of feeling with unprecedented skill, by the gentleness of soft persuasion, the majesty of sublime description, the force of withering invective or of solemn argument, they touch the instrument with master hands and its latent powers are evoked. So the progress of civilization, refinement, and learning enriches language by enlarging the circle of ideas which must in this manner find expression. In all this there is no change of the native characteristics of a language, or of the measure of its inherent adaptedness to be the vehicle of thought, but only a further elaboration or a finer finish of material which already existed.

Besides the various extent to which languages may be unfolded, we must take into account the character of the development itself, if we would estimate aright the nature of their influence. If each of them contains its own conception of the universe, and impresses this upon the minds into which it is received, it becomes a question of great moment whether this conception is coincident with truth. Does it waken right ideas and proper notions in the soul? Is it a pellucid medium through which things are seen clearly and in their true relations, or a murky, foggy atmosphere, by which objects are

dimmed and distorted? Or, worse than this, is it charged with moral miasma, breathing pestilence and deadly disease, instead of healthful invigoration and life? Contact with pollution necessarily breeds defilement. To receive into the mind a language soiled with foul ideas, to grow familiar with vice under palliative and honourable names, and to know only the caricatures of virtue, nicknamed by those who hate her, and would make her an object of offence, is to debase the soul, and to blind or corrupt its moral sense. It is difficult to form an estimate of our indebtedness to the truth which there is in language, and the correct ideas which we have gained from finding them there expressed. We can scarcely image to ourselves the difference in judgment, character, and feeling between two minds, whose ideas and modes of thought were imbibed respectively from a Christian and from a Pagan language. All know the embarrassment under which missionaries have laboured in China, growing out of the lack of any tolerably exact translation for the name of the Supreme Being—any term for God, which would not, to the mind of a native, convey a pantheistic notion of the object of worship, or suggest one of the false deities to which they are accustomed to pay their adoration. There is no such idea in the minds of the people as is suggested to us by the simple utterance of the name God; they have no notion of the spirituality, infinity, eternity, holiness, and glorious perfections which we have associated with it. Their language contains no term to express it. So it is with all ideas peculiarly Christian; the languages of the heathen do not contain them, and hence the difficulty of conveying these ideas to their minds. An entirely new class of notions and associations must be waked up within them, different from any they have ever had, and which there are no terms capable of conveying to them. It requires a slow process of elaborate training to eradicate or correct that concatenated system of false notions which is thus far the only thing that has ever entered into their thoughts. The language needs to be christianized as well as the people; the work of transformation in the latter cannot be complete and thorough until the former shall be reached and purified. The fountains of thought are poisoned, and their streams are laden with death. The words

must be purged of these false ideas and degrading associations before the natural flow of thought can be pure and true.

The importance of a proper medium for the spread of great ideas may be illustrated by the conduct of the Most High himself, in his providential preparation of a language to be the bearer of the facts and doctrines of the Christian revelation. The most polished and refined nation of antiquity was first engaged in the service; the master-pieces of literature which they elaborated are still the admiration of the world. The Greek thus wrought out became, in a literary sense, one of the most noble and cultivated of tongues. As the language of a Pagan people, however, it needed a thorough purgation. This was effected by causing it to circulate for centuries in the Jewish mind, until it was charged with ideas, and breathed a life drawn from the Old Testament, and from the divine training to which the people of Israel had been subjected for ages. The new idiom thus created by the transfusion of Jewish thoughts into the tongue of classic Greece, then stamped into uniformity and permanence by a special literature of its own, was finally wrought into its New Testament form by the lips and pens of apostles, trained by Christ himself in the new truths which he came to communicate.

The question may naturally arise here, whether a language shall ever be produced corresponding to its true ideal? The process, thus far, has been one of division and subdivision; each people has laboured at the problem in their own way; each striven to evolve a form of speech adequate to all their wants as a vehicle of thought and a medium of communication, and with the greatest possible variety in the result. Can it have been the design of Providence that this division should exist for the sake of an ultimate re-union?—that the partial elements of good wrought out in a disconnected manner among the various nations of the earth should be brought together, and, from their combination, result a language which may be regarded as elaborated by the entire race of man?—which shall contain within itself every valuable product of the experience of mankind in this particular, an instrument in the highest degree adapted to excite and to convey the legitimate workings of the human mind? Such a scheme would accord

well with the analogy of history. The present civilization of the most enlightened nations is not the result of their own unaided efforts, nor can it be traced back to any single source. Every great historical people has had its special mission—some predominant idea to develope or exemplify. This task it has performed not for itself alone, but for the benefit of the race; its gathered stores being poured into the common treasury of mankind. If it is thus with other intellectual products, why not with language?

This, too, accords with the present lines of progress. The isolations and mutual hostilities which have driven nations asunder, or kept them so, are yielding, and shall continue to yield, to the bonds of amity and reciprocal intercourse. Diversities of language must thus be reduced, as well as other differences; and the rather, as the curse entailed upon the world at Babel is one of the most formidable barriers to intercommunication. It was designed to sever a combination which aimed to arrest Heaven's decree for peopling the earth, but may not be permitted to stand in the way of such a combination as the peopled earth is, in the purpose of God, destined to form. Languages and dialects, of limited extent and minor consequence, are already melting away. Others will do the same. The leading languages of the earth are daily extending their limits, and are, besides, becoming more and more necessary beyond their proper bounds as mediums of intercourse. May it not be possible that the whole earth shall again be "of one language and of one speech"? And is it an unwarrantable stretch of fancy that such a consummation may be shadowed forth by the prophet, when he predicts a day as coming in which there shall be "one Lord, and HIS NAME ONE"?

From considering the influence of language upon man, we now turn to the counter-influence of man upon language. We have thus far contemplated it chiefly as a power resident in the mind; we shall henceforth have to deal with it in its objective form, as uttered whether in writing or in speech. The operation of language and of thought is reciprocal. We have seen how language gives birth to thought and continues ever after its permanent vehicle. It is itself likewise born of thought and perpetuated by it. It is the creation of the mind, its spon-

taneous product, flowing forth from it as naturally and inevitably as rays from the sun, and bearing as indelibly upon it the impression of its source. The clothing of individual conceptions and mental states in particular words and sentences is in a sense voluntary, for the mind frames them agreeably to its own idea of fitness. But the general laws which underlie all these particular utterances are not a matter of reflection or choice; they are determined by the constitution of the soul itself. The languages of men unfold the mind of the race, in even its most latent and unobserved workings; the study of language is therefore a most important aid to the mental philosopher, it puts into his hands a key which will unlock more effectually than any other the inmost recesses of the soul. Its evanescent and shifting states are here wrought into permanent and tangible forms. The phenomena submitted to the student's observation are indefinitely multiplied; and the best opportunities are afforded for examining into their real character.

Since language is thus a mirror of the mind, it follows as a necessary consequence that the speech of no two men can be absolutely identical, neither can the speech of any two be totally unlike. On the one hand, every man's utterances must bear the impress of his own individuality, he will have his own characteristic style of thought and of expression. And on the other hand, the community of nature which belongs to all, must reveal itself in the character of their thoughts and in the mode of their expression. There is a sense, therefore, in which all the languages of the earth are one. Beneath the superficial differences of words and forms, and special grammatical rules, there are certain great facts and principles which belong alike to all, which have their root in that mental organization and those fundamental laws of thought which inhere in all men. There is a limit, accordingly, beyond which the divergencies of language cannot extend; a bond which holds all in unity and harmony, in spite of every appearance of distracted confusion.

Between this limit of possible divergence and the other limit of possible approach, conditioned respectively by the generic unity and the individual diversity of men, there is every various grade of agreement and of difference. There is no more cer-

tain or delicate test than language affords, of the measure of the community which obtains amongst the several portions of the human race. Thus the different degrees of consanguinity between the members of the great human family are here exhibited. Affinities between the languages of different nations betoken the affinities of those nations. The English spoken in this country, the French in Canada and Louisiana, the Portuguese in Brazil, the Spanish in the rest of South America and Mexico, indicate the quarter from which the body of early settlers came. Ancient authors inform us that Carthage was a colony of Tyre; the identity of their languages declares the same. That the builders of the pyramids were ancestors of the Copts can no longer be doubted, since the hieroglyphic inscriptions, which, though a puzzle to the ancients, have yielded to the persevering labours of modern students, resolve themselves into Coptic. The book of Genesis, which would be invaluable had it no other merit than that of being a repository of the early history of our race, records that Nineveh was founded by a colony from Babylon; in strict accordance with this is the testimony of the monuments recently exhumed upon the site of the Assyrian capital. These have brought to light, together with the civilization and manners of that great empire, its language, which had been lost for ages; and now that the mystery of the strange character in which its inscriptions are written has been uncovered, this is found to be kindred to the Babylonish.

We have thus a means of tracing the course of the various currents of population from the beginning, and determining the migrations of tribes and races long before they are mentioned in authentic history. The primitive branches into which mankind were divided, as they spread abroad from their original centre to cover the world, can still be distinguished by the several families of languages which arose amongst them, each having a clearly defined type of its own, which is preserved in all its subsequent divisions and ramifications. And whatever doubt there may be as to the exact limits of these grand divisions as they shade off almost imperceptibly into one another, the leading facts are perfectly apparent and quite unmistakable. The various strata of human population became

thus as easy to be separated and to be recognized as the strata of rocks which compose the crust of the globe. Here we find a broad belt of nations speaking affiliated tongues; these must all have sprung from the same stock gradually overspreading the soil. There is a language, as the Turkish, interjected into a body of others entirely dissimilar, like a mass of granite perforating a bed of limestone; this testifies of ancient convulsions, the irruption of a conquering horde from some distant quarter. Again, small remnants of ancient strata are found, like the Welsh and other fragments of the old Celtic, cropping out through more recent layers, identifying the early tenants of the soil. Or, as in the Caucasus, with its wonderful medley of tongues, heterogeneous fragments may be found dropped without any order or system here and there, like erratic boulders fallen from the avalanches of nations which in various ages have swept past that wild inhospitable region. And even loose sands driven by the winds from clime to clime, such as the gypsies of the old world wandering in scattered bands without a settled habitation, may thus be recognized in spite of their disintegration and the foreign materials which they have accumulated, and assigned to their proper home. And if the vexed question of the origin of the aborigines of this continent is susceptible of a satisfactory solution, it is most probably to be looked for in a careful scrutiny of the native American tongues.

Language may not only teach us the origin of nations and enable us to trace each back to its respective source, but it reveals their several ages. It contains a scale of chronology not absolute indeed and fixing precise epochs, but relative, exhibiting the order in which the events in question occurred. The greater the divergence between branches springing from the same stem, the closer to the root will the point of departure be; and the greater their contiguity, the more recent must their separation have been. Families of languages divide themselves into subordinate groups, the individual members of which are more closely allied to each other than to any member of the affiliated groups. Each of these groups must represent an offshoot of the race to which they belong, which separated first in a body, and afterwards, as they spread further, again

diverged. Now language may be interrogated as to the relative ages of these different groups, in what order they severed themselves from the parent stem, and also in what order the several members of each group attained to a separate existence.

And further still, it may indicate successive eras in the life of the same people, mark the stages of their literature, and assign their intellectual products each to its proper date. Successive steps are plainly distinguishable in the language of England, viz., the Anglo-Saxon of Alfred, the old English of Henry III., the English of Chaucer, and that of modern days. And it is easy to perceive, that if some writing of unknown date were now to be discovered in one of the libraries of that ancient kingdom, an important criterion of its age would be gained by ascertaining which of these periods in the English language it represented. What has just been imagined in relation to our own tongue has actually been done in the case of others. The epochs of Hindoo literature and of the sacred literature of the Zoroastrians rest upon well defined criteria of this very nature; and whatever doubt may overhang the question of the absolute age of these various writings, there can be none as to the order of their production. Attempts have also been made in both these cases to go beyond this, and to establish not only a relative scale of measurement, but a fixed point of time from which to measure. Monuments of known date exist in both India and Persia; in the former, nearly contemporaneous with the expedition of Alexander, in the latter, belonging to the period of the Achæmenides. These fix the character of the two languages at those dates respectively; now if it were only possible to recognize the same stage of each language in its literary remains, their date would be absolutely settled.

If to community of descent be added other bonds of connection, this increased intimacy of relationship will have its counterpart in a closer approximation in point of language. While those sprung from the same race speak tongues which, though distinct, belong to the same family or group, those who together form one people, with a consciousness of their unity, occupying one country, subject to the same government and the same laws, with a common literature and free intercourse among

themselves, but severed geographically, as well as politically and socially, from other states around them, will speak one language peculiarly their own. Hence the boundaries of nations do commonly mark the limits of languages, as Spain and Portugal, France and Denmark. And nations which once existed, but have, like Germany, been broken into fragments, or like Poland, parcelled amongst larger states, may still, in some instances, be traced by the prevalence of their proper language. The petty states of Greece, whilst they maintained their independence, had each a separate dialect; but when Philip of Macedon united them under a common government, their dialects too were fused into one; and when the conquests of his illustrious son extended his empire over Asia, the Greek language everywhere followed. At the foundation of Rome, several distinct though related tongues were spoken by the various tribes which peopled Italy; but as the sway of Rome extended, her language supplanted all its rivals. The assimilating power of the dominant language of a people is shown in a most remarkable degree in our own country. The people, the government, and the literature are English; and the vast numbers who have emigrated from other lands of Europe, or have been brought from Africa, or have even been attracted from Asia, make no more impression than rivers pouring into the briny ocean make upon the constitution of its waters. Settling together in large communities, as the Germans, or brought in by the cessions of extensive territory, as the French in Louisiana, and the Spanish in Mexico, they may maintain, for a while, a sort of separate existence, and hold fast to the relics of their former nationality, like rivers which at their junction sometimes appear to flow side by side for a considerable distance without a complete mingling of their waters. But this isolation cannot long be maintained. The pulses of a people's life must be felt in every artery of its body, and whatever is not its proper expression and outgrowth must gradually yield.

If there be not sufficient vigour in the national heart to effect this result, every addition will be a source of weakness, not of strength. Instead of being compacted with the body as an organ in vital union with the rest, bound together in sympathy,

acting in concert, knowing but one interest, obedient to one impulse and a common will, it becomes a dead weight and an incumbrance; or rather a foreign body, with a unity and life of its own, bound by outward constraint to another with which it has no real fellowship. A schism is thus effected which only waits the occasion to develope it into disorganization and ruin. It was thus with the great Asiatic empires; it was thus with the old Roman empire. This is one of the notorious causes of the peril of Austria at this hour. The distinct languages spoken within its domain prevent its population from being blended into one homogeneous mass. They form so many lines of demarcation and division, which have sundered it in feeling, and will, in all probability, ultimately lead to its political dismemberment. Its Italian provinces are partly lost already, and the rest detest its sway; while Hungary looks hopefully towards that emancipation for which it has thus far vainly struggled. On the other hand Italy, though disunited at present, and split up into different states, feels, nevertheless, the drawings of a common tongue. And the enthusiasm with which Sardinia and her noble ruler are everywhere openly hailed, or secretly regarded, induce the hope that neither despotism nor priesthood can long avail to crush the popular will, which has made itself heard in such unmistakable tones; the hope, that they who speak the language of Dante and of Petrarch will yet salute one another as brethren and fellow-citizens, and a united Italy be more than a romantic dream.

The political power of language has long been understood by the wily government of Russia. It has been its steady policy, through the medium of the national church, to extend the Russian language and letters, and extirpate all others. This process was going forward in the Danubian principalities prior to the recent Crimean war. And in pressing his ambitious designs upon his feeble neighbour in the south, the Czar counted largely upon the lack of coherence in Turkey in this very respect. The disintegrating power of a multiplicity of tongues lent essential aid in the reduction of the rebellious tribes of the Caucasus. Could the concert of action possible with people of one speech have been effected among those brave and hardy mountaineers, and could their redoubtable

chieftain have had the opportunity which he would then have possessed of infusing into them his own desperate energy and hatred of the invader, he might still be in his native fastnesses, defying all the armies that could be brought against him.

The minor diversities which exist in nations speaking a common tongue, likewise reproduce themselves in language. Hence the provincialisms of a widely extended country, if its several parts be not bound together by the utmost frequency of intercourse; and these, in more secluded localities, and with a population that rarely stirs from home, lead even to distinct *patois* and dialects, as in various counties of England and France. The same thing appears in distinct classes or professions, forming a sort of community of their own, with their peculiar technical expressions and slang phrases. The dialect of college life, with its *chum*, and *fizzle*, and *rowl*, &c., may illustrate this. The sailor has his dialect; so has the prize-ring, and the degraded poor of our cities, each of which would be, in many points, unintelligible to the uninitiated.

These divergent tendencies would exhibit themselves far more than they do were it not for the harmonizing and uniting influence of a widely circulated literature. This acts as a sort of balance-wheel, preserving regularity of motion, and preventing any material deviation. It is a fixed and permanent standard, conformity to which on the part of all secures a close approximation to one another. Hence, among well educated people, the provincialisms and *patois* just spoken of are unknown. Hence, too, the dialects of savages, who have no written literature, are liable to such constant and serious change. An expression figuratively used to-day, becomes the ordinary phrase of to-morrow; descriptive epithets are adopted in place of appellatives previously employed; so that in a very short time their vocabulary may undergo a total change. Accordingly, every inconsiderable tribe of Indians has its own distinct language; and no matter how frequently they might divide and subdivide, the result would be the same. The speech of the separated portions would speedily become mutually unintelligible. It is this which occasions such serious difficulty in defining the limits of groups and families of languages spoken by roving and barbarous tribes. The uniform and

consistent type which characterizes the affiliated tongues of enlightened nations is unknown amongst them. No check remains upon the utmost possible divergence.

It has been seen how the inward relationships created amongst men by lineage and by political association are, in their several shades and varieties, reflected in language. The same is the case, likewise, with the slighter and more casual correspondences produced by contiguity and intercourse. These do not, like the more influential causes already referred to, affect the essential structure of a language, but lead rather to the borrowing of individual words and phrases. And the extent to which this transfer takes place, and the general character of the instances in which it is found, affords an indication of the nature and amount of the influence exerted by one people over another. Commerce and trade, while effecting an exchange of commodities, transport the name as well as the thing; and hence the current names of articles often tell us whence they were originally brought. Thus the words themselves declare that *tea* came from China, *myrrh* from Arabia, *cherries* from Asia Minor, *quinine* from Peru. We have thus a means, independently of any direct statements of ancient authors, of arriving at some knowledge of the trade which was maintained between the several nations of antiquity, the remoteness of the regions to which it extended, and the character of the goods in which they respectively dealt. The native names of Asiatic products found in Greek and Latin authors bear as explicit testimony to the existence of a traffic between the East and West, as do the coins of Greece and Rome found scattered as far even as India. Whatever obscurity may rest upon the tradition of Cadmus and his alphabet, the names of the Greek letters point to Phœnicia as the land of their origin. The figures with which the mathematician performs his calculations, and the merchant keeps his accounts, are, (if the results of the most recent investigations shall prove to be correct,) proved to be a gift from India to the world, by being traced back to forms which, in the language of that country, are the initials of the numerals from one to nine. The multitude of Greek words which found their way into Latin, is a perpetual monument of the literary preëminence of Greece, and the

crowds of Romans who resorted thither for instruction, pleasure, or gain. The scientific terms now in vogue which have their roots in Arabic, remind us that the Arabs were once the teachers of Europe.

The careful accuracy with which language receives the impression of the human mind in all its phases, and especially as affected by the various grades of relationship or intercourse subsisting amongst men, has been cursorily exhibited. It remains to add that it reproduces with equal distinctness and preserves with a like tenacity the great facts of man's inward and of his outward life, the ideas which have prevailed and the events which have occurred.

The language of any people presents in a compact form the limit and range of their ideas. The conceptions which they entertain find expression in their words, and whatever is lacking in the former will be betrayed by a corresponding gap in the latter. We may thus deduce the measure of a people's enlightenment and civilization. Gather their language and you discover what they are. If this could be done fully in the case of any nation of ancient or modern times, it would afford a perfect picture of their condition.

The same thing holds with races as well as with individual nations. If the languages of the same group or family be compared together, whatever is common to the whole must have belonged to the original stock from which all alike have descended. It is thus possible to determine a circle of objects and ideas with which the primitive ancestors of these several tribes and nations must have been familiar. If the process be carried further still, and a comparison be instituted between all the languages of mankind, we shall arrive at those ideas which are common to the entire race, and which must therefore be grounded in our common nature. And we shall thus hear the world, as with one voice, uttering its protest against atheism and a dreamy intangible idealism, and expressing its faith in the great truths of a distinction between right and wrong, moral accountability, and the existence of a world to come.

Ideas and philosophies once prevalent, but which have since passed away, may here be rediscovered. They have here erected to themselves a monument recording to after ages that they

have lived. The words by which they were once expressed no longer suggest to the popular consciousness the meanings which they were originally designed to convey. They are like fossils imbedded in the strata of our current speech, witnesses of a former life, remains of extinct species, the shell or skeleton outlasting the animating principle to which it owed its particular organic form. Or they may be compared to broken columns of an ancient architecture wrought into some modern edifice, which by their peculiarity of style still betray their real origin. Thus our current designation of the days of the week is a standing proof that they who so named them were idolaters; yet no one in speaking of Sunday thinks of it as dedicated to the sun, or in speaking of Monday has any idea of paying homage to the moon. No one is ever charged with giving credit to astrology, and believing that the stars control the destinies of men, because he uses such words as *disaster*, *lunacy*, *mercurial*, *martial*, *saturnine*; and yet the existence of these words is evidence that this belief did once prevail.

Past events and customs no longer observed may, in like manner, leave their record in language. The Saxon names we give to living animals, while the same animals slain for food bear Norman names, are echoes of the Norman conquest and of the exactions for their table levied by the lordly conquerors from the subject peasantry. The word *September* suggests to us that what is now the ninth, was once the seventh month of the year; and *February* tells us of the expiation customary as the year was closing. *Bank* reminds us from what small beginnings our great moneyed institutions have arisen, when fiscal transactions were conducted upon a bench in the street, which bench was broken in cases of failure and its owner declared *bankrupt*. We still speak of *calculation*, though the process so denominated is no longer performed by means of pebbles; of *ballots*, though little balls are not now used; of the *exchequer*, though the table with its checked cover is gone; of *candidates*, though they are not robed in white; of *manumission*, though the forms of Roman law are dispensed with; of the *pound sterling*, in spite of the diminution of its weight; and of the *chancellor*, though the lattice work has been taken away.

We extend a cordial welcome to the interesting and instruc-

tive volumes named at the head of this article, whose contents we have had in mind throughout the train of remark in which we have indulged. The science of language, as at present understood and prosecuted, has sprung up so recently, and has been developed with such amazing rapidity, that those who have not had their attention specially directed to it are scarcely aware of its existence or claims. And yet it has already attained such dimensions, established such relations with other branches of inquiry, and is withal possessed of such intrinsic interest and importance, that no educated man can afford to be ignorant of its methods and results.

We know of no work accessible to English readers in which so satisfactory a view of this subject can be obtained in so brief a compass and in so attractive a form. The general scholar will find it an admirable compend of just the information that he seeks, while they who desire to enter upon the comparative study of language with more thoroughness and in fuller detail, will do well to begin with the careful perusal of these volumes, for the sake not only of their masterly outline view of the whole field and the skilful presentation of first principles, but the copious hints and suggestions which will prove an invaluable guide in the further prosecution of their inquiries. And even those for whom philology in its broader aspects has few charms, if they desire to understand the mechanism of our own language, at least upon its classic side, and possess the results of the latest and best investigations, conducted upon a solid scientific basis, instead of the crudities and random guesses current in most of the accessible authorities, will feel that the article on Comparative English Etymology, with its satisfactory analysis of more than three thousand six hundred words, is worth the cost of the entire work.

ART. IV.—*A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures, Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical.* By Dr. JOHN P. LANGE, Professor of Theology at the University of Bonn, assisted by a number of Continental Divines. Translated into English, with Additions, original and selected, by Dr. PHILIP SCHAFF, in connection with a number of American Divines of various denominations. New York: Charles Scribner. Vol. I., containing the General Introduction and the Gospel of Matthew. By Dr. Lange and the American Editor. 1864.

IT is an argument of no mean force for the divine origin and character of the Bible, that it has been the subject of more discourses and commentaries than any other book or class of books, and constantly invites new investigation, with the promise of a plentiful reward. Fathers, schoolmen, reformers, and modern critics, German, French, English, or American, have dug in its mines of truth, and brought forth precious ore for the benefit of their age and generation, and the long line of commentators will never break off until our faith is turned into vision, and we shall know even as we are known.

Exegesis has its history, like every other branch of theological science. It has its productive and its digestive periods, its periods of rise and decline. Prominent among the productive epochs are three: the age of the fathers; the age of the reformers; and the age of modern critics and scholars. The first laid the foundation of Catholic, the second that of Evangelical theology, the third makes respectful use of both, but is more critical, scientific, and liberal in its character and method, and seems to open new avenues for the future and ever deepening development of Christian theology.

The patristic exegesis of a Chrysostom and Theodoret, Jerome and Augustine, is, to a large extent, the mature result of a victorious conflict of ancient Christianity with Ebionism, Gnosticism, Arianism, Pelagianism, and other radical heresies which stimulated the fathers to a vigorous investigation and defence of revealed truth. The exegetical works of Luther and Calvin, and the other reformers, breathe throughout a polemical spirit against the peculiar dogmas and traditions of Roman-

ism. So the modern evangelical exegesis of Germany has grown up on the battle-field of Christian truth against the gigantic foes of rationalism and infidelity.

If Germany should succeed in the end in thoroughly routing the most scientific and most powerful forms which heresy has ever assumed, it will achieve as great a work as it did by the Reformation of the sixteenth century. For now the very foundations of Christianity are called into question, and the life of the Saviour itself is turned into a myth. Inspiration is denied, and the sacred writers dissected and criticised like any profane author of ancient Greece and Rome. Never before has the Bible been assailed with so much learning, acumen, and perseverance as during the last fifty years in Germany, and within the last few years in England. Never before has it been subjected to such thorough and extensive critical, philological, historical, antiquarian, and theological investigation and research. But never before has it been more zealously and thoroughly vindicated, and defended with the help of all the means which the latest advances of classical and oriental philology and antiquarian investigation have made available. The productivity of the German mind in the critical, exegetical, and historical field has been intense and prodigious during the present century. It is almost impossible to keep up with the ever-multiplying commentaries on almost every book of the sacred canon, but more especially on the Gospels, the Life of Christ, and the Epistles of the New Testament.

In view of this immense activity still going on, it is high time now, and a very favourable juncture, such as rarely occurs, for the publication of a large and comprehensive commentary, which should, from a truly evangelical point of view, present the best and most valuable results of this last creative period of exegesis, and make them available for the practical benefit of ministers and intelligent laymen, thus forming a bridge between the scientific divines and the congregation of the people.

Such a Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is the one which is now in course of preparation and publication under the editorial supervision of the Rev. Professor Dr. John Peter Lange, in Bonn. It is intended to

be a Theological and Homiletical Commentary, a treasure-house to the pastor, and an exegetical library in itself. The idea originated with the publishers, and the execution was intrusted to a distinguished divine, who is peculiarly qualified for such a work. Dr. Lange is undoubtedly one of the ablest and best men whom Germany has given to the world. He combines a rare variety of talents as a divine, a philosopher, a preacher, and a poet. But he has more than talent, he is a real genius, of extraordinary fertility of mind, and abounding in original and fresh ideas. For the more sober class of minds he is somewhat too imaginative and fanciful, but this feature is not so prominent in his later works, and his fancies are always pious, suggestive, and edifying. He is a profoundly spiritual Christian, evangelical and orthodox in all the fundamental articles of faith, yet liberal and truly catholic. He has written a considerable number of works, poetical, theological, and literary. He was one of the earliest and most successful opponents of Strauss, and was elected professor in Zurich after the defeat of Strauss in 1839, as the one best qualified to represent the opposite side. Several years ago he was called to a professorship in Bonn. He is a moderate Calvinist, (German Reformed,) but without any sectarian exclusiveness. His most important works are a system of Christian Dogmatics, in three volumes, and a Life of Jesus Christ, of which an English translation, in six volumes, has just been published by Messrs. Clark in Edinburgh.

These previous labours, especially the comprehensive and profound work on the life of Christ, gave him the best preparation for the Commentary, to which he is now devoting his whole time and strength, and which will long survive him as the most valuable and useful work of his life. He has associated with him a number of German, Swiss, and Dutch divines, distinguished for sound theological learning, pulpit eloquence, and practical evangelical piety, as Dr. van Oosterzee of Utrecht, Dr. Lechler of Leipzig, Dr. Gerok of Stuttgart, Dr. Moll of Königsberg, Drs. Auberlen and Riegenbach of Basel, Dr. Kling, Dr. Fronmüller, and others.

The publication of the work commenced in 1857, with the first volume, containing the General Introduction, and the

Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. It has since gone forward without interruption. The New Testament is nearly completed; the Epistle to the Romans, and the Epistles and Revelation of John being the only books still wanting. The Old Testament has likewise been taken in hand by a number of contributors, but will not be completed for a number of years. The first and pioneer volume of the Old Testament department, embracing a General Introduction and Commentary on the Book of Genesis, prepared by the editor, has just appeared. In the General Introduction to the Old Testament, Dr. Lange discusses, in eighty-two pages, under suitable headings, in a very fresh and original manner, all the usual historical, critical, and hermeneutical questions, closing with a brief sketch of Biblical Theology in systematic form; the practical exposition and homiletical use of the Old Testament; the organism, with a valuable excursus on the so-called offensive passages of the Old Testament, as *foci* of the glory of the Old Testament religion. The last essay is especially valuable at the present time, as it furnishes the biblical student with excellent weapons against the Colenso school, and other modern attacks on the Old Testament. Dr. Lange is very ingenious in transforming the offences into "*foci* of glory;" and if he is not everywhere satisfactory, he is always fresh, suggestive, and edifying.

The Commentary of Lange and his associates is a threefold Commentary—*critical*, *doctrinal*, and *homiletical*. These departments are kept distinct throughout, which makes the book much more convenient for use.

1. The *Critical and Exegetical Notes** explain the words and phrases of the text according to the principles of grammatico-historical exegesis. On all the more important passages the different views of the principal commentators, ancient and modern, are given; yet all mere show and pedantry of learning is avoided. The main object is to clear up every difficulty as briefly as possible, and to present the most valuable and permanent results of original and previous exegetical labours, without the process of investigation itself, in a condensed form for convenient reference. These exegetical notes are based on

* *Exegetische Erläuterungen.*

a new translation of the text, which precedes them in larger type. The different readings are given in foot-notes, but only as far as they affect the sense, or are of some particular interest. In general, Dr. Lange follows the critical editions of Lachmann and Tischendorf.

2. The *Doctrinal and Ethical Ideas or Thoughts** present, under a number of heads, the leading theological truths and principles contained in, or suggested by, the text. In the Gospels these doctrines are viewed mainly from the christological point of view, or as connected with the person and work of the Saviour. The reader will find here a vast amount of most valuable living theology, fresh from the fountain of primitive Christianity, and the contemplation of the divine human person of Christ, who stands out prominent throughout as the great central Sun of truth and righteousness.

3. The third department is headed, *Homiletical Hints or Suggestions*,† and is of special importance and use to the preacher for preparing sermons and biblical lectures. It contains a rich variety of themes and parts, and mediates between the chair and the pulpit, the scientific exposition and the practical application of the word of God. It shows the inexhaustible wealth and universal applicability of the Scriptures to all classes and conditions of men. These "hints" are by no means intended, however, to supersede, but only to stimulate the labour of pulpit preparation. Under this department the authors give not only their own homiletical suggestions, but also judicious selections of older and more recent practical commentators, as Quesnel, Caustein, Starke, Lisco, Gerlach, and Heubner.

From this sketch it will be seen that the plan of Lange's *Bibelwerk* is the most comprehensive of any recent commentary, German or English, and views the Bible under every aspect, showing it to be truly a diamond, which shines and sparkles which ever way it is turned. It is a very important feature,

* In German, "Dogmatisch-ethische Grundgedanken;" in the Gospels, where the christological element preponderates, they are called "Christologisch-dogmatische Grundgedanken."

† Homiletische Andeutungen.

as a matter of convenience and economy of time, that the three departments are not mixed up, but kept distinct throughout, so that the reader can easily find just what he wants at a particular time, without going over a mass of irrelevant matter.

The work is mainly designed for ministers and students of theology, and is sufficiently learned to give the reader the assurance that he is everywhere on safe and solid ground, and under the guidance of a master who has gone through the whole tedious process of critical research. But it gives the results, and not the process itself, and presents the building in its beautiful finish, without any of the scaffolding. It is also sufficiently popular in its whole tone to be accessible to intelligent laymen and teachers of Sabbath-schools, if they should at all desire to refer occasionally to a work of such dimensions.

The spirit of the Commentary is truly Christian and evangelical, and falls in very well with the reigning theology of our American Christianity—certainly far better than most German works of the kind, not excluding Olshausen and Tholuck, whose Commentaries have become so widely popular among us. We do not know an exegetical work which is so well adapted to commend itself to all the evangelical denominations of this country. It is altogether free from sectarianism, and avoids all polemics, except against skepticism and rationalism, and occasionally against Romanism. And yet it is by no means loose and latitudinarian, but most decided and positive in all the fundamental articles of our Christian faith and practice.

Upon the whole we do not hesitate to call Lange's *Bibelwerk* the most useful Commentary on the Scriptures which ever appeared in Germany, or in England and America. There are, indeed, single commentaries on separate books, and also complete commentaries on the whole New Testament, which are superior in a particular feature, critical or practical, but there is none which combines so many excellencies and elements of long-continued usefulness. It is more particularly the *pastor's* commentary. It is almost an exegetical library in itself, and has already taken rank among those indispensable works which are constantly consulted as safe guides and intimate friends. The work has already been a decided success, and is selling

extensively not only in Germany, but in all parts of Europe and in the United States. The German booksellers of this country sell a larger number of Lange's *Bibelwerk* than of all other German commentaries combined. Six parts of the original have already gone through two or three editions.

A work of such sterling and permanent value should by all means be made accessible to the theological and religious public of Great Britain and the United States. Several years ago a translation was seriously projected by Dr. Schaff, then at Mercersburg, in connection with several others, and the preliminary arrangements were made with Mr. Scribner, of New York, as publisher. But the Presidential election of 1860, and the consequent Southern secession and rebellion, led to an abandonment or indefinite postponement of so extensive and expensive an undertaking. In the meantime Mr. Clark, of Edinburgh, commenced to issue translations of the first three Gospels of Lange's work, which introduced it to the English public, and created a taste for the whole.

In the spring of 1863 the original plan was resumed by Mr. Scribner as publisher, and Dr. Schaff as editor, and measures were at once taken to carry it into execution. A number of distinguished biblical and German scholars of different evangelical denominations, most of whom are already known as successful translators of German works, were secured, and are now at work on most of the volumes already published in German. Dr. Schaff assumed the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, and moved to New York in January last, to devote himself more fully to this task. Dr. Shedd, of Union Theological Seminary, New York, has in hand the Gospel of Mark; Dr. Yeomans, of Rochester, (the able translator of Dr. Schaff's History of the Apostolic Church,) commenced the Gospel of John; Dr. Schäffer, Professor at Gettysburg, (the excellent translator of Kurtz's Sacred History,) has already finished about one-half of the Commentary on Acts. The Epistles to the Corinthians were assigned to the Rev. Dr. Poor, of Newark; the Epistle to the Hebrews, to Dr. Kenrick, Professor of Rochester University, and reviser of the Edinburgh translation of Olshausen; the Catholic Epistles to Rev. Dr. Mombert, of

Lancaster, who translated Tholuck's Psalms; the Epistle to the Galatians to Rev. Mr. Starbuck, recently assistant Professor in Andover Theological Seminary; the Epistles to the Thessalonians to Rev. Dr. Lillie. Several other distinguished divines, most of them in connection with Theological Seminaries, will probably take part, sooner or later, as the translation is expected to extend also over the Old Testament; and it is likely that the Commentary on Genesis, which has just appeared, will be one of the first to be translated and published.

The American edition will faithfully reproduce the whole of the original, without abridgment and alteration, in idiomatic English, and contain such additions, original and selected, as promise to be of special interest to the American reader, and to give the work an *Anglo-German* character, or to make it a repository of the most valuable results of Anglo-American as well as German Biblical learning. But these additions are to be carefully distinguished from the original by brackets and the initials of the translator. Each contributor assumes the entire literary responsibility of his part of the work. Instead of giving a new translation, the Authorized English Version, according to the present standard edition of the American Bible Society, is made the basis; but the more literal renderings required by the Commentary, or new and generally approved readings, are to be inserted in brackets, and justified in Critical Notes, immediately after the text, with reference to the principal ancient and modern translations in the English and other languages.

The first volume of the American edition, containing the General Introduction to the Bible, and the Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, prepared by Dr. Schaff, is now nearly finished, and will probably be ready for publication in November, or at all events, before the close of this year.

To give the reader a clear idea of the forthcoming American edition of this Exegetical opus magnum, we present a specimen, selecting a difficult and important section of the sixteenth chapter of Matthew.

The Church as confessing Christ, the Son of God.

Matt. xvi. 13—19.

(Parallel passages—Mark viii. 27—30; Luke ix. 18—21.)

When Jesus came into the coasts [parts, $\tauὰ μέρη$] of 13 Cesarea Philippi, he asked his disciples, saying, Whom do men say that I,¹ the Son of man, am? And they said, 14 Some say that thou art John the Baptist; some Elias [Elijah]; and others, Jeremias [Jeremiah], or one of the prophets. He saith unto them, But whom say ye that I 15 am? And Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art the 16 Christ [the Messiah], the Son of the living God. And 17 Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona [Bar Jonah, son of Jonah]:² for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which [who] is in heaven [the heavens]. And I say also [And I also, 18

Revision of the Text.

¹ Ver. 13.—The pers. pron. $\muέ$ in Cod. C. after $\lambdaέγοντες$, [in the *text. rec.* before the verb], is wanting in Cod. B. [and in Cod. Sinaiticus] and in several versions, and is omitted by Tischendorf [and Tregelles and Alford]; Lachmann retains it, but in brackets. The insertion is more easily explained than the omission.—[If we omit $\muέ$, we must translate with Campbell and Conant: Who do men say that the Son of man is? Or with Alford, who retains the grammatical anomaly, if not blunder, of the author. Vers.: WHOM ($\tauίνα$) do men say that the Son of Man is? $\tauίνα$ $\tauόν αὐτόν$ is equivalent to I in the corresponding sentence below, ver. 15. Some who retain $\muέ$ in the text (Beza, Clericus, etc.) translate: Who do men say that I am? the Son of Man? i. e. Do they believe me to be the Messiah? But this does not suit the form of the answer, and would require either an affirmative *Yea*, or a negative *No*. In the received text $\tauίνα$ $\tauόν Σέω$ must be regarded as opposition to $\muέ$, and is so rendered in the E. V.—P. S.]

² Ver. 17.—[*Bar* (בר) is the Aramaic or Chaldaic word used by Daniel in the prophetic passage, vii. 13 (“I saw . . . and one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, etc.), for the Hebrew *ben* (בֵן) son. In the Authorized E. V. it is retained as the patronymic of Peter, as Matthew retained it in Greek, *Bēp' Iāwā*; Jerome in Latin, *Bar-Jona*; Bengel, de Wette, and Ewald, in their German Versions, *Bar-Jona*; while Tyndale, Cranmer's, and the Geneva Bibles, also Luther and Lange translate it into the corresponding vernacular. Compare similar compound names: *Bar-Abbas*, *Bar-Jesus*, *Bar-Nabas*, *Bar-Sabas*, *Bar-Timaeus*, *Bar-Tholomeus*. The translation depends on whether the name is here simply the patronymic, or whether it has an allegorical meaning, as Olshausen and Lange contend. In the latter case it must be translated *son of Jonah*, or *Jonas*. See Lange's *Exeg. Notes*, and my protesting footnote on ver. 17.—P. S.]

καὶ ὠδέ, say] unto thee, That thou art Peter [*Πέτρος*], and upon this rock [*πέτρᾳ*]³ I will build my Church [*ἐκκλη-*

³ Ver. 18.—[Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ,—one of the profoundest and most far-reaching prophetical, but, at the same time, one of the most controverted sayings of the Saviour, the exegetical rock on which the Papacy rests its gigantic claims (but not by direct proof, but by inference and with the help of undemonstrable intervening assumptions, as the transferability of Peter's primacy, his presence in Rome, and his actual transfer of the primacy upon the bishop of Rome), under the united protest of the whole Greek Catholic and Protestant Evangelical Churches, who contend that Christ says not a word about successors. Leaving the fuller exposition to the *Exegetical Notes*, we have to do here simply with the verbal rendering. In our Engl. Vers., as also in the German, the emphasis is lost, since *rock* and *Fels* are never used as proper names. We might literally translate: "Thou art *Peter*, and upon this *petress*"; or: "Thou art *Stone*, *Rockman*, *Man of rock* (*Felsenmann*), and upon this *rock*"; but neither of them would sound idiomatic and natural. It is perhaps remarkable that the languages of the two most Protestant nations cannot render the sentence in any way so favourable to the popish identification of the rock of the church with the person of Peter; while the Latin Vulgate simply retained the Greek *Petrus* and *petra*, and the French translation: "Tu es *Pierre*, et sur cette *pierre*," even obliterates the distinction of the gender. The Saviour, no doubt, used in both clauses the Aramaic word קִרְבָּה (hence the Greek Κιρῆς applied to Simon, John i. 42; comp. 1 Cor. i. 12; iii. 22; ix. 5; xv. 5; Gal. ii. 9), which means *rock*, and is used both as a proper and a common noun. Hence the old Syriac translation of the N. T. renders the passage in question thus: "*Anath-hu KIPHA, v'all hode KIPHA.*" The Arabic translation has *alsachra* in both cases. The proper translation then would be: "Thou art *Rock*, and upon this *rock*," etc. Yet it should not be overlooked that Matthew in rendering the word into Greek, no doubt under the influence of the Holy Spirit, deliberately changed the gender, using the masculine in the one case and the feminine in the other. He had, of course, to use Πέτρος in addressing a *man* (as Maldonatus in loc. correctly remarks: *Petrus, quia vir erat, non petra fæmineo, sed Petrus masculino nomine vocandus erat*); but he might with perfect propriety have continued: *ἐπὶ τάύτῃ τῷ πέτρᾳ*, instead of *ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ* (which change Maldonatus less satisfactorily accounts for simply on the philological reason that the masculine *πέτρος* et *Atticum et rarum est*). The masculine *πέτρος* in Greek (in Homer and elsewhere) means generally only a piece of rock, or a stone (like the corresponding prose word *λίθος*), and very rarely a *rock*. (Meyer, however, quotes for the latter signification a passage from Plato: *Σισύφου πέτρος*, one from Sophocles, and one from Pindar); but the feminine *πέτρᾳ* always signifies *rock*, whether it be used literally or metaphorically (as a symbol of firmness, but also of hardheartedness). I would not press this distinction, in view of the Syriac קִרְבָּה, and in opposition to such eminent commentators as Bengel and Meyer, who, like the Rom. Cath. commentators, admit no difference of the terms in this case. (Bengel: *hæc duo, πέτρα et πέτρος stant pro uno nomine, sicut unum utrinque nomen ΚΕΡΗΑ legitur in Syriaco.*) But it is certainly possible, and to my mind almost certain, that Matthew expressed by the slight change of a word in Greek, what the Saviour intended in using, necessarily, the same word in Syriac, viz., that the *petra* on which the Church is built by Christ, the Divine architect and Lord of this spiritual temple, is not the *person* of Peter *as such*, but something more deep and comprehensive; in other words, that it is *Peter and his confession* of the central mystery of Christianity, or *Peter as the confessor of Christ*, *Peter in Christ*, and *Peter*, moreover, as representing *all the other apostles* in like relation to Christ (comp. Eph. ii. 20; Rev. xvi. 14). Nor should we explain ver. 18 inde-

σία];⁴ and the gates of hell [hades]⁵ shall not prevail against it.⁶ And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of 19

pendently of ver. 28. It is very significant that, while the *believing* and *confessing* Peter here is called rock, the *disobedient* and *dissuading* Peter immediately afterward (ver. 23), with surprising severity, is called for the time being Satan, the enemy of Christ. If the papacy has any claim to the rocklike nature of Peter, it has certainly also fallen at times under the condemnation of the satanic, anti-christian, and denying Peter. Let us hope that it may imitate Peter also in his sincere repentance after the denial. Bengel: *Videat Petra romana, ne cadat sub censuram versus 23.*—Comp. the *Exeg. Notes* below, and the translator's *History of the Apostolic Church*, § 89, p. 351 sqq.—P. S.]

⁴ Ver. 18.—[All the English versions before Queen Elizabeth, except that of Wiclif (which reads *chirche*), translate *ἐκκλησία* by the corresponding English word *congregation*; but the Bishop's Bible substituted for it *church*, and this, by express direction of King James, was retained not only here, but in all the passages of the N. T. in the revised and authorized version of 1611. Among German translators and commentators, the Roman Catholics, (Van Ess, Arnoldi, Allioli) render *ἐκκλησία* by the term *Kirche* (*church*); while the Protestant translators and commentators (Luther, John Friedr. von Meyer, Stier, de Wette, Ewald, H. A. W. Meyer and Lange) render: *Gemeinde* (*congregation*). The Greek *ἐκκλησία*, from *ἐκκλέω*, *to call out, to summon*, occurs 114 times in the N. T. (twice in the Gospel of Matthew, but in no other Gospel, 24 times in the Acts, 68 times in the Epistles, 20 times in Revelation,) and corresponds to the Hebrew **בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל**. It is not to be confounded with the more spiritual and comprehensive term *kingdom of God* or *kingdom of heaven*, so often used by our Saviour. It means generally any popular convocation, congregation, assembly, and in a Christian sense the *congregation of believers* called out of the world and consecrated to the service of Christ. It is used in the N. T. (1) in a *general* sense, of the *whole body of Christian believers*, or the *church universal*, Matt. xvi. 18; 1 Cor. xii. 28; Gal. i. 18; Eph. i. 22 (and in all the passages where the church is called the *body of Christ*); 1 Tim. iii. 15; Heb. xii. 28, etc.; (2) more frequently in a *particular* sense, of a *local congregation*, as in Jerusalem, in Antioch, in Ephesus, in Corinth, in Rome, in Galatia, in Asia Minor, etc.; hence, also, it is often used in the plural, e. g., *αι ἐκκλησίαι τῆς Ἀσίας*, 1 Cor. xvi. 19; *αι ἐκκλησίαι τῶν ἔθνων*, Rom. xvi. 4; the seven churches, Rev. i. 4, 11, 20, etc. The Saviour himself makes use of the word only twice, viz.: in our passage, where it evidently means the *church universal*, which alone is indestructible, and in Matt. xviii. 17, where it can be understood only of a *local church* or *congregation* (*tell it to the church*). John never uses the term except in his third epistle. The word *church* is properly no translation of *ἐκκλησία* at all, but has etymologically a different meaning, being derived from the Greek *κυριακή*, i. e. *belonging to the Lord*, through the medium of the Gothic, whence also the cognate terms in the Teutonic and Slavonic languages, the German *Kirche*, the Scotch *kirk*, the Swedish *kyrka*, the Danish *kyrke*, the Russian *zerkow*, the Polish *cerkiew*, the Bohemian *zirkew*. (Leo, *Ferienschriften*, Halle, 1847, derives the word from the Celtic *cyrch* or *cylch*, i. e., centre, meeting place; but this would not explain the introduction of the word into the Slavonic nations, who received Christianity from the Greek church.) The word *church* is now used both in the general and in the particular sense, like *ἐκκλησία*, and in addition to this also in a third sense, viz., of a *building*, or house of worship, (Eusebius *Hist. Eccl.* ix. 10, calls the meeting-houses of the Christians *κυριακὰ οἰκεῖα*). As regards the English translation of *ἐκκλησία*, a number of modern commentators advocate a return to the term *congregation* throughout the whole N. T. But it is neither possible nor desirable to expel the term *church* from the English Bible, which has long since become the full equivalent of the Greek *ἐκκλησία*. We might use *church*, where the word signifies the *whole body of believers*, and *congregation*, where a *particular or local assembly of Christians*

heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

is intended. But even this is unnecessary. The Geneva Bible also employed the term *church* in a few passages, though not in ours, where it seems to me to be more appropriate than *congregation*.—P. S.]

⁵ Ver. 18.—[Πόλεις ἀδεν, in Hebrew שָׁאַרְשֵׁי עַדְעַת sha'are sheol, Isa. xxxviii. 10, an alliteration. On *hades*, as distinct from *hell*, compare the *Exeg. Notes* below, and also the *Crit. Notes* on xi. 23, p. 210.—P. S.]

⁶ Ver. 18.—Οὐ κατισχύσων αὐτὸν, from κατισχέειν τινός, *prævalere adversus aliquem*, comp. Isa. xv. 18, Sept. Tyndale, the Bishops', King James', and the Douay Bibles agree in translating: *shall not prevail against it*; the Lat. Vulgate: *non prævalebunt adversus eam*; Luther, de Wette, Ewald, Lange: *überwältigen*; Meyer: *die Obermacht haben (bhalten)*. I prefer the *prevail* of the Authorized Vers. to *overcome* (Geneva Bible) as expressing better the idea of ultimate triumph over long-continued passive resistance. The term must be explained in conformity to the architectural figure which runs through this whole passage:—*gates, build, keys*. Hades is represented as a hostile fortress which stands over against the apparently defenceless, yet immovable temple of the Christian Church, to which our Lord here promises *indestructible life*. (*Ecclesia non potest perire*.) The gates of hades, or the realm of death, by virtue of the universal dominion of sin, admit and confine all men, and (like the gates in Dante's *Inferno* with the famous terrific inscription) were barred against all return, until the Saviour overcame death and “him that hath the power of death” (Hebr. ii. 14) and came forth unharmed and triumphant from the empire of death as conqueror and Prince of life. Hades could not retain Him (Acts ii. 27, 31). The same power of life He imparts to His people, who often, especially during the ages of persecution and martyrdom, seemed to be doomed to destruction, but always rose to new life and vigor, and shall reign with Christ for ever. Comp. Rev. i. 18: “I am alive for ever more, and have the keys of death and hades;” and 1 Cor. xv. 26: “The last enemy that shall be destroyed, is death.” This interpretation of the figure appears to me much more appropriate than the usual one, which takes hades here in the sense of *hell*, and assumes an active *assault* of the infernal armies, rushing, as it were, through these gates and storming the fortress of Christ’s Church. To this interpretation I object: (1) That *gates* are not an active and *aggressive*, but a passive and *confining* power; (2) that *hades*, although closely related to geennah or hell and including it, is yet a wider conception, and means here, as elsewhere, the realm of death (*das Reich der Todten*), which swallows up all mortals and confines for ever those who have no part in the victory of Christ over death, hell, and damnation.—P. S.]

EXEGETICAL AND CRITICAL NOTES.

Ver. 13. **Into the parts of Cesarea Philippi.**—The cure of the blind person at the eastern Bethsaida (Mark xiii. 22) had taken place before that. *Cæsarea Philippi*, formerly called *Panæas* (Plin. *H. N.* v. 15,) from the mountain Panius, dedicated to Pan, in the immediate neighbourhood. The town is supposed to have been the ancient *Leshem*, Josh. xix. 47; *Iaish*, Judg. xviii. 7; and *Dan*—“from Dan to Beersheba.” It lay near the sources of Jordan, at the foot of Mount Lebanon, a day’s journey from Sidon, in Gaulonitis, and was partly inhabited by heathens. The town was enlarged and beautified by Philip the Tetrarch, who called it *Cæsarea* (*Kingston*) in honour of Cæsar Tiberius. The name *Philippi* was

intended to distinguish it from *Cæsarea Palestinae* (Robinson, *Palest.* ii. 439; also, vol. iii. sect. ix.) Tradition reports that the woman with the issue of blood resided here. Her name is said to have been Berenice. Agrippa II. further embellished this city, and called it *Neronias* in honour of Nero. The modern village of Banias, and the ruins around it, mark the site of the ancient city.

Who (not whom) do men say that I, the Son of Man, am?—How do men explain the appearance of the Son of Man? Meyer: What do they understand by the designation, Son of Man? De Wette: I who am a humble, lowly man. But this completely misses the peculiar import of the expression, *Son of Man*.

Ver. 14. **Some say.**—“The reply shows that, in general, He was *not yet* looked upon as the Messiah.” Meyer. But according to the representation of the evangelist, we must rather infer that Christ’s enemies had by their calumnies succeeded in lowering the popular estimate concerning him.

John the Baptist.—*See ch. xiv. 2.* This, for a time, had been the opinion of the courtiers of Herod.—**Elijah**,—as the precursor of the Messiah. Such was the view professed by those whom fear of their superiors induced to deny His claims to the Messianic office, while, from a desire of not entirely surrendering the expectations which had been excited by His appearance, they still regarded Him as a prophet.—**Jeremiah**.—Of course, in the same sense as Elijah,—not in the sense of literally revisiting the earth, nor in that of implying the doctrine of the transmigration of souls [metempsychosis].* The opinion of these persons concerning Jesus was evidently lower than that of those who regarded Him as Elijah. (Mark xv. 35; John i. 21). The one party referred especially to what might be designated as the reformation inaugurated by Jesus, while the other had regard to His denunciations of the corruptions of the times.

Or one of the prophets.—According to the lowest view, He was represented by discouraged friends as one of the old prophets. Three points are clearly brought out in this conversation: 1. That, to a certain extent, Jesus was still generally acknowledged by the people. 2. That the faith of the majority had been lowered and misled by the influence of their superiors, so that diverging opinions were now entertained regarding Him. 3. That this inconsistency and wavering led to a decreasing measure of homage.

Ver. 15. **But who say ye that I am?**—This was the decisive moment in which the separation of the New Testament *κανόνια* from the Old Testament theocracy was to be made. The hour had come for the utterance of a distinct Christian confession.

Ver. 16. **Simon Peter.**—Peter answered not merely in his own name,

* [Some, however, no doubt believed in a bodily resurrection of Elijah or Jeremiah. The latter was accounted by the Jews as the first in the prophetic canon. *See Lightfoot on Matt. xxvii. 9.—P. S.*]

but in that of all the disciples.*—**Thou art the Christ,—i. e.** the Messiah Himself. And this, not in the sense in which carnal Jewish traditionalism held the doctrine of the Messiah, but in the true and spiritual import of the title—the **Son of the living God.** The latter expression must not be taken merely in a *negative* sense, as denoting the *True God* in opposition to false deities; it must also be viewed in a *positive* sense, as referring to Him whose manifestations in Israel were completed in and crowned by the appearance of His Son as the Messiah. This, however, implies Sonship not only in a moral or official, but also in the ontological sense. Thus the reply of Peter had all the characteristics of a genuine confession—being *decided, solemn, and deep.*

[The confession of Peter is the first and fundamental Christian confession of faith, and the germ of the Apostles' Creed. It is a confession, not of mere human opinions, or views, or convictions, however firm, but of a divinely wrought faith, and not of faith only (*I believe that Thou art*), but of adoration and worship (*Thou art*). It is christological, *i. e.*, a confession of Jesus Christ as the centre and heart of the whole Christian system, and the only and all-sufficient fountain of spiritual life. It is a confession of Jesus Christ as a true man (*Thou, Jesus*), as the promised Messiah (*the Christ*), and as the eternal Son of God (*the Son—not a son—of the living God*), hence as the God-Man and Saviour of the world. It is thus a confession of the mystery of the Incarnation in the widest sense, the great central mystery of godliness, “God manifest in the flesh.”—Compare also the excellent remarks of Olshausen (in Kendrick's Am. ed., vol. i. p. 545 sq.) and Alford, who, following Olshausen, says *in loc.*: “The confession is not made in the terms of the other answer: it is not ‘we say,’ or ‘I say,’ but ‘Thou art.’ It is the expression of an inward conviction wrought by God's Spirit. The excellence of this confession is, that it brings out both the human and the divine nature of the Lord: ὁ χριστός is the Messiah, the Son of David, the anointed King; ὁ νέος τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ζωήτος is the Eternal Son, begotten of the Eternal Father, as the last word most emphatically implies not ‘Son of God’ in any inferior figurative sense, not *one* of the sons of God, of angelic nature, but the **Son of the living God**, having in Him the Sonship and the divine nature, *in a sense in which they could be in none else.* This was the view of the person of Christ quite distinct from the Jewish Messianic idea, which appears to have been (Justin Mart. *Dial.* p. 267) that he should be born from men, but selected by God

* [This is the correct view, already maintained by the fathers, *e. g.* Chrysostom, who, in Hom. 54, calls Peter in this connection *the mouth of the apostles, τὸ στόμα τῶν ἀποστόλων*: by Jerome, *Petrus ex persona omnium apostolorum proficitur*; and by Thomas Aquinas, *Ipse respondet et pro se et pro aliis*. Some Rom. Cath. commentators, as Passaglia and Arnoldi, for obvious reasons, maintain that Peter spoke only in his own name. But the Saviour addressed His question to all the disciples, and they certainly must have assented to Peter's confession of faith, which they had from the time of their calling, and without which they could not have been apostles. Comp. John i. 42, 46, 50, also the remarks of Dr. Schegg, a Rom. Cath. Com. *in loc.* (vol. ii. p. 349).—P. S.]

for the office on account of his eminent virtues. This distinction accounts for the solemn blessing pronounced in the next verse. Ζῶντος must not for a moment be taken here, as it sometimes is used (e. g., Acts xiv. 15), as merely distinguishing the true God from dead idols: it is here emphatic, and imparts force and precision to *vios*. That Peter, when he uttered the words, understood by them in detail all that we now understand, is not of course here asserted, but that they were his testimony to the true Humanity and true Divinity of the Lord, in that sense of deep truth and reliance, out of which springs the Christian life of the Church." Meyer, indeed, takes τοῦ ζώντος simply as the solemn epithet of the *true* God in opposition to the dead idols of the heathen; but there was no reason here for contrasting the true God with heathen idols, and Peter must have meant to convey the idea, however imperfectly understood by him at the time, that the Godhead itself was truly revealed in, and reflected from, the human person of Christ in a sense and to a degree compared with which all former manifestations of God appeared to him like dead shadows. He echoed the declaration from heaven at Christ's baptism: "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased," and recognized in Him the essential and eternal life of the great Jehovah.—P. S.]

Ver. 17. **Jesus answered.**—Also a confession, decided, solemn, and deep; being the divine confession of the Lord in favour of the Church, which had now confessed His name, and of her first witness.—**Blessed art thou** (comp. Rom. x. 9), **Simon, son of Jonah.***—Meyer denies in vain the antithesis between this address and the new title given to Peter. Different views have been taken in reference to this antithesis. 1. Paulus explains it: Simon, or obedient hearer,—son of Jonas, or son of oppression. 2. Olshausen: רְנָן dove, with reference to the Holy Spirit under the figure of a dove. Thou, Simon, art a child of the Spirit. 3. Lange (*Leben Jesu*, ii. 2, 469): Thou, Simon, son of a dove (which makes its nest in the rock, a figure of the Church), shalt be called a rock (the rock-like dwelling-place of the dove, i. e., of the Church).† With this antithesis the other in the same verse is connected. According to the flesh, thou art a natural son of Jonah; but according to this revelation of the Spirit, a child of the Father who is in heaven (referring to his regeneration, and

* [According to Lange's version. Comp. my critical note above.—P. S.]

† [I confess that this allegorical exposition of the term appears to me as far-fetched and improbable as that of Olshausen. *Bar Jona* has nothing to do with a dove, but is a contraction for *Bar Joanna* (Chaldaic), i. e., *Son of John*, as is evident from John xxi. 15, 16, 17, where Christ addresses Peter: Σιγωρ Ἰαννεῖου. But there may be in this use of the patronymic an allusion to the title *Son of Man* in ver. 13, which would give additional emphasis to the counter confession, in this sense: That I, the Son of Man, am at the same time the Messiah and the eternal Son of God, is as true as that thou, Simon, art the Son of Jonah; and as thou hast thus confessed Me as the Messiah, I will now confess thee as Peter, etc. If the Saviour spoke in Aramaic or Chaldaic, as He undoubtedly did on ordinary occasions and with His disciples, He used the term *Bar* in ver. 17, from Dan. vii. 13, the prophetic passage from which the Messianic appellation *Son of Man* was derived, so that *Bar enahsh* (*Son of Man*) and *Bar-Jonah* would correspond.—P. S.]

consequent faith and confession. [Similarly Alford: The name "*Simon Bar Jonas*" is doubtless used as indicating his fleshly state and extraction, and forming the greater contrast to his spiritual state, name, and blessing, which follow. The name *Σιμων Ιωνα*, Simon, son of Jonas or Jonah, is uttered when he is reminded by the thrice-repeated inquiry, "Lovest thou me?" of his frailty, in his previous denial of his Lord, John xxi. 15, 16, 17.—P. S.]

Flesh and Blood.—Various views have been taken of this expression. 1. Calvin, Beza, Neander, De Wette, refer it to our physical nature in opposition to the *πνεύμα*. To this Meyer objects, that our physical nature is termed in Scripture only *σάρξ*, not *σάρξ καὶ αἷμα* (in 1 Cor. xv. 50, "flesh and blood" should be literally understood). 2. According to Lightfoot and Meyer, it must be taken (with special reference to the fact, that the Rabbins use בָּשָׂר בְּשִׁיר as a kind of paraphrase for *Son of Man*, including the accessory idea of the weakness involved in our corporeal nature), as simply denoting *weak man*, equivalent to *nemo mortalium* (as in Gal. i. 16). 3. We explain it: the natural, carnal descent, as contrasted with spiritual generation. John i. 13: *καὶ σὺ ἐξ αἱμάτων, οὐδὲ ἐν γεννήσατος σάρκας, εἰ. τ. λ.* This appears still further from the connection between the expressions, "flesh and blood" and "son of Jonah," and from the antithesis, "My Father who is in heaven." Hence Gal. i. 16 must mean: When I received a commission to preach to the Gentiles, I conferred not with my Jewish nationality; and Eph. vi. 12: In reality, we wrestle not with beings of human kind, but with the powers of darkness, whose representatives and instruments they are; and 1 Cor. xv. 50: The kind which is of this world (of the first man, who is of the earth) shall not inherit the kingdom of God; but we must enter it by a complete transformation into a second and new life which is from heaven. Accordingly, the antithesis in the text is between knowledge resulting from natural human development, or on the basis of natural birth, and knowledge proceeding from the revelation of the Father in heaven, or on the basis of regeneration.

Hath not revealed it,—but my Father.—A difficulty has been felt, how to reconcile this declaration with the fact, that the disciples had at a much earlier period recognized Jesus as the Messiah (John i. 42, 46, 50). 1. Olshausen holds that this confession of Peter indicates a much more advanced state of knowledge: *διότι τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ ζωτοῦ*. 2. Neander thinks that all earlier revelations had more or less proceeded from flesh and blood. 3. Meyer suggests that the text refers to that first acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah, in consequence of which the disciples came and surrendered themselves to Him.* 4. In our view, the new element

* [Not exactly. In the fourth edition of his *Com. on Matt.* p. 320, Meyer assumes that Peter, although long since convinced, with the rest of the disciples, of the Messiahship of Jesus, was on this occasion favoured with a special divine revelation on the subject and spoke from a state of inspiration. "Daher," he says, "ist *αποκαλύψει* nicht auf eine schon beim ersten Anschliessen an Jesum erhaltenen Offenbarung, welche den Jüngern geworden, zu beziehen, sondern auf PETRUS und eine IHN auszeichnende besondere *αποκαλύψει* zu beschränken.—P. S.]

in this confession lies, first of all, in its ethical form. It was no longer a mere knowledge (or recognition) of Christ. While the general *knowledge* of the Jews concerning the Messiah had retrograded and degenerated into discordant and self-contradictory *opinions*, the knowledge of the disciples had *advanced*, and was now summed up and concentrated into an act of spiritual faith in Peter's confession, which, in view of the hostility of the Jewish rulers, may be characterized as a real martyrdom (*μαρτυρία*). Another new element lay in the view now expressed concerning the Messiah. On all the main points, the Jewish and traditional notions of the Messiah had evidently been thrown off, and a pure and spiritual faith attained from converse with the life of Jesus. In both these respects, it was a revelation of the Father in heaven, *i. e.*, a heavenly and spiritual production. The new life was germinating in the hearts of the disciples. —De Wette regards this passage as incompatible with the earlier acknowledgments of the Messiah; while Fritzsche, Schneckenburger, and Strauss talk of a twofold period in Christ's ministry: the first, when He was a disciple of John; the second, when He attained to consciousness of His Messianic dignity. But these critics have wholly misunderstood this narrative.

Ver. 18. But I also say unto thee.—The expression shows in a striking manner the reciprocity existing between Christ and His disciples. Their confession solicits His confession.*

Thou art Peter.—Πέτρος, in Aramaic, ΑΡΤΟ, the stone, or the rock (see Meyer). The Greek masculine noun arose from the translation of the name into Greek; the name itself had been given at an earlier period, John i. 42. It was now bestowed a second time to indicate the relationship subsisting between Peter and the Ecclesia, rather than to prove that Peter really was what his name implied (Meyer). From the first this name was intended to be symbolical; although its real meaning was only attained at a later period in the history of Peter. But at the same time the words of Jesus imply the acknowledgment that his character as Peter had just appeared in this confession. [It should be observed that in John i. 42 (in the Gr. text, ver. 43) we read: "Thou shalt be called (*κληθήσῃς*) Cephas," but here: "Thou art (*αὺς*) Peter."—P. S.]

And on this rock.—For the various interpretations of this passage, see Wolf's *Curæ*. We submit the following summary of them: 1. The term "rock" is referred to *Christ* Himself. Thus Jerome,† August-

* [MALDONATUS: "ET EGO. Elegans antithesis, Græce etiam efficacior: *καὶ γὼν δέ,* SED ET EGO DICO TIBI; quasi dicat; *tu, qui homo es, Filium Dei vivi me esse dixisti,* ego vero, qui *Filius Dei vivi sum, dico te esse Petrum, id est vicarium meum* [?], quem *Filium Dei esse confessus est. Nam Ecclesiam meam, quæ super me aedificata est, super te etiam, tanquam super secundarium quoddam fundamentum aedificabo.*"]

—P. S.]

† [This needs modification. JEROME, in his *Comment. on Matt. xvi. 18* (*Opera*, ed. Vallars., tom. vii. p. 124), explains the passage thus: "Sicut ipse lumen Apostolis donavit, ut lumen mundi appellarentur, ceteraque ex Domino sortiti sunt vocabula: ita et Simoni, QUI CREDEBAT IN PETRAM CHRISTUM, Petrilan- gitus est nomen. Ac secundum metaphoram petræ, recte dicitur ei: AEDIFICABO

tine,* Chemnitz, Fabricius, and others.†—2. It is referred to Peter's confession. Thus most of the Fathers, and several of the Popes,

ECCLESIAM MEAM SUPER TE." The last words (*super te*) show that he referred the *petra* not only to Christ, but in a derivative sense also to Peter as the confessor. So in another passage (*Ep. ad Damas. papam*, Ep. 15, ed. Val. i. 37, sq.) he says of Peter: "super illam petram aedificatam ecclesiam scio." Jerome also regards the bishop of Rome as the successor of Peter, but advocates elsewhere the equal rights of bishops, so that he can be quoted only in favour of a Roman primacy of honour, not of a supremacy of jurisdiction. Comp. on Jerome's views concerning the papacy the second vol. of my *General Church History*, now preparing for the press, § 61, p. 304, sq.—P. S.]

* [*I. e.*, AUGUSTINE in his later years; for at first he referred the *petra* to the person of Peter. He says in his *Retractations*, i. cap. 21, at the close of his life: "I have somewhere said of St. Peter that the church is built upon him as rock. . . . But I have since frequently said that the word of the Lord: 'Thou art Petrus, and on this *petra* I will build my church,' must be understood of him, whom Peter confessed as Son of the living God; and Peter, so named after this rock, represents the person of the church, which is founded on this rock and has received the keys of the kingdom of heaven. For it was not said to him: 'Thou art a rock' (*petra*), but 'Thou art Peter' (*Petrus*); and the rock was Christ, through confession of whom Simon received the name of Peter. Yet the reader may decide which of the two interpretations is the more probable." In the same strain he says, in another place: "Peter, in virtue of the primacy of his apostolate, stands, by a figurative generalization, for the church. . . . When it was said to him, 'I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven,' &c., he represented the whole church, which in this world is assailed by various temptations, as if by floods and storms, yet does not fall, because it is founded upon a rock, from which Peter received his name. For the rock is not so named from Peter, but Peter from the rock (*non enim a Petro petra, sed Petrus a petra*), even as Christ is not so called after the Christian, but the Christian after Christ. For the reason why the Lord says, 'On this rock I will build my church,' is that Peter had said: 'Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.' On this rock, which thou hast confessed, says he, I will build my church. For Christ was the rock (*petra enim erat Christus*) upon which also Peter himself was built; for other foundation can no man lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ. Thus the church, which is built upon Christ, has received from him, in the person of Peter, the keys of heaven, that is, the power of binding and loosing sins." (Aug. *Tract. in Evang. Joannis*, 124, § 5.) AMBROSE, too, at one time refers the *petra* to Christ, as when he says in *Luc. ix. 20*: "Petra est Christus," etc., but at other times to the person of Peter, as in the famous morning hymn quoted by Augustin (*Hoc ipsa petra ecclesiae Canente, culpam diluit*), and again to his confession, or rather to Peter and his confession. Comp. my *Church History*, vol. ii. p. 304. A similar apparent inconsistency we find in other fathers. The reference of the rock to Christ was also advocated by THEODORET, *ad 1 Cor. iii. 11*, the venerable BEDE in *Marc. iii*: "Petra erat Christus (1 Cor. x. 4). Nam Simoni qui credebat in PETRAM CHRISTUM, Petri largitus est nomen;" and even by Pope GREGORY VII. in the inscription to the crown he sent to the rival emperor Rudolph: "PETRA (i. e., Christ) dedit PETRO (Peter), PETRUS (the pope) diadema Rudolpho."—P. S.]

† [Especially CALOVIUS in the Lutheran, and quite recently Dr. WORDSWORTH in the Anglican, and (evidently under the influence of Wordsworth's arguments) Dr. JOS. A. ALEXANDER of the Presbyt. Church (although the latter, as usual with him in critical passages, does not finally decide). Dr. Wordsworth rests his laboured defence of the later Augustinian interpretation mainly on the difference between *nērpos*, stone, and *nērpa*, rock, which he thinks (referring to Lightfoot and Beveridge) had a parallel in the Syriac *Cephas* or

Leo I.,* Huss in the *Tractat. de ecclesia*, the *Articuli Smalcald.* in the *Append.*, Luther, Febronius, and others.—3. It is applied to Peter him-

Kepha (doubtful); on the fact that in the O. T. the title *Rock* is reserved to God Almighty (2 Sam. xxii. 32; Ps. xviii. 31; lxii. 2, 6, 7, etc.); and on the admitted equality of the apostles. He thus paraphrases the words of the Saviour: “‘I myself, now confessed by thee to be God and Man, am the Rock of the Church. This is the foundation on which it is built.’” And because St. Peter had confessed Him as such, He says to St. Peter, ‘Thou hast confessed Me, and I will now confess thee; thou hast owned Me, I will now own thee; thou art Peter, i. e., thou art a lively stone, hewn out of, and built upon Me, the living *Rock*. Thou art a genuine *Petros* of Me, the divine *Petra*. And whosoever would be a lively stone, a *Peter*, must imitate thee in this thy true confession of Me the living *Rock*; for upon this *Rock*, that is, on *Myself*, believed and confessed to be both *God and Man*, I will build My Church.’” This is all true enough in itself considered, but it is no exposition of the passage. Everybody knows and admits, that in the highest sense of the term *Christ* and He alone is the immovable (divine) Rock of the Church, the foundation (*θεμιτόν*), on which the apostles built and besides which no other can be laid, 1 Cor. iii. 11; comp. 1 Cor. x. 4 (*πέτρα*); Matt. vii. 24, 25. But it is equally true that in a subordinate sense the *apostles* are called the (human) foundation on which the Church is built, Eph. ii. 20; (*ἐπαύλεων οἰκοδομήντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμιτῷ τῷ ἀποστόλῳ καὶ προφητῷ, κ. τ. λ.*); Rev. xxi. 14 (*Σειράς διδύμης, κ. τ. λ.*). Now in our passage Christ appears not as rock, i. e., as part of the building itself, but under a higher figure as *architect* and *Lord* of the whole spiritual temple; and the mixing of figures in one breath as this interpretation implies, would be a plain violation of rhetorical taste and propriety such as we should not for a moment think of in connection with our Saviour. Again, the *antanaclasis* (i. e., the rhetorical figure of repeating the same word in a different sense) is conclusive against this explanation. The demonstrative *ταῦτα* must refer to *πέτρος*, which immediately precedes; for there is not the least intimation that the Saviour, after having said: “‘Thou art *Rockman*,’” turned away from Peter, and pointing to Himself, continued: “‘and on THIS rock (i. e., *Myself*, *τούτῳ πετρᾷ*) I will build My Church.’” On the contrary, He immediately continues: “‘And I will give to THEE,’ *καὶ δίστα σοι*, which can, of course, mean nobody else but Peter. This interpretation of Augustine and Wordsworth destroys the rhetorical beauty and emphasis of the passage, and can give us no advantage whatever in our controversy with Rome, which must and can be refuted on far better grounds than forced exegesis.—P. S.]

* [This reference to the fathers is too indefinite, and hardly correct as far as Leo and the popes are concerned. The majority of the fathers, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Leo I., Gregory of Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, etc., vary in their interpretation, referring the *petra* sometimes to the person of Peter, sometimes to his faith or confession, and sometimes (as Jerome and Augustine) to Christ Himself. (Comp. Maldonatus, *Comment. in quatuor Evangelistas*, ed. Martin. tom. i., p. 219 sq., and my *History of the Christian Church*, vol. ii., §§ 61 and 63, pp. 302 sqq. and 314 sqq., where the principal passages are quoted.) But this inconsistency is more apparent than real, since Peter and his faith in Christ cannot be separated in this passage. Peter (representing the other apostles) as believing and confessing Christ (but in no other capacity) is the *petra ecclesiae*. This is the true interpretation, noticed by Lange sub number 3. b). Comp. my *Critical Note*, No. 3, below the text. But the confession (or faith alone) cannot be meant, for two reasons: first, because this construction assumes an abrupt transition from the person to a thing, and destroys the significance of the demonstrative and emphatic *ταῦτα* which evidently refers to the nearest antecedent *'Petros*; and secondly, because the church is not built upon abstract doctrines and confessions, but upon living persons believing and confessing the truth (Eph. ii. 20;

self. (a) In the popish sense, by Baronius and Bellarmin, [Passaglia,] as implying that Peter was invested with a permanent primacy;* (b) with reference to the special call and work of Peter as an Apostle. By thee, Peter, as the most prominent of My witnesses, shall the Church be founded and established: Acts ii. and x. So, many Roman Catholics, as Launoi, Dupin,—and later Protestant expositors, as Werenfels, Pfaff, Bengel, and Crusius. Heubner thinks that the *antanaclasis*, or the connecting of Peter with *πέτρα*, is in favour of this view. But he [as also nearly all other commentators who represent this view] combines with it the application of the term to the confession.†—4. It is applied to Peter, *inclusive of all the other Apostles*, and, indeed, of *all believers*. Thus Origen on Matt. xvi. 18: “Every believer who is enlightened by the Father is also a rock.”—5. In our opinion, the Lord here generalizes, so to speak, the individual Peter into the general *πέτρα*, referring to what may be called the Petrine characteristic of the Church—viz., *faithfulness of confession*,‡—as first distinctly exhibited by Peter. Hence the words of

1 Pet. ii. 4–6; Gal. ii. 9; Rev. xxi. 14). Dr. Jos. A. Alexander, however, is too severe on this interpretation in calling it as forced and unnatural as the Roman Catholic. It undoubtedly implies an element of truth, since Peter in this passage is addressed as the bold and fearless confessor of Christ.—P. S.]

* [The Romish interpretation is liable to the following objections: (1) It obliterates the distinction between *petros* and *petra*; (2) it is inconsistent with the true nature of the architectural figure; the foundation of a building is one and abiding, and not constantly renewed and changed; (3) it confounds priority of time with permanent superiority of rank; (4) it confounds the apostolate, which, strictly speaking, is not transferable but confined to the original personal disciples of Christ, and inspired organs of the Holy Spirit, with the post-apostolic episcopate; (5) it involves an injustice to the other apostles, who, as a body, are expressly called the foundation, or foundation stones of the church; (6) it contradicts the whole spirit of Peter’s epistles, which is strongly anti-hierarchical, and disclaims any superiority over his “*fellow-presbyters*;” (7) finally, it rests on gratuitous assumptions which can never be proven either exegetically or historically, viz., the transferability of Peter’s primacy, and its actual transfer upon the bishop, not of Jerusalem nor of Antioch (where Peter certainly was), but of Rome exclusively. Comp. also the long note to § 94 in my *History of the Apostolic Church*, p. 374 sqq.—P. S.]

† [So also OLSHAUSEN: “Peter, in his new spiritual character, appears as the supporter of Christ’s great work; Jesus Himself is the creator of the whole, Peter, the first stone of the building;” DE WETTE: “ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ, on thee as this *firm confessor*;” MEYER: “on no other but this (*ταύτην*) rock, i. e., Peter so called for his firm and strong faith in Christ;” ALFORD: “Peter was the first of those *foundation-stones* (Eph. ii. 20; Rev. xxi. 14) on which the living temple of God was built: this building itself beginning on the day of Pentecost by the laying of *three thousand living stones* on this very foundation;” D. BROWN: “not on the man Bar-jona; but on him as the heaven-taught Confessor of such a faith;” and more or less clearly, Grötius, Le Clerc, Whitby, Doddridge, Clarke, Bloomfield, Barnes, Eadie, Owen, Crosby (who, however, wrongly omits the reference to the confession), Whedon, Nast. I can see no material difference between this interpretation and Lange’s own sub No. 5, which is only a modification or expansion of it. I have already remarked in a former note that this is the true exposition which the majority of the fathers intended, though with some inclination to the subsequent Romish application of the promise to a supposed successor.—P. S.]

‡ [*Die petrinische Bekenntnisstreue*.—P. S.]

Jesus only refer to Peter in so far as by this confession he identified himself with Christ, and was the first to upbuild the Church by his testimony. But in so far as the text alludes to an abiding foundation of the Church, the expression refers not to the Apostle as an individual, but to πέτρα in the more general sense, or to faithfulness of confession. That Peter was here meant in his higher relation, and not in himself, appears from the change of terms, first πέτρος, then πέτρα; also from the contrast in ver. 22; while the fact that his distinction conferred no official primacy is evident from this, that the same rights and privileges were bestowed upon all the Apostles: Matt. xviii. 18; John xx. 23; Eph. ii. 20; Rev. xxi. 14. That he himself claimed no preëminence appears from his First Epistle, in which he designates Christ as the corner-stone, and Christians as living stones, 1 Pet. ii. 5, 6 (as themselves Peters, or related to Peter). Lastly, that he knew of no successors in the sense of the Papacy, is proved by his exhortation to the presbyters not to be lords over God's heritage (the κλῆρος, 1 Pet. v. 3.).

My Church.—Here the *κοινωνία* of Christ appears for the first time in distinct contrast to the Jewish congregation, ὅμηλος. Hence the passage refers not simply to a community of believers, but to a definite organization of this community (compare what follows on the keys). Accordingly, the passage alludes to the Church as the organized and visible form of the βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν. The Church is not the kingdom of heaven itself, but a positive institution of Christ, by which, on the one hand, the kingdom of heaven becomes directly manifest in the world by its *worship*, while, on the other hand, it spreads through the world by means of its *missionary efforts*. The Church bears the same relation to the kingdom of heaven as the Messianic state under the Old Testament to the theocracy, the two being certainly not identical.

The gates of hades (underworld).—De Wette: “Here, equivalent to the kingdom of Satan.” But this is not the scriptural conception of hades or sheol. Throughout the Bible hades means the kingdom of death; which is, indeed, connected with the kingdom of Satan, but has a more comprehensive meaning. Hades is described as having *gates*; it is figuratively represented as a castle with gates (Song viii. 6; Job xxxviii. 17; Isa. xxxviii. 10; Ps. civii. 18). These gates serve a hostile purpose, since they opened, like a yawning abyss of death, to swallow up Christ, and then Peter, or the Apostles and the Church, in their martyrdom. For a long time it seemed as if the Church of Christ would become the prey of this destroying hades. But its gates shall not ultimately prevail—they shall be taken; and Christ will overcome and abolish the kingdom of death in His Church (see Isa. xxv. 8; Hos. xiii. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 15; Eph. i. 19, 20). Of course, the passage also implies conflict with the kingdom of evil, and victory over it; but its leading thought is the triumph of *life over death*, of the kingdom of the *resurrection* over the usurped reign of the kingdom of *hades*.—Erasmus, Calvin, and others, refer it to the victory over Satan; Grotius, to that over death; Ewald, to that over all the monsters of hell, let loose through these open gates; Glöckler, to that over

the machinations of the kingdom of darkness (the gate being the place of council in the East); Meyer, to the superiority of the Church over hades, without any allusion to an attack on the part of hades. The idea, that the Old Testament *κυριοτητα* would fall before the gates of hades, is here evidently implied (*Leben Jesu*, ii. 2, p. 887).

Ver. 19. **The keys of the kingdom of heaven.**—Luke xi. 52; Rev. i. 18, iii. 7; ix. 1; xx. 1. It is the prerogative of the Apostles, either to admit into the kingdom of heaven, or to exclude from it. Meyer: “The figure of the keys corresponds with the figurative expression *κινδύνουσσω* in ver. 18; since in ver. 18 the *κυριοτητα*, which, at Christ’s second appearing, is destined to become the *βασιλεια των ουρανων* [as if this were not already its real, though not its open character, which at Christ’s second coming shall only become outwardly manifest!]—is represented as a building. But, in reference to Peter, the figure changes from that of a rock, or foundation, to that of an *οικονομος*; or, in other words, from the position and character of Peter to his office and work.” But evidently the antithesis here presented is different from this view. Peter is designated the foundation-stone as being the first confessing member of the Church, though with an allusion to his calling; while in his official relation to the Church he is represented as guardian of the Holy City. Hence the expression, rock, refers to the nucleus of the Church as embodied in Peter; while the keys allude to the special office and vocation in the church.

[ALFORD: “Another personal promise to Peter, remarkably fulfilled in his being the first to admit both Jews and Gentiles into the Church; thus using the power of the keys to open the door of salvation.” WORDSWORTH applies the promise in a primary and personal sense to Peter, but in a secondary and general sense also to the Church, and especially the ministers who hold and profess the faith of Peter, and are called to preach the gospel, to administer the sacraments, and to exercise discipline. AUGUSTINE: “*Has claves non homo unus, sed unitas accepit ecclesiæ.*”—P. S.]

And whatsoever thou shalt bind.—A somewhat difficult antithesis, especially with reference to the preceding context. Bretschneider, (Lexicon): “The expression ‘binding’ means to bind with the Church; and ‘loosing,’ to loose from the Church.” But this is to confound ideas which are very different. Olshausen understands it of the ancient custom of tying the doors. But the text speaks of a key. Stier regards it as in accordance with rabbinical phraseology, taken from the Old Testament; *binding* and *loosing*, being equivalent to *forbidding* and *permitting*, and more especially to *remitting* and *retaining* sins. But these two ideas are quite different. Lightfoot, Schöttgen, and, after them, Von Ammon, hold that the expression implied three things: 1. Authority to declare a thing unlawful or lawful. Thus Meyer regards *διειν* and *λειπειν* as equivalent to the rabbinical *רְכַנֵּת* and *רְכַנְתָּה*, to *forbid*, and to *permit*. 2. To pronounce an action, accordingly, as criminal or innocent. 3. Thereupon to pronounce a ban or to revoke it. But as the Lord here speaks of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, He can only have referred directly to the last-mentioned meaning of the expression, though it involved the first and second,

as the *sentence* of the Apostles would always be according to truth. A comparison of the parallel passage in Matt. xviii. 18 confirms this view. There *Church discipline* is enjoined on the disciples collectively, to whom precisely the same assurance is given which in the text is granted to Peter alone; while in John xx. 23 the order is reversed: the expression, *remitting sins*, being equivalent for *loosing*, and *retaining sins*, for *binding*. The whole passage forms a contrast to the ecclesiastical discipline of the Pharisees, Matt. xxiii. From the evangelical character of the New Testament ministry, it seems to us impossible to interpret the expression as meaning to *forbid* and to *permit*, according to the analogy of rabbinical usage. To bind up sins, as in a bundle, implies coming judgment (Job xiv. 17; Hos. xiii. 12); while, on the other hand, sins forgiven are described as loosed (LXX. Isa. xl. 2). Both figures are based on a deeper view of the case. When a person is refused admission into the Church, or excluded from it, all the guilt of his life is, so to speak, concentrated into one judgment; while its collective effect is removed, or loosed, when he is received into the Church, or absolved. The object of this binding and loosing is stated only in general terms. No doubt it combined all the three elements of the power of the keys, as the non-remission or remission of sins (Chrysostom and many others),—viz.: 1. The principle of admission or non-admission into the Church, or the announcement of grace and of judgment (the kingdom of heaven is closed to unbelievers, opened to believers.) 2. Personal decision as to the admission of catechumens (Acts viii.). 3. The exercise of discipline, or the administration of excommunication from the Church (in the narrower sense, *i. e.*, without curse or interdict attaching thereto). In the antithesis between earth and heaven, the former expression refers to the order and organization of the visible Church; the latter, to the kingdom of heaven itself. These two elements then—the actual and the ideal Church—were to coincide in the pure administration of the Apostles. But this promise is limited by certain conditions. It was granted to Peter in his capacity as a witness, and as confessing the revelation of the Father (Acts v.), but not to Peter as wavering or declining from the truth (Matt. xvi. 23; Gal. ii.).

DOCTRINAL AND ETHICAL IDEAS.

1. At first sight it may seem an accident that the first announcement of the Church as distinct from, and in contrast to, the State—while the ancient theocratic community combined both Church and State—should have been made in the district of Cæsarea, which owned the sway of so mild a monarch as Philip. At any rate, the event was one of universal historical importance, and may be regarded as the preparation for the feast of Pentecost.

2. In what passed between our Lord and His disciples we are led to observe,—(1) The contrast between human opinions of religion and a confession of faith prompted and evoked by the grace of God:—in the for-

mer case, fear, dejection, uncertainty, and discordance; in the latter, courage, frankness, certainty, and unity. (2) The indissoluble connection between true confession and a life of revelation and in the Spirit, or regeneration; (3) between a common confession and the formation of the visible Church; (4) between the confession of the Church to Christ and Christ's confession to the Church; (5) between the character of the first believing confessor and his official calling.

3. In the text, Peter is presented to us in a two-fold relationship: (1) As Peter; (2) as receiving the keys. The former designation applied to him as the first believing confessor, the first member of the *ekklesia*, to which others were afterwards to be joined. Hence it referred to his practical life as a Christian bearing witness to Jesus, rather than to his official position in the Church. This spiritual character formed the basis of his office in the narrower sense, the main purport of which was to arrange individual believers into a community, and, by organizing a visible Church, to separate between the world and the kingdom of heaven. As being the first witness to Jesus, Peter, so to speak, laid the foundation of the Church: (1) By his confession on this occasion; (2) by his testimony, Acts ii.; (3) by his admission of the Gentiles into the Church, Acts x.; (4) by being the means of communicating to the Church the distinguishing feature of his character—fidelity of confession.

4. On the fact that the Church indelibly bears not only the characteristic of Peter, but of all the Apostles; or that all the apostolic offices are unchangeably perpetuated in it, comp. Com. on ch. x. (against Irvingism); and Schaff's *History of the Apostolic Church*, § 129, p. 516, sqq.

5. In its *apostolic nucleus, its apostolic beginning, and its apostolic depth and completeness*, the Church is so thoroughly identified with the kingdom of heaven itself, that its social determinations should in all these respects coincide with the declaration of God's Spirit. But this applies only in so far as Peter was really Peter—and hence one with Christ, or as Christ is in the Church. That there is a difference between the Church and the kingdom of heaven, which may even amount to a partial opposition, is implied in the antithesis: "*on earth*"—"in *heaven*."

6. The present occasion must be regarded as the initial foundation, not as the regular and solemn institution, of the Church. The promises given to Peter still relate to the future. For the strong faith which prompted his confession was rather a prophetic flash of inspiration (the blossom), than a permanent state of mind (the fruit). This appears from the following section.

7. In this passage Peter is represented as the foundation-stone, and Christ as the builder; while in 1 Cor. iii. 11, Christ is designated the foundation, and the Apostles the builders. "The latter figure evidently alludes to the relation between the changing and temporary labourers in the Church, and her eternal and essential character, more especially her eternal foundation; while the figurative language of Jesus applies to the relation between the starting-point and commencement of the Church in time, her outward and temporal manifestation, and her eternal Builder."

(From the author's *Leben Jesu*, ii. 2; p. 886). Richter (*Erklarte Hausbibel*, i. 157): "The Church opens the way into the kingdom of heaven. Christ built on Peter and the Apostles, not his *kingdom*, but his *Church*, which is *one*, though not the *only*, form in which Christianity manifests itself." Hence Olshausen is mistaken in regarding the *εκκλησία* as simply tantamount to the *βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

[WORDSWORTH observes on the words: *they shall not prevail*; "That these words contain no promise of infallibility to St. Peter, is evident from the fact that the Holy Spirit, speaking by St. Paul in Canonical Scripture, says that he erred (Gal. ii. 11-13).^{*} And that they do not contain any promise of infallibility to the bishop of Rome is clear, among other proofs, from the circumstance that Pope Liberius (as Athanasius relates, *Historia Arian.* 41, p. 291) lapsed into Arianism, and Honorius was anathematized of old by Roman pontiffs as an heretic."—P. S.]

8. For special treatises on the supposed primacy of Peter, see HEUBNER, p. 236; DANZ, *Universalwörterbuch*, article *Primat*; BRETSCHNEIDER, *Systematische Entwicklung*, p. 796, etc.

9. On the power of the keys, see HEUBNER, p. 240; THE AUTHOR'S *Positive Dogmatik*, p. 1182,—the literature belonging to it, p. 1196; *Berl. Kirchl. Vierteljahrsschrift*, ii. 1845, Nr. 1; ROTHE, *Ethik*, iv. 1066. [Compare also WORDSWORTH, ALFORD, BROWN, and the American commentators, BARNES, ALEXANDER, OWEN, JACOBUS, WHEDON, NAST on ch. xvi. 19.—P. S.]

HOMILETICAL AND PRACTICAL HINTS.

The Church of Christ founded under the sentence of expulsion pronounced on Christ and His Apostles both by the Jewish Church and the State: 1. Its preparatory announcement, ch. xvi.; 2. its complete and real foundation (Golgatha); 3. its solemn institution and manifestation, Acts ii.; comp. ch. iii. and iv. and Heb. xiii. 13.—The decisive question, "Who do men say that the Son of Man is?"—Difference between opinions about Christ and the confession of Christ.—The first New Testament confession of Christ, viewed both as the fruit and as the seed of the kingdom of heaven: 1. The fruit of the painful labour and sowing of Christ; 2. The germ and seed of every future confession of Christ.—The confession of Peter an evidence of his spiritual life: 1. In its freedom and cheerful self-surrender; 2. in its decidedness; 3. in its infinite fulness; 4. in its general suitableness for all disciples.—Jesus the Christ, the Son of the living God: 1. In His nature; 2. in His mission; 3. in His work.—The joy of the Lord at the first-fruits of His mission.—The Confession of the Lord to His Congregation: 1. How it will continue to become more abundant even to the day of judgment. ("Whosoever shall confess Me," etc.) 2. What it imports. (The blessedness of Simon in his character as Peter.)—The

* [But this was only an error of conduct, not of doctrine; and hence proves nothing against the inspiration of the apostles nor the pretended infallibility of the pope.—P. S.]

Son of the living God acknowledging those who are begotten of the Father as His own relatives and brethren.—The life of faith of Christians ever a revelation of the Father in heaven.—Genuine confession a fruit of regeneration.—The rock on which Christ has founded His Church, or Peter in a spiritual sense, is faithfulness of confession (*Bekenntnisstreue*).—Fidelity of confession the first characteristic mark of the Church.—Relation between Christ, the Rock of the kingdom of heaven, the corner-stone of the everlasting Church, and the rock-foundation on which His visible Church on earth is reared: In the one case, the Apostles are the builders, and Christ the rock and corner-stone; 2. in the other case, the Apostles are the foundation, and Christ the builder.—Only when resting on that rock which is Christ will his people become partakers of the same nature.—How the Church of Christ will endure for ever, in spite of the gates of Hades.—The old, legal, and typical Church, and the new Church of the living Saviour, in their relation to the kingdom of death: 1. The former is overcome by the kingdom of death; 2. the latter overcomes the kingdom of death.—Complete victory of Christ's kingdom of life over the kingdom of death.—First Peter, then the keys; or, first the Christian, then the office.—The power of the keys as a spiritual office: 1. *Its infinite importance*: announcement of the statutes of the kingdom of heaven; decision respecting the admission and continuance [of members]; or, in its three-fold bearing—(a) on the hearers of the word generally, (b) on catechumens, and (c) on communicants. 2. *The conditions of its exercise*: a living confession, of which Christ is the essence; readiness to bind as well as to loose, and *vice versa*, the ratification of the kingdom of heaven.—The keys of the prisons of the Inquisition, and of the coffers of Indulgences, as compared with the keys of the kingdom of heaven, or, the difference between the golden and the iron keys.—The confession of faith kept as a secret from the enemies of Christ.—The preparatory festival of the New Covenant.

STARKE:—It is useful, and even necessary, for preachers to be aware of the erroneous fancies which are in vogue among their hearers on the subject of religion.—*Cramer*: Every man should be able to give an account of his faith, John xvii. 3.—The discordant thoughts respecting the person of Christ.—*Majus*: The just must live by his own faith.—*Osiander*: Be not vacillating, but assured in your own minds.—*Jerome*: *Quemadmodum os loquitur pro toto corpore, sic Petrus lingua erat Apostolorum et pro omnibus ipse respondit*.—The other two confessions of Peter, Matt. xiv. 33; John vi. 68.—If we acknowledge Christ aright in our heart, we shall also freely confess him with our mouth, Rom. x. 10.—The divine and human natures combined in the person of Christ.—Blessedness of faith.—To know Christ is to be saved, John xvii. 3.—*Quesnel*: True blessedness: 1. It consists not in the advantages of birth, nor in natural gifts, nor in riches, nor in reputation and dignity; but, 2. in the possession of the gifts of grace through Christ.—*Hedinger*: All true faith is the gift of God.—*Osiander*: If the truth of God is mixed up with human fancies, it does

more harm than good.—Let no one hastily talk of the good which he has received, but let him first make experiment of its reality, Eccles. v. 1.

GERLACH:—The Christian Church possesses this power of the keys, not in its outward capacity or organization, but in so far as the Spirit rules in it. Hence, whenever it is exercised as a merely outward law, without the Spirit, the Lord in His providence disowns these false pretensions of the visible Church.

HEUBNER:—In order to be decided, and to become our own faith, we must publicly profess it.—How little value attaches to the opinions of the age on great men!*—The independence of Christians of prevalent opinions.—Peter's confession not his faith only, but that of all disciples, John vi. 68.—Peter's confession the collective confession of the Apostles.—See what value Christ sets on this faith.—It is impossible for any man, even though he were an apostle, to impart faith to another. This is God's prerogative.

* [Not, *How much great men are influenced by the opinions of the age*, as the Elb. trsl., misled by the German *wie viel* (which must be understood ironically), reverses the meaning of the original, thus making Heubner contradict himself in the next sentence. Heubner alludes to the confused and contradictory opinions of the Jews concerning Christ, ver. 15, and then contrasts with them the firm conviction of faith in Peter, ver. 16. Great men, during their lifetime, meet with the very opposite judgments at the bar of ever-changing popular opinion, and they are not truly great unless they can rise above it and quietly pursue the path of duty, leaving the small matter of their own fame in the hands of a just God and of an appreciating posterity which will judge them by the fruits of their labour.—P. S.]

ART. V.—*The Freedom of the Will as a Basis of Human Responsibility and Government*; elucidated and maintained in its issue with the Necessitarian Theories of Hobbes, Edwards, the Princeton Essayists, and other leading advocates. By D. D. WHEDON, D. D. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1864.

Freedom of Mind in Willing; or, Every Being that Wills, a Creative First Cause. By ROWLAND G. HAZARD. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864.

THESE works agree in being occupied with some preliminary discussions in regard to the nature of the Will, Liberty, and Necessity, and then in being devoted mainly and avowedly to the refutation of Edwards's famous treatise on this subject. However successful or unsuccessful these attempts, they are

certainly renewed testimonies of the highest order to the mighty power and adamantine logic of that great work. Volumes upon volumes have been published against it by the acutest of its adversaries; yet they appear not to have demolished it so thoroughly but that the representative advocates of the contrary scheme regard themselves as called upon to do the work over again, in order that it may be done effectually; that the book, in short, may be so put down as to stay down. Within not far from a quarter of a century, besides numerous elaborate criticisms in the Quarterlies, through which so many of our ablest thinkers address the public, we call to mind no less than five solid volumes, wholly or chiefly in review of Edwards on the Will, and all, with one exception, adverse. Surely there must be some strength in a fortress which, having survived all other assaults from the Old world and the New, for nearly a century, followed by the fierce bombardment of Tappan and Bledsoe here, still abides to challenge the cautious sapping and mining of Hazard, along with the furious and desperate storming of Whedon.

In truth, these very assailants contribute to its tenacity of life, not merely by promoting its continued notoriety and fame, and bearing witness that it still exerts an influence and convulsive force which require to be neutralized, but by furnishing evidence, more and more cumulative, of the futility of all replies to its fundamental positions and crucial arguments. This is none the less, but all the more so, notwithstanding any flaws which may be detected in some of the many lines of argument of which Edwards's inventive logical mind was so prolific, and the still greater infelicities of language which occasionally obscure or enfeeble his sharpest distinctions and reasonings with seeming ambiguity, or even contradiction. For, in spite of all this, the main pillars of his argument stand unmoved and impregnable. The blemishes to which we have referred, developed by a century of incessant and relentless criticism, no more impair their massive and unyielding solidity, than the seams, and clefts, and fissures of the rock impair the firmness and perpetuity of the everlasting mountains. And they are shown to be all the more moveless and impregnable by the manifest impotence and absurdity of the attacks of the

mightiest assailants. Let candid and thinking men, for example, study the answers which these volumes offer to Edwards's argument for the anterior certainty of volitions, from the divine foreknowledge and providence; from the case of God, angels, and glorified saints in heaven, and the irreclaimably obdurate in hell; and can he help feeling the weakness of the cause which is driven to such staggering efforts for its defence, or the strength of that fortress against which no stronger assault can be made? We think the real effect of such works, notwithstanding all their elaborate, boastful, and defiant plausibilities, is at length to work a conviction in honest minds—nay, in the minds of their warmest admirers—that there is something not easily overthrown in this great treatise of Edwards, and other cognate works of the great divines of the church, after all.

We have adverted to the unfortunate effect of certain ambiguities and infelicities in Edwards's terminology. It will facilitate our work if we point out some of the more conspicuous and perplexing of them. It is proper to observe, however, that, for various reasons, the terms relating to this subject have an inherent ambiguity, against which few, if any writers, can fully guard by qualifying adjuncts; and further, that it is not strange that a century of the ablest friendly and adverse criticism should have detected imperfections of this sort, which the author, with all his marvellous keenness, overlooked. The most important instances of this sort which now occur to us, although not confined to him, were,

1. The ambiguous use of the word *will*. In his formal definition of it, Edwards makes it include, after the manner of the schoolmen and older writers, all the active or non-cognitive powers of the soul, comprehending not only the power of volition, but of sensibility, desire, and affection. But his argument impliedly or expressly takes will in the narrower sense in which modern writers usually take it, as the mere power of volition, or of carrying out, in choice and purpose, the prevailing desires and dispositions of the soul. With this latter sense of the word, his argument is clear, cogent, and unanswerable; with the former, it runs into confusion, and is open to abundant criticism.

2. The word *motive* is subject to similar embarrassment. Sometimes it denotes the inward desires which determine the

volition, sometimes the object of choice, sometimes both—"whatever excites the mind to choice." The doctrine that the will is as the strongest motive, is true, if by motive be meant those inward states and activities of the mind which determine its choices. It is not true, if by motive be meant anything exterior to the mind, as some of the circuitous phraseology of Edwards and others, at times, suggests. To this circumstance many of the most plausible criticisms upon his work owe their power.

3. Another word is *necessity*. Edwards, in common with many others, adopts, or permits himself to use, this word, to denote the certainty of the connection between the choice or volition and the antecedent desire or inclination which prompts and determines it. This use of the word necessity, although often adopted by both parties in this controversy, so that the advocates of contingency or contrary choice insist in calling their opponents Necessitarians, and are allowed to do so without sufficient protest against it, is nevertheless improper and injurious. Define and explain as we will, words ever tend towards their natural and normal import in the minds of readers, and even of the writers themselves, who so explain and define them in a "non-natural sense." While it is true, and shown by the irrefragable demonstration of Edwards, that there is the aforementioned certainty of volitions, and that it is consistent with their freedom, the word necessity constantly suggests the idea of an outward constraint or mechanical force incompatible with liberty. This word ought, therefore, to be banished from these discussions, and certainty should be substituted in its place, being the essential point in issue.

4. Another equivocal word in this controversy is *good*. The doctrine of Edwards and other writers is, that "the will is as the greatest apparent good." Some restrict the word to denote happiness, or the means of happiness, in which case the maxim is not true. For men undeniably choose the right, and other objects, as well as happiness. But if good be used for what seems at the moment of choice most desirable, the maxim is true, and is abundantly demonstrated to be true, by Edwards, as well as by the most intimate consciousness of every free-agent.

5. Another term which, as used by Edwards and others, frequently causes misapprehension, is *self-determination*. What Edwards demonstrates is, that the will does not determine itself irrespective of the intellect, feelings, and desires. This is true. But it is equally true, that the will is not determined by forces *ab extra*. It is determined, or determines itself in its free actings, according to the desires of the mind. And since one view of the will given by Edwards is, that it is no separate agent, but only a faculty or activity of the mind, the "mind willing," it may be truly said that the will so defined, *i. e.*, the "mind willing" determines itself according to its own inclinations. In his crushing assaults upon the self-determination of the will independently of the antecedent state of the soul, he has not always sufficiently guarded against the interpretation of those, who charge him with wholly denying all self-determination of the soul, even according to its own pleasure, in volition.

These explanations and qualifications at once eliminate the most vulnerable parts of Edwards's work, and dispose of a large portion of the plausible reasonings against it, found in the present, and other attacks upon it. This remark applies particularly to Mr. Hazard's work, on which we will offer a few brief remarks, before touching Dr. Whedon's volume, which will occupy our chief attention.

Of Mr. Hazard's antecedents we know nothing. All our knowledge of him is through this carefully wrought volume, which shows him to be an earnest and candid thinker, not wanting in metaphysical acumen and speculative insight. He makes an occasional side utterance that ought not to be overlooked. He evidently has a tender side towards idealism and monism. Although "admitting for the purposes of argument the existence of matter as distinct from spirit," he says that "all the sensations which we attribute to matter are as fully accounted for by the hypothesis that they are the thought, the imagery of God, *directly* imparted, or made palpable to our finite minds, as by the hypothesis of a direct external substance in which he has moulded this thought and imagery." Pp. 5—8. "We do not even know that the movement of our own hand as a sequent of our volition is not a uniform mode of God's action, and not by our own direct agency." P. 365. Such declarations

show that the author is not wholly free from an idealistic and even pantheistic drift.

Again, he gives a strange definition of knowledge, in the following terms: "Of knowledge, obviously an important element in all intelligent cause, I will further remark, that I deem the term, in strict propriety, applicable only to those ideas, or perceptions of the mind, of which we entertain no doubt, and that it is applicable to such, even though they are not conformable to truth; for if we cannot say we know that of which we have no doubt, there is nothing to which we can apply the term and it is useless." P. 18. Again, "the knowledge of each individual as to what is morally right for him is infallible." P. 159.

We think that two great errors lurk, if they are not perfectly obvious, in these extracts. The one is, that men may *know what is untrue*. This subverts the nature and essence of knowledge, which consists in the cognition of what is, and not of unrealities. What has no existence is not knowable as existent. What is not a possible object of knowledge cannot be known. It may be a matter of belief, it may be a delusion, but it cannot be known. The view in question really obliterates the distinction between truth and error. Belief of the one is just as certainly knowledge as the other; but error is, in fact, only a form of ignorance. And surely ignorance and knowledge are not identical. Such a system, by depriving knowledge of the element of certainty, placing it on the same footing as error, really destroys all foundations, except those of scepticism, and these it lays firmly and immovably.

This is all the more conspicuous, as we see the author carrying out this principle into the sphere of ethics, theoretical and applied. He says, "the knowledge of each individual as to what he thinks right, is for him *infallible*." This we understand to erect each man's conscience or moral judgment into an infallible rule or standard of righteousness, no matter how perverted or defiled that conscience may be. This is among the most mischievous and superficial popular fallacies. No errors of moral judgment are excusable, or can excuse crimes committed in conformity to them. A woe is upon them who call good evil, and evil good; who put light for darkness, and darkness for light. Does the fact that Paul "verily

thought he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth"—that many think they "do God service" in persecuting his people—justify these crimes, or are such moral judgments "infallible" or excusable? Such a view obliterates all moral distinctions, all immutable righteousness, together with the supreme authority of God and his word. It is doubtless true that a man sins if he disobeys his conscience; but it is also true that he sins in doing what is wrong, even though it be enjoined or approved by conscience. A man whose conscience is misguided, is in a fearful dilemma. If he obeys his conscience, he sins, for he does what is wrong in itself; and a bad conscience can never make wrong right. His intention is good, but his act is evil. On the other hand, if he violate his conscience, he does what he believes wrong. His intention is therefore evil, though his act, aside of such intention, be good. An act, to be good in every aspect of it, must be good as to matter and form—good in itself, and good in the intent of the doer; and no delusion or blindness of conscience can make good evil, or evil good. The true solution of the difficulty is, that it is every man's duty to enlighten his conscience, as he may, by the candid and earnest use of the means within his reach; to know the right, and to do it. This he may do if he will. For, "if any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God."

With regard to Mr. Hazard's arguments about the will, and Edwards's Inquiry concerning it, we think they are almost entirely obviated, or shown to be irrelevant, by the explanations we have attempted, and a due estimate of the ambiguities and infelicities of language we have endeavoured to point out. The point in issue is, whether the will acts contingently, fortuitously, and independently of the antecedent states and activities—the views, preferences, and inclinations of the soul—or under their influence; whether the mind determines its volitions in accordance with them, or uninfluenced by them; and whether antecedent certainty of volitions, thus arising from the previous bias of the mind, consists with their freedom and responsibility? To this latter question, Edwards, Calvin, Augustine, and their followers say, yes. Their adversaries say,

no. This is the simple issue, however it may have been sometimes obscured or misstated.

Now, on this issue, Mr. Hazard, notwithstanding so many of his excerpts from Edwards, which he dexterously manipulates into targets easy to hit and shatter, really supports the former side—the side of those he evidently deems his adversaries, whatever counter doctrines and implications he may casually put forth. And this is true, not in the same sense as it is true of Dr. Whedon and other controvertists of that side, that they occasionally acknowledge the truth they assail, either inadvertently or by constraint. It is the main doctrine of his book. Its counter utterances are the exceptional ones. Mr. Hazard, however, appears to suppose that this doctrine, that the mind controls its own volitions according to its previous judgment and preference, (or as he, by an extraordinary misnomer, calls this antecedent of volition, *choice*, which is no other than volition itself,) establishes contrary choice in the sense denied by the Edwardean or Augustinian school. In our view, on the other hand, it utterly overthrows this dogma. But first, of the proof that he maintains as we allege, and then for its consequences.

First, he asserts not that the "WILL, but that the mind, the active being, determines its own volition, and that it does this by means of its knowledge; and further, that the choice which it is admitted in' most, if not in all cases, precedes the effort, or act of will, is not, as Edwards asserts, itself an act of will, but is the knowledge of the mind that one thing is superior to another, or suits us better than other things; this knowledge being always a simple mental perception, to which previous effort may or may not have been requisite; and that every act of the will is a beginning of a new action, independent of all previous actions—which, *of themselves*, nowise affect or influence the new action, though the *knowledge acquired* in or by such previous actions, being used by the mind to direct this new action, may be to it the reason of its acting, or of the manner of its acting; and that in the use of such knowledge to direct or adapt its action to the occasion, or to its want," &c. Pp. 233-4.

Here, it will be observed, that the mind determines its own

volition "by means of its knowledge," which knowledge is "choice;" a perception that "one thing is superior to another, or suits us better than other things;" that the use of such knowledge is to "direct" volition, and "adapt it to its wants." How could it be more clearly stated that volition is directed, made certain by the antecedent apprehensions, preferences, or in his queer phrase, "choice" of the mind? And is this any the less so, though it is said in the same breath, that "every act of the will" is the "beginning of a new action independent of all previous actions?"

Mr. Hazard speaks of "adapting" the volition to the "want" of the soul. "Want" figures largely, but none too largely, in his system. He says, "Intelligence in acting, then, must have an object. The object of its action must be an effect which it *wants* to produce. The mind acting intelligently, will not make an effort or will to produce an effect which it does not *want* to produce. Every volition, then, must arise from the feeling or perception of some want bodily or mental; otherwise there is no object of action." P. 53. "Its want furnishing an object of action, and its knowledge enabling it to determine *what* action, are all that distinguish the mind from unintelligent cause or force. . . . The want does not, generally, arise from a volition. We may want, we do want, without effort to want. The mind could not begin its action by willing a want, unless there were first a *want* of that want." Pp. 56, 57.

How could language more explicitly enunciate the doctrine that the acts of the will are guided by our desires or wants, and the dictates of intelligence, as to the best means of gratifying them? Nay, it is plainly and rightly taught that volitions without such stimulus and guidance are impossible. Indeed, one of the author's definitions of will is, "the mode in which intelligence exerts its power." P. 249. "The mind directs its act of will by means of its knowledge, in which act being thus self-directed, it acts freely." Pp. 402, 403. It would be difficult, in briefer terms, to state the truth, that freedom in volition supposes it directed and made certain by the antecedent apprehensions and desires of the mind. This involves the whole for which the class whom they style Necessitarians contend. All Mr. Hazard's reasonings in regard to the formulas of

Edwards, that "the will is as the greatest apparent good," as the "last dictate of the understanding," as the inclination, preference, desire, &c., end in proving that the acts of will are determined by the mind through its wants and intelligence, and not by forces *ab extra*. This is well enough in its place, but, with regard to the question at issue, it is *ignoratio elenchi*. The thing to be proved is, not that the mind determines its volitions; but that it does not determine them in virtue of, and in accordance with, its antecedent states. Just the opposite of this is what Mr. Hazard proves, and his whole analysis of the will requires —although he appears at times to think, that proving the mind's direction of its own volitions proves the power of contrary choice, in opposition to that to which the will is freely guided by the intelligence and wants of the soul. Yet he says, "if there be of *necessity* a connection between this decision and effort, this only proves that the mind is of necessity free in such effort; and to assert the contrary, is again like saying that freedom is not free because it is of *necessity* free." P. 382. Thus it appears that even necessity may connect the act of will with the previous judgment or "decision" of the mind, without impairing its freedom.

But this is still more clearly and decisively brought out by the author in reference to the divine actions and volitions. "I have already alluded to the fact, that this uniformity of the action of Supreme Intelligence, as observed in many cases, may arise in part from the perfect wisdom by which it determines its acts without the necessity of experiment. The same remark applies in some degree to the action of finite will, which, with finite wisdom, knowing or ascertaining by experience or otherwise the best modes in certain cases, will adopt them whenever such cases arise; and this gives some appearance of reason for the application of the law of uniformity and necessity in cause and effect to the mind." P. 378. This is a sufficiently emphatic testimony, that the certain and uniform direction of volitions, in accordance with an antecedent state of mind, no way militates against their freedom and moral quality.

Yet, notwithstanding these declarations of the formal doctrine of the book, the author is so possessed with the doctrine of contrary or contingent volition, and with the conviction that

he has unansweredly proved it, that he gives up the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, which he has the candour (unusual with this class of writers,) to concede and evince is undermined by such a theory of the will. To this we shall again recur. Meanwhile we pass to the work of Dr. Whedon, who is now, we believe, acknowledged *primus inter pares* among the expounders and champions of Methodism in our country.

His book contains one of the most ardent and searching discussions of the subject that have yet appeared. Bold, adventurous, inventive, eager, he threads every argument of his adversaries, presses on with burning zeal, and stops not till he appears to himself to have demolished all opposing theories, and completely worsted their supporters. Dr. Whedon is in his way a strong man. He betrays a force of intellect, an earnestness of conviction, and energy of will, which eminently fit him to lead other minds, and quite explain his polemical primacy in his communion. Amid much that is crude, he is never tame, feeble, or timid. He moves with a great momentum, which, indeed, is all the more crushing to himself when, with equal blindness and boldness, he dashes against the everlasting rock. He deals sledge-hammer blows, and, alas! too often with a fatal recoil upon himself. He is so radical and destructive in his principles, that he is altogether suicidal.

Before presenting to our readers the proofs and illustrations of these characteristics, as shown in his arguments, we feel called upon to notice some exhibitions of them in his language. We do not remember any respectable book, for a long time, so deformed with barbarisms of obsolete and new-coined words, whose inherent ugliness is not palliated by any valid plea of necessity. We have no taste for word-criticism, much less would we make a man an offender for a word, however illegitimate, if it be a solitary or nearly solitary instance. We accord the fullest liberty of introducing new terms, whether derivatives of our own, or importations from a foreign tongue, to more fully articulate new phases of thought, of which a correspondent growth of language is the mysterious but normal exponent. But on none of these grounds can we sanction the introduction of such terrific vocables as *volitivity*, *impressibilities*, *free-willer*, *unisubstanceism*, *impellency*, *non-differentiation*, *begin-*

ningless, volitionate, freedomism, freedomistic, mustness, exceptionlessly, necessitarianly, uniformitarian, alternatively, uncompulsorily, adamantinized, unimpededly, and much more the like.

The radical principle of this book is, that freedom of the will is the power to choose either way, in such a sense as to preclude any previous "fixing" of the choice, or securing or making it certain that it shall be in one direction rather than the other. The author denounces all antecedent "fixation" of choice, so as to render it certain to the exclusion of the contrary, as incompatible with liberty, and involving a necessity subversive of freedom and responsibility. Edwards's definition of liberty, as the power of doing as we please, he utterly scouts and derides. P. 28.

"A man may do as he pleases and yet not be free, both because his antecedent *please* is necessitated, and because he is limited and circumscribed to the course with which he is pleased. Power both *pro* and *contra*, power to the thing and from the thing is requisite for the liberty of a free agent. Power, then, to the volition and from the volition, and to a reverse volition must exist, or the agent is not free in the volition. It is an error to call an agent volitionally free, unless he has power for either one of two or more volitions." Pp. 34-5. If we "put forth a volition which is under necessitation to be what it is from previous volition, responsible freedom ceases. . . . The same necessitative result follows if we suppose the volition is *as* some fixed antecedent, whether such antecedent be a 'choice,' an 'inclination,' a 'wish,' or a 'please.' For if each and every antecedent in the series, however long the series be, is fixed by its predecessor and fixes its successor, the whole train is necessitated, and the putting forth of the last volition, the one in question is anteriorly fixed. And a volition whose putting forth is anteriorly fixed to a unitary result is not free." P. 36.

There can be no mistake as to the meaning of all this. If the volition be previously fixed and made certain, and the non-existence of the contrary insured by any antecedent whatever, be it outward or inward, even by the will, choice, inclination, wish, pleasure of the soul, this destroys its freedom and ac-

countability. And that there may be no possible chance for misconstruction here, he puts it in a great variety of forms. He tells us:—"The fact that the will is drawn or secretly attracted, so that the volition goes forth eagerly and of itself, as the soul does of itself by its own spontaneous power go after happiness, renders the necessity none the less absolute. Around the faculties of the soul a circumvallating line of causation is still thereby none the less drawn because it is delicately drawn and finely shaded. The resisting power at the spring of the will may be as completely annihilated by a seduction or fascination as by a rude impulsion. Causation securing effect, which Edwards maintains must rule at every infinitesimal point to secure us from atheism, as truly secures this so-called *free* forthgoing of the soul as the steam-power secures the movement of the car. No fine word-painting will change this necessity to freedom." Pp. 30-1.

No language could more plainly declare, that *whatever* secures a given volition, to the exclusion of the contrary, destroys its freedom. The choice being as *certainly* secured as the movement of a car by a locomotive, is no more free than the movement of that car. Any "seduction" or "fascination" which obtains such mastery as to render certain the free choices of the will, destroys their freedom and their merit or demerit. Even the grace of God, with irresistible sweetness drawing us, that we should run after God, according to this, destroys our freedom. Hence the phrase, "To secure the certainty of a free act, is absurd, because contradictory." P. 227. "Is a previously decreed volition any more responsible than a previously decreed intellection or muscular spasmodic action? God may as well secure my damnation without anything voluntary, as secure it by securing the voluntary. Securing my volition in order that he may secure my voluntary sin and consequent condemnation, is about the poorest piece of sneaking despotism that one could attribute to an omnipotent evil." P. 210.

If all this, and a vast deal more of the same sort in this book be so, then there is no security for the continued fealty of a single saint on earth or in heaven for another hour. And not only so, there is no certainty that God, or angels, or glorified

men, will not swerve from purity, "make a hell of heaven," and devastate the moral universe!

Indeed, the author puts the premise for this dread conclusion in such strong and explicit terms, as amount almost to the direct assertion of it, in the following, as well as other passages.

"Freedom is as much contradicted by a law of Invariability, that is, a law by which all will does obey the strongest motive, even though able to do otherwise, as by a law of Causation. If the invariability be formulated as an anterior fact, strictly absolute and universal, pervading all actual and possible cases, then, by the law of Contradiction, the counter exception becomes impossible. Thus it is claimed by some thinkers that though *the Will possesses power for choice against the strongest motives, yet that choice will never be used.* If that *never* is an invariability, as truly in itself universal as the law of causation, the usance of the power of counter choice is impossible. It is incompatible with an absolute universal contradictory fact, and *cannot take place,—and that the reverse of which cannot be, is a necessity.* A power which cannot be used, a power which is not in the power of the agent for act, is no adequate power in the agent at all. It exists in words only, and can be no satisfactory basis of responsibility." Pp. 38, 39.

By no possible torture can this and much more the like, be strained into consistency with the certainly immutable holiness of God, the future stability of the angels and saints in heaven, or the perpetual impiety of devils and lost men in hell. And what shall be thought of that scheme which must be false, unless heaven may apostatize and hell be converted? Other portentous consequences of it are too obvious, and have been made too prominent in discussions upon this subject, to be overlooked, even by Dr. Whedon himself. It is clearly incompatible with the foreknowledge and providence of God. It enthrones contingency or chance. It overthrows original righteousness, original sin, and efficacious grace. The reasonings by which it is supported, applied to undeniable facts, tend towards Universalism, and, as we shall see, are pushed by the author himself full far in that direction. Indeed, it subverts and utterly vacates freedom itself. For the idea that a choice should be free, and at the same time contrary to the pleasure of the agent, is a contradiction,

utterly opposite to all normal consciousness, and wholly inconceivable. And if a free choice be according to our pleasure, then it will be such as that pleasure prompts, and no other—free as to the manner, free in choosing as we please, and, therefore, certain as to the event. This is the undeniable fact with regard to all the most perfect free agents in existence. This doctrine, therefore, maintained professedly in the interest of freedom, in reality subverts it. Let us notice some of the ways in which Dr. Whedon deals with such objections to his scheme.

A careful examination of his book will show,

1. That he wavers in the maintenance of his great principle already brought to view, and, at times, apparently gives it up.
2. That he appears at times to accept, and at times to disown many of the logical consequences we have just attributed to it.
3. That consequently his reasonings in support of these shifting positions are often confused and contradictory.

1. In regard to his great principle that the rendering of choices certain or invariable by any antecedent ground or influence, destroys freedom and responsibility, the following are among the passages that evince the difficulty of firmly adhering to a doctrine so monstrous.

“HABITS are uniformities of action which may be said to grow upon us by repetition. They are uniformities of volition, too: and they are often performed with so little deliberation as to bear a resemblance to instinct. *Positively*, habit arises by the influence of the same recurring motives for the which Will will act. Those motives are brought up by the laws of intellectual association of time, place, objects and causation. Natural impulses seem to spring up in the being, physical and psychical, suggesting the usual volition. Meantime, *negatively*, counter-motive and counter-thought are gradually more perfectly and constantly excluded. No other than the given way is imagined or enters the mind. And thus the volitions move, as in a passage way walled upon either side. The wall is an amalgam of blending freedom and necessity.” P. 168.

Again: “The motive may be so permanent and strong as to create a firm reliability that the subordinate volitions will accord. Indirectly, the counter motives may be excluded, so as to leave the mind completely shut up to the positive motive,

and a necessitation be superinduced. Men, thus, may be so absorbed in their plans as to cease to be free alternative agents; but they seldom or never thereby lose their responsibility.” P. 169.

And yet again: “So largely and effectively do the dispositions, the habits, and the standard purposes influence the volitions, both by position and impulse, and by excluding counter courses from the view, that the agent, however intrinsically and by nature *free*, is, to a great extent, objectively unfree.” P. 170.

Still further: “Thus, if we have rightly traced the process, is constituted CHARACTER. Upon a basis of corporeal, physiological, and mental nature, are overlaid a primary superstructure of dispositions blending the native and the volitional, and a secondary formation of generic purposes wholly volitional, and formed by repetition into a tertiary of habits; and thus we have in his mingled constitution of necessitation and freedom an agent prepared for his daily free, responsible action.” P. 171.

Once more: “But of the sin which appropriates the sin of our nature, our axiomatic principles require us to affirm that it is *free and avoidable*; yet, *back of that freedom*, we admit that there is a NECESSITY that insures that, sooner or later, *the free act of appropriation will be made*. It is in this fact that the freedom and the universality of this fall are found to be reconciled.” P. 339.

Conclusive as are these passages to the effect that volitions may be rendered antecedently certain and uniform, without impairing their freedom and responsibility; conclusive, therefore, against the main doctrine of the book, we cannot forbear a single other quotation:—“A CHARACTER may be formed with a mind so wholly circumscribed within a circle of sensual feelings and conceptions, selfish and corrupt maxims, sordid purposes and habits, that the complete inventory of the thoughts is depraved, and no honourable or truly ethical volition is within the catalogue of possibilities. Of such a character it may be said, without our being obliged to define whether it be a case of necessity or reliable certainty, that he *cannot* will nobly or rightly.” P. 172.

What language could more decidedly express a complete surrendry of the author's distinctive doctrine? He goes further than the bulk of his adversaries, who only contend for a "reliable certainty" in choice, as flowing from the antecedent states of the mind. Any "necessity" beyond such certainty they disown, while in the extracts preceding, our author appears to maintain it. At all events he admits, at the least, such certainty, and calls it necessity. What, then, does all his vehement denunciation, with which this volume is freighted, amount to? Why should he, with such stupendous labour, erect this huge fabric, only to strike it down with a few strokes of his pen? Much more of the same essential force might be taken from his discussion of the power of motives, and elsewhere; but it is needless. It hardly helps his case, however, to tell us, that "for a volition to arise from the influence of motives, is not the same as to be the effect of motives." P. 159. A cause resting on such a distinction is not less thin and tenuous than the distinction itself. Does he not more than affirm, in these quotations, what he elsewhere so strenuously combats when put forth by his opponents, viz., freedom in the manner and quality of some actions, along with certainty, and even necessity, as to the event? Also, that the "direction" of choice, under given outward motives, is determined not by the bare natural faculty, but by the moral state"? Do not these passages abundantly teach that choice may be free and responsible, without the "property of choosing the exact contrary of what, in the whole, appears most eligible and desirable?"*

* Perhaps we ought not to leave unnoticed here a small bit of small criticism on ourselves, in the following terms:—"With a crude philosophy the Princeton Essayist, like other necessitarians, assumes that the mind must be completely occupied with one 'bias,' which excludes all coexistent contrarieties. 'Will any one pretend that it is conscious of a power to choose contrariwise, its ruling inclination or pleasure being and continuing to choose as it has chosen?' P. 254. 'What is meant by a ruling inclination's choosing, or a pleasure's choosing, we pretend not to say.' Pp. 373-4. Really, does Dr. Whedon need to be told, what is so obvious to all but captious critics, that the mind's inclination and pleasure to choose, import simply the mind inclined or pleased to choose?—that it makes choosing an act of the mind, according to its inclination or pleasure, and not an act of the pleasure or inclination

Dr. Whedon, in these extracts, has certainly shown how, in the lowest phase of character, freedom—and what he calls necessity—blend. In the following, among others, he quite soars to the grand Augustinian formula, that “on the highest point of moral elevation, freedom and necessity coincide.”

“We may suppose a free being born under conditions of free moral self-development, to be self-wrought to a state of high perfection. So has he trained his own nature by dropping all evil indulgences, that all evil propensities are lost; and so has he formed his taste to good, that none but motives of good can reach him. His habits are so perfected thereby that temptation ceases. He does right without effort, and ultimately *can no more do wrong than I can enjoy the central heat of a fiery furnace. The merit of virtue does not cease when its power is so perfect that its contest is over. Admitting the agent to be now necessarily right, his effortless virtue is none the less meritorious because it has become spontaneous.* The merit of his virtue does not cease as soon as he has perfected it.” Pp. 329–30.

We have italicised these last few sentences, because they are so momentous, and so clearly concede the great principles of the Augustinian psychology, which this book is written especially to overthrow. Generally, the italics and capitals found in our quotations are the author’s.

II. We now call attention to some of Dr. Whedon’s admissions, more or less explicit, of the consequences which, in our view, result from his theory.

In regard to the possibility of a lapse from holiness on the part of God, Dr. Whedon uses the following language:—“The rectitude of God’s actions is what we may call perfectly probable, and certain, *practically reliable* as any physical necessity, without admitting that the nexus is the same or equally irreversible, and strictly admitting the power of contrary choice.” P. 314. Deliver us from modes of thinking which can describe the rectitude of the divine acts as PROBABLE, even though it be enough so to be “practically reliable;” but not “equally irreversible” with the nexus between physical cause and effect,

abstractly, or otherwise than as the mind acts according to them? That we have assumed what he here ascribes to us, is an entirely gratuitous assumption of Dr. Whedon.

nay, wholly at the mercy of a strict power of contrary choice! Is it on such a foundation that our faith in God's immutable perfection rests? Is a probability, a mere practical reliability, which is less irreversible by the power of contrary choice than the causal connection between the law of gravity and the falling of an apple—that anchor of the soul which is furnished by the oath and promise of Him for whom it is “impossible to lie” (Heb. vi. 18), and who cannot “deny himself”? 2 Tim. ii. 13.

Dr. Whedon says further: “God is holy in that he chooses to make his own happiness in eternal Right. Whether he could not make himself equally happy in Wrong, is more than we can say.” P. 316. Again: “And how knows a finite insect, like us, that in the course of ages the motives in the universe may not prove strongest for a divine apostasy to evil?” P. 317. The saints in all generations, from the babe in Christ to the “great Apostle,” know full well the utter and eternal impossibility of these dread contingencies. Otherwise, how could their “hearts be fixed, trusting in the Lord,” even as “Mount Zion, that shall never be moved”?

Dr. Whedon excludes the acts of men and angels from the sphere of God's purposes and providence. He says: “The Divine plan, as embraced in God's predetermination, is a scheme strictly embracing only the Divine actions.” P. 293. Such a position needs no comment here. It of course follows inevitably, that if the actions of creatures are outside of God's plan and purpose, they are outside of his foreknowledge. Indeed, the utter inconsistency of this scheme with the foreknowledge of God is so obvious and demonstrable, that it rarely fails to loom up in discussions on this subject. The argument is simple and conclusive. If God has eternally foreknown the actions of free-agents, then there has been an eternal antecedent certainty what they will be. And this antecedent certainty was inconsistent with their being otherwise. There is no evading this. And if so, such antecedent certainty is compatible with freedom. It is of no avail to say that foreknowledge does not determine or make certain the action. If it does not make, it proves them certain eternal ages before their occurrence. For what is not in itself certain cannot be an

object of certain knowledge. This, of course, proves a Divine purpose or decree that they shall come to pass. For there is no conceivable ground, before their occurrence, of these actions passing out of the category of things possible to be, into those things that shall be—that is, from mere possibility to positive futurition—but the Divine purpose. But not to dwell upon this, whether it be true or not, the above argument for the absolute unfrustrable antecedent certainty of volitions abides impregnable. And among the most remarkable confirmations of the stringency of this argument, are the efforts of adversaries to parry it—especially those contained in the two volumes under review.

Dr. Whedon begins by telling us that “God’s foreordination must be viewed as being preceded by his foreknowledge.” P. 266. There is no precedence of either, both being alike co-eternal. But that a determination should be known before it is from some source determined—*i. e.*, fixed what it shall be—is a simple contradiction. Dr. Whedon tells us again and again, that “the freedom of an act is not affected by its being an object of foreknowledge.” Of course not. But what does this prove? Nothing, surely, except that Dr. Whedon is mistaken in his idea of freedom as inconsistent with any antecedent fixing, and consequent certainty of the choice, to the exclusion of the contrary.

Says our author: “If that agent in a given case be able to will either of several ways, *there is no need of a present causation to make it certain which he will do*. The agent, by his act in the future, makes all the certainty there now is. It is by and from that act solely thus put forth that the present *will be* of the act exists. He will put forth his act unsecured by any present inalterative making or securement. Whichever act he puts forth it is true that he *will put forth*; and that now unmade *will put forth* is all the certainty there is. It is by that putting forth solely, that the present *will be* is true. All the certainty there is, that is, all the *will be* about it, depends upon, and arises solely from the act of the free agent himself. It is simply the uncaused *will be* of an act which can otherwise be. Certainty, therefore, is not a previously made, caused, or manufactured thing.” P. 282. This is a total denial that out

of several acts possible to be, that one which is certain to occur, and is foreknown as certain to occur, has any certainty not created by the act itself; of course, any certainty anterior to the act, and, therefore, any possibility of being foreknown. This effectually subverts the Divine foreknowledge. It is quite in keeping to tell us on the same page, that "no argument can be drawn from the prophecies of holy Scriptures, to prove the predetermination of human actions." We are hardly surprised after this to be told that, while foreknowledge must know the right fact, it is unnecessary that "the fact should accord with the foreknowledge," p. 283; or that Dr. Whedon should "deny that between the foreknowledge and the agent-power the connection is necessary or indissoluble," p. 284; or that foreknowledge "can be true in full consistency with the existence of a power to make it false," p. 285; or finally, that "God's foreknowledge neither makes the event necessary nor *proves* it so." P. 288. We have had enough of Dr. Whedon's dissolving views on this subject. We now turn to Mr. Hazard's more logical and manly course—in admitting the inexorable consequences of his doctrine, and giving up the Divine Omniscience. He says:

"An event foreknown by infallible prescience must be as certain in the future as if known by infallible memory in the past, and to say that God foreknows an event, which depends on the action of an agent, which acting without his control, may, of itself, freely and independently produce any one of several different results, or none at all, involves a contradiction. I am disposed to yield to the argument of Edwards all the benefit of any doubt on these points; . . . to admit that what is certainly foreknown by Omniscience must certainly happen, and that, if God foreknows the volitions of men, then they cannot will freely. . . . though God having the *power to determine could* foreknow all events, he may forego the exercise of such power, and neither control nor know the particular events which are thus left to be determined by the action of the human mind." Pp. 385, 386. Of course, when we assent to the argument that foreknowledge is inconsistent with freedom, it is only in their false meaning of the word freedom as a

something incompatible with previous certainty. And this remark applies to analogous quotations from Dr. Whedon.

Mr. Hazard, however, gives up the Omniscience of God in behalf of his superficial conception of freedom, only to entangle himself in still more formidable difficulties in regard to God's providence and government of a universe, the most momentous events and highest actions in which are wholly unforeseen. We cannot follow him here. Surely none can study his toilsome and futile attempts to meet these difficulties, without being more firmly convinced of that great truth, the rejection of which involves plunge upon plunge, from deep to deep, till, beneath the lowest, they reach a lower still, in this abyss of absurdities.

We cannot conclude without touching a single other topic. We said that the reasonings employed in support of the doctrine of these volumes point logically towards Universalism, and that Dr. Whedon pushes them full far in that direction. This is a grave allegation. We will briefly give our reasons for it.

The doctrine of these volumes is simply that the previous fixation, or securing the certainty and invariability of volitions by any antecedents whatever, destroys freedom, responsibility, merit and demerit. But it is undeniable, and is, as we have seen, freely admitted by Dr. Whedon, that such certainty and invariability of sinful choices in mankind are established from the beginning of their moral agency, at least until regeneration, by their antecedent state. What is the inevitable consequence of such premises? Why, surely, that men are neither culpable nor punishable for their sins, and will not suffer on account of them. Hence salvation is a matter of justice. The atonement is uncalled for and needless, or if it be on any account needful, it is a simple discharge of justice to injured man, rather than a vicarious satisfaction of the demands of Divine justice upon the pardoned sinner. Says Dr. Whedon, p. 341, "Without losing its intrinsic character of stupendous grace, the atonement becomes a justice—a theodice. It blends in with the terrible elements of our fallen state, and forms an average probational dispensation, in which the Divine Administration appears not merely absolutely just, but practically equitable, and mercifully reasonable to our human reason. . . .

And thus we see that without the Redeemer no equitable system of probation for fallen man is a possibility." This surely makes the atonement, whatever of grace it may contain, a matter of justice to mankind. But let us look further into the author's applications of his principle.

He says, "Although there is not a perfect equation of the means and advantages among all mankind, yet it may be affirmed that *no man is condemned to everlasting death who has not enjoyed FULL MEANS and OPPORTUNITY for salvation, and has (not?) wilfully rejected them by persevering in a course of conscious sin.*" P. 345. Thus, by a single dash of the pen, he acquits and shields from perdition all the heathen whose enormities Paul so graphically depicts (Rom. i.), declaring them "without excuse," and that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness." For all this, it remains infallibly true, that the "wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God."

Our author then proceeds to put the most degraded and abandoned part of Christendom on the footing of those who die in infancy, as to their prospects of salvation, in the following manner:

"Within the bosom of Christendom there is an immense class adult in years, but apparently entitled to the moral immunity of infancy; geographically Christian, but with as little access to a true Christianity as the most distant heathenism. Heathenism in Christendom!... In the dregs of our large cities it is impossible to say what numbers there are whom we can hardly decide whether they are to be assigned to the infant or idiot dispensation, or to heathendom. Each man is, in a degree, by himself a dispensation. But what is the ultimate destiny? Precisely the same, we reply, with that of the infant." Pp. 346-7. "The application of the same liberality of interpretation which would save the visible church in Christendom, would save the invisible church in heathendom. He is a saved heathen who lives as nearly up to the light he has as does the Christian, who is finally saved to the light he has."

"Truly that severity of Christian judgment, with which

many judge the unfavoured peoples, would leave us little hope of the Christian church." Pp. 350-1.

"Bold assertions in missionary speeches and sermons, that all the world without the pale of Christendom is damned in mass, never quicken the pulse of missionary zeal. On the contrary, they ever roll a cold reaction upon every feeling heart and every rational mind. Our better natures revolt, and, alas! a gush of scepticism is but too apt in consequence to rise in the public mind." P. 357. All this could quite as plausibly be said of the doctrine of eternal punishment—indeed of the very sufferings and woes that shroud the earth—and of the very permission of sin and suffering itself. Quite as plausible and stirring an appeal could be made to the merely human sensibilities, as to the consistency of these undeniable facts with the righteousness and benevolence of God. But whither does all such declamation logically tend? Clearly in the direction of Universalism, of Infidelity, of Atheism. And what strength the missionary cause will have, if the heathen are believed by the Christian community to be as really in a state of salvation, without the gospel, as with it, may be learned from the missionary operations of Unitarians and Universalists.

We have now shown what we meant, in saying that the reasoning of this book tended towards Universalism, and are pressed full far by the author in that direction. With this we bring to a close the few criticisms for which we have time, out of the many that these works, especially that of Dr. Whedon, invite. Its superficial plausibility, its vaunting and supercilious tone, its pretensions to philosophic depth and subtlety, enlisted in support of a loose latitudinarianism, have very naturally secured for it laudations enough to challenge a close examination. It is due, therefore, to the cause of God and truth to call attention to some of its weaker and more dangerous points. In doing this, we have perhaps treated our readers more largely to extracts from the author, than to our own comments upon them, both because we have desired to do full justice to him in letting him speak for himself, and because we fully believe Dr. Johnson's saying, "No man was ever written down except by himself." We have no fear of the result of these periodical attacks upon that view of the freedom

of the will, which, in our judgment, alone corresponds with consciousness, with all fact, with the representations of Scripture, and the great articles of the Christian faith, as shown in its standard symbols. A system which teaches that volition is not voluntary,* and its supporters cannot uphold without contradicting it, which involves either the possibility of future apostasy in heaven, or the denial that God, holy angels, and glorified saints are free agents; which, to be consistent, must deny either the universal apostasy of our race, or the sin and guilt thereof; which staggers in regard to the foreknowledge of God, vacates his decrees, and militates against the possibility of his universal Providence; whose broad liberalism makes such alarming strides in the path which terminates in universal salvation; will gain nothing by challenging renewed attention to its deformities. The foundation standeth sure. The Lord still reigns. He doeth all things after the counsel of his own will. His throne is for ever and ever. It is impossible for him to lie. His counsel shall stand. Therefore his saints surely and for ever trust him.

“In heaven and earth, and air and seas,
He executes his firm decrees,
And by his saints it stands confess
That what he does is ever best.”

* “Both the elder and the younger Edwards, as well as jubilant Dr. Pond, were guilty of the oversight of calling volition a voluntary act.”—*Whedon*, p. 78. See also p. 22.

Correction by the Hon. Stanley Matthews.

CINCINNATI, August 15, 1864.

Rev. CHARLES HODGE, D. D.,
Editor of Princeton Review.

Dear Sir—In the July Number of the *Princeton Review*, p. 554, commenting, in your article upon the General Assembly, on the report on the subject of slavery, you impute to me the following declaration: "that every man is bound to presume that the laws and the measures of the government are right and binding. They may be otherwise, but the private citizen is not the judge."

From the quotation marks, I infer that the language is extracted from some newspaper report of my remarks.

I beg leave to state that I did not use any language to that effect, nor give expression to any such doctrine. What I did say was simply that every citizen was bound to presume that the laws and measures of the government were legal—constitutional—valid as civil obligations. This is a very different proposition. An enactment entirely legal and valid as a civil obligation may yet be of such a character as not to give rise to the moral obligation of obedience. On the contrary, there may be a moral obligation to disobey it. But there being no such moral obligation supposed, I simply contended that, as a matter of law, every measure of the civil government is presumed to be legal, and that it was the duty of all citizens so to regard it, until the proper tribunals should have decided otherwise.

I trust you will do me the justice to make the correction in the next number of the *Review*.

Respectfully, your friend,

STANLEY MATTHEWS.

SHORT NOTICES.

Expository Lectures on the Heidelberg Catechism. By George W. Bethune, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Sheldon & Co., 335 Broadway. 1864. Vol. i., pp. 491, Vol. ii. 535.

It is a wise ordinance of the Reformed Dutch Church which requires its pastors to lecture regularly on the Catechism from the pulpit on the Sabbath. Originally this was required to be done every Sabbath, the Catechism being divided into fifty-two parts, so as to furnish a topic for every week. In this country the rule has been modified so as to require one lecture a month, which secures the Catechism being gone over once in four years. In this way the doctrinal instruction of the people is secured. These volumes contain the lectures of the late eminent Dr. Bethune in discharge of this duty. They are what they profess to be, popular expositions. At the same time they contain much sound instruction, presented in a clear and simple manner, in the polished style for which the distinguished author was remarkable. They constitute a popular body of divinity. Besides an Index, the last volume contains a list of the Commentaries on the Heidelberg Catechism, filling more than twelve pages.

The Early Dawn; or, Sketches of Christian Life in England in the Olden Time. By the author of "Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family." With an Introduction, by Professor Henry B. Smith, D. D. New York: M. D. Dodd, 506 Broadway. 1864. Pp. 397.

Few works have been more deservedly popular, both in this country and in England, than the "Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family." The simple announcement that this is a new work from the same author, written on the same plan, will be enough to secure for it a cordial and extensive welcome.

The Hawaiian Islands: Their Progress and Condition under Missionary Labours. By Rufus Anderson, D. D., Foreign Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1864.

The title and the author of this well-constructed volume will secure for it the eager attention of all interested in missions, and the propagation of the gospel. This attention will be richly rewarded. Dr. Anderson having recently visited the

Sandwich Islands, on a tour of official inspection in behalf of the American Board, was, of course, under the necessity of embodying the results of his observations in a report to that body. In pursuance of this object, he happily soon adopted the plan of a volume, giving a complete history of the past operations and achievements of Christian missionaries, and of the present condition, prospects, and perils of Christianity in these islands, in which modern missions have done their most perfect work, and wrought their most signal triumphs. All these topics are treated in a thorough, instructive, and entertaining manner. The information in regard to the present efforts of "Reformed Catholics," and "Roman Catholics," to possess the land, and proselyte the people, are especially valuable. We rejoice that the venerable author, after preparing the "Memorial Volume" of the American Board, has been spared to leave this additional precious legacy to the church. We hope it is but the precursor of others.

Report of the Punjab Missionary Conference, held at Lahore, in December and January, 1862, 1863: including the Essays read, and the Discussions which followed them; also, Prefatory Remarks and other Papers; closing with a Comprehensive Index of the Subjects Discussed, and a Glossary of Urdu Words used by the Writers and Speakers. Edited by the Committee of Compilation. Lodiana: Printed at the American Presbyterian Mission Press, the Rev. A. Rudolph, Superintendent. 1863. Sold by Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway, New York.

Many of our readers will remember the Missionary Conference, some years ago, in New York, under the auspices of Dr. Duff, at which various questions of moment connected with missions were vigorously discussed. Subsequent conferences of a similar character have been held at Calcutta, at Benares, at Octacamund, at Liverpool, and now at Lahore. These conferences have come to be established institutions, to meet the ever new and exigent questions developed by the growth of missions, and their manifold surroundings and relations. We have, in a former number, presented an extended account of the Liverpool Conference, which showed the importance of the questions discussed at these meetings, and the ability of the papers and debates thus drawn forth. The present volume is replete with reports of masterly discussions of vital and perplexing questions, which cannot fail to be appreciated by all interested in missions. The topics treated in this volume—some of them by missionaries and martyrs of our own church—are: Preaching to the Heathen; The Hindoo and Mohammedan Controversy; Schools; Missionary Work among the Females of India; Itinerations; Lay Coöperation; A Native Pastorate; Sympathy

and Confidence of Native Christians; Inquirers; Polygamy and Divorce; The Hill Tribes; The Sikhs; Vernacular Christian Literature; Inter-Mission Discipline; an Indian Catholic Church. Many of these dissertations are elaborate and searching, while the accompanying debates are often powerful and luminous. We look for great good from these missionary convocations. Both this and Dr. Anderson's volume are valuable contributions to missionary literature.

The Days that are Past. By Thomas James Shepherd, fourth pastor of the Philadelphia (N. L.) First Presbyterian Church. Philadelphia : Lindsay & Blakiston. 1864.

Mr. Shepherd has here given us a complete history of the church of which he is pastor, from its first planting, half a century since, until now. It includes careful biographical sketches of its three distinguished former pastors—James Patterson, Daniel Lynn Carroll, and Ezra Stiles Ely—names that will not soon be forgotten. Sketches of leading men in the eldership are also interspersed. Pastors cannot do a better work than to make such contributions to our ecclesiastical history. The author would have done well to have made the title of his book more indicative. The cream paper and fine typography are great luxuries.

A Treatise on Homiletics. Designed to illustrate the True Theory and Practice of Preaching the Gospel. By Daniel P. Kidder, D. D., Professor in Garrett Biblical Institute. New York: Carlton & Porter, 1864.

It is undeniable that the Methodist ministry, as a class, have in their own way and sphere had great success as preachers. It will scarcely be questioned that they have excelled among the Protestant clergy, especially in Britain and America, in gaining the ear of the humble and less educated classes, to the gospel message. This is no mean praise. To the poor the gospel is preached. The church that gathers them in has one eminent token of the Divine favour. It is no less undeniable that the tones and style of Methodist preaching, exceptions apart, have thus far failed to lay a powerful and extensive grasp upon the educated and intelligent classes. It is obvious, therefore, that this preaching, as a whole, is marked by great merits and great defects, which it will be of the highest advantage for preachers in that and other communions to study; that Methodist preachers may thus amend their defects, while others learn from them whatever is worthy of imitation. This text book on Homiletics, by an eminent Methodist Professor in that department, is well fitted to promote both these results.

It is, in the main, characterized by learning, judgment, and taste. The author gleans his materials, illustrations, and authorities, from all ages and branches of the church. He brings them to bear in illustrating the merits and faults of the prevailing modes of preaching, in his own and other communions. As might be expected, he favours preaching without reading or memorizing, but insists on the most diligent preparation. The arguments, however, for and against the different styles of preaching are presented with great fulness and fairness, and may be studied with profit by all concerned. The book is an unquestionable acquisition to our homiletical literature.

Life and Times of Nathan Bangs, D.D. By Abel Stevens, LL.D., author of the "History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century called Methodism." New York: Carlton and Porter. 1864.

Dr. Bangs was certainly a representative man of the Methodist Church for the last half-century, the principal period of its growth and development in our country. Few contributed more to advance and mould this vast communion. He was foremost in the self-denial of pioneer evangelization in our ever-receding frontiers. He occupied the leading Methodist metropolitan pulpits. He was one of their most trusty, expert, and effective polemics. He was second to none as a debater and counsellor in ecclesiastical meetings, and the great organizations of his church. He was in all respects a leader among his brethren; and eminently qualified to be so. Although a vehemently anti-Calvinistic polemic, he was of genial temperament, and not destitute of catholicity. He grew more mellow and large-hearted with age, and became able to appreciate better the merits of other communions, while he also saw and sought to correct faults in his own. He has left his impress on his church and generation, and deserved a fit biographical memorial. He could not have found a better biographer. By his previous studies as the historian of Methodism, and his facility and tact as a writer, Dr. Stevens was peculiarly qualified for the task which he has admirably executed.

Life, Times, and Correspondence of James Manning, and the Early History of Brown University By Reuben Aldridge Guild. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1864.

Dr. Manning, the first president of Brown University, was also prominent and influential as a Baptist divine. His life, therefore, not only involves the founding and early history of that institution, but, in some degree also, of the Baptist denomination of Christians in this country. This book is a rich

repository of facts in regard to all these subjects, which were on the verge of hopeless oblivion. The author's industry and judgment are shown, not only in the amount and value of the facts so brought to light and preserved, but in their arrangement, and in the exhaustive tables of contents at the beginning, and the index at the end of the volume. Dr. Manning was eminent as a divine, scholar, and educator. He was one of the early distinguished graduates of Princeton College, after which Brown University was largely patterned.

The Voice of Blood in the Sphere of Nature and the Spirit World. By the Rev. Samuel A. Philips, A. M., Pastor of the Reformed Church, Carlisle, Pa.; author of "Gethsemane and the Cross," and "The Christian Home." Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston.

In this work, the author first analyzes the voice, its structure, functions, capabilities, as a material organ of the spirit; then the blood in which is the life; then blood as the voice which utters mighty truths and testimonies; then "the voice of accusing blood from the ground," beginning with the blood of Abel; the "voice of typical blood from the altar," comprehending the Jewish sacrifices; "the voice of atoning blood from the cross;" "the voice of martyr-blood from the church;" of "sacramental blood from the Christian altar;" of "pleading blood from the mercy-seat;" of "witnessing blood from the judgment throne;" of "avenging blood from hell;" and, finally, of "glorifying blood in heaven." These topics are treated in a fervid and impassioned style which seldom flags, and with a florid exuberance of diction and imagery, which would suffer nothing by judicious pruning. The reader, however, is never wearied by dulness, even if sated with luxuriance of metaphor and soaring phraseology. Without endorsing every sentiment, we find the work evangelical, earnest, and quickening.

The True Penitent Portrayed, in a Practical Exposition of the Fifty-first Psalm: To which is added the Doctrine of Repentance, as declared in Acts xvii. 30. By E. C. Wines, D. D., author of "A Treatise on Regeneration," "Adam and Christ," &c. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

These momentous subjects are here elucidated by Dr. Wines, in his usually clear and instructive manner. This is an important service at this time, when the tendency is so strong to deal with all sorts of subjects but the spiritual and experimental; and to handle these loosely and superficially, and on all other sides except simply the spiritual and experimental.

Satan's Devices, and the Believer's Victory. By the Rev. William L. Parsons, A. M., pastor of the Congregational Church, Mattapoisett, Mass. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co.

Much scriptural truth, closely implicated with Christian experience, and which is widely losing its hold of the faith, and recognition, in the experience of Christians, is brought out in this volume. That Satan is a real person, of prodigious power, malignity, craft—constantly tasking his stupendous faculties in compassing the destruction of Christ's kingdom, and the eternal ruin of souls—is what multitudes deny, and still greater multitudes ignore. The reality as well as the form of Satan's devices is ably set forth in this volume, which displays considerable vigour and freshness of thought and style. The writer evidently thinks for himself, and has no distrust of his own opinions. He makes his mental philosophy quite conspicuous enough for such an experimental work, while his opinions, psychological and theological, have generally an orthodox tone; yet his views on some subjects are not altogether ripe and well-balanced. Although he has thought with more or less freedom upon them, he has not yet thought himself through. Surely no well-poised Christian or ethical guide will try to induce another to promise to do, he knows not what, as a condition of spiritual peace. Pp. 38–40. But notwithstanding any such exceptions, the drift of the book is sound, instructive, and edifying.

Christian Memorials of the War; or Scenes and Incidents illustrating the Religious Faith and Principles, Patriotism, and Bravery in our Army. With Historical Notes. By Horatio B. Hackett, Professor of Biblical Literature in Newton Theological Institute, author of "Illustrations of Scripture," "Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1864.

The title of this book and the name of its author are enough to evince its power to fascinate, while it instructs and edifies the reader. Among the wonderful manifestations which relieve the darker horrors of the war, is the unanimity of Christian people in its support, because the ends sought by it have the most earnest approval of the Christian conscience; and the manifold illustrations of moral and Christian heroism, and other virtues, which it has furnished. This book is a collection of the most brilliant examples of all this, arranged in logical and luminous order.

Letters on the Ministry of the Gospel. By Francis Wayland. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1863.

Of course Dr. Wayland could not write and publish a book on such a subject without giving many weighty counsels

and judicious suggestions as to the sources of ministerial power and usefulness. These we find in abundance in this little work. And yet we think the author exaggerates the degeneracy of the pulpit now, as compared with the past age—at least, taking the whole country and church into view—whatever may be true of the region or communion most familiar to himself. He is too sweeping in his condemnation of written sermons. His counsels are shaped to the ecclesiastical polity and usages of the Baptist and Congregational churches.

Our Board of Publication have issued, in a beautiful style, a number of excellent books adapted to Sunday-school libraries and family reading. We subjoin the titles of a number of these interesting volumes.

- Irish Stories. Good and Bad Men. Little Irish Girls' Holiday, &c.* Pp. 287.
Johnny McKay; or the Sovereign. Pp. 216.
Cherry Bounce; or the Wise Management of Human Nature. Pp. 180.
Uncle Alick's Sabbath-school. By Maxwell. Pp. 180.
Teddy, the Bill Poster; and how he became Uncle Alick's right-hand man. By Maxwell. Pp. 216.
Valley of Decision; or Divine Teachings in a Boarding-School. A true narrative. By Mrs. H. C. Knight. Pp. 79.
Amy's New Home, and other stories for Boys and Girls. Pp. 216.
The School Days of Jennie Graham. Pp. 180.
Emma Herbert; or Be ye Perfect. Pp. 179.
Charlie Evans; or the Boy who could not keep his Temper. Pp. 107.
Sunshine for Gloomy Hours. Pp. 216.
Hatty Winthrop. Pp. 106.
Frank Netherton; or the Talisman. Pp. 252.
Loving Words. In two Sermons to Children. By Rev. Adolph Monod, of Paris. Translated for the Presbyterian Board. Pp. 96.
Early Dawn; or Conversion of Annie Herbert. Pp. 143.
Susie's Mistake, and other Stories. By Marian Butler. Pp. 216.
Norah and her Kerry Cow; or the Bible the Best Guide. Pp. 144.
Outside and Inside, and other Tales. By Frank Stanley. Pp. 216.
Frederick Gordon; or Principle and Interest. Pp. 180.
Kitty Foote; or the True Way to Peace. Pp. 180.
Frank Eston; or the Joy of Believing in Jesus. By Mrs. Caroline L. Blake. Pp. 144.
Willie Maitland; or the Lord's Prayer illustrated. Pp. 144.

The Cap Makers. By the author of "George Miller," "Blind Annie Lorimer," &c. Pp. 180.

Nannie Barton. By the same author. Pp. 288.

The Little Sea Bird. By the author of "Mackerel Will," &c. Pp. 180.

Norah Neil; or "The Way by which He led thee." Pp. 179.

Aunt Harriet's Tales about Little Words. By H. B. McKeever, author of "Jessie Morrison."

The Brazen Serpent; or Faith in Christ illustrated. By Joseph H. Jones, D. D.

Life and Light; or Every-Day Religion. By the author of "George Miller," "Blind Annie Lorimer," &c.

Homes of the West, and How they were made Happy. By the author of "Johnny Wright," "Words of Wisdom," &c.

The foregoing are recent additions made by the Presbyterian Board of Publication to its excellent "Series for Youth." They fully sustain its character. Our Board cannot well overdo in its efforts to provide reading, at once useful and entertaining, for our families and Sabbath-schools, our children and youth.

We have received several works too late for notice, among which are the following publications of the "Presbyterian Publication Committee, 1334 Chestnut street, Philadelphia."

The Shepherd of Bethlehem. King of Israel. By A. L. O. E. Pp. 440.

Stories from Jewish History, from the Babylonish Captivity to the Destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. By the same Author. Pp. 178.

The Communion Week. A Course of Preparation for the Lord's Table. By the Rev. Ashton Oxenden, of Pluckley, England. Pp. 88.

The American Presbyterian Almanac for 1865. Pp. 48.

The Soldier's Scrap-Book. By the Rev. B. B. Hotchkin. Pp. 60.

